

国際会議参加報告

第 43 回国際軍事史学会大会の概要

平野 龍二

2017（平成 29）年度の第 43 回国際軍事史学会大会は、2017 年 9 月 2 日から 9 月 8 日にかけてカメルーン共和国のドゥアラ市にて開催された。今大会は、初めてアフリカ中部、いわゆる「ブラック・アフリカ」で開催されたことが最大の特徴であり（今までのアフリカ開催は南アフリカ共和国とモロッコ王国）、このことはオープニング・セレモニーをはじめとして本大会の随所で強調された。アフリカで開催されたこともあり、本年は例年より少ない 27 か国から 125 名が参加し（内 50 名がカメルーン国内からの参加）、国外からはオランダが 9 名で最多、米国、ロシア、中国の各 6 名が続いた。日本からは稲葉千春・名城大学教授（国際軍事史学会理事）及び筆者の 2 名が参加した。

本大会の共通論題は、「歴史の中の世界戦争と植民地」(World Wars and Colonies in History) で、開催国カメルーンのダニエル (Abwa Daniel) ヤウンデ大学教授による基調講演に始まり、サブテーマごとに 16 のワーキングセッションと 4 つの Ph.D. ワークショップが開かれた。準備された発表 48 本を地域別に見ると、今回は発表者の 1/3 が開催国カメルーンをはじめとするアフリカ諸国であったこともあり、半数の 24 本がアフリカに関するものであった。例年は欧州、中近東に関するものが多い傾向にあるが、今回はテーマが植民地であったこともあり、中近東以外のアジア地域に関する発表も 10 本あった。

東アジア各国からは、中国軍事科学院副院長の何雷中將が「中国共産党による抗日軍は、敵の占領地においてどのように生き残り発展していったのか」と題して、韓国軍史編纂研究所のユン・ヨンフィ博士が「1943 年のカイロ会談における同盟軍事戦略と戦後構築に関する計画」と題して発表した。

最終日の総会では、翌 2018 年度の開催地がイスラエルに決定されたことが理事会より報告された。また、本年度より創設された若手研究者優秀賞を米国のカージス (Caleb Kerges) コンコーディア大学准教授が受賞して表彰と受賞講演が行われ、本大会は閉幕となった。

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The Influence that the Russo-Japanese War Had on the Annexation of Korea: With a Focus on the Progress toward the Protectorate

平野 龍二

【要約】

日露戦争は、韓国における日露間の勢力圏争いが戦争原因と考えられているが、この戦争に至るまでの間、日本が韓国との提携を目指していた時期もあった。しかしながら、日露戦争が始まると、日本は戦局の推移につれて、韓国との条約を締結し保護国化を進めていったのである。日露戦争の展開と韓国保護国化の進展には密接な関連があったものと考えられるが、その相互の影響について、あまり注目されることはなかった。韓国併合については、軍事史の分野ではほとんど等閑視され、主に政治・外交史の分野から研究されてきたからである。そこで、本稿では、日本の陸海軍の動向と外交政策を考察することにより、日露戦争の進展が韓国保護国化に及ぼした影響を検討した。

1904年2月に日露間で戦端が開かれると、速やかに京城を占領した日本は日韓議定書を締結し、韓国内における軍事行動の自由を担保する。5月初旬に、日本が鴨緑江の戦闘でロシア軍に勝利し、朝鮮半島の大半を軍事占領すると、その月の31日の閣議で、韓国の外交及び財政を監督する方針を決定した。続いて、旅順で熾烈な攻防が繰り返されている最中に、第一次日韓協約が締結された。この条約により、日本政府は韓国政府に外交と財政についての顧問を送り込み、保護国化に向けた道を着実に歩む。

翌1905年1月1日、激しい戦闘の末に旅順が陥落し、さらに3月に奉天会戦に勝利すると日本は戦争拡大を企図する。しかしながら、4月8日に戦争拡大を阻止し外交を活発にして戦争終結を目指す主旨の閣議決定がなされた。この時、同時に「韓国保護権確立ノ件」も閣議決定され、韓国の保護国化は既定路線となった。日露講和後の11月17日、第二次日韓協約で韓国保護国化が完成した。ここに、韓国併合への大きな流れが方向づけられたのである。

ここまでの経過を考察してみると、日本は日露戦争における戦局の進展に伴って、韓国保護化への政策を進めていったことが概観できる。この5年後に韓国は日本に併合された。

Introduction

It is considered that the Russo-Japanese War, which recently is called the World War 0,¹ was caused by the conflict in Korea between Japan and Russia.² There had been a period when Japan tried to cooperate with Korea. However, when this war started, Japan concluded the Japan-Korea Protocol, and secured the freedom of military activity in Korea. Subsequently, the First Japan-Korea Treaty was concluded according to the progress of the war.

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government completed what made Korea the protectorate by the Second Japan-Korea Treaty. It oriented a huge stream toward the annexation of Korea. I consider that there was a close relation between the development of the Russo-Japanese War and the progress toward the protectorate of Japan. However, its mutual influence has not been focused on sufficiently. The reason is that the annexation of Korea has not been focused on in the field of military history study and has mainly been studied in the field of political and diplomatic history.³

Accordingly, I examined the influence that the development of the Russo-Japanese War had on the progress toward the protectorate of Japan by the view of Japan's movement of the Army, the Navy, and diplomatic policy. I would like to try to explain how Japan formed the policy against Korea with the development of the Russo-Japanese War and how Korea became the protectorate of Japan.

¹ John W. Steinberg, et al. eds., *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Brill, 2005), pp. xix-xxi(Introduction), 105-106; John W. Steinberg, "Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?" *The Russian Review*, Volume 67, Issue 1 (January 2008), p. 2, 7.

² The proclamation of war by Japan stated that the purpose of this war is to maintain the integrity of Korea from Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed., *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* [Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy], Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War I (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Rengo Kyokai, 1958), pp. 142-145. This series is hereafter cited as *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*.

³ The instance of study from political and diplomatic history is as follows: Shigenori Moriyama, *Kindai Nikkan Kankei Shi Kenkyu* [The Historical Study of Modern Relation between Japan and Korea] (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1987); Fukuju Unno, *Kankoku Heigou Shi no Kenkyu* [The Historical Study of Annexation of Korea] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000); Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Alexis Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

1. The Japan-Korea relations before the Russo-Japanese War

The advance to East Asia by the Great Powers of Europe and America in the 19th century gave Japan a great shock. After the Meiji restoration, the new Japanese government reorganized the political and military structure to develop as a modern state.⁴ On the other hand, when we turn our attention to this region, the Korean Peninsula was a place of disputing influence by the Qing dynasty of China and the Great Powers of Europe and America already from the 1860's. Accordingly, Japan needed that stability and neutralization of Korea for Japan's security.

In 1876, the Japanese government concluded the Japan–Korea Amity Treaty, and established the diplomatic relations with Korea.⁵ Thereafter, the modern relations between Japan and Korea started to develop.⁶ However, the incident surrounding Korea became a great problem for Japan by the Imo Incident and Gapsin Coup.

In 1882, the soldiers of the old Korean Army, which had antipathy to the new organized Korean Army educated by a Japanese instructor, raised a rebellion. This Imo Incident was suppressed by the troops dispatched from the Qing Empire. The problem surrounding Korea became the most important in the Japanese diplomacy by this Imo Incident. Moreover, the opposition between Japan and the Qing Empire was unveiled by direct intervention of the Qing.⁷

In 1884, the Enlightenment Party of Korea carried out the coup by support of the Japanese minister in Korea. However, the Qing troops suppressed this coup again. The pro-Japanese group in Korea was annihilated by this Gapsin Coup. Moreover, because the Japanese Army was defeated by the Qing Army, the Japanese influence in Korea was weakened drastically. After this coup, Japan wanted to settle with Qing peacefully, and Qing adopted a policy which settled with Japan peacefully too.⁸ Though the Qing troops evacuated from Korea by the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese

⁴ For instance, the new Japanese government founded the cabinet and the Diet for politics, and founded the modern Army and Navy for Military.

⁵ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 9, pp. 114-119.

⁶ For instance, Japan established a legion in Seoul and dispatched a military instructor to Korea.

⁷ Hidenao Takahashi, *Nisshin Senso eno Michi* [The way to the First Sino-Japanese war] (Tokyo: Tokyo Sogen Sha, 1995), p. 12, 118.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152, 158.

Tianjin Convention of 1885,⁹ Qing was predominant in the real power balance.

In 1894, because the Donghak Rebellion broke out in Korea, both Japan and Qing dispatched the troops. Then the First Sino-Japanese War started. The Japan forces won the first battles in ground and sea, and advanced on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, Japan concluded the Japan-Korea pact of 1894 as an alliance. This pact decided that Japan fights Qing, and Korea supports Japan for moving army and supplying food. However, when peace with Qing was recovered, this pact was repealed by the article of the time limit.¹⁰

When Japanese were celebrating the victory against the Qing Empire, the Triple Intervention by Russia, France, and Germany resulted in the complete submission against the Russian demand.¹¹ This weakened Japan's influence in Korea. In this situation, the Korean Queen, who was in favor of Russia, was killed by the conspiracy of the Japanese minister in Korea in October of this year. This incident aroused antipathy to Japan in Korea. In February of the next year, 1896, the Korean King moved to the Russian legation. The political influence of Russia in Korea increased much more by this incident. Moreover, Russia occupied Manchuria by the Boxer uprising of 1900, and manifested interest in Korea.

On April 8, 1903, the Russian Army ignored the treaty and did not evacuate from Manchuria. Moreover, Japan acquired information for the Russian Army to begin to invade northern Korea. This situation made the Japanese government perceive the threat of the Russia's advance to the Korean Peninsula.¹² From August of the same year, the negotiation between Japan and Russia to resolve the problem surrounding Korea and Manchuria began.¹³ The focus of this negotiation was not using of the Korean territory for military purpose and establishing a neutral zone in Korea.¹⁴ While Russia still occupied Manchuria, Japan could not accept that the Japanese military operations were limited on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese leaders made up their mind to break down the negotiation.¹⁵

⁹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 18, p. 309.

¹⁰ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 337-338.

¹¹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 80-81.

¹² The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ed., *Komura Gaikou Shi* [The Diplomatic History of Komura] (Tokyo: Shinbun Gekkan Sha, 1953; reprint, Hara Shobo, 1966), pp. 301-308.

¹³ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 8-9, 13.

¹⁴ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 30-32.

¹⁵ Soho Tokutomi, *Koshaku Katsura Taro Den* [The Biography of Prince Taro Katsura], Vol.

2. The beginning of the Russo-Japanese War and the conclusion of the Japan-Korea Protocol

In December of 1903, the Japanese government was aware that there was a high possibility of a conflict between Japan and Russia, and needed an offensive and defensive alliance with Korea.¹⁶ Gonsuke Hayashi, the Japanese minister in Korea, had already begun to negotiate with the Korean government. In January of 1904, though the negotiation between Japan and Korea advanced, Aleksandr Pavlov, the Russian minister in Korea, and the pro-Russia group in Korea rallied, the Korean Government declared neutrality.¹⁷ The negotiation about the alliance between Japan and Korea failed because of this.

Japan's biggest fear was the movement of the Korean Emperor to Russian or French legation. Hayashi handed the Korean government a memorandum which ensured the protection of the Imperial Household, national territory, and independence of Korea. Jutarou Komura, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, later approved it.¹⁸

On February 8, 1904, the Russo-Japanese War began by the night raid against Port Arthur (present Lushun) in this situation. During the same time, the Japanese Army disembarked the advance unit to Incheon. In the morning of the next day, February 9, Hayashi notified the Korean government that the advance unit of Japanese Army would arrive in Seoul on the same day.¹⁹ Thereafter, Hayashi met the Korean Emperor, and took him by his word to consider the conclusion of the Japan-Korea alliance. Moreover, Hayashi made the Emperor approve the freedom of Japanese military operations in Korea.²⁰ Subsequently, the Japanese Army disembarked the main forces of the Twelfth Division, and quickly occupied Seoul. Thereafter, the negotiation of the Japan-Korea Protocol began again, and on February

Kon(Second) (Tokyo: Ko Katsura Koshaku Kinen Zigyō Kai, 1917; reprint, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), p. 195.

¹⁶ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 41-45.

¹⁷ On details of the negotiation, see, Unno, *Kankoku Heigou Shi no Kenkyū*, pp. 99-107.

¹⁸ Masaaki Kin ed., *Nikkan Gaiko Shiryo Shusei* [The Diplomatic Documents Compilation between Japan and Korea], Vol. 5 (Tokyo: Gennando Shoten, 1967), pp. 46-47, 50.

¹⁹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War I, p. 128.

²⁰ Takahito Iwai ed., *Hayasi Gonsuke Jutsu: Waga 70 Nen wo Kataru* [Recollection by Gonsuke Hayasi: I Spoke My 70 Years' Life] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobo, 1935; reprint, Tokyo: Yumani Shobo, 2002), pp. 190-191.

23, it was concluded under the Japanese military power.²¹

During this time, the Japanese Army and Navy conducted military operations actively, this Protocol made Japan conduct the necessary operations and made Korea support the Japanese operations. Consequently, though Korea was wavered between Japan and Russia, it clearly belonged to the Japanese side. Throughout the unstable situation of Korea, Japan occupied the strategic key point of Seoul, proceeded the diplomatic procedures with the Korean Court and government, and secured the freedom of military operations. The Japan-Korea Protocol, which was estimated as the first step toward making Korea a protectorate, was concluded principally for the military reason in the Russo-Japanese War.

3. The military occupation of the Korean Peninsula and the First Japan-Korea Treaty

Thereafter, the Japanese Army advanced northward on the Korean Peninsula, and on May 1, won the battle of Yalu River, and occupied most of the Korean Peninsula. Japan advanced the battle on the ground and the sea with superiority.

In this war situation, on May 31, “the policy against Korea” was decided by the cabinet of Tokyo. The policy decided that Japan holds real power to protect Korea with politics and military, and develops concessions of Japan on the economy in Korea more and more. At the same time, the cabinet decided “The general plan implementing against Korea” which described “protect,” “control of diplomacy,” “control of finance,” “assumption of transport facilities,” “assumption of communication facilities,” and “promotion of colonization,” in Korea.²² Japan advanced to conclude the treaty with Korea in order to implement this policy and general plan.

On the other hand, in July, six months after the beginning of the war, the Japanese government already began to consider a peace treaty. Komura, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted a memorandum which concerned the conditions of peace between Japan and Russia. It stated “Making Korea be

²¹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 338-339, 343-346.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 351-356.

subordinate to Japanese sovereignty” as one of the four major purposes of this war.²³

In August, Prime Minister Tarou Katsura decided the major policy based on the Komura memorandum. Moreover, Katsura tried to expand the concessions in Korea and Manchuria to anticipate difficulty of acquiring war reparations. He expected the victory of the battle of Liaoyang and the fall of the Port Arthur Fortress, and decided the general conditions for peace. One of the conditions was that Japan make Russia accept Japan’s right of freedom in Korea.²⁴ Japan considered it would prevent future conflicts.

On August 10, the Battle of Yellow Sea, and on August 14, the Battle off Ulsan broke out, and the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy won. However, the Japanese Navy failed to annihilate both the Port Arthur Squadron and the Vladivostok Squadron of the Russian Navy. Moreover, though the First General Attack on the Port Arthur Fortress began on August 19, the Japanese Army failed to capture this fortress with heavy casualties on August 24.

On August 22, the First Japan-Korea Treaty was concluded during a fierce battle at the Port Arthur Fortress. This Treaty decided that the Korean government accepts a Japanese financial adviser and a foreign diplomatic adviser recommended by the Japanese government, and that it negotiates in advance the conclusion of a treaty and other important diplomatic matters with the Japanese government.²⁵

4. The progress of the Russo-Japanese War and the Second Japan-Korea Treaty

Thereafter, the Battle of Liaoyang and the Battle of Saka was fought in September and October. Although the Japanese Army won both battles, they failed to annihilate the main forces of the Russian Army. On August 26, the Second General Attack on the Port Arthur Fortress began. However, the Japanese Army failed to capture this fortress with heavy casualties. The Japanese Army was forced

²³ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War V, pp. 59-63.

²⁴ Tokutomi, *Koshaku Katsura Taro Den*, Vol. Kon(Second), pp. 265-266.

²⁵ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 368-370.

to conduct dual front operations against the main forces of the Russian Army around the Saka area and the Port Arthur Fortress. If the Second Pacific Fleet (the Baltic Fleet) of the Russian Navy came from Europe, Japan would lose their sea lines of communications to the continent, and then they would be in a critical situation. The Japanese Army needed to capture the Port Arthur Fortress quickly.

On November 26, the Japanese Army began the Third General Attack on the Port Arthur Fortress. After the fierce battle, the Port Arthur Fortress fell on January 1 of the next year. This situation urged Kogorou Takahira, the Japanese minister in United States, to meet President Theodore Roosevelt, and to make him allow Japan to put Korea under control.²⁶ The fall of the Port Arthur Fortress proceeded to make Korea the protectorate of Japan with advance of peace.

The Battle of Mukden (present Shenyang) started on February 22. Although the Japanese Army won and occupied Mukden on March 10, they failed to annihilate the main forces of the Russian Army again. About 3 weeks later, “the operation policy after March, 1905” was adopted. This policy aimed to proceed to Harbin and to annihilate the Russian Army in the Far East.²⁷ Although Japan was exhausted by the battles against the great power of Russia for about 1 year, this policy meant the expansion of the war.

Gentarou Kodama, the Chief of the General Staff in the Japanese Manchuria Army, had concern for this reckless strategy. Therefore, he returned from the battlefield to Tokyo, to try to stop this expansion strategy in cooperation with Gaishi Nagaoka, Vice Chief of Staff in the Imperial Headquarters.²⁸ As a result of consideration by the elder statesmen, Aritomo Yamagata, who was the Chief of the General Staff in the Imperial Headquarters, and the key cabinet minister,²⁹ on April 8, the Japanese cabinet decided “the Matters concerning to keep step between the military operation and the diplomacy during the

²⁶ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War V, pp. 215-217.

²⁷ Ministry of War ed., *Meiji Gunjishi* [The Military History in Meiji Era], Last Vol. (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), pp. 1483-1485.

²⁸ On details, see, Shiro Yamamoto ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki 1900-1918* [Masatake Terauchi Diary] (Tokyo: Douhousha, 1980), pp. 315-317; Nagaoka Gaishi Bunsyo Kenkyu Kai ed., *Nagaoka Gaishi Kankei Bunsho: Kaiko Roku Hen* [The Document Related to Gaishi Nagaoka: Memoirs] (Kudamatsu: Nagaoka Gaishi Kensho Kai, 1989), pp. 131-132.

²⁹ Yamamoto ed., *Terauchi Masatake Nikki 1900-1918*, pp. 317-318.

Russo-Japanese War.”³⁰ This decision denied practically “the operation policy after March, 1905” which outlined the expansion of the war. Japan decided to conduct a limited war, and proceed the diplomacy for peace.

On the same day, the cabinet decided “the matter to establish the right of making Korea Japan’s protectorate,” simultaneously. This decision confirmed to take the Korean diplomacy and make Korea Japan’s protectorate in accordance with the established policy.³¹ The peace recovery of this war and making Korea a protectorate were considered in conjunction.

On May 27 and 28, the Battle of Tsushima was fought, and the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy won and annihilated the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy. On June 9, President Roosevelt proposed to hold a peace conference with both Japan and Russia. Thereafter, on July 29, William Taft, the U. S. Secretary of War, came to Japan as a special envoy, and concluded the Taft-Katsura Agreement with the Japanese Prime Minister, Katsura. This agreement stated that Japan would govern Korea and United States would continue to govern the Philippines.³² Moreover, on August 12, the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty was concluded in London. This treaty stated that Japan would make Korea a protectorate and United Kingdom would continue to govern India.³³ Because the United States and the United Kingdom were the great powers which owned colonies, Japan got the approval of both countries to make Korea a protectorate.

On August 10, the peace conference began in Portsmouth of United States, and Japan concluded the peace treaty with Russia on September 5. Russia approved the Japanese right to govern Korea by this treaty.³⁴ Japan got the approval from the dominant great powers about making Korea a protectorate. Thereafter, on November 17, Japan took the diplomacy of Korea, and Korea became the protectorate of Japan by the conclusion of the Second Japan-Korea Treaty.³⁵ It was the policy that was already established during the Russo-Japanese War.

³⁰ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War V, pp. 102-104.

³¹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 519-520.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 450-452.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-63.

³⁴ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Separate Vol. The Russo-Japanese War V, pp. 528-538.

³⁵ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 532-533.

Conclusion

I have no doubt that the Russo-Japanese War had an influence on making Korea a protectorate. Every time a peace problem was considered at the turning points in this war, the policy of making Korea a protectorate was considered and decided. The Japanese leaders in those days considered it necessary to make Korea a protectorate for stability in the Far East after peace recovery of the Russo-Japanese War. We can observe the history that this making of the protectorate progressed to the annexation by Japan 5 years later.