An Essay on the China’s Military Diplomacy

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This paper elucidates the features of the military diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with particular focus on its strategic intent, by attempting to categorize its diplomatic patterns. The paper draws the following five conclusions.

First of all, the PRC’s military diplomacy consists of more than diplomatic activities carried out by the armed forces, but should be considered part of the whole national diplomatic strategy. China’s military diplomacy is based on security and geopolitical interests and calculation, which are driving the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army in an effort to improve the international security environment. Second, from the viewpoint of realism in international relations, the aims and the means of the PRC’s military diplomacy are theoretically orthodox. The major function of the PRC’s military diplomacy is to protect national interests such as maintenance of a peaceful security environment, the modernization of its armed forces, and enhancing China’s influence on other countries. China is using limited resources effectively to maximize the achievement of its own national interests, and is allocating a good share of its national resources to military diplomacy. Third, China’s geopolitical strategy as seen in its military diplomacy is basically an extension of its traditional united front strategy. Judging from the specific activities of its military diplomacy, China definitely categorizes the countries by their strategic importance. China obviously places Russia and the United States in prominent positions at the two different poles, and positions other countries, including U.S. allies, somewhere in the middle, in an effort to either co-opt them or keep them in check. Fourth, China has strategically strengthened the multilateral approach in the its military exchanges. It can be said that China’s military diplomacy shows that even realist power, rooted firmly in power politics, sometimes finds an interests in behaving in an idealistic way. Finally, it is apparent that the PRC’s military diplomacy has a great deal of strategic flexibility. China has a small and relatively cohesive political leadership capable of developing and implementing foreign policies in a consistent way, allowing the optimum use of tactical advantages.

The PRC is making serious attempts to move the countries with which it currently shares a relatively tense or confrontational relationship to a closer position in its categories of military diplomacy, and is making outstanding achievements in stabilizing its international security environment. However, China has achieved this dramatic policy change in a short period of time, without any fundamental changes of its political system, that is, the one-party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. It remains necessary to watch closely whether China is making these policy changes due to a fundamental diplomatic revolution, or is merely using idealistic behavior toward tactical ends.
Reexamining Peacekeeping: The “Brahimi Report” and Onward

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This article examines changing notions of peacekeeping in the periods following the Brahimi Report released in 2000. It first describes how the report defined peacekeeping on the basis of two distinctions: traditional and complex peacekeeping; and neutral and impartial uses of force. As the report was notable for its introduction of the concept of impartiality as the characteristic mode of force for complex peacekeeping, the article analyzes major pre-Brahimi reports on peacekeeping by the United Nations (UN) and points out two factors that were conducive to the emergence of the impartiality concept: (1) the realization that the traditional codes of action for peacekeepers did not allow them to deal with intrastate conflicts with grave humanitarian consequences—a type of conflict into which they were increasingly asked to intervene; and (2) the fact that, as the norms of humanitarianism and human rights gradually became established in the international community, impartiality as a key principle of humanitarian action also began to take root in the field of peacekeeping.

The article then reviews how the Brahimi Report’s typology of peacekeeping has been incorporated into discussions on and recent practice of peacekeeping. On the distinction between traditional and complex types of peacekeeping, peacekeeping reform by the UN Secretariat in the post-Brahimi period on the whole assumes this distinction, which is also supported by UN Member States. On the possibility of the impartial use of force by peacekeepers, however, there appears to be an opinion gap between the Secretariat, which is pushing for the institutionalization of this mode of force, and Member States, which are trending toward the insistence that peacekeeping return to the three traditional principles (party consent, use of force only in self-defense, and neutrality). Nevertheless, a look at the mandates of the eight peacekeeping missions established or greatly expanded after the Brahimi Report reveals that all are complex operations equipped with a Chapter VII mandate to use “all necessary means” for the implementation of their mandates and/or the protection of civilians at risk as well as UN and relief personnel.

The article concludes with a consideration of the significance of this seemingly contradictory attitude among Member States—contradictory because the mandates of peacekeeping operations are, after all, authorized by Member States. While their opposition to the idea of the impartial use of force speaks for the preeminence of state sovereignty in the minds of many decision makers, their agreement or acquiescence to the creation of many “robust” peacekeeping missions in practice may also be seen as a “softening” of the norm of sovereignty that to allow more active engagement in intrastate conflicts and post-conflict nation/state building. In this sense, this trend may represent a transition in the international community’s understanding as to how sovereign states should address conflict situations.
The Humanitarian Aid Dilemma and the Roles of the Military: A View from the Perspective of Civil-Military Cooperation

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Mary B. Anderson, a development economist, points out the impact of aid on conflict through transfer of resources in the book entitled *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-Or War*. This impact is often known as the humanitarian aid dilemma. Several cases are common. Combatants steal aid goods and use them to finance their war efforts. Unequal benefits from aid can reinforce intergroup tensions in conflict areas (pp.39-53).

International humanitarian organizations have set their own limits on responsibility for resolving humanitarian aid dilemma, due to their practice of the principles of nonviolence and neutrality in relief efforts. In the 1990s, however, some of international humanitarian organizations, such as those of the United Nations family (UNHCR, WFP and others), the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and certain NGOs, began to cooperate closely with the military sector in order to protect themselves and ensure that relief was safely distributed, as well as to provide sanctuary for refugees and internally displaced persons, while at the same time maintaining their position on nonviolence.

The reason behind Civil-Military Operations (CMO) like this is the increasing number of people killed or injured by combatants while providing emergency humanitarian relief since the end of the Cold War. The international humanitarian organizations have grown increasingly concerned about the security of their personnel in such conflict areas as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo and elsewhere, which has made them welcome the security that military forces can provide. In ideological terms, the post-Cold War era has made such cooperation more palatable.

CMO is of great importance before, during and after a conflict, and is regarded as one of the most effective means of preventing and settling conflicts. Past instances of humanitarian support in northern Iraq, Rwanda, and Afghanistan demonstrate the effectiveness of CMO. CMO has a tremendous amount of potential not only to ensure the success of the relief activities for affected people, but also to settle disputes or reduce intergroup tensions.
Coping with a Ballistic Missile Threat: 
Strike Capability under an Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

TAKAHASHI Sugio

The Japanese defense policy has a unique character. Based on an “exclusively defense-oriented policy” (EDOP), Japan’s defense posture is strongly inclined toward passive defense. EDOP is more than just the declared policy; it also functions as the employment policy. Under EDOP, the force structure of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has been highly focused on territorial defense. The SDF has not acquired weapon systems for offensive operation, such as long-range bombers or ballistic/cruise missiles. It is important to note, however, that EDOP does not prohibit the use of offensive operations if Japan has no other means to cope with a threat. Strikes against ballistic missile launch sites would be one example. Despite this, however, the SDF has not developed capabilities for offensive operations.

Recently, due to the increasing threat of ballistic missile proliferation, some people maintain that Japan should have strike capability. This paper discusses the issue of whether Japan needs strike capability solely from the military perspective, rather than from the diplomatic or political perspectives.

There are three military options for Japan’s strike capability: deterrence, first-strike, and pre-boost phase defense. The first option, a deterrence strategy, would involve the potential for retaliatory strikes against the cities of a country that launched ballistic missile(s) against Japan. This is the traditional “deterrence by threat of punishment,” based on the potential to counter-value/city attack. This strategy, however, exceeds the strike capability permitted under EDOP. The second option, a first-strike strategy, is to destroy ballistic missiles before they are launched. In this case, the issue is feasibility. In the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. conducted a massive air campaign to destroy Iraqi Scud missile launchers. This “Scud Hunt” campaign was not effective, however, and Iraqi Scud forces continued to operate until the cease-fire (American capability to attack time-sensitive targets has dramatically improved since then). Serious questions remain as to the effectiveness of a first-strike strategy is highly difficult to work.

The third option, a pre-boost phase defense, means that strike capability plays a role in part of a missile defense system. Ballistic missiles can be intercepted at these three phases in their trajectory: the boost phase, the mid-course phase, and the terminal phase. Although strike capability does not function against these three phases, it can enhance the effectiveness of the interception system by destroying some missiles on the ground and suppressing the operation of mobile launchers. If strike capability succeeds in decreasing the number of missiles launched, the probability of successful intercept will increase. Even in the Gulf War, once the “Scud Hunt” campaign began, the number of Scud launched decreased. Thus, the combination of pre-boost phase defense using strike capability and a ballistic missile defense system would be effective against a ballistic missile threat.

However, if Japan develops strike capability, it would of necessity change its employment policy, even though it would have no effect on the declared policy of EDOP. This could change the regional military balance. Any decision on strike capability must be based
on thorough calculations of the cost-benefit balance.

The Modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army: 
An Analysis of the Military Exercises in 2004

KOUGAMI Tomio

Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and State President, assumed the job of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC in September 2004. Then, in March 2005, Hu also became Chairman of the CMC of the People's Republic of China. Thus, Hu Jintao has become the supreme leader of the armed forces, in the lines of both the party and the nation.

Military trainings of the armed forces have been conducted in line with the military strategy advocated by supreme leaders. A large-scale military exercise is carried out before changing the military strategy. By the time of Jiang Zemin, the "training the troops through science and technology" exercise of October 2000 was the typical example.

Through the military trainings done in 2004, the PLA strived to develop itself from the stage of “a half mechanization” to the stage of “a revolution in military affairs with Chinese characteristics.” As a part of the efforts for this change, “joint trainings” have been done nationwide. It seems that such a tendency will continue in coming years. As for Hu Jintao’s thoughts on leading the armed forces, the whole is not yet clear, but he might aim to take the direction of “a local war strategy under conditions of informatization (IT).”