

国際会議参加報告

第40回国際軍事史学会大会の概要

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本年度(2014年度)の第40回国際軍事史学会大会は、8月30日(土)から9月5日(金)にかけてブルガリア共和国のヴァルナのホテル兼国際会議場にて開催され、32ヶ国から約230名が参加した。大会の共通テーマは「第一次世界大戦」であり、24の部会等において小官によるものを含め計72の論文が発表された。

そのうちの一部を紹介すると、小官が参加した部会「アジア諸国の戦争」では、中国からの参加者が第一次世界大戦が戦争全般に及ぼした影響について発表、続いて小官が「第一次世界大戦と日本——地中海への艦隊派遣を中心に」を発表し、最後に韓国からの参加者が、日本が第一次世界大戦に参戦し、勝利したことが、本当にその後の日本にとってプラスだったのかという、興味深い発表を行った。その後、それぞれの発表に対する活発な質疑応答が行われた。

本大会への参加を通じて考えさせられたことは、世界各国、とりわけヨーロッパ諸国の中で第一次世界大戦の占める「大きさ」である。

周知の通り、2014年は第一次世界大戦開戦100周年にあたり、ヨーロッパ諸国を中心としてその起源、過程、結末、さらには社会全般に対する影響などに関する国際会議が多数開催されている。但し、過去10年間に開催された第一次世界大戦をめぐる国際会議の多くは、軍事史の観点でからではなく、社会史や文化史からのものが多かっただけに、その意味においても軍事史に焦点を絞った本会議の意義は極めて大きなものであったように思われる。また、本会議はブルガリアで開催されたこともあり、日本人には馴染みの薄い東部戦線での戦争の様相についての発表が多々あったため、極めて興味深いものであった。

なお、2015年度の大会は中国の北京で開催される予定である。その後は、2016年度にはトルコのイスタンブールでの開催が予定され、2017年度はカメルーンで開催する方向で調整が進められている。また、2018年度は未定であるものの、2019年度には既にアメリカが立候補している。

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Japan and the First World War: Focusing upon its Naval Escort Mission in the Mediterranean

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【要約】

1914年の第一次世界大戦開戦直後、日本は日英同盟の精神に基づいて第一次世界大戦に参戦することになる。日本は8月23日、ドイツに対して宣戦布告した。

歴史家ですら、第一次世界大戦における日本の関与について知らないものが多い中、筆者は、便宜上、以下の4つの領域において日本の関与が重要であったと考える。第1は、青島のドイツ軍基地に対する上陸及び包囲作戦及び西太平洋における島々の占領、第2は、1918年以降のいわゆるシベリア出兵、第3に日本の同盟諸国（いわゆる連合国）に対する武器弾薬の輸出、そして、第4に地中海への艦隊派遣、であるが、この小論で筆者はこの第4の艦隊派遣について焦点を当ててみたい。

1917年春以降、日本海軍は駆逐艦8隻と旗艦となる巡洋艦1隻を地中海のマルタに派遣した（派遣した艦艇数は、その後増加する）。そこで「第二特務艦隊」は、同盟諸国の輸送船の護衛任務に就き、ドイツ及びオーストリア軍の潜水艦の攻撃から同盟諸国の輸送船を保護した。基本的にはマルタを中心として、マルセイユ、タラント、そしてアレキサンドリアとの交通路を護衛したのである。ある史料によれば、第二特務艦隊は計348回の護衛任務に従事している。

しかしながら、こうした第一次世界大戦での日本海軍による関与及び貢献は、今日、世界の歴史家の注目を集めるには殆ど至っていない。おそらく、この理由の一端は、第二次世界大戦の記憶が暗い影を落としているからであろうが、だからこそ筆者は、この小論で小規模ではあるが正当に評価されるべき同大戦での日本の関与について、読者の注意を喚起したいのである。

確かに、ヨーロッパ西部戦線での激しい戦闘や凄まじいまでの殺戮、例えばソンムの戦いやヴェルダン戦の戦いなどと比較すれば、地中海における日本海軍の関与など微々たるものであろう。また、地中海でのアメリカ海軍の関与と比較しても（同国が第一次世界大戦に参加したのは1917年春以降である）、日本の関与及び貢献について過大に評価することは許されない。

だが、こうした事実を認めながらも本論は、兵站の重要性、つまり戦場に補給物資を送り込み続けることがいかに重要であるか論じるものである。

Foreword

In 1914 the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, first signed in 1902, for mutual defense encouraged Japan to enter the First World War on the British side.¹ Japan declared war against Germany on the 23rd of August under the spirit of the Alliance, with the aim of capturing the German base of Tsingtao on mainland China and occupying the German Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas(except Guam) island groups in the Western Pacific.²

Tsingtao (and Kiaochow Bay) was besieged and taken on the 7th of November 1914 by a largely Japanese naval and land force, with token British participation for political reasons.³ By then, the German island groups in the Western Pacific north of the equator had been occupied by the Japanese.

The Imperial Japanese Navy also helped escort ANZAC troopships across the Indian Ocean and some of its warships took part in the hunt for the German light cruiser *Emden* in the East Indies and Indian Ocean, and for Admiral von Spee's German East Asiatic Squadron in the Pacific Ocean. The German squadron destroyed a Royal Navy squadron at the Battle of Coronel before being itself destroyed at the Battle of the Falkland Islands.

Until 1917 however, the Japanese forces stayed mainly in the Asia- Pacific region.

1. Japan's Decisions for War

Anglo-Japanese relations before and at the outbreak of the First World War

¹ The Alliance was renewed and extended in scope twice in 1905 and 1911, before its demise in 1921. It officially terminated in 1923. For the English literature on the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, see Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo- Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907* (London: Athlone Press, 1985), pp. 23- 95; Phillips O'Brien, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance* (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2004).

² On the 15th of August Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany, stating that Germany must withdraw its warships from Chinese and Japanese waters and transfer control of Tsingtao to Japan. When the ultimatum expired on the 23rd Japan declared war on Germany.

³ For the Japanese, Tsingtao was the object of great interest. For the English literature on the Tsingtao campaign, see John Dixon, *A Clash of Empires: The South Wales Borderers at Tsingtao, 1914* (Wrexham: Bridge Books, 2008); John Dixon, "Germany's Gibraltar: The Siege of Tsingtao," *Britain at War* (October 2008), pp. 25-31; Charles B. Burdick, *The Japanese Siege of Tsingtao: World War I in Asia* (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976); Mark J. Grove, "The Development of Japanese Amphibious Warfare, 1874 to 1942," in Geoffrey Till, Theo Farrell, Mark J. Grove. eds., *Amphibious Operations* (SGSI, The Occasional, No. 31, October 1997).

were not cordial. Far from it.⁴

Britain withdrew its earlier request for Japan to join the War, and when Japan did declare war on Germany, Britain maintained that Japan had to limit the scope of its military or naval operations just off the coast of China, which naturally upset Japanese political as well as military leaders.⁵

This is because many British leaders quite correctly suspected that far from aiding the Allied cause in the War, the Japanese aimed simply to profit at the expense of the European powers' interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan for its part, regarded the outbreak of the War as "god-given opportunity" to expel the Germans from the Asia-Pacific, establishing and strengthening its sphere of influence in the region, most notably in China. Japanese Foreign Minister Takaaki KATO expected that the War in Europe could spell opportunity for Japan to assert itself as the hegemon of the Asia-Pacific, and therefore took the government into the war although Japan was technically not obligated under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁶

Sakuzo YOSHINO, soon to gain celebrity among the Japanese as the preeminent champion of democracy, saw it as "absolutely the most opportune moment" to advance Japan's standing in China.⁷

At the same time, however, the Japanese military, especially the Imperial

⁴ For example, the Australians were alarmed rather than reassured when, after the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905 the British withdrew ships from the Asia-Pacific in order to better counter German naval growth in the North Sea arguing that Japan could protect British interests in the region. Carl Bridge, "W. M. Hughes and Japan at the Paris Peace Conference and After, 1916-22: A New Assessment" (paper presented at NIDS seminar, April 2012).

⁵ For more details, see, for example, Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, pp. 365-377; Ian H. Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-23* (London: Athlone Press, 1972), pp. 115-157; Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 177-219; Frederick R. Dickinson, "Japan" in Richard F. Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig, eds., *The Origins of World War I* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 300-336; S. C. M. Paine, *The Wars for Asia 1911-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 13-47.

⁶ KATO was an early advocate of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. For him, the key to Japan's world standing remained in steadily expanding economic privileges in China and continued association with the world's greatest naval power and largest commercial presence on the Asian Continent, Britain.

⁷ Williamson Murray, Tomoyuki Ishizu, "Introduction to Japan and the United States," in Williamson Murray, Tomoyuki Ishizu, eds., *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), pp. 1-17; Jonathan Bailey, *Great Power Strategy in Asia: Empire, Culture and Trade, 1905-2005* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), pp. 61-84.

Japanese Army, worried about potential Japanese losses in a military engagement with Germany. In fact, most of the military experts gave Germany a better than even chance of victory in Europe.⁸

Even the students of the First World War sometimes overlook Japan's role in the War, but there are four areas where, the author believes, Japanese commitment was important.

These are; (1) the landing and siege operations on the German base in China at Tsingtao, combined with the occupation of various islands in the Western Pacific, (2) the expedition against the Bolsheviks in Siberia from 1918 onwards, (3) exports of weapons and ammunitions to the Allied, and, (4) the naval escort mission in the Mediterranean.

In addition, Japan was asked to contribute more to the Allied over the course of the First World War, and these included; to send land forces to the Eastern Front; to send land forces to the Western Front; to send a naval force to the American Atlantic coast; to send an expedition to the Gulf of Aden or the Red Sea, but the Japanese government turned all of them down mainly because of its military reasons.⁹

Let us now briefly examine the four areas in turn.

2. Japan in the Asia-Pacific Region

Firstly, Japan was active over the entire course of the First World War in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Oceans, and this is mainly by naval commitment.

This includes, once again, the attack on the German base in China at Tsingtao,¹⁰ combined with the occupation of the German island groups in the Western Pacific, hunting for the German East Asiatic Squadron in the Pacific Ocean, escorting ANZAC troopships across the Indian Ocean, and patrolling in the Pacific.

Japan even helped British forces to put down a mutiny by Indian soldiers in Singapore in February 1915.¹¹

⁸ Germany for its part approached Japan in 1916 for a separate peace.

⁹ These Allied requests were presented over the course of the War, officially or not, and were on the whole not pursued if they were once rejected by Japan.

¹⁰ The Tsingtao campaign was a naval blockade followed by landing and siege operations. From the British side, the 2nd Battalion of the South Wales Borderers and a half battalion of the 36th Shirkts took part in the campaign. See Dixon, *A Clash of Empires*, pp. 13- 37; Dixon, "Germany's Gibraltar," pp. 25- 31.

¹¹ In February 1915, marine units from the Imperial Japanese Navy ships based in Singapore

3. Japan and the Siberian Intervention

Secondly, the so-called Siberian Intervention from 1918 onwards may have been a small issue in the First World War for most of the European powers, but it was strategically very important for Japan.

The Siberian Intervention was the dispatch of troops of the Allied to the Russian Maritime Provinces as part of a larger effort by the Western powers and Japan to support White Russian forces against the Bolshevik Red Army during the Russian Civil War.

The collapse of the Russian Eastern Front presented a tremendous problem to the Allied, since not only did it allow Germany to shift troops and war material from its Eastern Front to the west, but it also made it possible for Germany to secure the huge stockpiles of supplies that had been accumulating at such strategically important places as Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok.

In addition, some 50.000 Czech Legion, fighting on the side of the Allied, was now trapped behind “enemy- lines,” and was attempting to fight its way out through the east to Vladivostok, along the Bolshevik- held Trans- Siberian Railway.

Faced with these concerns, Britain and France decided to militarily intervene in the Russian Civil War against the Bolshevik government.¹² The Japanese viewed the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 as an opportunity to free Japan from any future threat from Russia by, if possible at all, detaching Siberia and forming an independent buffer state.

However, the Japanese government had in the beginning refused to undertake such a military expedition and it was not until the following year, 1918, that events were set in motion which led to a change in its policy. The agreement of the United States was obtained. Whereas Britain and France would have been happy to give Japan a free hand, the United States would not agree, and the Japanese leaders had declined to send an expedition to the area of Amur basin unless they were invited to do

helped suppress a mutiny by Indian troops against the British government.

¹² Britain and France had three objectives that they hoped to achieve: (1) prevent the Allied war material stockpiles in Russia from falling into German hands, (2) rescue the Czech Legion and return it to the European Front, (3) resurrect the Eastern Front by installing a White Russian backed government. For the English literature on the Siberia Intervention, see Paul E. Drnscomb, *Japan's Siberian Intervention 1918- 1922: 'A Great Disobedience against the People'* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011).

so by the United States.¹³

After lengthy discussions, Japan and the United States reached an agreement (without really consulting their European allies) to undertake an inter- Allied expedition on the 2 August and Japan dispatched more than 70,000 soldiers in total to Siberia.¹⁴

Although Western powers finally decided to withdraw from Russia in 1920, the Japanese stayed on, primarily due to fears of the spread of communism so close to Japan, and the Japanese controlled Korea and Manchuria, north-eastern part of China.

It was not until 1922 that Japan decided to withdraw from the Russian Maritime Provinces, and finally in 1925 Japan withdrew from the northern half of Sakhalin after it had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

4. Japan as a logistical Base

A third area is the exports of weapons and ammunitions to the Allied. Military supplies were sold on a large scale to the Russians for use on the Eastern Front. One could argue that the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 could not have been carried out without Japanese military supplies. In fact, almost two- thirds of the weapons and ammunitions used by Russian soldiers in 1916 were imported from Japan.

In addition, Japan helped the French by, for example, constructing 12 destroyers to the French navy, and again, vast amount of Japanese military supplies were used by the French soldiers, say, at the battle of Verdun of 1916. And it is needless to say that Japan exported weapons and ammunitions to its most important ally, Britain as well.

¹³ When the United States entered the War on the 6th of April 1917, Japan and the United States found themselves on the same side, despite its increasing acrimonious relations over China and competition for influence in the Asia- Pacific region. This led to the Lansing- *Ishii* agreement of the 2nd of November 1917 to help reduce tensions. See Murray, Ishizu, "Introduction to Japan and the United States," in Murray, Ishizu, eds., *Conflicting Currents*, pp. 1- 17.

¹⁴ There were of course other strategic reasons behind the Japanese intervention including the expansion of Japan's sphere of influence. True, Japan was in Siberia primarily to safeguard stockpiled military supplies and to rescue the Czech Legion. However, the Japanese government's intense hostility to communism, a determination to recoup historical losses to Russia, and the perceived opportunity to settle the "northern problem" in Japan's security by either creating a buffer state, or through outright territorial acquisition, were also important factors.

5. Japan's Naval Escort Mission in the Mediterranean

A fourth area of commitment is the Imperial Japanese Navy's escort mission in the Mediterranean, upon which the author will focus in the following sections.

As was mentioned above, it was Japan's desire to occupy Tsingtao and the German island groups in the Western Pacific that led Japan to war. Japan also needed to consolidate its position in China, as exemplified by the presentation of the so-called "Twenty-one Demands" of 1915, and to secure a voice at a peace conference after the War.¹⁵

The Imperial Japanese Navy, which had long advocated Japan's advance to the South as opposed to the Army's desire for Northward advance, was among the most powerful driving forces.¹⁶ It is little wonder that Real Admiral Saneyuki AKIYAMA, the main architect of the Japanese naval operation plan at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, vigorously supported not only Japanese participation in the War, but its escort mission in the Mediterranean.¹⁷

Responding to the British request for further support to the War, from April 1917, 8 destroyers with a flagship cruiser under the command of Rear Admiral Kozo SATO (the Second Special Squadron with the 10th and 11th Japanese flotillas) were

¹⁵ For more details about this issue and the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, see Frank Dikotter, *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 101- 104, 160- 161.; Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race, and Equality* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 115; Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 84- 116; Frederick R. Dickinson, *World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919- 1930* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.1- 22.

¹⁶ This escort mission gave the Imperial Japanese Navy a rationale for enlarging its budget *vis-avis* the Army and expanding the fleet. See J. C. Schenking, "Bureaucratic Politics, Military Budgets and Japan's Southern Advance: The Imperial Navy's Seizure of German Micronesia in the First World War," *War in History*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 308- 326.

¹⁷ Admiral Saneyuki AKIYAMA, who had long advocated Japan's Southward advance, argued strongly in favor of not only participation in the War, but also sending a squadron to the Mediterranean on the ground that, though there would be danger and possibly casualties, it would contribute to a greater understanding of naval techniques and technology and lead to the improvement of weaponry in the Japanese Navy.

At the same time, however, there was a strong group in the Naval General Staff who opposed this course on the ground that "for Japan to operate in a war zone which is of no direct interest to the Empire will not only cause disaster to its ships but also put at risk the valuable bulwark of the state." Those who opposed to AKIYAMA's course also argued that, by sending a considerable naval force to the Mediterranean, Japan would be leaving its home island undefended and vulnerable. For AKIYAMA and his argument, see Sadao ASADA, *From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: American Strategic Theory and the Rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2006).

based at Malta in the Mediterranean, playing an important and efficient part in anti-submarine convoy escort-duty against German U-boats, along the sea lines of communication between Marseille and Malta, Taranto and Malta, and Malta and Alexandria.¹⁸ A further 4 brand-new destroyers arrived in Malta in August as the 15th flotilla with the armored cruiser *Izumo* to add to the Japanese commitment.¹⁹ As one may as well recall, Germany had declared the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, and overall casualties of the Allied transports were increasing dramatically since then.

Apart from the warships mentioned above, two British destroyers, *Minstrel* and *Nemesis* (renamed as *Sendan* and *Kanran* respectively) were handed over to the Japanese Navy in June 1917 and manned by its sailors for the duration of the War. In addition, two British sloops, renamed *Tokyo* and *Saikyo*, were also in the Mediterranean. As was mentioned above, 12 destroyers made by the Japanese were handed over to the French Navy, all of which were on the active duty there during the entire course of the War.²⁰

The Japanese were nominally independent, but they actually carried out whatever orders they received from the British Commander-in-Chief at Malta, Admiral George A. Ballard. According to Japanese sources, the Japanese Navy by the end of the War carried out escort missions 348 times, escorting 788 Allied warships and transports and 750,000 personnel, with 34 actual combat operations.

Three episodes are worth mentioning in this short paper.

First, in May 1917, two Japanese destroyers engaged in a rescue operation, saving British personnel from the transport *Transylvania* which was sunk by the German torpedoes, despite the fact that the German U-boat was still in the vicinity. 3,000 out of 3,300 personnel were rescued. In recognition of this rescue operation, 27 Japanese officers and sailors were awarded military medals by the King George V.

A second episode was rather tragic. One of the Japanese destroyers, *Sakaki*,

¹⁸ When Japan received assurances from its allies of something tangible in return: an immediate promise by the Allied to support Japan's claims to former German possessions which it then occupied, Japan decided to send a naval force to the Mediterranean.

¹⁹ Cruiser *Akashi* arrived in Malta in mid-April 1917 as flagship of eight destroyers of the 10th and 11th flotillas. In August 1917, armored cruiser *Izumo* arrived in the Mediterranean to relieve *Akashi* as flagship.

²⁰ Furthermore, two of the four cruisers of the First Special Squadron were sent to Cape Town, South Africa.

was torpedoed by the Austrian U- 27 on the 11th of June 1917 in the Eastern Mediterranean off Crete. She was badly damaged, with 59 dead including the Captain of the ship, Commander Taichi UEHARA.²¹

Thirdly, in the face of the German spring offensive of 1918, *Kaiserschlacht*, the Allied employed the so- called “Big Convoys” in the Mediterranean between Marseille and Alexandria, and all of the five round- trip convoys were escorted mainly by the Japanese destroyers with a minimum loss of transports.

With these Japanese activities in the Mediterranean, Admiral, G. C. Dickens, Commander- in- Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet reported back to the Admiralty that, “whereas Italians are inefficient, French are unreliable, Greeks are out of the calculation, and Americans are too far away, the Japanese are excellent, but small in number.”²² *The Times* newspaper also praised the Japanese Navy using such expressions as “speedy arrival and seamanlike,” and “good seamanship and greatest rapidity of action.”²³ From these remarks, one could easily imagine how grateful the British felt at that time to have Japanese destroyers in the Mediterranean.

Indeed, Ian Nish wrote in his *Alliance in Decline*:

“If we try to assess Japan’s naval contribution to the allied effort, we have to conclude that it was considerable in the last stage of the war. It was by no means the sole cause of allied success in meeting the submarine onslaught; but it has to be numbered as one factor alongside the contribution of American destroyers and the success of the British convoy system. Her contribution in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean was a great relief to the Royal Navy. Finally, Japan’s naval assistance was more valuable to Britain than to other members of Entente who were less dependent on keeping open trade channels.”²⁴

Paul Halpern also concluded in his *A Naval History Of World War I* that “this Japanese contribution.....at a critical moment in the war against submarines has

²¹ *Sakaki* was salvaged and repaired.

²² Paul G. Halpern, *The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915-1918* (London: Temple Smith, 1987), p. 496.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Nish, *Alliance in Decline*, p. 228.

been largely forgotten, but under the circumstances it was far from negligible.”²⁵

It is, however, true to say that these commitments by the Imperial Japanese Navy during the First World War have almost been “forgotten,” even remaining outside conventional appreciation by historians, partly because it was overshadowed by the memories of the Second World War in 1939-45.

This is why the author wants to draw the attention of the audience to a small but remarkable aspect of the history among the Allied and that, some 100 years ago, Japan and the Allied European countries fought side by side in the Mediterranean for common causes.

Conclusion

If one visits Malta today, one can see a memorial built in 1918 at the Commonwealth War Graves, to the 78 Japanese sailors who fell in the Mediterranean. 73 out of these 78, including the Captain of the destroyer *Sakaki* were buried there.

Ironically, the memorial was destroyed by a German air raid during the Second World War at the Battle of Malta and then left unattended until 1973 when it was reconstructed.

True, compared with the fierce battle and sheer slaughter of the Western Front, say, in Somme and Verdun, the Japanese naval commitment and casualties in the Mediterranean may only be a side-show in the First World War.

Even among naval operations during the War, the Mediterranean campaign could only be a small footnote if one compares its significance with that of, say, the Battle of Jutland to the entire course of the War.

True, compared with the US Navy’s contribution in the Mediterranean (Note that the US was a late comer to the First World War),²⁶ Japanese commitment cannot be exaggerated.

Having accepted this, however, one could still argue that the importance of logistics or supplying the theatre of war must never be underestimated.

However, the lessons of the Mediterranean operations, including the importance of the *guerre de course*, of blockade, of submarine and anti-submarine

²⁵ Paul G. Halpern, *A Naval History of World War I* (Abington; Routledge, 1994), p. 393.

²⁶ For the US contribution in the Mediterranean, see for example, *The Times History of the War* (London: Times Publishing Company, 1919), Vol., XVIII, p. 449.

warfare, and the value of the merchant navy and convoy systems for example, were neither properly learned nor implemented in its policy by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the 1920s and 30s.

Hence, the Second World War in the Pacific.²⁷

(The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not reflect the views of the NIDS, the Defense Ministry or the Government of Japan.)

²⁷ For the good account of the Pacific War, see Daniel Marston, eds., *The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima* (Oxford: Osprey, 2005).