

Abstracts

Strategic Significance of Missile Defense and Its Impact on International Security

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In December 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush decided to deploy a limited number of three types of land- and sea-based interceptor missiles, to go into operation in September 2004. President Bush declared the deployment a prelude and did not specify an ultimate architecture for U.S. missile defense systems.

China, although it had long been opposed to America's missile defense programs, did not react strongly. Beijing stopped short of denouncing the U.S. or of taking any countermeasures. This was despite the fact that the impact of U.S. missile defense on China is far more serious than that on Russia. In view of China's small numbers of ICBMs, even a limited missile defense for the U.S. homeland could neutralize the Chinese deterrent. In addition, such a U.S.-Chinese imbalance in strategic security precipitated by U.S. homeland missile defense might help secure Taiwan's current status of *de facto* independence.

At present, it is not clear whether deployment of U.S. homeland missile defense would prompt China to accelerate buildup and deployment of ICBMs. If China exercises this option, however, it would have significant ramifications for regional security, including the Russian and Indian reactions. In order to prevent such a scenario, the U.S. and China must deepen their strategic dialogue on missile defense, which would at least give the Chinese leadership the impression that the U.S. is sensitive to China's security concerns, thereby helping prevent a severe U.S.-Chinese confrontation.

The argument that Japanese missile defense would spur an arms race in East Asia is misleading. Any missile defense shielding a country like Japan, which does not deploy nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, would be purely a defensive weapons system

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and would not pose a serious threat. Whether or not an arms race with the countries neighboring Japan that have ballistic missiles deployed takes place depends on how each of those states responds to Japanese missile defense. East Asian countries must recognize that the prime mover of any arms race in East Asia would not be a Japanese missile defense program, but rather, the deployment and strengthening of ballistic missile forces by Japan's neighbors.

The Change of South Korea's Threat Perception and the Direction of the Modernization of Its Military

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Since 1970s, ROK has been seeking self-reliant defense policy. In 1980s democratization movements occurred in ROK. ROK began improving the relations with socialist countries. But the threat perception of the South Korean people doesn't seem to have changed. In 1990s, governmental-level dialogues between South and North Korea have proceeded. In September 1990, prime ministerial-level meeting were held for the first time.

The Basic Agreement between South and North Korea was signed in December 1991. This became a basis for coexistence of the two Koreas. Exchanges and dialogues between South and North Korea in early 1990s became a basis of the sunshine policy by Kim Dae Jung government.

In June 2000, South and North Summit meeting was held in Pyongyang. The both Koreas agreed to cooperate with each other to solve the issues of unification between the two Koreas.

Then the threat perception in ROK began changing. Many South Korean people began thinking that South and North Korea agreed not to fight with each other again. At the same time, the South Korean people became more independent when they think about the future U.S.-ROK alliance. ROK depends on the deterrent power

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of the U.S. Forces in ROK defense against North Korean military. At the same time they think that the threat from North Korea has been decreasing since the South and North Korean Summit Meeting in 2000. The ROK people began seeking a bigger role of ROK military in the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Now, ROK seems to be asking itself whether she should play a more independent role or she should continue sound security relations with the U.S. in the ROK-U.S. alliance or she should promote South and North Korean exchanges more rapidly.

This influences ROK's defense policy. The ROK Ministry of Defense has stopped publishing the Defense White Paper since 2001. This can be attributed to the ROK's dilemma between its defense policy against the North and its promotion of South-North Korean dialogues.

The present ROK government, which promotes the modernization of ROK military, is influenced by domestic public opinion, South-North Korean dialogue and ROK-the U.S. security cooperation. These three factors also will influence the ROK's ongoing modernization program in the future.

Enlargement of NATO: From Madrid to Prague

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NATO enlargement to the East created a curious reversal in NATO. After the Cold War, while the existing NATO states had begun to seek restructured relations with Russia, the former East European states, anticipating Russia's recovery, began to hope for admission to NATO as a "military alliance." Although NATO had fully realized the necessity of filling the power vacuum generated in the former East European states, there was an appreciation that such action by NATO would cause Russia to defy it as a new containment measure, which might provide another excuse

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to the nationalists in Russia and trigger a new confrontation. From the start, the issue of NATO enlargement contained inherent theoretical contradictions.

At the Madrid Summit of July 1997, NATO decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to become new members, in accordance with the United States' open-door-policy. NATO achieved this first stage of enlargement without running up against a tough stance or a shift in military posture on Russia's part. However, this did not mean that the Russians accepted the situation as is. At that point, the Russians regarded NATO as a military alliance.

When the candidates for the second round were nominated at the Prague Summit in November 2002, there was the possibility that new problems would be added to the unresolved issues of the first stage. The first problem was the relationship with Russia. In this sense, the affiliation of the Baltic states was most contentious, because the NATO line of defense would directly border Russia. This might not only exacerbate the frustration of the Russian military and State Duma with President Putin, who was looking for a way to compromise with NATO, but also drive Russia to shift its military posture by, for example, deploying tactical nuclear weapons which did not contravene existing treaties. However, the May 2002 Summit agreement between Russia and NATO on establishment of the NATO-Russia Council seemed to have had a reassuring effect on Russia.

The second problem was the redefinition of the Alliance for the second enlargement. Ironically enough, states anticipated to become new members would not contribute to the strengthening of NATO's military capability. Furthermore, after the events of 9/11, NATO had accelerated the transformation of its military posture in order to enhance its crisis management capabilities. This development, of necessity, pushed NATO to decrease its territorial defense capabilities through modification of the CFE Treaty.

Thus, though expressing concern over NATO enlargement, Russia did not take action against NATO on the occasion of the Prague Summit, when NATO nominated seven states, including the Baltic states, as new members. It should be noted that China, which was anxious about appeasement between NATO and Russia, contacted NATO officially for the first time in October 2002, using the occasion of coop-

erating with NATO on anti-terrorism activities in Central Asia. NATO enlargement has changed the landscape of the Eurasian strategic environment.

SALW and Micro-disarmament — Norm-building and the Roles of the United Nations —

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The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW) drew international attention in the 1990's when recognized as responsible for most of the killing today and as a major destabilizing factor in regional conflicts. The United Nations hosted a conference in July 2001, entitled the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, in order to address the complex nature of the issue. The United Nations concurrently issued a Joint Statement and Programme of Action, which defined the issue, promoted the development of norms on SALW issues, and encouraged states, regional organizations, and actors in international civil society to participate in global action against SALW proliferation in all its aspects.

The micro-disarmament characterizing the UN approach toward SALW has made a phenomenal contribution in terms of “norm-building.” Although positive and negative assessments of the conference do exist, most agree that it helped to shape a conceptual and material framework for the “global public policy” on SALW, and it is hoped that the accumulative effect of the policy will make the world safe from gun violence. Scholarly observation of the process leading up to the conference and the development of the issues thereafter reveals that the UN and the international community managed to bring together the national interest of individual states with norms constructed by international civil society. A delicate balance between the interests and the international norm was made possible through complicated multilateral diplomacy and negotiation with NGO communities. The two functioned in tandem to reinforce the development of a global agenda for the issue, within which most concerned actors

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feel comfortable and obliged to participate, and which has also benefited them in its final outcome.

However, this balance is maintained via the mutual restraint of the actors involved, and radical or provocative agenda-setting could shatter this fragile accord. We must acknowledge the fact that the issue has just begun to take shape as an item on the global security agenda. Therefore, the United Nations must press forward to maintain the inclusive nature of micro-disarmament, striving to frame and underscore the issue framework through as much linkage to the national interests of the participating countries as possible. The international community is relatively inexperienced in addressing such sociological dimensions of international security issues. The United Nations has an important role and responsibility, both in refining appropriate tools and methods for the SALW issue and in norm-building.

China's Security Cooperation with South-east Asia: The Case of the ARF

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China's security cooperation with Southeast Asia began with its participation in the ARF in 1994. China decided to join in the ARF to prevent itself from being isolated in the Asia-Pacific region, although one of the major aims of ASEAN in putting together the ARF was to check the rise of China. At the initial stages, China participated quite passively in the ARF.

However, after a couple of years of experience with the ARF, China has come to be more actively engaged, and makes good use of the forum for its own purposes. China sees the ARF as a good opportunity to create a desirable international environment by taking the initiative in shaping the security order of the Asia-Pacific region through advocating the "new security concept," China's original con-

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cept about security.

On the other hand, China has to prevent the ARF from developing a higher degree of institutionalization, which could restrict China's actions in the region. Therefore, China is reluctant to step-up the process of the ARF from confidence-building measures (CBMs) to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. China insists that CBMs be the "core" of the ARF process. In this sense, China is trying to shift the major target of security cooperation through the ARF to non-traditional security issues.

China is making other efforts to diversify its security cooperation with Southeast Asia. Among these are its bilateral cooperation with Southeast Asian nations and cooperation with ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea (through the ASEAN 10+3). China has signed the "Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" and the "Joint Declaration on the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues" with ASEAN. China is also positive about proceeding with security cooperation addressing non-traditional security issues in the framework of the 10+3. With these efforts, China intends to establish a favorable regional order by increasing its influence in the region through advancing security cooperation with Southeast Asia and East Asia without the presence of the United States.