The Sustainment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by Japan: an International Political Science Approach
Yasufumi Miyahara

A large number of excellent researches concerning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance have been carried out. However, little is known about why Japan had continued to ally with Britain for over twenty years, and she had regarded it as “diplomatic essence of Empire of Japan.” For this reason, I would like to show the distinctive factor leading the Japanese to ally with Britain, and to outline its history by use of international politics hypothesis in order to focus on that factor.

In the early Meiji period, Japanese leaders perceived that they lived in the law of Jungle, and that Europe was our threat. And they had assessed the Korean Peninsula as the focal point of national defense, over which Russia’s military threat had been approaching. Russia’s “Offensive Power” was increased by constructing the Siberian Railway, and her “Geographic Proximity” increased by occupying Manchuria after Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Japanese leaders strongly perceived her “Aggressive Intentions” from past her actions. Consequently, Japanese leaders decided to select Britain alliance in balancing against Russia’s threat.

Just after the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese leaders’ perception of Russia’s threat didn’t change. On the other hand Britain alliance’s “Credibility” increased through that War. Their expectation of potential effect, or the guarantee of Japan’s international status and overcoming racial prejudice, from Britain alliance increased too. However, from around 1907, Russia’s threat changed into potential one. And Britain alliance’s “Credibility” decreased. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance persisted, because of Britain’s “hegemonic Leadership” making sacrifices such as being criticized by America, or accepting Japan’s activities on the Asian Continent and the effect Japanese leaders expected would stem from the alliance with Britain.

After that, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance wavered from Xinhai Revolution to WWI. Furthermore, Russia’s threat diminished, no longer imminent threat. Under these circumstances, Britain’s “hegemonic Leadership” weakened, her alliance’s “Credibility” further declined. Japanese leaders’ expectation of effect stemming from the alliance with Britain still remained. But before long they didn’t persisted on Britain alliance if Britain wouldn’t want Japanese alliance.
The effect Japanese leaders expected would stem from the alliance with Britain, which cannot be explained well in international politics hypothesis I use. Actually it was likely the distinctive factor leading the Japanese leaders to continue the alliance with Britain.

Following this, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance fluctuated during the period from the Xinhai Revolution to the First World War. Furthermore, due to revolution, the threat from Russia greatly diminished and was no longer imminent. Under these circumstances, Britain’s hegemonic power weakened, and confidence in the alliance further declined. Although hopes for the benefits of forging the alliance with British power remained as before, the Japanese leadership’s eventual reasoning was that if Great Britain did not want the alliance, Japan would be less concerned with pushing for it. The alliance was in its dying days and was gradually being replaced by a state of affairs in which Japan had cooperative relationships with both Britain and America.

The hope of benefitting from an alliance with Great Britain was a perpetuating factor, which cannot be explained in anyway with the international politics hypothesis I use. However, it was likely the most important factor in Japan’s continued wish for an alliance with Great Britain.

The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Military Expenses in the Taisho Period: World War, Siberian Expedition and Arms Buildup.
Keishi Ono

28-48

The World War I (WWI) was an unprecedented all-out-war, and the financial burden from the war for the countries of Europe was much greater than it had been for Japan ten years earlier, when it employed its national resources for the Russo-Japanese War. For example, in terms of the ratio of war expenditure to GNP, the financial burden from the WWI for the European powers was four to five times greater than for Japan at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time, although Japan participated in the WWI as an Allied nation, it mobilized few troops and the eventual financial burden from the war was minimal. Before the WWI, the Japanese economy had continued to stagnate, and there was a downward trend in the balance of specie due to a deficit in the current account, but the outbreak of the war transformed this state of affairs. Furthermore, in this period, not only the manufacturing industry, but also service-producing industries such as the trade and marine transportation industries greatly expanded. For this reason, although the country
experienced a postwar recession following the WWI, the financial burden from war, including that from the Siberian Expedition, was not a large one.

Japan’s direct war spending in the WWI and the Siberian Expedition was dealt with collectively as a Special Account of the Extraordinary War Expenditures, and it is thought that 80 percent of this was allocated to the Siberian Expedition. When the breakdown of these expenses is compared to the Special Account at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the amount of mobilized forces allocated to the Army differed and the proportion of expenditure was low. In addition, in terms of the amount allocated to the Navy, the proportion of expenditure on arms procurement and that related to maintenance and servicing was smaller. However, this was influenced by the fact that, in the Russo-Japanese War, capital ships (battleships or armored cruisers) were constructed in a hurry using the Special Account, whereas in the WWI and the Siberian Expedition, only destroyers were newly constructed in that account. On the other hand, in the WWI and the Siberian Expedition, the naval operation theatre widened from the one in the Japanese coastal waters at the time of the Russo-Japanese War to one that included the Southern Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, America, and Kamchatka, so the proportion of expenditure related to supplies (mainly fuel costs) was greater.

The burden of Japan’s military expenditure in the Taisho Period shows up more in the military expansion, particularly the naval military expansion as shown by the 8-8 Fleet Plan in the general account after the WWI rather than in the Special Account of the Extraordinary War Expenditures. The proportion of the general account at the time of the outbreak of the WWI (1914) allocated to the Army and Navy Ministries was about a quarter, but in 1921, when the Washington Conference was held, it reached a half. Since Japan’s economic burden in the WWI and the Siberian Expedition had been small, immediately after the war, there was enough money to spare to plan large-scale fleet construction. For this reason, Japan’s finances in the Taisho period, a time of war involving both the WWI and the Siberian Expedition, was greatly influenced by the general account allocated to the Navy Ministry, which was principally current military expenditure.
In this paper, I focus on propaganda and pacification activities in Manchukuo (1932–1945), and through the examination of various archive materials, I analyze and verify matters such as the Kwantung Army's political blueprint for the occupied territory, the role played by resident civilian groups up to the establishment of Manchukuo, and the development of relevant policies after the state had been established. The resultant hypothesis I put forward is that the initial framework of the Kwantung Army, the activities of the Japanese residents in Manchuria immediately after the Manchurian Incident, the propaganda activities after the state had been established, and the fact that a characteristic of Manchuria was that it was adaptive were all important factors enabling the administration of Manchukuo with a degree of stability over almost thirteen years.

First, to form a premise in my argument, I examine how the Kwantung Army and the Japanese of the time regarded the region known as Manchuria and whether they aimed to occupy and then govern it for a particular purpose. Specifically, I examine the plan in the earliest stages to take possession of Manchuria formed by the Kwantung Army between 1930 and 1931. Based on this, I suggest that in the Kwantung Army's initial political blueprint for the occupied territory, there was both a utopian ideal of a “free paradise” in which citizens enjoyed peace and a realist dimension that demanded a type of militaristic rationality.

Next, I discuss the role played in nation building by the Manchurian Youth League, the Yuho-kai (Majestic Peak Society), and other groups formed by Japanese who were resident in Manchuria (civilians). Soon after the Incident occurred, they joined as temporary workers in the staff section of the Kwantung Army. Important contributions they made were activities toward postwar reparation, the restoration of the joint railway between China and the West, and pacification activities, and through these, the attainment of Chinese collaborationists in each province (main provincial city). Finding people to cooperate in trade and agricultural associations, which were guilds of skilled workers in each province, and establishing a foundation for nation building was another major contribution these Japanese civilians made.

Following this, I describe the characteristics of the Manchukuo administrative system that was developed after the founding of the state, and discuss the formation and development of the information mechanism within that system. The propaganda and pacification activities carried out
by various groups before the founding of the state were institutionalized as the Information Bureau of the General Affairs Agency, which was a base for Japanese government officials.

Finally, I analyze aspects of the local administration and information mechanism of Manchukuo. After founding the state, the focus of the local administration was maintaining peace and working toward stability of public sentiment. Policies for the maintenance of order are divided into military suppression, political maneuvering, and propaganda activities. In around 1937, activities for enforcing public order were having a definite effect, and armed fighting was more or less subdued. On the other hand, the schemes of the Chinese Communist Party had intensified in terms of carrying out guerilla warfare and stirring up public sentiment with relentless propaganda. With such a state of affairs, working toward public order depended heavily on propaganda and pacification activities.

The Korean War and the Expansion of China's Military Industry
Shinji Yamaguchi

76-101

Established in 1949, the People's Republic of China faced a situation in which soon after the nation was founded it had pervasive effects on the Korean War and the Cold War in Asia. In this paper, I examine what kind of framework for building its military industry the People's Republic of China intended to make under such a security environment, and through what kind of process and by formulating what kind of executive system.

I attempt here to understand these issues from three viewpoints: the connections between the Chinese security strategy and its program for building its military; Sino-Soviet relations; and the formation of the Chinese political system.

In the paper, I elucidate the following. First, China significantly changed its framework for building military power in light of the Korean War. Around the time the state was established, the Chinese Communist Party's framework for building the military industry was based on three factors: a move toward peacetime with the end of the civil war; a strengthening of sea-air power with a focus on a Taiwanese declaration of independence; and progressively making a modern military industry in line with socio-economic development. However, as a result of entering into a state of war with the United States due to the Korean War, the transformation toward peacetime halted. Furthermore, because Taiwanese independence operations had receded, building naval
strength became less of a priority, and it again became necessary to accelerate the building of the military industry.

Furthermore, it is possible to see that accelerating the building of the military industry promoted industrialization through a planned economy. China also needed to rapidly modernize its military power not only because of its participation in the Korean War, but also in order to counteract American besiegement and war, and it tried to achieve this by intensifying the building of its military industry with help from the Soviet Union. This was an important background factor in China working quickly to industrialize the nation and change to a planned economy.

Second, the Sino-Soviet military alliance at once deepened in the Korean War period. The Soviet Union not only sold arms to China, but also supported the building of the Chinese military industry, and due to this, the modernization of China’s weaponry and equipment progressed. The equipment of the People’s Liberation Army had been a mixture of arms from different countries, but it was standardized to become all Soviet weaponry. In addition, China was aiming at the domestic manufacture of arms in the future, and so focused on introducing technology to that end.

Third, for China to participate in the Korean War and to intensify its military industry building in order to continue that participation, and to start building a planned economy, it was necessary to formulate a centralized political system. From that perspective, it was natural that centralization should be effected with a focus on formulating and starting the First Five-Year Plan. However, this centralization not only led to a reorganization of the power structure within the Party, but consequently to a bitter power struggle.

Japanese Contribution to the Korean War: Logistic Contribution from the War’s Outbreak to the Incheon Landing Operation
Akira Tanaka

The Japanese civilian contribution of repairing and reconditioning the military work of the United Nations (UN) forces in the Korean War is not well known in Japan, nor the fact that this work was gradually built up for the United States Army from the end of 1947, and that most of the weapons and ammunition used by the US Army at the beginning of the war were in fact manually repaired, reconditioned, and maintained by the Japanese.
As the wartime production lines from World War II had all closed, the US Far East Command had to depend on World War II surplus for the military equipment for the Korean War. In Operation Rollup, this surplus was collected and accumulated, and in Operation Rebuild, it was repaired and reconditioned in Japan. Reusable vehicles, weapons, and equipment were collected from the islands in the Pacific, and repairing and reconditioning capability for Operation Rollup was newly established using Japan’s labor force and production infrastructure. This work gradually expanded from 1948, and by the time of the Korean War, around three thousand vehicles had been reconditioned. At the same time, a program was completed to increase production to enable the reconditioning of up to twenty-three thousand vehicles a year.

In the first months after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, almost all the weapons and equipment used by the US Army were supplied by Operation Rollup. If weapons and equipment had not been collected and reconditioned in Operation Rollup Rebuild, the fighting power of the US Army units that were dispatched to Korea would clearly have been inferior. Without the Rollup and Rebuild programs and the geographical advantage of Japan’s proximity to the war zone, a quick and timely supply to the troops in Korea was unlikely to have been possible. Japan, close to the battleground and excellent in the time-efficient repair and reconditioning of military equipment, played an essential role.

In order to achieve the target of a September 15 landing in the Incheon Landing Operation, it was imperative that the large amount of various military equipment that needed to be concentrated in Incheon was gathered and installed within a short time. Much of this equipment could be acquired by repairing and reconditioning World War II surplus using Japan’s production infrastructure through Operation Rollup and Operation Rebuild.

Despite the fact that Japan was in the early stages of reconstruction in the years following World War II, Japanese technological and production capability was rated highly and thus employed, and it was directly linked to establishing and maintaining US military (particularly ground force) power. It is likely that far more than was previously realized Japan’s contribution to the UN forces at the beginning of the Korean War was a decisive factor in how that war went.