

The Soviet Military Offensive in Manchuria and the Leadership of the State Defense Committee

Tomoyuki Hanada

[Abstract]

This paper analyzes the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan in the final stages of the Pacific War, focusing specifically on Soviet military affairs and diplomatic policies. In particular, this paper clarifies the basic structure of war leadership in the Soviet Union during World War II by providing a general overview of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme General Headquarters (Stavka)—organs of state that played a central role in the war against Japan—as well as major subordinate institutions which include the General Staff of the Red Army and the People's Commissariat for Defense. This paper also seeks to elucidate the external background and military developments that made it feasible for the Soviet Union to implement the Military Offensive in Manchuria by analyzing not only the decision-making processes, but also the Strategic Offensive Plan against the Kwantung Army from the aspect of operations and military logistics, using Russian archives, historical publications and other such resources declassified after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

As this paper explains, while the official groundwork for the war against Japan was being laid through means such as conferences between the heads of Allied powers and disputes with the Republic of China concerning rights and benefits in East Asia, the State Defense Committee and the Supreme General Headquarters were behind the scenes preparing operations and military logistics for the invasion of Manchuria. Regarding of this point of view, the author clarifies some historical facts as following: 1. The Soviet war leadership was based on the vertical power structure with Joseph Stalin at the top. Diplomatic and military strategy was determined by the State Defense Committee composed of high-ranking cadres from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee CPSU and the Supreme General Headquarters composed of high-ranking generals in the Red Army; 2. The General Staff controlled operations, and the People's Commissariat for Defense did military logistics. Chief of General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevsky was responsible for preparing the strategy for entering the war against Japan, and Andrei Khrulev, the Chief of Military Logistics of the Red Army, played an important role in supplies and transports; 3. The Soviet Union initiated preparations to enter the war against Japan in March 1945, before the defeat of Germany, and on June 3 of that year

the State Defense Committee resolved to dispatch some elite military troops that put up great fights in the war against Germany to the Far East; 4. On June 28, the Strategic Offensive Plan in Manchuria, which was to attack on three fronts, surround and destroy the Kwantung Army, was ordered in secret by the Supreme General Headquarters to the Transbaikal Front Army, the Primorsky Krai Army Group (later the 1st Far Eastern Front Army) and the Far Eastern Front Army (later the 2nd Far Eastern Front Army); and 5. In conjunction with the Military Offensive in Manchuria, military logistics for large-scale supplies and transports from Europe to the Far East via the Trans-Siberian railway were preparing in the guise of railway district development, and on April 13, the State Defense Committee resolved to establish the Far Eastern Railway District with its headquarters in Chita.

The Japanese Troops Stationed in French Indochina and Their Problems

Kyoichi Tachikawa

[Abstract]

This paper illuminates the situation of the ground forces of the Japanese Army stationed in French Indochina from the time of the advancement (in September of 1940) of the army into the northern part of French Indochina until the year following the end of the Pacific War (1946), reveals some of the problems that occurred while the forces were stationed in the area and examines the measures taken to solve or circumvent such problems.

The Japanese Army stationed in French Indochina had faced sporadic bombing by Allied forces as well as air strikes using machine guns and other weapons; however, there had not been any full-scale battles until the coup d'état was launched by the Japanese Army against the French Army in French Indochina on March 9, 1945. It would be reasonable to say that until that battle, conditions had been close to those of peace time. That being the case, one would assume that the Japanese Army stationed in French Indochina did not face any particular problems. In reality, however, problems were occurring; even though, in spite of the war going on, there were no battles being fought nor any actual plans to do so. Moreover, leaders of local units were not finding these problems easy to resolve. Further, the natural environment did not necessarily favor the Japanese Army; the soldiers were constantly affected by the heat and humidity, and infectious disease was an

ever-present danger. There were concerns that the docile locals and humid climate in particular would cause the soldiers to become less vigilant, giving rise to various problems. For the units stationed in French Indochina, establishing and maintaining military discipline, implementing sanitation measures, and managing the health of the soldiers were urgent and on-going challenges.

To prevent problems caused by soldiers becoming less vigilant, the units endeavored to establish and maintain military discipline among the troops stationed in French Indochina through daily training and instruction, occasionally interspersed with some forms of recreation. Notwithstanding these attempts, problems such as desertion, vigilantism, violence and assault, and other forms of misconduct did in fact occur. At the same time, the hot and humid climate of French Indochina made it imperative to build up immunity to disease and prevent the spread of epidemics caused by lack of sanitation so as to maintain the fighting strength of the troops. In reality, although measures were being taken in each unit to deal with dangerous animals and poisonous snakes and insects, as well as educate soldiers about diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and amoeba dysentery, cases of the most worrisome infectious diseases would nevertheless sporadically occur.

Moreover, in spite of the efforts of the units, leaders constantly grappled with the issue of establishing and maintaining military discipline. Eventually, they had no choice but to attempt to solve these problems by setting a concrete strategic goal in the form of a coup d'état.

The History of the Military-Industrial Relations and Related Theories - A Study of Phased Changes -

Keishi Ono

[Abstract]

As an economic entity, the military—the consumer—relies on private companies to provide equipment (weapons) and supplies (food, fuel, etc.). While this has resulted in the formation of a military-industrial relationship, the exact nature of the relationship has undergone changes according to the type of warfare carried out and the configuration of the military as well as economic, scientific and technological developments in each era. From ancient times to the middle ages, the relationship between the military and industry consisted of simple commercial transactions.

In the early modern era, this morphed into a relationship between the military and its purveyors, before evolving in the 20th century into a relationship of industrial mobilization focused on total war. Throughout that time, the military consistently held a position of strength in the relationship.

However, the advent of total war, especially as practiced in the Second World War, served to enhance the bureaucracy (the military and defense industry), market monopolies/oligopolies (the weapons market) and scientific technologies (technologies related to aerospace, telecommunications, and nuclear and atomic power). This was the start of a "trinity" relationship that continued through the Cold War, leading to the formation of a symbiotic relationship known as the "military-industrial complex." The purpose of the military-industrial relationship here was not industrial mobilization; rather it was an interdependent entity constructing an extended technostructure that encompassed the military and industry, with the relative power between the two being equal.

With the end of the Cold War and early 21st century developments such as the privatization of the military and the exponential growth of IT, the military was confronted with major changes in social and economic structures. Here, for the first time in history, industry held the position of strength in the relationship. While the future direction of the military-industrial relationship remains obscure, the writings of management scholar Peter Drucker concerning "organizing ignorance" may provide a hint. In the technologically-driven 21st century, the defense industry will become knowledge intensive. When this takes place, the role that the military is expected to play in the military-industrial relationship will be one of "organizing ignorance" whereby the autonomy of the industrial side (experts) is respected to the greatest degree, while the industrial side will need to be released from the shackles of a bureaucratic management system. Although Peter Drucker developed this theory soon after the end of the Cold War, it still has significant implications today.

The Historical Significance of the Former Naval College of Engineering Administration Building

Hiroyuki Kanazawa

Aya Ito

[Abstract]

This paper examines the historical significance of the former Naval College of Engineering Administration Building (currently the 1st Administration Building of the Headquarters of Maizuru District, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force) from the perspectives of both philological and architectural history. In April 2016, the historical story "The Four Dynamic Coastal Cities of Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, and Maizuru - Centers of Japanese Modernization " and the cultural assets comprising these four cities were certified as Japan Heritage through a joint application of the four former naval port cities. However, as only a few empirical studies of old military historic sites have been conducted so far, there is an urgent need to accumulate more research on the philological and architectural history of such sites.

It has been said that the former Naval College of Engineering Administration Building exists as a pioneer in architectural thought; built based on the flexible structure theory advocated by the naval civil engineer Kenzaburo Mashima, and that it is living witness to the history of the use of steel materials manufactured for warships, whose construction was discontinued due to the Washington Naval Treaty. This paper will empirically examine these ideas.

The Naval Engineering College relocated to Maizuru due to the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, and the Naval College of Engineering Administration Building and other facilities were completed in 1930. The Naval College of Engineering Administration Building has not subsequently been rebuilt in spite of the many historical changes that have taken place since its completion. However, in discussing the historical value of the building, it is important to note that the building has been added to and renovated, both before and after the war.

Regarding the thought that Mashima's flexible structure theory was applied to the building, upon comparing Mashima's theory with the Naval College of Engineering Administration Building drawings, it was discovered that while there were components that were exactly the same as those advocated by Mashima's theory, there were also components that were similar, but that were of different size. In addition, although this building is one of the buildings to which Mashima's theory

was applied, it was constructed in the latter period of Mashima's time at the Navy Ministry, so it is necessary to evaluate it relative to other buildings with which Mashima was involved.

Regarding the thought that steel for warships whose construction was discontinued due to the Washington Naval Treaty was used, while it could be confirmed that steel from the Kure Naval Arsenal was used, it could not be confirmed from historical sources whether they were building materials or warship materials. Further discussion will therefore be required based on the results of future scientific investigations.

Regarding the positioning of the building as a pioneering example of the seismic resistant theory, it could not be proved a direct and unbroken connection of architectural thought from Mashima's theory to current seismic resistant theory. However, as a result of the disputes on the question whether an earthquake resistant structure should be rigid or flexible, between Mashima as a naval civil engineer and other people (i.e., Toshitaka Sano and Kiyoshi Muto) who belonged to the Tokyo Imperial University, the possibility that Mashima's ideas influenced the structural design of postwar high-rise buildings cannot be ruled out.

In short, after collating the results of analyzing primary historical sources and examining architectural history, some of the widely held views concerning the former Naval College of Engineering Administration Building remain nothing more than folklore so far. Further progress will therefore be required based on the perspectives of empirical research from both philological and architectural history.