

Abstracts

Partnership between the Self-Defense Forces and Disaster-Relief NPOs

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The Self-Defense Forces have played a major role in responding not only to large-scale natural disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and volcanic eruptions, but also to hazardous calamities caused by marine accidents, plane crashes and other man-made disasters. Thus, the expectations that the Japanese people hold for the SDFs' disaster relief operations have heightened considerably.

The SDFs have been dispatched, in principle, in response to requests by prefectural governors and other authorities in order to protect human lives and property. At the same time, many Non-Profit Organizations organized for disaster relief (henceforth referred to as "disaster-relief NPOs") have been established in recent years, and they provide their own unique relief services.

Under the current situation in which various means of providing relief, including disaster-relief NPOs, have dramatically grown and developed, in order for the SDFs to effectively perform disaster relief, it is important to discuss, among other issues, the need for cooperation and contact between the SDFs and disaster-relief NPOs, as is common in the USA.

By taking the U.S. military's basic policy for disaster relief into consideration, this paper assumes fundamental roles for the SDF and disaster-relief NPOs as follows: the SDFs will engage in disaster-relief operations when all of the following conditions exist: (1) an emergency necessity; (2) significant public interest; and (3) no alternative to the SDFs' support to improve the situation. In disaster relief operations,

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the SDFs will mainly take responsibility for activities that carry significant risks, require large material and human resources, and include large-scale search and rescue operations. On the other hand, disaster-relief NPOs will play a role in areas other than operations taken on by the SDF, in which they can fully utilize their unique characteristics.

The following three basic models can be considered for the modality of co-operation between the SDFs and disaster-relief NPOs: (1) A case in which the SDFs provide support for disaster-relief NPOs; (2) a case in which the SDFs receive support from disaster-relief NPOs; and (3) a case in which the SDFs collaborate with disaster-relief NPOs.

In addition, the stance for interaction should neither be for disaster-relief NPOs to be used to complement the SDFs nor for them to be used under any strong direct control, but should focus on the most important matter of maintaining equality within the relationship. In so doing, a true partnership can be built between the SDFs and disaster-relief NPOs for the very first time.

Information Technology and the U.S. Defense Industry: IT Implications for Japan's Defense Industry

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U.S. defense-related firms have merged, been acquired, or liquidated to cope with the dramatic decline in the defense budget in the post-Cold War era, with only some surviving intact. Currently, it is said that they ultimately flourished because they recognized that their strong technology base was a core competence and a potential source of competitive advantage in the course of these consolidations. Existing studies have broadly explored how companies integrated their corporate and technology strategies, but again have not related these consolidations to strengthening of the de-

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fense industrial base. In addition, little systematic theoretical and empirical work has been done to analyze how the emerging structure of the U.S. defense industry functions. The purpose of this study is to investigate what had shaped or was shaping the structure of the U.S. defense industry in the post Cold-War era, and in particular to examine what effects IT is having on a series of structural changes, and then to deduce implications for Japan's defense industry.

This study uses a model based on transaction-cost economics to analyze these structural changes. To be more precise, it focuses on the dimensions of structural and institutional changes by describing corporate strategies and the DOD's public policies from the transaction cost saving point of view.

The study's theoretical and empirical analysis shows that, in the post-Cold War era structural changes in the U.S. defense industry have come about as a result of a series of efforts both among defense industry actors and the DOD for reductions in transaction costs over equipment. During and after the late 1990s, the DOD has adopted and executed a package that expressly provides directional characteristics for equipments and encourages a competitive environment and dual-use technologies based on IT innovation. Accordingly, U.S. defense-related firms have modularized and deployed open-architecture strategies to save transaction costs over both defense-specific and dual-use technologies. In contrast, in the first half of the 90s, U.S. defense-related firms had deployed vertical and horizontal integration strategies to save transaction costs over defense-specific goods and services.

The results from this study also indicate that it is important for Japan's defense industry and the JDA to enter a full and open debate based on a broad mutual partnership in order to adapt to changes in the technological and security environments and accomplish a needed evolution.

The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Imperial Japanese Defense Policy Outline

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Japan gained the advantage over Russia during the last period of the Russo-Japanese War. Britain, which was convinced that Japan would defeat Russia, began to think about how to deter Germany and Russia from advancing into India. Britain was forced to concentrate its Army and Navy in India and the surrounding area, and cooperation with Japan became indispensable for Britain to defend its territory eastward of India. Under these conditions, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was asked to change from a defensive alliance to an offensive one, and to expand its activity area into India.

Japan was dissatisfied with the second Anglo-Japanese alliance, because Russia, with its large army, and the United States, with the second most powerful sea forces in the world, were the main threats to Japan. But Japan reluctantly agreed with Britain to change the character of the alliance from a defensive one to an offensive one, and on expanding its activity area into India.

The main point of the Imperial Japanese Defense Policy Outline that Japan enacted after the revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance agreement was the defense of only Japan. Japan chose this option because Japan realized two problems of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Firstly, Japan realized, through its experience with the first Anglo-Japanese alliance and the negotiations on the second Anglo-Japanese alliance, that Britain did not have the will or the ability to conduct cooperative operations with Japan in East Asia. Secondly, Britain did not consider the United States an object of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

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The Imperial Japanese Defense Policy Outline enacted in 1907 gave a high priority to the defense of only Japan and a secondary priority to cooperative operations with Britain. In spite of this negative factor in the military aspects, the offensive Anglo-Japanese alliance was maintained because positive factors in politics, diplomacy and economy made up for this negative factor.