
英文要旨 (Summaries in English)

Developments of Security Issues

Arms Control Challenges in ‘Cold War 2.0’

ICHIMASA Sukeyuki

National Institute for Defense Studies

Since the early 2010s, against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition, a series of discourses have been published stating that the security environment has entered a ‘Cold War 2.0’ situation between the US and China, the US and Russia, and democracy versus authoritarianism. Both discourses share a common feature of ideological confrontation in an international architecture based on interdependence, and the nuclear shadow, which has profound implications for international politics, is coming into focus. However, in recent years, an ‘end of arms control’ situation has arisen, where arms control treaties, which are supposed to contribute to strategic stability, have ended. The reasons for this can be pointed to changes in the security environment and reduced incentives to maintain agreements, which undermine the irreversibility of disarmament and have negative implications for strategic stability due to the loss of verification functions. Few arms control arguments of ‘Cold War 2.0’ squarely deny the value of arms control. Therefore, it is necessary to re-engage in verifiable arms control negotiations while promoting multi-stakeholder, multi-layered consultations on the prevention of inadvertent nuclear war and the arms control of advanced technologies affecting nuclear deterrence.

China’s Blueprint for Non-Contact Information Warfare:

“Winning Without Fighting” across Physical, Cyber, and Cognitive domains

JIN Yuan-Chou

Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies

IGARASHI Takayuki

National Institute for Defense Studies

Under the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy, China's activities in the cyber domain have become multifaceted not only for the People's Liberation Army, but also on the national scale. China has also long emphasized the importance of the cognitive domain. Against the backdrop of the spread of emerging media, China has thus shifted to a fighting style that packages both old and new media. To achieve security objectives without contact with the enemy, China has, furthermore, sought to build capabilities for Informational Warfare that traverses three domains — the physical, cyber, and cognitive domains. For example, before and after the U.S. Speaker of the House Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, disinformation was disseminated in Taiwan to sway the Taiwanese people's minds, in conjunction with cyber attacks and military exercises. However, the effects sought by China was limited because the Taiwanese people have become accustomed to China's military threats and other such related acts. Taiwan has, nonetheless, become a testing ground for China's efforts to build a cross-domain, Non-Contact Informational Warfare capabilities through state mobilization.

Exploration of Security Policy

History of the Establishment of a Rescue Organization Within the Japan Air Self-Defense Force:

The Urgent Establishment of the Rescue Unit

MURAKAMI Kyouichi
National Defense Academy

With the ceasefire of the Korean War in July 1953, following suit with the other (Ground and Maritime) Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (hereafter, JASDF) was established in July 1954. The JASDF began construction of its aviation units based on a five-year security plan with fiscal year 1954 as its inaugural year. And yet, that plan was aimed at equipping an air force to deal directly with an invasion, not at developing a system that would also take into account search and rescue operations to prevent attrition of aircrew. However, in March 1958, the JASDF which had previously relied on the U.S. military and other forces, hastily

established a search and rescue unit at Hamamatsu Air Base which was not part of the original plan. The main reasons for this include the fact that there had been a number of air accidents starting in 1957, and since it was also the time when a US Air Force B-29 had been shot down over Japan by a Soviet aircraft, it had become mandatory for JASDF aircraft to be on rescue standby for counter-airspace intrusion missions. In addition to this, the main U.S. Air Force rescue units abruptly withdrew to their home countries, and internal authorities recognized the importance of the JASDF as a national search and rescue organization.

**Backgrounds of the German Security Policy Revision on the Out of Area
Deployment of German Bundeswehr:
Focusing on the participation in UNTAC**

KOBASHI Fumiyuki

National Institute for Defense Studies

In 1992, Germany made a historic decision to dispatch the Bundeswehr medical unit to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This was Germany's first full-fledged participation in UN peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) 'out of area' under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The thesis examines the reasons why Germany's security policy had been revised, analyzing such original historical documents as Bundestag minutes, official government archives and statements of high-ranking officials, from today's historical perspective,

The reasons leading to this revision regarding 'out of area' dispatching policy on the occasion of UNTAC were ascribed not only to the outbreak of the Gulf War, but also to the end of the Cold War, the harsh political demand for a drastic reduction of the number of Bundeswehr personnel due to the unification of East and West Germany, and the urgent need to redefine the missions of the Bundeswehr in response to NATO's new strategic concept.

It is concluded that the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr played a significant role in term of epoch-making revision in Germany's security policy.

Educational Reform at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the 1980s:

How was drastic reform accomplished?

KINOSHITA Yukihiro

Japan Ground Self Defense Force

U.S. Army carried through the revision of officer development systems amid the national defense policy reorientation from Vietnam to Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. In this sustained effort, education at the U.S. Command and General Staff College (CGSC), recognized as the most important experience in its systems, was transformed after 1981 into higher education in which both theoretical understanding about warfighting and excellent application of the science of warfighting were strongly required. At the same time, vocational training, that just imparted the knowledge and skills that would be useful in post-graduation duties, recognized as less important, although it had been the most important until 1980. This paper aims to explain what educational philosophies supported such drastic reform and how these philosophies were institutionalized within the CGSC.

[Research Note]

Why Economic Sanction Can Never Stop Russia from Invasion to Ukraine: A Strategic Perspective for Functional Analysis of Economic Sanction as a Bargaining Tool

YAMAMOTO Satoshi

Japan Air Self Defense Force

Is the economic sanction against Russia able to hold back or to stop the invasion in Ukraine? Answering this simple but serious question requires various analyses with multi-dimensional perspectives. Amongst pragmatic approaches, this study focuses on logical and behavioral aspects in tacit bargaining between sanctioning and sanctioned countries.

By referencing the arguments and key concepts of tacit bargaining in complex system, such as Thomas C. Schelling's "focal point" and "art of commitment", this study analyzes the reason why countries failed to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine by

economic sanction, and the possibilities of improving much effective and practical ways of announcement and commitment of economic sanction.

While economic sanction itself can never deter military actions in crisis phase, commitment of sanction can contribute to shaping a focal point among actors that Ukraine could have sufficient capabilities to endure self-defense, as economic sanction requires continuation of war. However Russia carefully tried to investigate the actual military capabilities of Ukraine and its supporting countries, and it finally made a “wrong” decision over the focal point. Thus it indicates that without adequate military capabilities such an inhibitory focal point may work negatively in some cases as it ostensibly signifies the intention of sanctioning countries.

Military History Revisited

Reconsidering the U.S. Use of Nuclear Weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

Approaches from the Level of Purpose and Effect

CHIJIWA Yasuaki

National Institute for Defense Studies

This study focuses on the controversies surrounding the United States use of nuclear weapons (dropping the atomic bombs) against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By approaching this issue from the “level of purpose” and “level of effect,” this paper will disentangle the complicated debates and help to deepen our understanding of the process of ending the Pacific War and the issue of nuclear use as a historical problem between postwar Japan and the U.S.

Concerning the U.S. use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the “nuclear diplomacy theory” and the “Soviet factor theory,” or the “cost minimization theory” and the “nuclear factor theory” do not have to go hand in hand. Rather, based on recent researches and newly released historical materials, it is possible to assemble the cost minimization theory at the level of purpose and the Soviet factor theory at the level of effect.

On May 27, 2016, Barack Obama became the first American president to visit Hiroshima, marking a turning point in this issue. There is a need to go beyond emotional debates and objectively analyze this historical case as an example of a failed policy to end the war.

Continuation of education reform of the Naval Staff College in the Japanese Navy and the result:

From the viewpoint of “Military Administration Studies”

YAMAGUCHI Masaya

National Institute for Defense Studies

Toshiatsu Sakamoto, a leader in educational reform at the Naval War College, broadly divides the new subjects into “Tactical Strategy” and “Military Service and Military Administration.” In order to have students acquire knowledge about the organizational system and accounting affairs of the Army and Navy based on the Constitution and its provisions (= educational purpose), “Military Administration Studies” was created as a new subject under “Military Service and Military Government.” Furthermore, Sakamoto sets the teaching method of “Military Administration Studies” to be centered on military administration, and to teach the principles of the Constitution and national economy within this related scope.

Achieving the educational objectives of “Military Administration Studies” became unsustainable with Sakamoto’s retirement because the knowledge about the teaching methods necessary for that purpose belonged to Sakamoto personally and was not shared or accumulated in an organized manner. From then on, “Military Administration Studies” changed its educational form depending on the experience and knowledge of each teacher, so while it was unstable, it was not uniform, and it changed in accordance with the trends of the times. In addition, there were developments in education that would help students prepare for immediate use in naval administrative work.

**The “Yougekitai” Concept and Island Defense Operations:
Focusing on the Japanese Army’s “Kaijo Kido Hangeki” Concept**

**FUKUMOTO Masaki
Japan Ground Self Defense Force**

The Absolute National Defense Sphere, including the defense of Saipan, was planned as a joint Army-Navy operation based primarily on the “Yougekitai” (Interception Belt) concept formulated by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), which sought a decisive battle with the U.S. fleet to win a war.

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) envisioned “Kaijo Kido Hangeki” (Maritime Maneuver Counterattack) forces, in close coordination with ground troops deployed at the water’s edge, to land on the flank and back of the enemy landing forces, whose posture was not yet complete immediately after landing.

However, the IJN understood this concept as “strategic reinforcement” for the island defense forces, that were “bait” for the enemy fleet, while the IJA planned a “tactical counterattack” to destroy the enemy that landed on the islands. In fact, they were in the same bed but had different dreams.

In the original plan, the “strategic reinforcement” was to be carried out on Biak Island. But when U.S. Carrier task forces, however, appeared in the Marianas, the plan was suspended. In addition, the “tactical counterattack” on Saipan Island was not carried out because the operational environment was different from the original scenario. The “Kaijo Kido Hangeki” ended up as an illusion.

**A study on compiling military history:
Focusing on collecting historical materials for the compilation of Senshi Soshō
compiled by the Office of War Study of the National Defense College**

**SAITO Tatsushi
ONOE seitaro**

National Institute for Defense Studies

This paper is a basic study aimed at clarifying the problems in compiling military history under the current legal system from the perspective of historical materials

management.

For this purpose, we will use the *Senshi Soshō*, a compilation of the military history of World War 2 compiled by the Office of War Study of the National Defense College of the Defense Agency between 1955 and 1975, as an example, to explain how the historical materials necessary for compilation were collected, preserved, and managed.

This was made clear by linking it to the compilation of war history by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy.