

国際会議参加報告

第39回国際軍事史学会大会の概要

千々和 泰明

本年度（2013年度）の第39回国際軍事史学会大会は、9月1日（日）から9月6日（金）にかけてイタリア・トリノの国際会議場にて開催され、35ヶ国から約250名が参加した。大会の共通テーマは「戦史における統連合作戦」であり、26の部会等において小官によるものを含め計115の研究が発表された。そのうちの一部を紹介すると、ベトナム戦争における米韓連合作戦を通じた韓国軍の近代化、中国人民解放軍の統合作戦の変遷と特徴、日本の軍事博物館における戦争の記憶の扱われ方などに関する研究発表がおこなわれた。またトリノはリソルジメント（イタリア統一）運動を主導したサルデーニャ王国の首都であり、王宮などリソルジメントゆかりの史跡研修がおこなわれたほか、ラ・スペツィア伊海軍基地見学の機会も設けられた。

本大会への参加を通じて考えさせられたのは、政治や軍事における「統合」や「連合」といった概念の難しさである。真に統合された作戦であれば誰もそれを「統合」作戦とは呼ばないであろうし、「連合」作戦についても同様であろう。本来的に統合・連合されえないものの統合・連合だからこそ、「統合」「連合」の語を用いざるをえない。したがって、そこでは統合・連合の度合いの強弱が問題になる。ではそれが何によって規定されるのかということを考えてときに、本大会におけるいくつかの研究発表に共通していたのは、統連合作戦の在り方が、純軍事的な要因以外の要因、具体的には一つは外交的要因、もう一つは国内政治的要因に規定されているという視点であった。先述の通り、本大会の開催地トリノは19世紀のリソルジメントの舞台でもあった。そのリソルジメントによって誕生したイタリアは、藤沢房俊著『「イタリア」誕生の物語』（講談社、2012年）によると、実はその「統合」の度合いが脆弱な国家であるという。イタリア半島全土を統合した新生イタリア王国は、さまざまな偶然が重なり合った結果、共和主義者、カトリック教会、サルデーニャ政府のいずれもが望んでいなかった形で成立した。そのため「イタリア」は「統合」後も絶えず「国家と教会」「北と南」の対立に苦しめられていると藤沢氏は言う。そのようなリソルジメントの歴史的舞台であったトリノの地で、政治・軍事における「統合」「連合」概念に関する国際交流がおこなわれたことは感慨深いものであった。

いずれにせよ、統連合作戦という共通テーマの下、国際会議で発表・意見交換の機会を得たことは、防衛研究所における安全保障政策史研究に資するものであり、また大会参加を通じて得られた各国研究者とのネットワークは、防衛研究所の今後の諸活動に裨益するものであると思量する。なお2014年度の大会は「第1次世界大戦 1914-1918」をテーマに、ブルガリア・ヴァルナで開催される予定である。

（防衛研究所戦史研究センター安全保障政策史研究室主任研究官）

# The Concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” and Japan-United States Joint Operation

千々和 泰明

## 【要約】

1976年10月に策定された「防衛計画の大綱」で初めて登場し、日米共同作戦計画の基礎となるものとして1978年11月に策定された「日米防衛協力のための指針」でも踏襲された「限定小規模侵略独力対処」概念は、冷戦期の日本の安全保障政策においてどのような意味を持ち、またなぜそれは冷戦終結後に放棄されたのかを、「自主防衛／日米同盟」パラダイムとは異なる視点から明らかにする。同概念は、冷戦期から冷戦終結後の日本の安全保障政策において、その重点を「防衛力整備」から「運用」へと架橋する役割を果たすものであった。

## 1. INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, Japan had adopted the concept of so-called “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” (*gentei shōkibo shinryaku dokuryoku taisho*) in its national security policy. This concept first appeared in the “National Defense Program Outline” which was formulated in October, 1976 (“the NDPO (or *bōei taikō*) 1976”). The NDPO 1976 mentioned that:

“Should direct aggression occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage by taking immediate responsive action and trying to conduct an integrated, systematic operation of its defense capability. Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance. In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression.”<sup>1</sup>

That concept was also followed in the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” which was some kind of a basis for joint operation planning in these bilateral relations and formulated in November, 1978 (“the Guidelines 1978”). The Guidelines said: “In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to

---

<sup>1</sup> The National Defense Program Outline 1976 (October 29, 1976).

repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.”<sup>2</sup>

The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” had been maintained until the new “NDPO 1995” (formulated in November, 1995) and the new “Guidelines 1997” (formulated in July, 1997) abandoned it in the aftermath of the Cold War.

What did the concept mean to Japan’s national security policy? Why was that abandoned after the end of the Cold War?

There is a trend in Japan today for people to understand its national security policy through a paradigm of conflict between “Autonomous Defense (or *jishu bōei*) line” and the “Japan-U.S. Alliance line.” According to one point of view, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was a product of the “Autonomous Defense line.” This valued Japan’s autonomy from the U.S. because it had the intention “to repel without external assistance” in spite of the U.S. duty based on Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which prescribes that the U.S. should defend Japan when it was attacked<sup>3</sup>. However, according to the other point of view, the concept would enhance Japan’s security relationship with the U.S. because Japan could not help relying on the U.S. assistance to repel greater aggression than “limited and small scale.”<sup>4</sup> But, is it true that we can understand what the concept meant through the paradigm of “Autonomous Defense vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance”?

The purpose of my presentation today is to reconsider what the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” meant, from the view point of “Defense Force Building” and “Operation.”

## 2. THE NDPO 1976 AND THE CONCEPT OF “REPELLING LIMITED AND SMALL-SCALE AGGRESSION WITHOUT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE”

<sup>2</sup> The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (November 27, 1978).

<sup>3</sup> Akihiro Sadō, *Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji* [defense and politics in the postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbun Kan, 2005), pp. 274-278. See also Yū Takeda, “Nihon no Bōei Seisaku ni okeru ‘Jishu’ no Ronri: ‘Bōei Keikaku no Taikō’ wo Chūshin ni,” [logic of ‘autonomy’ in Japan’s defense policy: featuring formulation of ‘National Defense Program Outline’] *Kokusai Seiji Keizai Gaku Kenkyū* [study of international politics and economy] 17 (March 2006).

<sup>4</sup> Norman D. Levin, *Japan’s Changing Defense Posture* (RAND: California, 1988), pp. 13-14. See also Shingo Yoshida, *Nichi Bei Dōmei no Seidoka: Hatten to Shinka no Rekishi Katei* [institutionalization of Japan-U.S. alliance: historical process of its development and deepening] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2012), pp. 272-275.

After World War II, Japan's defense force was re-built in accordance with successive four five-year plans. However, in the 1970's, it became difficult to accomplish the goal for defense force building due to the recession. Furthermore in Japan after World War II, many were allergic to defense issues and some groups that regarded the Self-Defense Force as an unconstitutional entity were powerful. Therefore, the policy to build defense force against the Soviet Union threat as in the past, in spite of détente, had been facing growing criticisms.

Since defense force building by a five-year plan as in the past became deadlocked, the NDPO 1976 was formulated based on a way of thinking to build the "minimum necessary" defense force. The NDPO is now the official document that sets forth the basic policies for Japan's national security, as well as basic guidelines for Japan's defense force in the future, including the significance and the role of Japan's defense force, the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be developed. Unlike previous five-year plans, the NDPO 1976 lasted for 19 years. Then there were a question which asked "what was the 'minimum necessary' defense force?" The NDPO 1976 answered that it meant defense force that "could repel to limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance." Concretely speaking, it meant Japan's defenses included 180,000 personnel in the Ground SDF, 4 flotillas in the Maritime SDF, 430 combat aircrafts in the Air SDF.

Then, would Japan actually repel without the U.S. assistance when limited and small-scale aggression occurred? In reality it was not. Noboru Hōshuyama, who was deeply committed to the formulation of the NDPO 1976 as a staff in Division of Defense in Bureau of Defense in Defense Agency, said in his oral history that:

"[If the U.S. helps us at a pinch] many would be always talking about 'Japan's defense force is not matter. SDF can buy their choice within the limit of budget. There is no problem to exercise by such equipment.' This is not the ideal philosophy for defense force building in an independent state. [Therefore, the concept of "Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance" was needed.]"<sup>5</sup>

Moreover Akira Shiota, who was former defense councilor at the time of formulating the Guidelines 1978, told in his oral history as the following:

---

<sup>5</sup> Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku eds., *Hōshuyama Noboru Ōraru Hisutorī* [oral history of Noboru Hōshuyama] I (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku, 2005), pp. 67-68.

“The NDPO 1976 said ‘Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.’ But actually SDF would not repel limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance. It was not an actual operation plan. It was just a defense force building plan. So it only wanted to build defense force that would be comparable strength to repel limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance.”<sup>6</sup>

As described above, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was not an operational concept but something constructed to clarify the meaning of the “minimum necessary” for defense force building.

### 3. THE GUIDELINES 1978 AND THE CONCEPT OF “REPELLING LIMITED AND SMALL-SCALE AGGRESSION WITHOUT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE”

After the Vietnam War, misgivings had arisen in Japan whether American commitment in Asia would decrease or not. In response to such concerns, the Guidelines, set forth the basis for wide-range exchanging opinions between Japan and the U.S., were formulated to operating of joint research and training, mutual exchanging in the areas of equipment and technology, cooperating of host nation support for the U.S. force in Japan, and the basis for joint operation plan. In the Guidelines 1978, also, the description of “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” was incorporated. Why the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” that meant the concept for defense force building was incorporated into the Guideline that meant operational plan? Still, was the concept operational one? The answer is no.

Last year I interviewed with a person who was deeply committed to formulate the Guidelines 1978 as a staff in Joint Staff Office. In this interview, about the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance,” he said:

“The Guidelines described similar words [about “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” with the NDPO], but there are no relation in substance between them.”

“So the theory of ‘the NDPO 1976’ was never substantially introduced to the Guidelines. We

---

<sup>6</sup> Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyū Kai eds., *Shiota Akira Ōraru Hisutorī* [oral history of Akira Shiota] (Tokyo: Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyū Kai, 2006), p. 118.

did not consult with the U.S. side about the concept.”<sup>7</sup>

The reason why the first Guidelines referred to “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” nevertheless was that, in the negotiation, Japanese side recognized “if we did not indicate the description of it to the U.S. at the very least, Japan might repel all scale aggression without external assistance. Then support from the U.S. would be limited only to make up for deficiencies. That is terrible.”<sup>8</sup> In other words, this description in the Guidelines stressed to clarify that Japan could not repel aggression more than limited and small-scale one without American assistance.

#### 4. PROGRESS OF DEFENSE FORCE BUILDING AND JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION

After that, through 1980’s, defense force that the NDPO 1976 targeted gradually became to build. P-3C antisubmarine aircrafts and F-15 fighters were introduced. Then, there were increasing interest in operations that was difficult to consider in the era when defense force was not built enough.

And by formulation of the Guidelines, joint exercises between the SDF and the U.S. Force boosted. In November, 1978, the Air SDF had first Japan-U.S. joint exercise. In February, 1980, the Maritime SDF first joined the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. In November, 1982, the first Japan-U.S. joint field training exercise that assumed the aggression against Japan was conducted. In October, 1986, the first Japan-U.S bilateral joint exercise was also conducted. Through these exercises and exchanges, role-sharing between Japan and the U.S. gradually became clear so it became possible to consider operation concretely.

#### 5. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND ABANDONMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF “REPELLING LIMITED AND SMALL-SCALE AGGRESSION WITHOUT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE”

After the end of the Cold War, the NDPO 1976 and the Guidelines 1978 that were formulated in the Cold War era were naturally revised. The newly formulated NDPO 1995

---

<sup>7</sup> Author’s interview with person involved in the Secretariat of Joint Staff Council (November 8, 2012, Tokyo).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

said “Should direct aggression occur, take immediate responsive action by conducting an integrated and systematic operation of its defense capabilities, in appropriate cooperation with the United States, in order to repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage”<sup>9</sup> and the Guidelines 1997 also said “Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was abandoned.

Regarding that development, Masahiro Akiyama, who was Director of Defense Bureau at that time and initiated to formulate the NDPO 1995, wrote in his memories that: “Speaking in the extreme, apart from whether the U.S. military would battle on the frontline actually, considering there are great U.S. military presence in Japan, when military attack against Japan would occur, based on Japan-U.S. military alliance, it would be inevitable that Japan and the U.S. actually cooperate to repel any scale aggressions from the very beginning. ‘In one case, Japan would repel it without the U.S. assistance because the attack is limited and small-scale.’ ‘In the other case, Japan and the U.S. cooperate because scale of the attack is greater.’ It is nonsense. I thought that it should not be indicated any concept that differed so much from actual operations.”<sup>11</sup>

The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was gradually considered to be unsuitable with any actual operation.

## 6. CONCLUSION

According to verbal evidences by related persons in Defense Agency and the SDF, it seems that formation and abandonment of the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” did not have much to do with the paradigm of

---

<sup>9</sup> The National Defense Program Outline 1995 (November 28, 1995).

<sup>10</sup> The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> Masahiro Akiyama, *Nichi Bei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta: Anpo Sai Teigi no Butai Ura* [strategic dialogues between Japan and the U.S. have started: behind-the-scenes of redefining Japan-U.S. security partnership] (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), p. 104.

“Autonomous Defense vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance” that scholars on Japan’s security policy often use. In the 1970’s, the concept was constructed to build the “minimum necessary” defense force after defense force building by counter-threat five-year plan was deadlocked and indicated in the NDPO 1976. The Guideline that was a basis for joint operation plan between Japan and the U.S. also did not regard it as operational concept. However, through 1980’s, as Japan’s defense force building progressed and joint exercises and exchanges boosted between Japan and the U.S., there were increasing interest in operation. And in the 1990’s, after the end of the Cold War, the concept was abandoned by operational request.

In short, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” played a role to form a bridge between defense force building and operation in Japan’s security policy from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era.