

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Its Implications for US Military Transformation

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This paper seeks to shed light on how those within the defense policy community interpreted the “lessons” from the Iraq War of 2003, assuming that their interpretations would have had a considerable impact on the ongoing efforts for military transformation launched by the Bush administration. Particular attention is given to issues related to ground forces, particularly the US Army, since it spearheaded the offensive on Baghdad and played the principal role in the war, while simultaneously undergoing great change under the leadership of its chief of staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker.

The paper first touches upon the factors to which military analysts attribute the Coalition forces’ early victory in the war. While many in the media point out the Coalition forces’ strength, including its superior air power and the effects of “Shock and Awe,” a closer look reveals a different perspective. Weaknesses on the part of the Iraqis certainly contributed to the victory, and the role of air power was other than what it has been believed to be.

Second, the paper discusses the wisdom of the popular view that advancements in situation awareness can allow firepower, armor protection and mobility—all inherent aspects of heavy forces—to be traded for deployability. Third, this study discusses the war’s implication for the Army’s traditional echelon: brigade, division, corps and army.

The paper concludes by acknowledging the undeniably great advance of the Coalition’s capability, but also points out various phenomena that are common to “traditional” wars: the persistence of the “fog of war,” the importance of destruction of an enemy’s main force, the utility of heavy forces, and other elements. The Russian military theorist Makhmut A. Gareyev once noted that military theories take a dialectical path of development. The Iraq War may well be one testament to the relevance of his argument.

The Korean War and Japan's National Police Reserve

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This paper, mainly based on the document entitled, "The History of the National Police Reserve of Japan, from July 1950 to April 1952," studies how the U.S. Army Far East Military Forces affected the founding and development of Japan's National Police Reserve. A brief outline of the paper is as follows.

The outbreak of the Korean War was so tremendous and widespread that the General Headquarters, Far East Command (GHQ) in Tokyo launched Japan's National Police Reserve as "covered planning." The strong intervention of the Chinese People's Volunteer Force into the war forced General Douglas MacArthur, GHQ commander, to provide the Reserve with U.S.-style ground weapon systems. And General Matthew Ridgeway, replacing the GHQ commander, found it urgently needed to introduce colonel-class officers of the Imperial Army possessing command and staff capabilities to reinforce the current military status to cope with Soviet threats to Japan. These urgent, dramatic military requests reshaped the characteristics of the police force into those of a military force for defending Japan. The introduction of the former Imperial Army officers, though raising the specter of a return to militarism, contributed to the consolidation and introduction of modern military U.S.-style tactics through a study of the Japanese way of waging war that had been used by the Imperial Army and Navy. This study was initiated by eleven people, including colonel-class former officers. Thus, the National Police Reserve inherited U.S. weapons and U.S.-style military doctrine, forming one basis of the Japan-U.S. relationship. Another issue for Japan was to develop its own defense doctrines, different from both that of the U.S. forces, expeditionary in nature, and that of the Imperial Army, which had exclusively offensive doctrines.

The Korean War and the Japanese Response: Case Study of Yamaguchi Prefecture

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Most of the past studies of Japan's involvement in the Korean War, dealing with such topics as its impact on Japan or the Japanese contribution, have addressed the issue through events at the higher, national level; that is, the studies have focused on peace treaties, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, rearmament, logistics support, dispatch of minesweepers, the red purge of the political spectrum, and Japan's economic recovery via increased demand generated by the Korean War.

In the field of history, on the other hand, local history has been the most popular subject in recent years, and regarding the impact of wars on local regions in particular, interesting studies have appeared now and then, covering wars from the Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War experienced by modern Japan. However, there has not been sufficient study of this nature regarding wars related to post-war Japan, including the Korean War. This paper attempts to address this shortfall by examining Yamaguchi Prefecture's relationship to the Korean War, investigating the impact the war had on the prefecture and its response to it.

Yamaguchi Prefecture was selected as the region for this study not only due to its geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula, but also because of the complexity and the importance of the relationships it had with the Korean Peninsula. As a prefecture with many Korean residents, the prefecture experienced a variety of problems related to these residents during the post-war period, some of which developed into serious security problems. The prefecture was also nominated as a possible location for the exiled Korean government during the early Korean War period.

The outbreak of the Korean War brought Yamaguchi Prefecture, which had been experiencing drastic changes under the occupation, a number of crises: it was sounded out about its willingness to accept the exiled Korean government, smuggling increased, and civil order deteriorated. In general, however, the prefecture responded flexibly and successfully managed these delicate conditions. Several factors appear to have contributed to this success: the strong leadership of Governor Tanaka Tatsuo, the focus on information gathering, and efficient security measures as exemplified by Japan's first special weapons and tactics teams. In the meantime, the Ozuki garrison of the newly established National Police Reserve, while overcoming the confusion due to the U.S.-style training, was sent on a disaster relief mission for the first time, less than one year after its foundation.

Demarcation and Territorial Problems between Vietnam and China

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This paper analyzes demarcation and territorial problems between Vietnam and China by exploring the history of negotiation processes as well as the current situation. The problems are categorized into three types: land border, maritime border, and the islands in the South China Sea. These three types of problem are considered separately because each problem has developed according to a unique historical process and has different prospects.

The land border problem was settled first. Vietnam and China concluded a land border agreement near the end of 1999, after which they began planning to place border markers. However, placing markers along the border has not been an easy task. By the end of 2004, the two countries had only placed 134 markers, one-fifth of the total number to be placed. Even in 2005, the work to place border markers has not made steady progress. One of the reasons for the slow pace of the work is the geographical difficulty of placing markers in mountainous regions between the two countries.

An agreement on the sea border and fishery in the Tonkin Gulf was concluded at the end of 2000. This agreement was followed by a series of intensive discussions on technical issues related to the sea border and fishery in the gulf. Eventually, Vietnam and China agreed on these issues and the sea border agreement was ratified in June 2004.

Of the three types of problem, the islands in the South China Sea appear to be the most difficult to solve. Although Vietnam has been claiming sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, the islands are substantially dominated by China. What is even more difficult is that not only Vietnam and China, but also other countries such as the Philippines and Malaysia, are claiming sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. The countries interested are striving to reach an agreement on the issue. The fact that in 2002 ASEAN and China agreed to declare conduct of parties in the South China Sea can be interpreted as the first step. Nevertheless, the final solution on sovereignty is yet to be seen.