

Abstracts

Research on the Development of IT and Its Impact on Military Organizational Structure

- *The problem of organizational structure in Info-RMA* -

Hide Hamada

Various arguments in the field of revolution in military affairs (RMA) have been developed, originating with perspectives on the military technical revolution (MTR) in the Soviet Union during the 1980s. This trend continues in Info-RMA, where the information technology (IT) revolution is playing a central role by enabling development of precision-guided munitions (PGM), sensors, and dual-use technologies (DUT). For organizations in general, IT has enhanced speed of operations and increased the ability to overcome the limits of geographical location. When an arms system gives IT a central role, transforming elements such as equipment systems, organization, and tactical training, it follows that the performance efficiency of military strength will improve by leaps and bounds.

Despite this potential, there is a dearth of research on the effects of promoting Info-RMA on military organizations. Here, research on military organizations refers to the study of the problem of organizational structure; for instance, the potential influence of information sharing and the flattening of organizational structures. This paper focuses on IT and organizational structure from the viewpoints of organization theory and business administration. The question of whether specific promotion of Info-RMA in military organizations, in particular in ground forces, would result in a flatter organization is addressed. The term “flattening” here indicates a decrease in the number of vertical levels of hierarchy in an organizational structure, brought about by the application of IT. Organizational structure, simply put, means the construct used for division of work and

adjustment. In general, when information sharing advances and the means of communication used to convey various messages shifts from human being to IT, a sharp decrease in staff engaged in information control and adjustment will result, flattening the hierarchy. Unlike issues more commonly addressed in papers on military organization, this paper focuses on the U.S. Army Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT).

Currently, the U.S. Army is promoting its “ARMY TRANSFORMATION” to an “OBJECTIVE FORCE” which goes to RMA-ization. The IBCT is positioned as a test-case brigade for the transition to an “OBJECTIVE FORCE.” Through systematization of IT and equipment, the IBCT has made it possible to target precise fire power on an enemy and to carry out high-speed engagements. This can be explained by the fact that IT affected functions involving the most fundamental control and adjustment in this particular military organization. Simultaneously, “flattening” was realized in this military organization by promoting functions involving control or adjustment.

However, despite the introduction of the benefits of IT to a military organization, the fact that human beings intervene somewhat in an arms system remains unchanged. Uncertainty and equivocality are included in the information which faces an organization. Uncertainty can be reduced by IT, but because equivocality involves differences in human semantic interpretation and recognition, it is difficult to reduce by means of IT. Equivocality must be reduced through the conventional hierarchy.

For this reason, even when a military organization takes on a flatter organizational structure, this structure will coexist with a hierarchy (hierarchy is equipment which serves to reduce equivocality).

Northern Limit Line: Demarcation Issues in the Yellow Sea

Keiko Morita

In 1973, North Korea began to challenge the Northern Limit Line (NLL)—a quasi-maritime demarcation line dividing North and South Korea—and to express legal claims to the sea areas surrounding the five offshore islands in the Yellow Sea. Lack of legal provisions concerning the maritime demarcation line in the Military Armistice Agreement and the subsequent failure to establish a mutually acceptable line under the Armistice framework are the primary causes of the contention between South Korea and the United Nations Command (UNC) on the one hand, and North Korea on the other.

South Korea contends that the NLL has functioned as a *de facto* maritime demarcation line since it was drawn by the UNC in 1953 and can be regarded as an equidistant median line as defined in Article 15 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. North Korea, on the contrary, has contested the validity of the NLL since 1973 by taking military actions in the Yellow Sea and expressing its position at the Military Armistice Commission Meetings. It also issued a declaration in 1999, unilaterally establishing a maritime demarcation line in the disputed area. This claim was based on North Korea's interpretation that all waters to the north of this military (and maritime) demarcation line were under its jurisdiction, and that there was no territorial sea around the five offshore islands, whose land areas, as provided under the Armistice Agreement, were under South Korean jurisdiction.

This paper examines the following questions: Is this argument by North Korea supported by the Armistice Agreement, "historical title," "specific circumstances," or any other reasons? Is the Law of the Sea relevant to this controversy? The paper also explores the reasons that the concerned parties have thus far failed to resolve the issue.

Imperial Japanese Naval Officers' Geopolitical Strategic Perspective in the First Imperial Japanese Defense Policy:How They Could Interpret the Substance of the First War Plan Orange

TAKAHASHI Fumio

Most of the previous studies on the first Imperial Japanese Defense Policy of 1907 have placed the emphasis on the image of the military and naval officers who were responsible not for military command but for military administration. Consequently, those studies have interpreted the policy as the result of the inconsistency between the military policy and diplomacy, or in light of the “dual” national defense policies formulated by the two services, and have also stressed, without considering the first War Plan Orange of 1906 or the first War Plan Black and German Operation Plan III of 1903, that the Imperial Japanese Navy regarded the U.S. as the hypothetical enemy in order to boost the naval expansion budget.

There must have been, however, a “reality” meeting the eyes of the military and naval officers who were responsible for military command. To develop an understanding of this “reality,” this paper examines the working hypothesis that the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers' geopolitical strategic perspective and the impact of the “message ” from President Theodore Roosevelt allowed them to interpret the substance of the first War Plan Orange and to position the U.S. as the hypothetical enemy in the first Imperial Japanese Defense Policy.

This paper also approaches the working hypothesis from two analytical points of view: the geopolitical strategic perspective and the operational thinking on blockades. Although the term “geopolitics” did not exist at that time, the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers cultivated a geopolitical strategic perspective that allowed them to analogously apply the geopolitical strategic features of the Caribbean Sea to that of Japan and its surrounding areas. Moreover, just before and after the Russo-Japanese War, the operational thinking on blockades evolved

from that of a tactical level blockade against harbors to a strategic blockade against the whole of the Japanese Archi

pelago. Thus, the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers, who were reminiscent of the so-called “Tripartite Intervention” by the message from President Theodore Roosevelt during the Portsmouth Peace Conference, could interpret the substance of the first War Plan Orange in light of the scenario of the U.S. Navy’s Caribbean Exercise of 1902-03 .

Finally, this paper hints at a new possibility for studying the view on national security held by the Imperial Japanese Military and Naval Officers who tackled the geopolitical strategic weakness of Japan. Such studies should yield some useful implications, since the geopolitical strategic features of Japan, such as its geographical and ideological position between West and East, lack of natural resources, and vulnerability to a strategic economic blockade, remain an independent variable to her security.

The Changing Eurasian Strategic Environment after the September 11

SAKAGUCHI Yoshiaki

Russian President Vladimir V. Putin considered the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 11 September 2001 a good opportunity to improve its relations with the U. S. The U. S. – Russia relations have been very close since the September 11, and Russia has played an important role as a member of the counter-terrorism coalition of the willing under the leadership of the U. S.

Through the 1990s Russia and China have made noticeable progress toward eliminating their former antagonism. Russia and China have shared concern over the unipolar supremacy of the U.S., which has emerged as the sole superpower with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has been concerned about NATO's enlargement to the East, and China has feared the U.S., which might cast China as a source of future threat. Russia had considered the Russo – Chinese strategic partnership very important from the viewpoint of counter-balancing the uni-polar supremacy of the U. S. But since the September 11 Russia's perception of the importance of this strategic partnership has changed with the improvement of the U. S. – Russia relations.

China has concerned about Russia's participation in the coalition of the willing under the leadership of the U. S. and about the deployment of the U. S. military in south-east Asia and central Asia, and China has tried to avoid its isolation through the process of strategic dialogue with NATO under the leadership of the U. S.

Although President Putin has not given priority to the Russo – Chinese strategic partnership, he has considered Russia's trade with China very important from the viewpoint of the recovery of Russian economy. Russia will continue to expand its arms transfer to China, and Japan has concerned about this factor because the build-up of China's big Navy with Russian-made advanced weapons will become serious military threat to Japan.