Japanese Counterinsurgency Operations in North China

Nobu Iwatani

[Summary]

This paper examines the Counterinsurgency Operation conducted by Japanese Army in North China in association with the political campaign and guerrilla warfare conducted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

After the Sino-Japanese War broke out the Eighth Route Army had made efforts to build their base as well as accommodate and reorganize private armed forces while avoiding battles with Japanese Army. As a result, the member of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army had readed about 500,000 at the end of 1940. In their base area, the regular army was responsible for base defense and attacking enemy’s main force, local forces including flying column was responsible for disturbing the enemy the Eighth Route Army, and the militia defended their villages. Due to poor equipment, had been focused on guerrilla warfare. They also expanded their force by conducting political campaign to solders and residents, and they became a threat to Japanese Army at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Under these circumstances, the following were required for Japanese Army to succeed in Counterinsurgency Operation. First, obtaining accurate information was essential. Not only strategy related military information, security information relating political campaign was also essential. The former was often obtained by COMINT and SIGINT, and the latter was obtained only through constant effort for information gathering by military police and experts on the CCP. Although the Imperial headquarters Army Department neglected the importance of intelligence for the CCP, the North China Army was aware of the importance of intelligence and also achieved a certain degree of success through the efforts of improving intelligence collection.

Second, gaining support of the local population was required to fight against the guerrilla and conduct the counterinsurgency operation. It the Japanese Army need to achieve popular support, appersing the locals is not enough. In this regard, the Japanese Army had fallen behind of the CCP. However, even if the Japanese Army fully realized the importance of popular support, it was hard to put an idea into action due to shortage of hands and goods, especially after the latter half of the Pacific War. Although the efforts of the Japanese Army toward counterinsurgency operation seemed appropriate, it has no power left to fully develop
Stabilization of the Public Sentiment under Japanese Military Administration in the Southern Regions

Kyoichi Tachikawa

[Summary]

In the progress of the Southern Operation, Japanese Army conducted pacification and publicity works sequentially from the occupied areas when starting the military administration. At the same time, they also tried to gain the cooperation from local officials of Sultan and influential people of each ethnic group to establish the public sentiment by restoring public order through the reconstruction of the administrative system and the establishment of police organization. After the first stage of the Southern Operation had completed and the military administration was formally enforced, the Japanese Army took full-fledged measures to establish and ensure the public sentiment and prevent destabilization. More specifically, policies and guidelines of the southern military administration were followed: in terms of politics, society and culture, measures were taken for the protection of religion, respect of belief customs, use of the residual governance system, and functional recovery of judicial, police and education systems; in terms of economy, measures were taken to ensure a stable supply of daily necessities including food, stabilize prices, prevent unemployment, and protect local business activities.

The public sentiment was generally established, except some areas, during the spring and summer of 1942, six months into the war. The establishment of public sentiment in such early stage was the result of the efforts of restoring order through the reconstruction of the administrative system and the establishment of police organization, which were done in parallel with the pacification and publicity works, thanks to the overwhelming dominance of Japanese Army. In addition, after the military administration officially came into effect in February – March 1942, measures were taken in areas of politics, economy, society and culture, which also demonstrated certain effects.

On the other hand, such measures of establishing public sentiment were not universal.
Activities of anti-Japanese forces such as defeated soldiers and guerrilla in some areas continued until the end of the war, without being eradicated by public sentiment establishing measures. Establishment of public sentiment had the top priority in the enforcement of military administration along with the recovery and maintenance of public order. It was a requirement to the success of the military administration. However, establishment of public sentiment was not universal and the effects of each measure were not long-lasting. Thus, the administration needed to set out new policies according to the circumstances. Similarly, the effects of these new policies would not last very long. Therefore, establishment of public sentiment is a requirement but not a sufficient condition.

The Defense Build-up Concept and Modernization of JASDF in the Post-Fourth Defense Program: As 2 examples, treatment against Fundamental defense force concept and introduction of F-15

Hideyuki Takahashi

[Summary]

This paper focuses on the defense force build-up of Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) in the Post 4th Defense Build-up Plan. It reveals how the JASDF dealt with the trend of de-threat based fundamental defense force concept and proceeded with the defense force build-up with the main aim of modernization, thus "shifting from quantity to quality", using the 3rd FX - a major challenge at the time - as a case study.

In previous research, some discussed problems from a critical standpoint that the uniformed personnel disapproved the fundamental defense force concept, and some did not analyze the military rationality sufficiently. In fact, the main actors of Air Staff Office responsible for the defense build-up of JASDF had responded realistically to withstand the future changes. In particular, they understood the current situation of the defense force build-up based on the opposing relative strength, which was the unavoidable reduction of defense budget while keeping the idea of required defense force. They also set a goal of “status quo + α” as a realistic compromise to avoid further quantitative restrictions. After tenacious negotiations with internal bureau and the Ministry of Finance (at the time), the Air Staff Office was able to establish a theoretical grounding of the ‘status quo + α’, secure possible
room for the defense build-up at the basis of counter-threat, and get the policy makers to recognize an insufficient defense force (feasibility of expansion: 1% GNP) as a "political risk".

The model selection of F-15 was on this context. Compared to the previous FX selections, rather than having influences from the outside of the Defense Agency such as trading companies and relevant politicians, they were able to put qualitative capacity as the top priority and select the models based on the military rationality.

The main factors of this were as follows: 1) an overall analysis of cost-effectiveness through counter-threat based OR (especially, data that was obtained in the Mig-25 incident had contributed to the reliability improvement of OR), and 2) required financial resources being secured by adjusting the number of F-4 to be procured, which was still in progress of procurement at the time.

After that, with the development of the Cold War triggered by Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghan (1979), Japan expanded the quantity of the selected F-15 and the number in possession became the second only to the US in the west. Therefore, the possession of F-15 by JASDF made a contribution to “deterrence” after the new Cold War coupled with Japan-US alliance.

We need long term for Defense Build-up, and on the occasion of Build-up, we can not handle against rapid change of situation. This case suggests that even when the restrictions are severe, continuing to secure a “bud for future” until conditions get better can ensure the diversity and respond to the future uncertainty even in the current defense force build-up.