国際会議参加報告

第 44 回 国際軍事史学会大会の概要

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2018 (平成 30) 年度の第 44 回国際軍事史学会大会は、9 月 2 日から 9 月 7 日までの間、イスラエルのエルサレムにて開催された。今大会は、第一次世界大戦終結 100 周年およびイスラエル建国 70 周年を記念したものとなり、開会式典では、エリ・ベンダハン国防副大臣のほか、マッシモ・レオナルディ国際軍事史学会会長、ベニー・ミケルソン大会運営委員長（イスラエル軍事史学会会長）から祝辞が述べられた。27カ国から 140 名が参加し、日本からは筆者が参加した。

本会議の共通テーマは「20 世紀における新国家の誕生と旧帝国の崩壊」であり、19 のワーキングセッションと 3 つの Ph.D.ワークショップにおいて、合計 74 の発表が行われた。全体を通して、第一次大戦後の旧帝国の崩壊と欧州諸国の対外戦略に関する歴史研究や、1948 年のイスラエル独立戦争および建国後の政軍関係に関する理論研究が目立ち、活発な質疑応答が見られた。また、イスラエル開催ということで、バルフォア宣言以降のパレスチナへのユダヤ人移住（計画）や、イスラエル国防軍の前身となったユダヤ人軍事組織ハガナーを取り上げた発表も見られた。

東アジアからは、中国軍事科学院副院長の曲愛国少将が「中華人民共和国の成立と建設における人民解放軍の主な歴史的役割」、韓国軍史編纂研究所の金承基博士が「日本帝国に対する韓国の独立戦争の実態」と題する発表を行った。また、ロシア参謀本部大学戦史研究所副所長のミロスラフ・モロゾフ博士が「第一世界大戦の終結が及ぼしたロシアと世界に対する影響」と題する発表を行った。

本大会は、イスラエル国防省・国防軍の全面的支援のもと開催され、本会議の内容だけでなく、パルマッハ博物館やラトルン戦車博物館などへの史跡研修も充実していた。イスラエル国防省・国防軍の軍事史研究に対する支持と熱意が拝察された。また、エルサレムにあるヤド・ヴァシェム（世界ホロコースト記念館）を訪問できたことは、ユダヤ人のホロコーストの歴史を概観するのに大変有益であった。

今後の開催地として、2019 年度はブルガリア（ソフィア）、2020 年度はポーランド（ポズナニ）が予定されている。

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The Soviet Military Offensive in Manchuria and the Collapse of Japanese Empire in August 1945

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【要約】
本稿は、ソ連の対日参戦（満州進攻）と日本帝国の崩壊について、主にソ連の軍事と外交に注目して、ソ連の対日参戦に実現可能性をもたらした対外的背景と軍事的展開を論じている。そしてソ連崩壊後に公開された公文書史料などを利用して、ソ連の対日参戦の意思決定過程だけでなく、ソ連軍による満州進攻計画を作戦と兵站の両面から分析して実相を明らかにしている。また、鈴木貫太郎内閣の対ソ終戦外交の展開について、日本政府のソ連外交への過信と、東郷茂徳外相の欧州戦争史に鑑みた大国間外交の重視が大きな影響を与えたことに言及している。

Introduction

This paper analyzes the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan in the final stages of the Pacific War, focusing specially on Soviet military affairs and foreign policies. In particular, this paper clarifies the external background and military developments that made it feasible for the Soviet Union to implement the Military Offensive in Manchuria by analyzing not only the bilateral relations which the Japanese government called for the Soviet Union to mediate war termination between Japan and the Allied Powers, but also the strategic “all-out attack” plan against the Kwantung Army, particularly its operational and logistical aspects, using Russian archives and other resources declassified after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Many Japanese historians predominantly focus on the theme of war termination and the question why the Japanese leaders could not end the war before the atomic bombing to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and not prevent the Soviet military offensive in Manchuria. The theme of these “double impacts” factors in the process of war termination dominate Japanese public and scholarly discussions on the question of the military necessity and moral justification of atomic bombing. In this regard, a Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa pointed out in his book that there was a pre-fixed “timetable” until the atomic bombing to Hiroshima. He mentioned that the
The final decision for the atomic bombing in the Harry Truman administration was made before the Potsdam Declaration was announced, rather this Declaration was issued to justify the use of atomic bomb for avoiding the sacrifice of one million American soldiers.1

Informed by these existing historiographical points of view, this author examines that the Soviet leaders were behind the scenes preparing offensive operations and military logistics for the invasion of Manchuria, while the official groundwork for the war against Japan was being laid through international conferences between the heads of Allied Powers and disputes on rights and interests in East Asia. In this paper the author also examines the comparative impact of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on Japan’s decision-making on the unconditional surrender in relations with another major factor, namely the atomic bombing.

1. War Leadership and Diplomatic Peace on Suzuki Cabinet

In the evening of April 7, 1945, Admiral Kantaro Suzuki was appointed as Prime Minister of “final war cabinet.” The Emperor strongly trusted him, who had a remarkable career as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Naval Chief of Staff, and the Grand Chamberlain in the February 26 Incident, in 1936 (failed coup d’état in Tokyo). In addition, Suzuki’s wife Taka was the Emperor’s nursing tutor, so Suzuki gained personal trust from the Imperial Household. Although Suzuki was 77 years old then and at once firmly declined to be appointed, but the Emperor and his close adviser Koichi Kido (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) persuaded him to follow the Emperor’s will of peace. In Suzuki’s autobiography was described a lyrical episode that when he began to stay in the Prime Minister’s official residence in Nagata-cho, he looked out cherry blossoms in full bloom outside the window. And he seriously considered that “if we continue to carry out this war as it is, the collapse of Japanese

Empire will be truly obvious,” and pondered on the question “will the great cause of Japanese nation remain after the ruin of its state?”  

In his eyes the cherry blossoms in full bloom symbolized not only his sense of crisis that the Japanese Empire could collapse as a result of the disastrous defeat of war, ending the long history that the Japanese nation made rapid progress as modern state in the international society and established a regional order in the Great East Asia, but also his mission to prevent it as an elder Prime Minister.

For the Suzuki cabinet, most imminent tasks were to end the war against the Allied Powers and to propose that the Soviet Union should play a role as a mediator for diplomatic peace. But one of the biggest difficulties that faced his cabinet was that the Soviet Union refused automatic extension of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact concluded in 1941. In this time, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Minister) Vyacheslav Molotov explained to the Japan’s Ambassador in USSR Naotake Sato that when this Pact had been concluded, there had neither the Operation Barbarossa nor the Attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, but international situation drastically changed and the Tripartite Alliance was concluded in 1940, the German *Wehrmacht* invaded the Soviet Union, and now “this Pact loses its meaning and it is impossible to extend the term of validity.”  

In response to this diplomatic notice, the Suzuki cabinet and the Imperial General Headquarters did not abandon their hopes for diplomatic peace and recognized that the Neutrality Pact would remain valid until April 25 of the following year. The Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo pointed out that it would be meaningless to develop diplomatic relations with other countries for the purpose of preventing the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. What was important here was that most Japanese politicians and generals believed that the validity of this Pact certainly left more one year, and in particularly Prime Minister Suzuki regarded Joseph Stalin as a certain degree of reliable leader in the Allied Powers.  

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4 Suzuki regarded as the Stalin’s personality as like the Takamori Saigo, who was one of the brilliant leaders of Meiji Restoration, and was supposed to believe the possibility
Furthermore, on May 8, 1945, the Nazi Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied Powers at last, which turned the war situation further against Japan. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Supreme War Leadership Council was held from May 11 to 14. Prior to the Council, Togo suggested that the Council should be strictly off limit to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Army Minister, the Naval Minister, the Army Chief of General Staff, and the Naval Chief of Staff. Underlining such suggestion was Togo’s political hardships as the Foreign Minister who was directly responsible for the initiation of the “Great East Asia War.” Togo warned that the army’s young and middle hardliners insisted on the war continuation thoroughly and they never permitted to mediate for diplomatic peace. He desired to debate freely and frankly about the way of ending war and of diplomatic peace with the Soviet Union without leaking governmental secrets through their secretaries and assistants.

His suggestion was accepted among the members of the Council which decided to strive to “prevent the entry of the Soviet Union into the war” and to keep its “favorable neutrality.” In order to advance the relations with the Kremlin, they also considered to abandon the Portsmouth Treaty and the Japan-Soviet Basic Convention and thereby offer the Soviet Union a range of concessions such as: (1) eliminating fishery rights, (2) opening up the Tsugaru Straits, (3) the transfer of various railways in North Manchuria, (4) the guarantee of influence of the Soviet Union in Inner Mongolia, (5) the lease of Port Author and Dalian. Furthermore, the Council discussed even a possibility of “transferring the northern half of Kuril Islands” and “making a neutral zone in South Manchuria while the Korean Peninsula would remain as a part of the Japanese Empire and the independence of Manchukuo should be ensured to the greatest extent possible.”

The Foreign Minister Togo had confidence in the success of negotiation with the Soviet Union, and in his memoir he wrote that the Japanese government did not get enough diplomatic conditions beyond the unconditional surrender to negotiate with other states like Sweden (Vidar Bagge), Switzerland (Allen Dulles) and Vatican City of diplomatic peace. Shigenori Togo, *Jidai no Ichimen* (One Aspect of the Era), Hara Shobo, 1967. p. 332.

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(Bishop Vagnozzi) for the ending war.\(^6\) He had an experience to conclude the cease-fire agreement in the Nomonhan Incident in 1939 as the Japan’s Ambassador in USSR with Molotov.\(^7\) In this regard, Togo’s Secretary to the Minister Katsumi Ohno mentioned that Togo always emphasized the importance of “Yorosha (Key Person or State)” to end the war and it should be limited to the major powers from the lessons of European war history.\(^8\) Some historians point out that his wife Eddie de Lalande was German-Jewish and he had affection for German literature and culture, Togo personally harbored anti-Nazi Regime sentiments, despite the fact that his country was an Axis Power aligned with Germany.

On the contrary, the Japan’s Ambassador Sato intensely doubted why the Soviet Union betrayed the Allied Powers for the Japanese Empire and criticized the Japanese government foreign policy. The most recent historiographical studies have revealed that the Japanese military intelligence grasped the existence of “secret agreement” in the Yalta (Crimea) Conference and Stalin’s ambition for the rights and interests in East Asia, but the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters ignored these “inconvenient facts” and continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union.\(^9\)

2. The Red Army’s “Encore Performance in Manchuria”\(^10\)

Behind the scenes the Soviet leaders were preparing offensive operations and military logistics for the invasion of Manchuria. At the Teheran Conference Stalin had promised with Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to attack the Japanese

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\(^9\) Through the intelligence of General Makoto Onodera who was a military attaché to a Consulate in Stockholm, Sweden, the contents of “secret agreement” had reached Tokyo. But there was no evidence that this confidential information was reflected in Japanese war leadership. Shin Okabe, *Kieta Yalta Mitsuyaku Kinkyuden* (Disappeared Yalta Confidential Emergency Telegram), Shinchosha, 2012.

Empire after the Germany’s defeat in exchange for the Allied pledge to open up a second front in Europe, and again in the Yalta Conference the Big Three decided the Soviet military offensive in Manchuria would start after three months from the Germany’s defeat. And as mentioned above, in the Crimea they reached the “secret agreement,” which guaranteed: (1) the status quo in Outer Mongolia, (2) the southern part of Sakhalin, (3) the internationalization of the commercial port of Dalian, (4) the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base, (5) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad jointly operated by the Soviet-Chinese company, (6) the transfer to the Kuril Islands.

As a Russian historian Boris Slavinsky emphasizes, when the Soviet Union concretely began to plan the military offensive in Manchuria was in October 1944. The Chief of General Staff of Red Army, Alexander Vasilevsky planned with the General Staff and submitted an operation plan to the Stalin after the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. This plan requested more 60 divisions and sufficient supplies, foods, arms, equipment, tanks, tracks and products to conduct an offensive campaign against the Japanese Empire, and large scale material aids (3,000 tanks, 78,000 tracks, 5,000 aircraft, fuel 206,000 tons) from the United States. And the Soviet General Staff calculated that it took three months to transport the Soviet forces and supplies from Europe to the Far East using the Siberian Railway.

On March 26, 1945, the Soviet Supreme General Headquarters (STAVKA) gave two confidential orders (No. 11047 and No. 11048) to the Primorsky Army Group and the Far Eastern Front. These two orders entitled Preparation for the Advance of the Japanese Forces were nominally for preventing the construction of bridgeheads to the Far East coast and the landing operations to the territory of the Soviet Union. Although they appeared the defensive postures, this became the first step to transport the Soviet forces and supplies from Europe to the Far East for entering the war against Japan.

Under these orders, Stalin and Alexei Antonov (successor of Vasilevsky) gave confidential orders for large scale transport from Europe to the Far East in the phased process of implementing the operation plan. Since the end of the “Great Patriotic War,”

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12 Там же. С. 36.
the scale of transport was expanded, and on June 3, the Soviet State Defense Committee (GKO) adopted a Resolution No. 8916 “Military Joint and Transport in the Trans-Baikal Military District, the Primorsky Army Group and the Far Eastern Front.”13 This Resolution requested the transport of elite units in the Eastern Front to the Far East, comprised of the Karelian Front and Second Ukraine Front (4 armies, 15 army groups, 36 divisions, 53 brigades, etc.), reinforcing military capability in the Far East. In particularly, 5th and 39th Armies which fought on the Königsberg Front were deployed to the eastern Manchuria and reorganized into the Primorsky Army Group, 6th Guards Tank Army and 53th Army which fought in Hungary and Austria were deployed to the western Manchuria and reorganized into the Trans-Baikal Front.

Following the large scale transport, on June 28, the Supreme General Headquarters gave special confidential orders (No. 11112, No. 11113 and No. 11114) to the Trans-Baikal Front, the Primorsky Army Group and the Far Eastern Front that intended “siege and annihilation operations” against the Kwantung Army.14 In these orders each strategic goal was defined. The Far Eastern Front was ordered to invade the Sōnghuājīāng to occupy Harbin (No. 11112), the Primorsky Army Group was ordered to invade the central Manchuria to occupy Harbin, Changchun and Chongjin (No. 11113), and the Trans-Baikal Front was ordered to invade the western and central Manchuria to occupy Chīfēng, Mukden and Changchun combining with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (No. 11114). As an important point, these operations were carried out from three sides and all preparations for the invasion were completed by August 1. Then the Soviet leaders assumed the timing of invasion was in the middle of this month.

With these operational orders, larger scale transport operation was executed to the Far East. By the end of July, about 1.5 million soldiers, 300,000 armed equipment, 5,250 tanks, 5,170 aircraft were gathered in the Far East. In the midnight of July 5, Marshal Vasilevsky arrived in Chita, was established the Far East General Headquarters and he was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the
Far East.\textsuperscript{15}

The military logistics of the Red Army also played essential roles in the implementation process of the military offensive in Manchuria. General Andrei Khrulev, the Chief of Logistics in the Red Army, managed to transport large scale military supplies using the Siberian Railways.\textsuperscript{16} According to the Russian archives of the State Defense Committee, on April 13, the Far East Railroad District was established in Chita and about 6,000 kilometers railroad between Novosibirsk (halfway point of the Siberian Railway) and Vladivostok was used for the military transport of 24 round trips a day until May 1 (2,708 vehicles), 30 round trips a day until August 1 (2,947 vehicles), and 38 round trips until October 1 (3,107 vehicles).\textsuperscript{17}

3. Final Road to the Ending War of Japan

The Suzuki cabinet continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union for diplomatic peace and ordered the former Prime Minister Koki Hirota to contact with the Soviet Ambassador in Japan Yakov Malik, who did not offer any clear answer on the matter amid the Soviet double-tongued diplomacy. At the Imperial Council on June 22, the members of Supreme War Leadership Council decided to concurrently prepare for possible battles in mainland Japan and pursue diplomatic peace. On July 10, they planned to dispatch the former Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe as Special Envoy to Moscow with Emperor’s autograph letter. However, Konoe’s travel never materialized and the Emperor’s message for peace did not reach Stalin. The point was only reported by the Japan’s Ambassador Sato in the form of an official telegram No. 893 to the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Solomon Lozovsky.\textsuperscript{18} In this time, Stalin and Molotov were in the train leaving for Potsdam.

During the Potsdam Conference Truman understood the success of nuclear test in Alamogordo (New Mexico), and dramatically changed U.S. war plan. In

\textsuperscript{15} Там же. С. 334-336.
\textsuperscript{17} РГАСПИ, Ф.644, Оп.1, Д. 397, Л. 148.
American views the Soviet invasion of Manchuria was no longer indispensable for the victory of the Pacific War. The Potsdam Declaration was announced to Japan on July 26, but the Suzuki cabinet decided to “ignore it entirely” because it was not stated to “retain the Kokutai (National Polity)” which paved the way for the atomic bombing at Hiroshima on August 6. It was remarkable that at 16:30 (Moscow time) on August 7 Stalin ordered Vasilevsky to advance the date of offensive operations in Manchuria and he ordered the invasion of Manchuria at 18:00 (Moscow Time) on August 8 to Trans-Baikal Front, the 1st Far Eastern Front (renaming of Primorsky Army Group) and the 2nd Far Eastern Front (renaming of Far Eastern Front).19

Through the Soviet intelligence activities in the United States, Stalin recognized the Manhattan Project and understood the implication of atomic bomb.20 He feared that the Suzuki cabinet would accept the unconditional surrender before the start of Soviet invasion of Manchuria, which made it impossible for the Soviet Union to expand influences in East Asia. In the official document on the memorandum of conversation between Stalin and the U.S. Ambassador in USSR Averell Harriman on August 8, when Harriman asked the “Generalissimo” Stalin of the effects of the atomic bomb, Stalin answered that the Japanese Empire was “at present looking for a pretext to replace the present government” and “the atomic bomb might give them this pretext.”21 While Stalin evaluated the strategic effects of the atomic bomb, on the other hand he implied that the atomic bomb and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria were both necessary as combined operations to defeat the Japanese Empire. This author could find no more fitting phrase to characterize the American-Soviet relations against Japan than “same bed, different dreams.”

In fact, the Supreme War Leadership Council was held on August 9 to decide whether the Suzuki cabinet should accept the unconditional surrender of the Potsdam

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19 Русский Архив: Великая Отечественная. Том.18 (7-1). С. 342-343.
20 There were two famous “atomic spies” who worked on the Manhattan Project, a theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs and a special engineer David Greenglass. As the archival documents of Venona Project are declassified, it is evident now that they engaged in intelligence activities at Los Alamos Laboratory to inform much important confidential information to the Soviet Union. Regarding the Venona Project, see John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America. Yale University Press, 2000.
Declaration with “conditions,” and by Emperor’s twice Seidan (Sacred Decisions) for peace at the Imperial Council the Suzuki cabinet accepted the unconditional surrender on August 14. According to the Annals of Emperor Showa released by the Imperial Household Agency, on August 8 after the atomic bombing to Hiroshima, the Emperor “hoped to end the war as soon as possible for gaining the advantageous conditions,” and on August 9 after the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, his close adviser Kido reported to the throne that “Prime Minister Suzuki would decide the country’s stance toward the Potsdam Declaration.” The Emperor mentioned it firstly on August 9.

**Conclusion**

While the international environment was being laid through conferences with the Allied powers, Soviet leaders were behind the scenes preparing offensive operations and military logistics for the invasion of Manchuria. In particularly, the Soviet Defense Committee and the Supreme General Headquarters played central roles of war leadership against Japan. The hope for diplomatic peace of Suzuki cabinet was never realized in August 1945.

Although the war came to end in mainland Japan on August 15, the Soviet invasion expanded to the southern part of Sakhalin and Kuril Islands where were guaranteed in the “secret agreement,” and on August 23 the Soviet Defense Committee adopted a Resolution No. 9898 on the “Acceptance, Accommodation and Labor Use of 500,000 Japanese POWs.” Meanwhile, Truman decided that the Japanese occupation policy should be implemented solely by the United States even in the risk of deteriorating the relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of Japanese Empire constituted the end of WWII and a prelude of the Cold War.

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22 In this Council, whereas Suzuki, Togo and the Naval Minister argued to accept the unconditional surrender with one condition of the “retain the Kokutai,” the Army Minister, the Chief of General Staff and the Naval Chief of Staff argued to accept it with four conditions: self-disarmament, domestic prosecution of war crimes and no postwar occupation by foreign powers in addition to the “retain the Kokutai.”


24 РГАСПИ, Ф.644, Оп.1, Д.457, Л. 58-64.