国際会議参加報告

第 42 回 国際軍事史学会大会の概要

清水 壮太郎

2016（平成 28）年度の第 42 回国際軍事史学会大会は、当初トルコ共和国（イスタンブール）で開催される予定であったが、同年 7 月トルコ国内で生起したクーデタ未遂事件の影響で、急遽ブルガリア共和国のプロブディフにおいて 2016 年 9 月 3 日から 9 月 10 までの間、開催されることとなった。急遽の変更にもかかわらず、28 か国から 80 名が参加し、国別では米国、中国が各 7 名で最多、イタリア、オランダの各 6 名が続いた。ブルガリアでの開催は、2012 年度ソフィア、14 年度ヴァルナに続き 3 回目となったが、全参加者は、大会運営委員長ドブロミール・トテフ（ブルガリア国防省次官）、同次長ディミタール・ミンチェフ（ブルガリア軍事学会会長）をはじめとする大会運営スタッフ各位より心温まる歓待を受けた。

本会議の共通論題は、「地域戦争とその世界的影響」（Local Wars-Global Impacts）で、12 のワーキングセッションと 1 つの Ph.D.ワークショップが開かれた。全発表 40 本を地域別に見ると、欧州、中近東に関するものが多く、東アジア・太平洋地域では、日露戦争関連が 1 本、第二次世界大戦・日中戦争関連が 3 本、朝鮮戦争関連の発表が 3 本あった。東アジア各国では中国軍事科学院から 7 名（うち発表者 2 名）、韓国軍史編纂所から 2 名（同 1 名）、またロシア軍関係者 4 名（同 3 名）がそれぞれ参加し、日本からは稲葉千春・名城大学教授（国際軍事史学会理事）、清水の 2 名が参加した。

今後の開催地として、2017 年度はカメルーン共和国（ドゥアラ）、2018 年度はロシア連邦（モスクワ）が予定されている。

（防衛研究所戦史研究センター戦史研究室研究員）
The Manchurian Incident and its Global Impacts: The Japanese Army and the Search for a Grand Strategy

清水 亮太郎

【要約】
本稿は満洲事変前から日中戦争開始までの時期を対象に、日本陸軍の対ソ戦略の変遷について述べ、極東におけるソ連との軍拡競争が次第に不利に傾くなか、「満洲国」統治を契機として、日本陸軍の一部で共有された戦略構想とその挫折について概述する。

Introduction

The Manchurian Incident has always been considered the overture of catastrophe in modern Japanese history. Both academic and popular discussions in post-war Japan tend to adopt a “15-year-war” view of Japanese history during this period, in which the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific war are seen as one consecutive war from 1931 to 1945. In particular, it was impressive that the television programs aired intensively for few days after the demise of the Showa Emperor in January 1989, in which they presumed Manchurian Incident as the beginning of hardship in his over 60 years’ reign in exactly the same manner.

The Incident had enormous repercussions on both domestic politics and international relations. For instance, the establishment of Manchukuo by Japan, which advocated the idea of “Ethnic Harmony,” was an open antagonism of national self-determination. It was rather a combination of legitimacy of late Qing dynasty and of technocratic efficiency, intended to replace the “tyranny” of the Zhang family. This was also the beginning of regionalism in East Asia, which would be reduced to the proclamation of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the 1940s.

In less than three months, Japan declared the abandonment of the gold standard system, and drastically expanded fiscal spending to govern the new state. This resulted in a means to recover from the depression, thus the international gold standard system come to a complete end.

And then, the aim of this study is to explore transition strategies in the
Japanese army, both before and after the Incident, to provide support for the idea that it was the catalyst for the period of conflict that followed.

**Before the Incident**

E.H Carr stated that the most significant for the Soviet Union occurred in Manchuria in 1929, when Zhāng Xuéliáng sought to resume the Chinese Eastern Railway.\(^1\) His efforts were met with resistance from the USSR, launching the Sino-Soviet Conflict. In this battle near Manzouli, the Soviet Army beat the Chinese Army with overwhelmingly superior artillery, aircrafts (including bombardment aircrafts), and tanks.

The conflict was critical for Japan, too. The Japanese Army was shocked by the strength of the Far Eastern Soviet Army. Especially, as they estimated the flight range of the bombardment aircraft of the Soviet at that time was 1,000 to 1,500 km, when the range would extend to 2,000 to 3,000 km in near future, the Soviet could bombard mainland Japan from the airbase in Primorskii (the maritime province of Siberia).\(^2\) This sense of threat would be the most important drive for Japanese soldiers, mainly middle-ranking officers, who executed the Manchurian Incident.

The Kwangtung Army was established in 1919. Its origin was the troops deployed to protect the interests on the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchuria Railway Company succeeded from Russia after Russo-Japanese War. Since then, the potential enemy for Japanese Army was always Russia. It was because the political and military leaders had thought Russian Empire must take a revenge war. On the other hand, confidential clauses contained in the 1907 and 1912 agreements between Japan and Russia show the influential division of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia: South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia for Japan, and North Manchuria and Western Inner Mongolia for Russia.

After the Sino-Russian Conflict, the Kwantung Army changed its anti-Soviet strategy. Formerly, the task of the Kwantung Army was to hold positions in Central

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\(^2\) *Suzuki Teiichi Shi Danwa Sokkieroku [Oral history of Teiichi Suzuki]*, vol.1, Tokyo, Kidonikki Kenkyukai, 1971, p. 61,68.
Manchuria (around Changchun) and to cover the concentration of main forces from the
Korean Peninsula and mainland Japan. The organization of the Kwantung Army at
the time consisted in one division in a two-year rotation system and six railroad
garrison battalions (a total of approximately 10,000 soldiers). As they had no
transportation units, they could not advance far from the South Manchuria Railroad
(Dalian-Changchun).³

After Kanji Ishiwara joined the Kwantung Army as Chief of Operations in
October 1928, he and other staff conducted several field trips in North Manchuria. He
advised his colleagues to set “the end of offensive” for the future battlefield of
Manchuria in the Khingan Mountains (Greater Khingan and Lesser Khingan) and the
Plains of Hulunbuir (north-west of Qiqihar).⁴ The reasoning was that, if the battle
were fought in Central Manchuria, the Japanese army would face an uphill battle
thanks to the advanced artillery and mechanized corps of the Soviet Army. Instead, it
was thought that North Manchuria should be occupied, and that the Japanese army
should fight in the mountain range along the border with Russia. The defense relied
heavily on taking advantage of the slopes in the wave-like plains of Hulunbuir.⁵ In the
interview by Lytton Commission of the League of Nations (April 1932), Ishiwara
answered that the Khingan and the Amur is the natural defense border between
Manchuria and Russia.⁶

As well known, the Japanese Army had an eye for exploiting mineral
sources in Manchuria, throughout the investigation and planning for total war since
the breaking of WW I. However, growing fears over the Soviet Army triggered the
Manchurian Incident and decided the territory of Manchukuo. It was for this reason
that the Kwantung Army persisted in its quest to take all of Manchuria, despite the
fact that Tokyo—the Cabinet, as well as the Ministry of War and Army General

³ Katakura Tadashi Shi Danwa Sokkiroku [Oral History of Tadashi Katakura], Tokyo,
⁴ Ishiwara Kanji, “Manmo Mondai Kaiketsu no tameno Senso Keikaku Taiko [Outlines
of War Plans for Resolving Manchuria-Mongolia Problem] April 1931.”, in Tsunoda Jun
ed., Ishiwara kanji Shiryo: Kokuboronsakuhen [Ishiwara Kanji Papers: Essays on
⁵ Katakura Tadashi Kankei Monji [Tadashi Katakura Papers], National Diet Library of
Japan (NDL), R29, 394-459.
⁶ Ishiwara Kanji, “Manmo to Nihon no Kokubo” (Manchuria, Mongolia, and Japanese
Staff—insisted in late 1931 that the new government domain in North-East China should be confined to South Manchuria.  

**New Strategy Against the Soviets**

In March 1932, just five months after the Incident, the Manchukuo government was established. By agreement between Puyi (the last Emperor of Qing dynasty) and the Commander of the Kwantung Army, Japan had the responsibility to protect Manchukuo, and the Japanese army was entitled to use every resource for the defense of the new state. Manchukuo was, in turn, required to make a defense contribution totaling approximately 10% of the general account. The War Ministry decided to use this contribution to build the trenches in the eastern border area.  

The Army General Staff had updated its anti-Soviet strategy by August 1932. They expected the main force of the Soviet Army to intrude along the western frontier (Greater Khingan), with branch operations taking place on the northern and eastern frontiers. Then, immediately after the outbreak of war, the Kwangtung Army was to take the offensive in the east, destroying each unit there, and then intercepting the main force. That is, applying the lessons of the Schlieffen Plan in WW I and developing railways and an information infrastructure in Manchuria, they intended to predominate by mobility on each front.  

However, in September 1933, Chief of Operations at the Staff Office, Yorimichi Suzuki admitted to his friend of the War Ministry that they were not confident of victory against the Soviets, owing to the gap in aircraft power between the two countries.  

Thus, as consequence of the Manchurian Incident and the establishment of Manchukuo, both Japan and the USSR were forced to expand their military power in the Far East. As a result of this arms race, the military balance was completely broken.

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by 1935.\textsuperscript{10} In late 1935, it seemed that the strength of both sides were as follows: Japan had 5 divisions, 200 aircraft, and 150 tanks; the Soviets, 14 rifle divisions, 950 aircraft, and 850 tanks.\textsuperscript{11}

Disjunction of Military Strategy

Faced with this situation, from 1932 to 1935, a serious conflict appeared in the Japanese Army over both the governing of Manchukuo and the strategy against the USSR.

Group A (\textit{Kodo-\text{\textbf{h}}a}) wanted to maintain the policy of nurturing Manchukuo and defending against the USSR, while group B (\textit{Tosei-\text{\textbf{h}}a}) insisted on moving into North China to set the buffer area from the unification movement of the Chinese National Party (Kuomintang).

It is said that Group A had fanatical and irrational ideas, and that they maintained aggressive external policies. However, as their main goal was to conserve Japanese national identity against the interfusion of communism, they had a restrained external policy.

Group B had a profound sense of crisis throughout the research and planning for total war, and they had the progressive idea to reform Japan adapting to the new situations. They sought to restructure political and economic regimes, and in so doing, to grasp hegemony in Japanese politics. As such, they were inclined to have influences from other countries; the planned economy from Russia and the fascist politico-economical regime from Germany.

From a modern perspective, Group A can be regarded as ideologists, and group B as progressive.

Ishiwara and His Conception

The ideas of Ishiwara and his followers can be classified as Group C:

\textsuperscript{10} Bouei Kenshujyo [NIDS], \textit{Senshi Sosho: Daihonei Rikugunbu [Army Division of Imperial Headquarters]} vol.1, Tokyo, Asakumo Shinbunsha, p. 352f.

\textsuperscript{11} Bouei Kenshujyo [NIDS], \textit{Senshi Sosho: Kantogun [Kwangtung Army]} vol.1, Tokyo, Asakumo Shinbunsha, 1969, p.194f.
geo-strategist. This group strove to rebuild Japan as a land power, starting with the mobilization of nearly every Japanese military unit to Manchukuo.

Ishiwara was appointed as Chief of Operations in Army General Staff in August 1935. Upon entering the heart of the country's military operations, he was shocked at its lack of military strength. He conceived of a new military strategy, which saw Japan increase its troop strength against the Soviets to 80%, with 8 divisions in Manchuria and Korea. And rapid increase of aircraft strength and mechanized forces were also indispensable. They estimated it needed 12-13 hundred million yen (The expenditure of general account in 1935 was 22 hundred million yen, and the military expenditure was 10.3). And then, in order to meet the demands of operation units, the heavy industrialization of Manchukuo was necessary.12

The basis of his argument was the good aptitude of Manchuria toward economic developments in comparison with Siberia. In ten years or so, he believed Japan could win the “development race” and could make the Soviet Union abandon its offensive in Manchuria.13

In 1936, Ishiwara established a new division for formulating grand strategies. As chief of the division, he drew up a midterm plan of rapid military expansion, composed of 40 divisions (10 divisions in Manchuria) and 140 aviation squadrons by 1942.14

In March 1937, Ishiwara was appointed to Director of Operations at the Staff Office. Ishiwara and his staff designed a five-year economic development plan corresponding to the military expansion plan above. Accordingly, Japan and Manchukuo would obtain two to three times their then-current basic industrial capabilities, and aircraft production would increase tenfold, transforming Japan into a developed, heavy industry economy. The plan made under Ishiwara was approved by both the War Ministry and the Cabinet. Ishiwara estimated that at least ten years of peace were needed to bring his grand vision to fruition.15

12 Ishiwara Kanji, “Tame Sanbojityo [For Vice Chief of Staff]” and “Kaiso Otoroku [Interview by Military History Division, Army General Staff],” in Tsunoda ed., op. cit., p.134f, 434.
14 “Showa 12nen iko Gunbi Jyujitsu ni kansuru Ken [On the Military Expansion after 1937],” Center for Military History, NIDS.
15 Kurono Taeru, Teikoku Kokubo Houshin no Kenkyu [Studies on Imperial Defense
This was the only national grand strategy in modern Japan, which included and combined politics, economics, economy, and military operations. However, in July 1937, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and its escalation to full-scale war prevented the economic plan that sought to develop heavy industries in Manchuria and Japan as a cohesive unit. They had to take priority of meeting demands for the war of the moment over the midterm plan.

The beginning was a small skirmish at Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing between local Chinese and Japanese troops. The War Ministry and Army General Staff were divided into “expansionist” and “non-expansionist” factions, with the latter represented by Ishiwara and the Division for Grand Strategy. Ishiwara opposed the dispatch of troops to Shanghai from mainland Japan and tried to prevent escalating the war. He was eventually forced out of his position in the aftermath of factional infighting.

**Aftermath**

In the spring 1939, the Nomonhan Incident (the Battle of Khalkin Gol) had broken out. The incident had escalated from a small skirmish around the border between Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic to a full-fledged, severe battle between Japan and the Soviet near the river Khalhin Gol in August.

The Chief of Operations at the Staff Office at the time, Masazumi Inada looked back later and said that the Incident was another, and final turning point. Prior to the Incident, in the spring of 1938, he and his staff planned in agreement with the War Ministry to withdraw most troops from Central China, deploying them to the western border area of Manchuria as soon as Hankou had fallen.16

By 1938, the back-foot of the Kwantung Army against the Soviet Army was increasingly remarkable, so that they acknowledged they hardly could take the offensive expect in the east front. Inada, who saw himself as a successor to Ishiwara, aimed to increase the military strength in the western border area, which was intended to enable the offensive in the west front, if necessary. Since excellent

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16 Inada Masazumi Shi Danwa Sokkiroku [Oral history of Masazumi Inada], Tokyo, Kidonikki Kenkyukai, 1968, pp. 253-255.
mechanized units (especially transportation units with trucks like Ford or GM) were necessary for advancing in the desert of Hulunbuir, leveraging the new grand strategy, he aimed to nourish the heavy industries, such as automobile manufacture, in Manchuria.\(^\text{17}\)

In truth, since the Kwantung Army got overwhelmed by mechanical power of the Soviet Army in Nomonhan, according to Inada, they gave up to catch up and after that the project for fundamental modernization of the Japanese Army had never appeared.\(^\text{18}\)

**Conclusion**

In the power struggle among the three groups above, the winner was the progressives (Group B). Hideki Tojo was a representative figure among them. They won the hegemony of Japanese politics, and they succeeded in transforming the politico-economical regime under the Sino-Japanese War.\(^\text{19}\) However, the actual opponent during this period was the Chinese Army. Despite their outdated equipment, the Stuff Office could estimate that the Japanese Army would be ten times stronger than a Chinese military group of roughly the same size. And then, with little improvement, the Japanese Army had to fight the Pacific War.

In a twist of irony, attempts to drastically modernize the Japanese Army—which was provoked by the Manchurian Incident—were abandoned owing to local conflicts: some people in garrisons were willing to escalate it in Ishiwara’s wake: first in Beijing, second in Khalkin Gol.

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*


\(^{19}\) Since the prevailing of “The Total War Regime” theory in the west Europe, this politico-economic regime was interpreted as “The 1940 Regime” in the 1990s of Japan. In the theory, the regime accomplished by 1940 to carry out the total war, had remained after WW II and made high economic growth possible, but now it prevents Japanese economy from restructuring in the globalization age. See, Noguchi Yukio, *1940 nen Taisei: Saraba Senji Keizai* (*The 1940 Regime: Good Bye Wartime Economy*), Tokyo, Toyokeizai Shinposha, 1995.

For the acceptance of the total war regime theory in Japan, see Yamanouchi Yasushi, *Soryokusen Taisei* (*The Total War Regime*), Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 2014.