

Regionalism in Southeast Asia and the Response of External Powers

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In recent years, regionalism has become the trend in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) came into effect in 2002, reflecting the desire of ASEAN member countries to unify their markets in order to strengthen their economic self-reliance and cope with China's rising economic power, particularly following the Asian financial crisis. ASEAN also played a critical role in establishing ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and South Korea) as a supporting mechanism for its economic development. Free trade agreements increasingly have been negotiated and concluded in East Asia, with a view to building an East Asian Community.

The Asian financial crisis caused political turmoil in several ASEAN countries. The region experienced the intensification of independence and separatist movements, ethnic and religious conflicts, as well as an escalation of terrorist activities. As a result, ASEAN keenly felt the need to enhance regional cooperation, in order that those problems might be resolved without external intervention. The ASEAN member states thus agreed to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020 that would comprise three dimensions: economic, political, as well as sociocultural.

In response to the trend of integration in East Asia led by ASEAN, powers including China, the United States, India and Japan have been extending a political and an economic hand to ASEAN in a bid to expand their respective influences. Thus, ASEAN has become a hub of Asia-Pacific free trade areas, and a grand chess board for outside powers.

Since China and Japan are key to establishing the East Asian Community, which could become a driving force for further regional cooperation and development, the favorable bilateral relations are vital. It seems, however, that both countries are competing to lead the formation of the community. Due to historical issues that cloud the bilateral relationship and for which no solution is likely in the short term, the impact on the region would undoubtedly be negative were either country to assume leadership. For this reason, Japan should allow ASEAN to take the initiative in building an East Asian Community, while Tokyo focuses on institutionalizing the necessary trade and investment rules in the region in accordance with WTO regulations.

Host States Face Legal Consequences of Armed Conflict : Neutrality Violation or Armed Attack?

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A host state is here defined as a state that permits a belligerent entity to commit acts of war on its territory (including its territorial waters), or to use its territory as a base of operations. The state might also provide a belligerent with fuel, munitions and other assistance. Such actions are tantamount to the state discriminating against other parties in favor of the belligerent, and therefore contravenes the requirement for impartiality on the part of a neutral state. According to international law, a party that found itself injured in this way could resort to reprisals or retaliation were the neutral state to fail to persuade the belligerent party to respect its territorial sovereignty.

There have been many violations of territorial sovereignty and instances in which penetrated areas have been transformed into theaters of war. Belligerents have justified their reprisals and retaliation against a neutral power or an adversary as being for self-defense or in the interests of self-preservation. Such behavior has often triggered controversy among neutral powers regarding the degree to which the rights of a neutral party might be restricted during a state of war.

The United Nations Charter strictly prohibits the use of threats or force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. Therefore, it is illegal for a belligerent to use armed force against a neutral state unless the state were to commit "an armed attack" against that belligerent. No decision has yet been made regarding whether the law of neutrality can be applied in a modern armed conflict and, if so, to what degree. However, the assistance provided by a host state to a power that has been attacked might best be termed collective self-defense, rather than the non-fulfillment of the requirements of neutrality. That said, exactly what would amount to an armed attack has yet to be defined. It is not clear to what degree a state would have to become engaged in an armed conflict (given the conflict is short of "substantial," which term is described in the Definition of Aggression, and has been substantiated in the case of Nicaragua) with an "attacking" belligerent for the situation to be termed an armed attack.

These matters, which have legal implications for modern host states in times of armed conflict, are considered in this paper from the perspective of neutrality and the right of self-defense.

Cost Analysis of U.S. Military Operations in Iraq

ONO Keishi

This article discusses the cost of the military operations conducted in Iraq by U.S. armed forces between March 20, 2003 and May 2, 2003. The period is from the outbreak of the air raids by coalition forces to the announcement, by President George W. Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln, that the major combat in Iraq had ended.

The analysis includes expense items comparison between the operations conducted in 2003 and 1991. The cost of the military operations, which contains expense for personnel, closing, medical and transport, provisions, materiel procurement or maintenance, troop bases setting-up, etc. Therefore the cost of the operation reflects the characteristics of the armed forces concerned. The details of the cost are not yet been made public and only some information has been released by the General Accounting Office. Therefore the analysis of this paper depends on the ante bellum estimates reached by the House Budget Committee and Congressional Budget Office.

It could be assumed that the cost of U.S. military operations over the 44 days in 2003 totaled some US\$30 billion, which is less than half the amount spent during the Gulf Crisis in 1991. The lesser figure is due mainly to the fact that fewer troops were mobilized. Under the Rumsfeld Doctrine, which requires that information technology, precision-guided munitions and special forces be used, the number of troops committed to the conflict in 2003 was only around two thirds of the 1991 figure.

In the last section of the article, a cost model of the military operations is presented. Based on defined variables, the model shows how exogenous and independent variables affect costs. It is thought that in 2003, the Rumsfeld Doctrine succeeded to reduce the two main cost variables, namely, the duration of the operation and troop numbers.

Civilian Officials in the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy

UJIKE Yasuhiro

This paper discusses the civilians who were appointed to the rank of officer in the Japan's Imperial Army and Navy. Civilian officers were divided into two broad categories: the *kōtō bunkan* (higher civil servants) and the *hannin bunkan* (junior civil servants). Together, the categories represented only a small proportion of army and navy personnel, most of the rank-and-file of which comprised factory workers, clerks and engineers.

The paper focuses on the lower echelon of civilian officers between 1934 and 1945.

During this period, Japan's army and navy changed their focus from disarmament to expansion. As a result, both branches of the armed forces began to pay more attention to the caliber of the civilians who were appointed officers, even to the lower echelon. The added care was necessary to ensure both the selection of good human resources and loyalty.

Technical experts were treated relatively better than office workers, because they were needed to help manufacture and modernize weaponry. Special courses were provided to allow the technical experts to acquire further skills, and able factory workers who took advantage of courses that were offered were promoted to *hannin bunkan*, or even to *kōtō bunkan*. No educational benefits were made available to office workers, however, and so relatively few of these civilians were promoted from *hannin bunkan* to *kōtō bunkan*. In order to explain the methods by which *hannin bunkan* were appointed, the paper also examines how other ranks were filled with civilians.