

第45回 国際軍事史学会大会の概要

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2019（令和元）年度の第45回国際軍事史学会大会は、8月18日から8月23日までの間、ブルガリアのソフィアにて、同国防省の支援のもと、開催された。なお、開催を記念した式典では、クラシミール・カラカチャノフ国防大臣のほか、マッシモ・レオナルディ国際軍事史学会会長から祝辞が述べられた。

本会議は、ヴェルサイユ講和条約の100周年を記念し、共通のテーマとして「1919年パリ講和会議以降における未解決の問題—軍事衝突と外交交渉」を掲げた。会議の内容としては、18のパネルとその他セッションにおいて合計74の発表が行われた。その多くは共通テーマに沿って、第一次大戦後における欧州各国の軍事政策や各地で発生した紛争に関する歴史研究であり、筆者の参加したいずれのパネルにおいても活発な質疑応答が見られた。とくに戦後の欧州とりわけ中欧・東欧諸国において進められた再軍備政策を取り扱った議論では、戦間期から第二次世界大戦に至る欧州の軍事情勢について新たな視点を提供する実証研究の進展が感得された。また、アフリカや中東、アジアなどヨーロッパ以外の地域における軍事情勢を扱った報告もなされ、軍事史研究における視点の多様化が進んでいることも伺われた。

また、本大会では、ソフィア市内や近郊の要塞跡、修道院における史跡研修も行われた。古代ローマから冷戦期まで様々な勢力の痕跡を伝える史跡をめぐる研修からは、ブルガリアが置かれた地政学上の立ち位置が窺われると同時に、ブルガリア国防省・国防軍の軍事史研究に対する支持と熱意が拝察された。今後の開催地として、2020年度はポーランド（ポズナン）、2021年度はギリシア（アテネ）が予定されている。

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The Lost Peace Settlement and Escalation of the War: A Case of Sino-Japanese War

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【要約】

本稿は日中戦争における和平の試みの失敗とその後の戦争のエスカレーションについて、個々の軍事作戦が与えた影響に注目して論じるものである。そもそも、日中両国は 1930 年代を通じて軍事衝突を回避する努力を続けてきた経緯があり、戦争勃発後も停戦の可能性を探りあっていた。とくにドイツを仲介とするトラウトマン工作をはじめとする幾つかの試みは、現在の研究では交渉が妥結する可能性もあったと考えられている。また、結果的に占領地域に新政権を樹立することになった、汪兆銘らに対する日本の工作も、もともとは国民党政権内に和平の動きを作り出すことが目的だった。しかし、現実においては日中双方の内部で進められた和平に向けた試みはいずれも失敗する一方で、戦線を拡大する日本に中国が反撃するという形で事態はエスカレートしていった。また、停戦に向けた工作活動も次第に双方に対する諜報活動の様相を呈していった。そのなかで、中国における日本の軍事作戦は、単に国民党政権に直接的なダメージを与えるだけでなく、政権内部の弱点を突き、その崩壊を促進するという謀略的な性格を伴うようになった。

Introduction

This paper analyzes the influence of military operations exercised by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) during the Sino-Japanese War. In particular, it will examine the influence of these operations on the failure of antebellum peace settlement attempts, and on the eventual escalation to full-scale war. Since the early 1930s, both Japan and China had made numerous efforts to avoid the outbreak of war. Even after the war broke out in 1937, both countries explored the possibility for enacting a peace settlement. Recent studies have pointed out how these efforts possessed the potential for being brought to fruition; a key example being the mediation attempts spearheaded by Trautman, the then incumbent German ambassador to China. Furthermore, even Wang Jingwei's Japanese collaborationist government had originally aimed to promote some form of peaceful settlement between the two sides.

Unfortunately, these peace efforts failed and local conflict eventually escalated

into full-scale war. Additionally, after the war had reached a stalemate in 1938, further attempts at enacting peace transpired to be either be a political maneuver which attempted to overthrow the Chinese Nationalist government or a form of intelligence gathering. Under such circumstances, the IJA launched military operations to force the Chinese Nationalist government to surrender.

This paper thus examines the relationship between peacemaking efforts, military operations and political maneuvering during the Sino-Japanese War, especially during the period of 1939-1940. As we shall see, the IJA failed to not only coerce China to cooperate with Japan, but also failed to prevent the escalation of hostilities into full-scale war.

1. The Peace Settlement at the Beginning of the War

Local conflict fought between Japan and China from June to August 1937 would eventually lead to full-scale war. In Shanghai, the Chinese Nationalist government deployed an elite force to destroy the Japanese navy's land force. To counteract these Chinese strikes, Japan dispatched reinforcements to Shanghai. This decision, and the ensuing battle in Shanghai, came to serve as the first step in the gradual escalation of tensions which would lead to the Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, these military operations in mainland China constituted the watershed moment from which Japan ceased to exercise a policy of "non-expansion."

Nevertheless, both countries also tried to seek out opportunities for resolving the conflict peacefully. There were at least two major attempts in this regard. The first was initiated by the Japanese government when it sent Funatsu Shinichiro to negotiate with Gao Chongwu. Funatsu was the Japanese President of Textile Commerce in China and had deep ties to the Chinese political world. However, due to the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai, this negotiation attempt came to be abandoned.¹

The second effort at enacting peace came with the "Trautman Mediation." The "Trautman Mediation" was spearheaded by the German ambassador to China, Oskar Trautmann. During its seizure of Shanghai, the IJA was on the verge of launching an

¹ Ryoichi Tobe, "Nichusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku—Nihon gawa kara mita [The peace settlement in Sino-Japanese War :from the views of Japan]," in Kiyotada Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2* [Lectures on Showa Japan vol.2] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2016).

attack on Nanjing. As such, the Japanese government attempted to initiate peace negotiations. In this regard, the IJA General Staff Office was particularly proactive. Whilst the Chinese side was wary about this proposal at first, as Chiang and the Chinese leaders were disappointed about the lack of Western diplomatic pressure placed on Japan, began to reconsider this avenue.² Despite seemingly earnest attempts at following through with this peace attempt at first, after the fall of Shanghai, the IJA rapidly progressed forwards with its Nanjing operation. Moreover, following the fall of Nanjing, the adoption of a more hardline stance towards China garnered further support within the Japanese government. The IJA believed that Chiang Kai-shek would soon give up due its triumph over German-trained and German-armed Chinese forces in Shanghai, and furthermore because of its capturing of Nanjing. Nevertheless, the IJA General Staff Office continued to seek out peace talks with China in preparing for war against Soviet Russia, but was unable to stop the IJA's operations in China.³ As a result, the Japanese government abandoned these negotiations and issued a statement from Prime Minister Konoe that announced that “the Japanese government will no longer deal with the Chinese Nationalist government.”

After Konoe's statement, although several attempts for enacting peace between Japan and China were underway, none of them developed into full-fledged negotiations. For example, the Japanese government tried to negotiate with Kung Hsiang-hsi, a member of the central executive committee of the Nationalist government and Chiang Kai-shek's brother-in-law, who demonstrated a positive attitude towards finding a means to peace with Japan. However, since the Japanese government was unwilling to budge on a number of conditions which the Chinese government found unacceptable such as its stipulation for Chiang Kai-shek's resignation, Chiang called off Kung's negotiations with the Japanese.⁴

However, another attempt at peace was also made. From September 1937, Japanese Col. Wachi and Hxiao Zhen began secret peace talks which possessed the

² Ibid. pp.148-149.

³ On the antebellum situation, see Iwatani Nobu, “From Marco Polo Bridge to Shanghai: Initial Phase of the Sino-Japanese War Revisited,” *NIDS military history studies annual*, vol.19 (March 2016).

⁴ Nobu Iwatani, “Nicchusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku—Chugoku gawa kara mita [The peace settlement in Sino-Japanese War :from the views of China],” in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, p.167.

potential for developing into official negotiations. Chiang Kai-shek demonstrated a positive attitude towards these talks, and took direct control over them.⁵ If Japan was willing to accept an immediate retreat of the IJA after concluding a ceasefire agreement, and was also willing to restore things to how they were before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chiang was happy to consider the promotion of these talks to the level of full-blown negotiations.⁶ However, this attempt later fell flat after the IJA attacked Wuhan and Guangzhou in October 1938. A key factor in their demise was due to the fact that Chiang regarded the Japanese peace settlements as forcing China to surrender under military pressure.⁷

2. Wang Jingwei's Movement for Peace Settlement

While Chiang Kai-shek eventually came to oppose the aforementioned peace negotiations, an internal faction within the Nationalist government that was critical of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership had other ideas. This faction, led by Wang Jingwei, Gao Zongwu, and Zhou Fuhai opposed Chiang's penchant for do-or-die resistance and wanted to pursue the possibility of enacting a peaceful settlement. The Japanese government aimed to use these opponents of Chiang for its own political schemes and for the purposes of weakening the Chiang's regime.⁸

The IJA thus began down the path of establishing a new Chinese government which could collaborate with Japan. Col. Kagesa of the IJA General Staff Office, was particularly taken with the idea of establishing a Japanese collaborationist government, and saw it as a strategy which trumped the entertaining of any form of peace negotiations with the Chongqing-based Chinese Nationalist government.⁹ Eventually, Wang Jingwei left Chongqing for Hanoi in December 1938. There, he and his peers went about establishing their own government which could seek out its own peace settlement with the Japanese.

⁵ Ibid. pp.170-172.

⁶ Ibid. p.173.

⁷ Ibid. pp.173-174.

⁸ Liu Jie, *Nitchu Sensoka no Gaiko* [Diplomacy during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa. Kobunkan, 1995), p.159.

⁹ Tobe, "Nichusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku," in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, pp.148-149.

However, as Wang Jingwei did not possess his own military force, Wang had to induce a number of Nationalist commanders to defect and join him in his cause. Most of these commanders were regional leaders of such areas as Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan that were under the command of Chiang. Long Yun, Governor of Yunnan province, was seen by Wang as being the most promising individual to approach as he had previously assisted Wang in his escape to Hanoi when he had stopped by Yunnan en route there. In Kungming, the capital city of Yunnan, Wang met with Long and conveyed his intentions that he wished to attempt a peace settlement with Japan. After this meeting, Long let Wang proceed on his way to French Indochina.¹⁰ Consequently, Wang put much stock in the potential for Long to rebel against Chiang and support his proposed peace settlement.

Since the 1920s, these local powers had their own armies and were sometimes even in conflict with Chiang Kai-shek. For this reason, Chiang and the central government recognized them as potentially hostile forces. Of these, the Guangxi Army was one of the most powerful. It joined forces with the anti-Chiang Nationalist faction and provoked war against the central government in 1936. The IJA and Wang aimed to overthrow the Chinese Nationalist government with the support of these local powers.

The political movement that Wang instigated had a profound impact upon the Chinese Nationalist government. At the same time, however, Wang's rally for local support did not go to plan. As soon as Wang started to call upon local powers to participate in his proposed peace settlement, the local leaders sent telegrams to the central government, arguing the destruction of Wang Jingwei and assuring the Chinese Nationalist government of their loyalty except Long Yun.¹¹

At around the same time as Wang Jingwei's new government was established, the IJA began a new operation. On March 23 1939, it attacked Nanchang in Hunan province. This was the largest scale military offensive by the IJA since the battle of Wuhan. To counter the IJA's attack, beginning in February, the Chinese high command

¹⁰ On the relationship between Wang Jingwei and Long Yun, see Yang Tianshi, "Zailun Long Yun yu Wang Jingwei Chutao Shijian [Re-expounding on Long Yun and Wang Jingwei's Escape from Chongqing]," *Tansuo yu Zhengmei* [Exploration and Free Views] (December 2015).

¹¹ Yang Tianshi, *Zhaoxun Zhengshi de Jiang Jieshi: Jiang Jieshi Riji Jiedu vol.2* [Looking for the Real Chiang Kai-shek: Interpretation to Chiang Kai-shek's Diary vol.2] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2010), p.151.

deployed a large amount of forces to the midstream region of the Yangtze River.¹² Chiang Kai-shek regarded this operation as an indication that the IJA aimed to conquer Hunan province, and thereby at long last take control of central China.¹³ In this way, from the Chinese perspective, the Battle of Nanchang was seen as a prelude to the struggle for Central China.

Under such circumstances, in March 1939, Chiang Kai-shek took the following decision:

“Taking advantage of the disorder engendered by Wang Jingwei’s escape, the enemy attacked Nanchang whilst simultaneously seeking the possibility of peace negotiations. In addition, the enemy aim to attack Changsha, Fujian and East Zhejiang and also to take control of the Zhehang Railway.”¹⁴

Consequently, Wang Jingwei’s movements and the IJA’s military offensive drove Chiang Kai-shek to all-out resistance. The Chinese government countered Wang’s movements by bolstering its control over local forces and by reinforcing its military discipline program.

3. Political Dynamics of the Peace Settlement in South China

Although regional leaders demonstrated their loyalty to the central government, Chiang Kai-shek nevertheless remained suspicious of them. For Chiang, the very existence of these local forces threatened his power and the regime. He was particularly suspicious of Long Yun. Long had been the governor of Yunnan province and had built up his own army since he took control of the provincial government via a coup in 1927.¹⁵ Long’s Yunnan government kept its distance from the central government and denied to accept its orders. Therefore, despite the fact Long immediately reported his meeting with Wang Jingwei to Chiang in order to set Chiang’s

¹² Lu Fangshang ed., *Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian vol.6* [the Chronological Record of Chiang Kai-shek vol.6], (Taipei: Academia Historica 2014), p.23.

¹³ *Chinang Kaishek Diaries*, March 19, 1939.

¹⁴ *Chinang Kaishek Diaries*, March 31, 1939.

¹⁵ Yang Weizhen, *Cong Hezuo dao Juelie: Lun Long Yun yu Zhongyang de Guangxi, 1927-1949* [From Cooperation to Rupture: Long Yun and Central Government Relations, 1927-1949], (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000).

mind at ease, Chiang saw Long as untrustworthy due to the assistance he had tendered to Wang in his escape from Chongqing. Chiang Kai-shek thus sent Bai Chongxi, Vice Chief of General Staff, to Kunming to observe his activities.¹⁶

In addition to Chiang, almost all of the Chinese high command kept their eyes on Long. Indeed, they suspected that he was communicating secretly either with Japan or with the Wang Jingwei side. In August 1939, the Chinese military intelligence service reported to Chiang that Japan would invade Guangxi province under an alliance with local forces with the aim of partitioning Yunnan from the auspices of the central government control.¹⁷ However, it was not only the Yunnan government that was suspected of betraying Chiang's trust. At the end of 1939, when the IJA attacked Nanning (the capital of Guangxi province), some of the high command informed Chiang about the assistance that the Guangxi Army's militia (known as the "Guangxi Mintuan") had tendered to the Japanese side during the operation.¹⁸ Thus, local forces in both Guangxi and Yunnan were suspected by the central government of betrayal.

Under such circumstances, the Chinese high command attempted to strengthen its control over the military by reinforcing its discipline regime and by beginning a program of supervision over its political officers. In January 1939, Chen Cheng, Chief of the Political Section of the Chinese Military Committee, proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that the central government ought to declare its intention to progress down the road of unification and centralization of military command.¹⁹ The most important point in Chen's proposal was his suggestion to use the Wang Jingwei led movement as an opportunity to place local forces under the rigid control of the central government. In this regard, Chiang Kai-shek also felt the urge to tighten his regime,

¹⁶ He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng Xiansheng Shuxinji: Yu Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Wanglai Handian vol.1* [Correspondence Papers of Chen Cheng with Chiang Kai-shek vol.1], (Taipei: Historica Academia, 2007), p.134.

¹⁷ Confidential Cable to Chiang Kai-shek from Mao Qing-xiang, August 7, 1939, Chiang Kai-shek Archive, 002-080200-00519-139, Academia Historica, Taipei.

¹⁸ Motohiro Fujii, "Juukei Kokuminseifu ni yoru Koseisho no Tosei Kyoka to Gunji Kiko : Keinan Kaisen wo Chuushin ni [Chinese Nationalist Government's Military Control and Organization in Guangxi Province : with Special Reference to the Battle of Guinan]," in *Rekishigaku Kenkyu* [The Journal of Historical Studies], Vol. 919 (June 2014), p.12.

¹⁹ He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng Xiansheng Shuxinji: Yu Jiang Zhongzheng Xiansheng Wanglai Handian vol.1* [Correspondence Papers of Chen Cheng with Chiang Kai-shek vol.1], (Taipei: Historica Academia, 2007), p.180.

and considered dispatching inspectors to local governments or military bases.

Against this backdrop, the central government established KMT branches or dispatched intelligence officer within numerous local governments and a War Zone Command.²⁰ For example, the central government dispatched these agents to the Fourth War Zone Command (which managed military affairs in Guangdong and Guangxi) to investigate allegations that local force leaders have a cooperative relationship with Communists or Wang Jingwei regime.²¹

Furthermore, due to the ever evolving military situation in East Asia, the military operational aspect of the relationship between Yunnan province and Japan gained the attention of the Chinese military high command. In the summer of 1940, signs of Japan's advancement into the northern part of French Indochina began to appear. At this time, French Indochina faced two threats: military pressure from Japan and the destabilization of the French colonial system. With regards to the former, the Japanese navy was able to deploy fleets to the South China Sea from Hainan Island, which it captured in 1939.²² As for the latter, because France faced the German threat in Europe, its defense of French Indochina had begun to weaken. Japan took advantage of this opportunity to threaten the French Indochinese government by communicating its plan to shut down its trade routes into China. Moreover, the IJA aimed to station its forces in the northern part of Indochina.²³

The Chinese high command regarded the Japanese attempt to shut down the Chinese trade routes also an indication that it was preparing to attack Yunnan. The Chinese Nationalist government therefore decided to enhance its defense of the Yunnan-French Indochina border by deploying the Central army which fell under the direct command of the central government.²⁴ When the central government's army

²⁰ Li Baoming, *Guojiahua Mingyixia de Sishuhua: Jiang Jieshi dui Guomin Geminjun de Kongzhi Yanjiu* ["Privatization" of KMT army in the name of "nationalization"], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press(China), 2010), pp.170-171.

²¹ Zhang Fakui, *Zhang Fakui Huiyilu* [the memoir of Zhang Fakui], (Taipei: Yatai Zhengzhi Zhaxue Wenhua Chuban, 2017), pp.397-401.

²² See Kiyoshi Aizawa, *Kaigun no Sentaku* [The Japanese Navy's Road to Pearl Harbor], (Tokyo: Chuokoron shinsha, 2002).

²³ Yu Moriyama, "Nanshinron to Hokushinron [Southward Policy and Northward Policy of Japan]," in Aiko Kurasawa etc. ed., *Iwanami Koza Ajia Taiheiyo Senso vol.7: Shihai to Boryoku* [Iwanami Lecture, Asia Pacific War Series vol.7: Rule and Violence] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), p.192.

²⁴ Motohiro Fujii, "Jukei Kokumin Seifu Gunji Inkaikai no "Nanshin" Taio o Meguru

reached Yunnan province, Long Yun was thoroughly displeased. For the Yunnan Army, the rapid reinforcement of the central army equated to a strengthening in pressure placed upon it by the central government. Xu Yongchang, Chief of the Military Operations Office, had this say about Long's negative disposition:

“Long Yun's attitude are a demonstration of our weakness. If we (the central government) refuse his proposal, he might use it as an excuse to betray us and cooperate with Japan.”²⁵

Thus, in South China, the Chinese Nationalist government confronted both external and internal threats. The external threat came from the Japanese advancement into French Indochina. The internal threat came from the tension between it and the local powers. From the Nationalist perspective in Chongqing, these factors appeared to be deeply interconnected, tied together by the Wang Jingwei movement. The Chinese high command understood that the IJA's southward policy could result in the leaders of local powers joining Wang Jingwei's movement.

4. From Losing Peace Settlement to Escalation of the War

From the end of 1939 to November 1940, new attempt, named “Kiri Kosaku,” to negotiate peace between Japan and China had been progressed. The Japanese government tried to start negotiation with the Chinese Nationalist government through contact with Song Ziliang who is the younger brother of Song Ziwen, the Secretary of Treasury of China. The IJA which particularly had a great expectation of making peace negotiation with China displayed positive attitude toward meeting with Song Ziliang in Hong Kong.²⁶ However, this meeting was a kind of political maneuver set up by Dai Li, the chief of Chinese military intelligence service, to intervene the Japanese government recognizing Wang Jingwei's new government. The man who met with Japanese intelligence officer as Song Ziliang was a fake. Dai Li aimed to gather intelligence

Ichi Kosatsu: Chuetsu Kankeian o Tegakari ni,” [Reflections on the Chinese nationalist government military's response to the Japanese southern expansion policy: focusing on the relationship with French-Indochina], in *Shigaku*, vol.82, no.4 (January 2014).

²⁵ Xu Yongchang *Riji* [Xu Yongchang Diaries], July 21 1940.

²⁶ Tobe, “Nicchusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku,” in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, p.153.

through the meeting in Hong Kong.²⁷

However, it is hard to say that whole of these peace negotiations were just deception. Chiang Kai-shek concerned to proceed the negotiation depending on the conditions proposed by Japan. At the other negotiation that has been proceeded in parallel between Col. Wachi and Zhang Xielan, Chinese side made proposal that was no mention about neither stationing troops in China nor recognition of Manchukuo.²⁸

Despite of these efforts, due to Japanese side found out Song Ziliang is a fake, “Kiri Kosaku” was abandoned.²⁹ At the same time, China also made a decision of rupture the negotiation with Wachi, because of Chiang Kai-shek sensed that Wang Jingwei government tried to disturb peace settlement through intervening this negotiation.³⁰

Around the same time, the IJA exercised a new campaign toward several important district in Central China. In 1940, the IJA took Xiaoyang and Yichang. Due to Yichang placed near to Sichuan Province, Chiang Kai-shek had to concern about the possibility of the IJA preparing to attack Chongqing.³¹

As mentioned in above, the IJA expanded the fronts to South China, attacking Nanning and Longzhou of Guangxi to shut down the trade routes. The both city were the significant locations on the routes of transporting goods from French Indochina. And in June 1940, since France was defeated by German, a kind of “power vacuum” has been created in French Indochina. Chinese high command recognized that Japan using this opportunity prepare for sending units for Northern Indochina through their intelligence activity. Chiang Kai-shek realized the IJA could attack Yunnan from Northern Indochina and considered about military options.³²

Thus, after peace settlement and military offensive both reached a deadlock, Japan attempted forcing Chiang Kai-shek to surrender through isolate Chongqing from

²⁷ Ibid. pp.154-155.

²⁸ Iwatani, “Nicchusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku,” in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, pp.176-177.

²⁹ Tobe, “Nicchusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku,” in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, p.15.

³⁰ Iwatani, “Nicchusenso ni okeru wahei kosaku,” in Tsutui ed., *Showashi Kougi vol.2*, pp.176-177.

³¹ *Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, June 30, 1940.

³² Fujii, “Jukei Kokumin Seifu Gunji Inka no “Nanshin” Taio o Meguru Ichi Kosatsu,” pp.154-155.

the aid of Western countries. The advancement of northern part of French Indochina in August 1940 was a part of its attempt.³³ Chinese high command came to regard that Japanese campaign in mainland China is linked with this southward advance. Facing this crisis situation, Chiang Kai-shek said in his diaries: “If Japan hold Yichang tight and intrude into French Indochina, we fall into a dangerous situation.”³⁴ And he concluded “From now, Japan will take more offensive in mainland China.”³⁵

After French Indochina border had been closed, Burma-Yunnan border became the last remaining trade route for China. This route, named “Burma route,” started at Rangoon and ended at Kunming, took the role of transporting the aid offered by Western countries. At first, the IJA tried to close down the route by conducting an air strike on a facility inside Yunnan and putting diplomatic pressure toward Britain. Japanese attempt was succeeded at first. Britain which confronted German’s direct attack on its mainland was obliged to accept Japanese claim, closing down the border for 3 months from July 1940. However, 3 months later, Britain abandoned appeasement toward Japan and decided to reopen the Burma route.³⁶ After the end of 1940, Japan proceeded southward advance policy and faced strong opposition from Western countries. In June 1941, U.S. applied economic sanctions against Japan advanced into Southern Indochina.

On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalist government regarded that opposition between Japan and Western countries as the opportunity for improving their international situation. Chiang Kai-shek appealed that Japan would be a threat for Southeast Asia and called for Britain to confront Japan in cooperation with China.³⁷ From February to June 1941, the Chinese Nationalist government sent the military attaches group to Singapore, Malay, Burma and India to observe their defense system

³³ As Japanese Southward Policy, see Moriyama, “Nanshinron to Hokushinron.”

³⁴ *Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, June 19, 1940.

³⁵ *Chiang Kai-shek Diaries*, June 22, 1940.

³⁶ Kyoichi Tachikawa, *Dainiji sekaitaisen to Furansu ryo Indoshina: "Nichi-futsu kyoryoku" no kenkyu* [Franco-Japanese Collaboration in French Indochina during World War II], (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2000), pp.27-28.

³⁷ Motohiro Fujii, “Jukei Kokumin Seifu no Tainichi Senryaku to Gunji Sakusen: 1942nen no Birumasen o Chuushin toshite [Chinese Nationalist Government’s Strategy toward Japan and Military Operations in Burma 1942],” in *Senshi Kenkyu Nenpo* [NIDS Military History Studies Annual], vol.22 (March 2019).

and exchange views on Japanese threat with British high command in Southeast Asia.³⁸ Subsequently, China held conference with British military attache in August 1941, discussing about joint actions in response to Japanese military offensive. Through this negotiation process, China offered Britain exercising joint operations in Yunnan and Burma against Japan. However, British side turned down it at that time, avoiding to commit Chinese war against Japan directly.³⁹

Despite of the proposal was refused by Britain, Chiang Kai-shek kept to expect for the IJA invasion to Yunnan and Burma, dispatching the Central army which is comprised of 9 divisions. Chiang gave an instruction to the staffs of the Central army stationed Yunnan as follows:

“The upcoming battle of Yunnan is of great significance. It will be our decisive battle and If Japanese loose it, the other countries come to disregard Japan.”⁴⁰

As described above, Chiang Kai-shek tried to drive Japan into the war with U.S. and Britain through the battle of Yunnan. After the failure of peace settlement in June 1940, Japan and China based on their own strategic interest, escalated the war each other through expanding it into Southeast Asia. Japan progressed southward policy and closed down the trade route for China to weaken Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. In contrast, The Chinese Nationalist government take advantage of Japanese threat toward Southeast Asia, approached Britain and launched diplomatic offensive against Japan. Finally, the Japanese high command considered that they have to fight with U.S. and Britain in order to fix the war against China.

Conclusion

In Sino-Japanese War, Japan and China explored possibility of peace settlement. However, in fact, these efforts had failed and the limited conflict escalated into full-scale war. Additionally, after the war had reached stalemate in 1938, the peace settlement turned to be a part of political maneuver attempting to overthrow Chinese Nationalist government or intelligence activities to probe each other’s situation. In this

³⁸ Ibid. pp.6-9.

³⁹ Ibid. p.8.

⁴⁰ *Lin Wei-wen Kangzhan Riji Jielu* [Lin Wei-wen Diaries], November 2, 1941, Chen Cheng Archive, 08001070100001001, Academia Historica, Taipei.

circumstance, the Chinese Nationalist government realized that the IJA attempt to weaken its regime through military operations and came to increase mistrust to Japan.

While these attempts for peace negotiation reached a dead end, the IJA began to establish new government which was led by Wang Jingwei who was originally Chiang Kai-shek's rival and supported appeasement policy. Japan tried to weaken the Chiang Kai-shek regime through its peace movement. However, Chiang Kai-shek's also used Wang's movement to suppress the local forces which was suspected as cooperating with Wang and anti the central government. As a result, Japan's attempts for peace settlement helped Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen its regime. The same thing can said on the situation after 1940. After the failure of peace settlement in June 1940, Japan progressed southward policy and tried to shut down the trade route for China to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's regime. In contrast, The Chinese Nationalist government took advantage of opposition between Japanese and Western countries cause of Japanese southward, approaching Britain and launching diplomatic offensive against Japan. Thus, after the failure of peace settlement in June 1940, Japan and China based on their own strategic interest, escalated the war each other through expanding it into Southeast Asia.