

## **Abstracts**

### **Envisioning the Future of the Armed Forces of Russia in the Russian Far East**

**- Their Influence on the Security of East Asia and the Pacific Region -**

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This paper envisions the future of the Armed Forces of Russia in the Russian Far East (hereafter, Far Eastern Forces) and their influence on the security of East Asia and the Pacific region.

The Russian Far East is contiguous with the United States, North Korea, Japan, and China. The Far Eastern Forces perceive the largest potential threat from the United States. Putin's Russia is still pursuing a relationship of equals with the United States based on the perspective of a multipolar world. This creates the possibility that relations between the United States and Russia may become strained in the future.

Putin's Russia is trying to diminish various potential threats through non-military means. As a result, the concern of Putin's Russia is not the Asian front, but the Western and Southern fronts, where many problems exist.

The Armed Forces of Russia determine the organization, equipment, and strategy of the Far Eastern Forces. The Armed Forces of Russia are planning to acquire the ability for conventional forces to execute a local war. They also plan to deter and counter large-scale attacks by nuclear force. Today, the Armed Forces of Russia are entering an age in which conventional forces are valued, and leaving an age when strategic nuclear force had been valued. The Armed Forces of Russia now consists of three branches (Ground, Naval, and Air Forces) and three combat arms (Strategic Rocket, Space, and Airborne Forces). Topics of interest on the Ground Forces include the dismantling of the Transbaikal military district, which was reorganized into the Far Eastern military district and the Siberian military district. The Far Eastern military district thus covers about 37% of Russian territory. On the Pacific Fleet, it is important to note that all SSBNs belonging to the Pacific Fleet submarine force may

retire within several years.

Based on the above, the following four basic scenarios can be envisioned for the future Armed Forces of Russia (Far Eastern Forces).

First, the Armed Forces of Russia (Far Eastern Forces) will see China as a potential threat.

Second, they will see the United States as a potential threat.

Third, they might become a part of NATO.

Fourth, they will probably strengthen their ability to respond to low-intensity conflicts.

The most likely scenario is the second, because tensions are likely to arise between the United States and Russia over Russia's insistence on an equal status. If so, the most important duty of the Russian Far Eastern military district, without the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Pacific Fleet (with the SSBN disappearing in the near future) would be to contribute to the Siberian military district with the Strategic Rocket Forces. The size of the Far Eastern Forces would not increase because of the importance of the Western and Southern fronts. Moreover, the Northern territories would not be restored to Japan because the territories are deemed necessary to maintain strategic reach and position.

Under the second scenario, what influence would the Armed Forces of Russia (Far Eastern Forces) have on the security of East Asia and the Pacific region in the future? This situation may exert a strong indirect influence on China. Under the second scenario, China would not experience a large military threat from Russia. If so, China would be able to focus its concern in the Pacific region. China is involved with a number of disputes in the Pacific region. Therefore, an unstable situation would continue in the Pacific region.

From the point of view of security in East Asia and the Pacific region, the most preferable scenario is that the Armed Forces of Russia (Far Eastern Forces) would become a part of NATO. In this case, a stable situation unlike anything seen before might appear in East Asia and the Pacific region. However, to make this situation possible, it is necessary for Japan to take the initiative in preventing China from being cut off from the rest of East Asia.

## Terrorism and International Law

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A massive terrorist incident such as September 11 is not covered by current international law. Terrorists are not an entity under international law. They are neither combatants in a civil war nor an entity that controls a certain geographical area. September 11 was not an armed attack, because it was conducted by civilians and civil aircraft were used. The UN collective security framework does not anticipate such an event.

Nevertheless, the possibility that a similar incident could happen cannot be denied. An international system to deal with massive terrorist incidents must be established. The exercise of the right of self-defence against terrorists, who are not an entity under international law, is not logically coherent. The right of necessity under international law, however, might explain the use of force against terrorists. Even so, the widely shared support of the international community for such an action, and the protection of the human rights of civilian victims as well as the accused are essential.

Military response has only a limited counter-terrorism effect. International cooperation, especially efforts to improve the effectiveness of various anti-terrorism treaties, are required. Also essential is the establishment of a proper legal system for bringing terrorist suspects to justice and trying them in national or international courts.

The legal and political legitimacy of international cooperation against terrorism should be maintained, and it is the responsibility of democratic nations to pursue this goal.

# U.S. Approach to International Military Exercises and Asia-Pacific Security

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Despite the “Weinberger-Powell Doctrine,” the restrictive doctrine on the use of military force that guided Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm, overseas deployment of the U.S. military expanded throughout the 1990s. The end of the Cold War brought about peace operations, which had been once impossible during the East-West confrontation. The Clinton administration, under the name of “asserted multilateralism,” promoted U.S. involvement in these missions.

In addition, in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997, the administration formulated “shaping” as one of the missions assigned to the U.S. military. The “shaping” mission included such missions as exercises and combined training, as well as military-to-military contacts and international military education training (IMET). The Review endorsed an upward trend in the U.S. military’s international activities.

One other factor that contributed to the increase of international activity by the U.S. military was the need to enhance multilateral/coalition warfare capability. The Joint Vision 2010 stipulated that almost all operations involving the U.S. military would be allied or coalition. “Shaping” missions were increasingly regarded as a vehicle to boost interoperability with allied and coalition partners.

The Bush administration had been critical of Clinton’s approach to military deployment for humanitarian missions and peacekeeping for increasing the burden on the U.S. military. They advocated limiting U.S. military involvement to operations directly related to national interest, seeing, for example, the question of U.S. participation in East Timor as a model for future U.S. intervention: the U.S. would play only a secondary role, leaving the major roles to those in the region, primarily Australia in this case. The “Global War on Terror,” launched in the wake of September 11, further siphoned military resources, serving to enhance this selective and discriminative ap-

proach to the U.S. military's international cooperation.

In the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has been pushing ahead with multilateral exercises with regional militaries. In addition to promoting mutual understanding and confidence with its counterparts, PACOM expected that such efforts would facilitate gaining access to militarily useful facilities in the region. The PACOM leveraged these exercises to facilitate smooth cooperation among militaries in the Asia-Pacific, as typified by Pacific Reach 2000. Cobra Gold, a bilateral exercise with Thailand, Tandem Thrust, with Australia, and Balikatan, with the Philippines, were merged to form a multilateral exercise Team Challenge. The content of these multilateral exercises has diversified to include peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

With the mounting pressure to release the U.S. forces from various burdens, which is becoming ever heavier due to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the need to secure access to the world's key regions, the Bush administration will continue to attach importance to military contacts, notably multilateral exercises. As such programs are streamlined and become increasingly multilateral in the Asia-Pacific, it will surely impact traditionally "bilateral" regional security frameworks.