

Evolution of Japanese Infantry Tactics after the First World War

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1-26

During the first stage of the World War I, basically infantrymen used to act in a compact formation with their companies lined up side by side, equipped only with a rifle as their firearm. With the war deadlocked in the Western Front, however, both the German army and the allied forces of the British and France made trials and errors to find the way to break directly through the enemy lines during the approximately four-year battle based on position operations, and it became increasingly clear that the traditional organization, equipment and formation of the infantry and the traditional method of commanding them were not adequate for prosecution of modern warfare. Finally every country reached a somewhat common conclusion as to the need for transformation of the mode of battle of the infantry. In other words, the need for more diversified and complex organization and equipment at the infantry battalion level, comprehensive exercise of the fighting power operated by the battalions, dispersion and liquidation of operations of the infantry, and delegation of command and control to the squad level was recognized.

Information on such changes in tactics during the First World War was successively obtained by the Japanese Army through activities of the Provisional Military Investigation Committee established within the Ministry of Army in 1915. As organizational efforts for adoption of lessons learned by the European countries from the war, the Japanese Army conducted the Position Operations Manoeuvres (1918), edited the draft of the Infantry Drill-book (1920), considered the Infantry Fighting Method Workshop (1921) and conducted the Position Operations Special Manoeuvres (1922) for the purpose of continuous consideration. In the process of compilation of the draft of the Infantry Drill-book (1923), it was decided that the Japanese Army would transit to a new fighting method, completely getting rid of their traditional fighting method based on the one during the Russo-Japanese War, on the basis of the same idea as was held by the European countries, which had adopted the lessons learned from the First World War.

The Defense Build-up Concept of JMSDF in the
Post-Fourth Defense Program:
The Modernization of Maritime Force and
“Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters Concept”

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27-55

“The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters” in JMSDF has been regarded as one of the symbols of our nation's defense force modernization after 1980s.

However, there have been not necessarily previous academic and systematic research investigating the background and the objective of this concept, and the real meaning of this concept for our nation's maritime defense though the summary of this concept was described in the “JMSDF 50 Years History” etc.

Taking it into consideration that we have recently gotten some valuable verbal evidence by the planners of this concept with oral history conducted by NIDS, I tried to reaffirm the background and development process of this concept, and to thereby consider the meaning of “The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters” in maritime defense of Japan and so on.

Regarding this, the author's view is as follows. That is, JMSDF which had been kept lower priority about defense build-up than JGSDF and JASDF, had the resistance for “the fundamental defense force concept” because it had a feature of keeping the scale of the defense forces status quo. In addition, as a turning point that the possession of five escort flotilla which JMSDF had requested for long time was not permitted in decision of “National Defence Program Outline”, JMSDF decided to compensate for the lack of flotilla quantity with the improvement of equipments quality (modernization). This was the reason why JMSDF came to formulate “The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters”

Furthermore, this concept was not only trial for modernization of equipment but also for aiming at promoting the integrity of military rationality and the political relevance including the financial consideration. It was a realistic measure based on the

concept of High-low Mix, and it is thought that its development process is even useful in the business of today's national security policy and defence policy.

The paper is composed of the following three chapters, thereby reaffirming and considering all the facts related those above.

Chapter 1 “Transition of the Defense Build-up Plan and JMSDF” reviews the transition of the Defense Build-up Plan in view of the defense concept since foundation of JMSDF and confirms the actual strength of the escort flotillas in those days. Chapter 2 “Fundamental defense force concept in the National Defense Program Outline and JMSDF” reviews details of development of the fundamental defense force concept and the “51NDPO : National Defense Program in and after FY1977”, and describes the background of the need for “The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters.” Chapter 3 “Establishment of ‘The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters’ and its meaning for our nation’s maritime defense” reaffirms the process of accomplishment of the concept with a focus on construction of New Destroyers planed in post-fourth defense program, and reviews the meaning of “The Concept of Eight Destroyers with Eight Helicopters” for our nation’s maritime defense.

The Image of a Preemptive Air Attack against Egypt by the Israeli Air Force in the Six-Day War

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56-84

The outcome of the Six-Day War was determined on its first day, by the success of the surprise air attack operation of Israel. Particularly the attack on the Egyptian air force, which was the strongest in the Arab side, played a major part. This paper is designed to describe the latest understanding of said Israeli surprise air attack on Egypt, which has often been described only from an Israeli point of view, by intensively using the latest documents (especially those from the Egyptian side), and to gain a new insight into the air operations from an operational point of view.

The situation was critical for Israel before the war, as the Arab countries were said to possess four times as strong aviation power as Israel. Israel decided on a basic doctrine

stipulating that military action would be started with a surprise attack on the enemy air base at the beginning of the war, on the basis of the lessons learned from the Suez Crisis, and attacks on air bases became the top priority of the Israeli air force.

On the first day of the war, the Israeli air force started a surprise air attack on Egypt with the use of almost all its operational planes. The attacking force, in formations each composed of four planes, made waves of attacks on several Egyptian air bases. The initial assault destroyed the runways, and the subsequent Strafing attacked planes remaining in the bases. The attack was successful, and many of the bombers and most advanced fighters, the highest-priority target, were destroyed. In fact morale was high in the existing units of the Egyptian air force and they struck back sporadically, but a variety of factors prevented them from stopping the attack of the Israeli air force.

Determining factors included information, training, the quality of commanders, cooperation among the Arab countries, lessons which had not been used, and rigid commanding activities. As for information, especially on the day of the attack, Israel obtained information on the planes remaining in the bases by wire-tapping the phone, and thoroughly assaulted even on shunting airplanes. As for training, Egypt had been providing training inappropriate for operational conditions while Israeli had focused all their training efforts on this surprise air attack. Qualities of the top ranking officers in Egypt were lower than expected, and many unit commanders in the war area had been replaced immediately before the beginning of the war, which hampered adequate prosecution of the war. There was virtually no cooperation among the Arab countries, which made it possible for Israel to defeat each of them. Israeli used lessons learned from the Suez Crisis, but Egypt did not. Furthermore the rigid commanding activities on the Egyptian side could not respond to changes in situations.

It has been traditionally believed that excellence and power on the Israeli side mainly contributed to the success of this surprise air attack, and that incompetency and failure of the Egyptian army were only a secondary contributor. Facts concerning the Egyptian side demonstrate that their incompetency and failure were rather a main factor. It is suggested that a complete victory in surprise air attack operations under unfavorable conditions might have been impossible without negligence of the enemy.