

Abstracts

Japan-U.S. Alliance under the New Strategic Environment: Its Present Situation and the Necessity for Strategic Dialogue

KONDO Shigekatsu*

Entering the 21st century world, the Japan-U.S. alliance has increased in importance. Both countries took measures to readjust their alliance relationship to the post-Cold War security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, Japan dispatched vessels of its Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to provide rear area support for the military campaign in Afghanistan. They refueled foreign vessels participating in the campaign. This dispatch was unimaginable before September 11. In order to promote cooperation in the alliance, Japan and the U.S. need to conduct the strategic dialogue continuously.

In order to pursue the strategic dialogue, we have to start by confirming several factors related to the present status of the alliance. One of these is that East Asia will continue to be unstable for a long while due to the enormous gaps existing economically, socially and politically among the countries in the region. In this situation, the U.S. military presence and the alliance between Japan and the U.S. are providing the most realistic framework for regional security. We can call these “international public goods.” For the U.S., Japan has been valuable in terms of its national power and the military bases it provides. George Kennan, the architect of the containment policy, noticed Japan’s strategic importance from its potential power when it was in ruins as a defeated country. On the other hand, the U.S. has asked Japan to play a bigger security role in the region and the world as one of the responsible major powers. Japan, however, has restrained its security role in relation with its peace constitution. Regarding this issue, the Armitage-Nye report of October 2000 argued

* Director, First Research Department

that Japan's prohibition against collective self-defense was a constraint on alliance cooperation.

Japan has to have its own security thinking in order to conduct a strategic dialogue with the U.S. ODA (official development assistance) has been the typical tool for Japan's role in the international community and could have compensated for its smaller contribution in more direct security areas to some extent. But it has become difficult for Japan to increase its economic assistance quantitatively. Therefore, Japan has to use its limited resources much more wisely to promote its international role.

As Prof. Kenneth Pyle pointed out, sitting under the U.S. security umbrella and using the peace constitution as an excuse for not playing a positive security role, Japan has failed to develop a policy-making mechanism in the security field. Japan is evolving even in this field, and some proposals have been made very recently to strengthen Japan's capabilities in foreign policy-making. Japan is, however, in urgent need of forging an integrated security strategy and establishing a mechanism to accomplish that within the Cabinet.

Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula

TAKESADA Hideshi*

Even though the North-South Basic Agreement of 1991 was concluded on confidence building measures between North Korea (DPRK) and South Korea (ROK), not much progress has been made.

But after the Summit talks between the North and the South, the need for confidence building measures has risen due to the urgency of the North and South railway connection.

In June 2000, both Koreas met for a summit talk, and decided to convene a

* Senior Research Fellow, Second Research Department

meeting of military officials. In September, the North-South military commission was convened – this led to an agreement on the structure of the “military officers commission”.

South Korea proposed concrete confidence building measures at the Defense Ministerial meeting. For instance (1) the structure of the North-South military commission chaired by a General and the installation of a subordinate military practitioners commission; (2) installation of a direct military telephone line between top-level military officers; (3) notification of movements of large scale troops and military exercises, and mutual visits of inspection of military training; (4) exchanges of military personnel.

It appears that concrete points in the arms control discussion were addressed at this meeting. However, there is still a vast difference between the North and South Korean position on basic matters like the significance of U.S. troops, and how to promote arms reduction between the North and the South. It seems that the North-South Basic Agreement was the beginning CBMs in the Korean Peninsula – a link to conventional arms reduction.

Japan’s Security in the Changing Eurasian Strategic Environment

KANEKO Yuzuru*

SAKAGUCHI Yoshiaki**

MAYAMA Katsuhiko***

Arms control and disarmament as part of detente is essentially complementary to the safeguarding of security by military means. A military detente, along with deterrence and defense, is an indispensable element for national security. It can be said that it is a national strategy to eliminate military weakness in keeping with human-

* Chief, First Research Office, Second Research Department

** Chief, Second Research Office, Second Research Department

*** Research Fellow, Third Research Office, Second Research Department

istic ideals. From this point of view, we realize that the strategic link among the West (mainly NATO backed by the U.S.), the Soviet Union (Russia of today) and China changed drastically in nature upon the end of the Cold War.

In the Cold War era, as the monolithic unity of communism began to crumble, the Soviet political leader Leonid Brezhnev, who was seriously alarmed by instability on the eastern front, tried to promote detente with the West. His attempt to prevent operations on two fronts brought the success of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), which corresponded to Western interests. At the end, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty of 1990 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact became a landmark of military detente in Europe. On the contrary, in the Asia-Pacific, sharing a fear of Soviet military power, China and the U.S. reached a political reconciliation, which came as a great surprise to Japan.

After the Cold War, both Russia and China have shared the concern that the U.S. will undercut the basic concept of Cold-war-era military detente and plays a dominant role in the world. The U.S. attitude to the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty has brought the two countries into a closer relationship. Furthermore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization founded in 2001 and the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty of the same year may develop new military ties against the U.S. and its allies despite their posturing. Turning our attention to Western Eurasia, NATO's expansion to the Russian border may damage the fruits of military detente in Europe.

Japan did not adopt a clear detente policy during the Cold War era because security ties with the U.S. had worked effectively to deter aggression against it, and also because suspicions and tensions over the wounds of the last war had prevented it from initiating a policy in the Asia-Pacific. In the changing Eurasian strategic environment of the post-Cold War era, the idea of military detente has become acute for Japan in order to reduce the risk and cost of military uncertainties in the region. A multilateral framework may ease the legacy of the last war for Japan. As Japan's immediate security concerns are about the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and on maritime safety in the region, it is useful for Japan to help promote the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in which all East Asian countries participate.

China's "New Security Concept"

TAKAGI Seichiro*

China's "New Security Concept" (NSC) was first presented to the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in 1996 and first publicized in the Sino-Russian Joint Communiqué of 1997 as an approach to national security based on peaceful resolution of conflicts, as opposed to military alliance, or the "cold war mentality." Later that year, its emphasis on economic security was made clear. Its publicized formulation further evolved into the formula presented in Jiang Zemin's speech at the UN disarmament conference in 1999. The formula was elaborated in the position paper on the concept presented to the ARF meeting in 1992. According to the position paper, the essence of the NSC is the pursuit of common security through mutual benefit and cooperation. Its core elements are mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation. The explanation of these core elements indicates that the NSC is the adaptation of such concepts as common security and cooperative security as discussed in the West, with a clear infusion of Chinese security interests.

Despite its name, the NSC does not represent the totality of China's national security policy. Although the NSC has little to say about military security, China is clearly in no position to deny its importance. In fact, the NSC together with traditional military security constitutes China's total security policy, the former for promoting peace and reducing potential adversaries' motivation to attack China, and the latter for deterring possible attacks and defeating enemies out-side of the border, with both sharing the purpose of securing an international environment favorable to China's economic development.

The international context in which the NSC was promoted suggests its additional features and purposes. First, it is based on the judgment that the international power structure of "one super-power, many strong powers," would last for a long time, and that therefore the transition to a multi-polar structure, which China wants to

* Director, Second Research Department

happen, would be a long process. Secondly, it is presented in the context of China's successful management of foreign relations and thus reflects China's desire to take initiative in international relations. Thirdly, its intention is clearly to counter the strengthening of the American alliance systems, i.e., reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. security alliance and the trend toward NATO's eastward expansion. It is also intended to allay "China-threat" concerns, especially in Southeast Asia. As these purposes are pursued in the context of regional multilateral processes, it has also functioned as the theoretical framework for China's participation in these processes. The ARF and the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation (SOC) are the two major regional multilateral institutions, in which China has participated. China's enthusiasm about participation in them, however, clearly differs, reflecting the extent to which China can play a leading role in each.

Significance and Problems of the Moscow Treaty

OGAWA Shinichi*

The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, or the so-called Moscow Treaty, is not a traditional arms control treaty. It offers neither a framework for strategic stability in the traditional sense nor the ability to predict the other country's future strategic force structure. It places no restrictions on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and allows each side to determine both the composition of its deployed nuclear forces and the handling of warheads removed from service. The treaty simply stipulates to the effect that the U.S. and Russia shall reduce their operationally deployed nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700 to 2,200 each by the end of 2012. What the Moscow Treaty tells us is that the strategic nuclear relationship is no longer the central issue in U.S.-Russian relations, but simply one of the details.

* Senior Research Fellow, First Research Department

The Moscow Treaty was most likely bargained on the assumption that either Russia was no longer able to match the U.S. or Russia had no alternative to pursuing cooperative relations with the United States. It is true that today's Russia needs various forms of U.S. assistances to revive itself. But what if Russia should re-emerge and become hostile again? As long as the U.S. and Russia keep on deploying sizable nuclear weapons, it continues to be imperative to visualize and maintain policies that are conducive to strategic stability. And nuclear arms control hedging against a future uncertainty is more achievable in the era of cooperative relations than in the antagonistic days of the past. The U.S. should not miss current golden opportunity to institutionalize nuclear stability vis-à-vis Russia.

“Land, Ocean, Sky, and ? : Manifestation of Military Power”

NAGAO Yuichiro*

ISHIZU Tomoyuki**

TACHIKAWA Kyoichi***

After the end of the Cold War, religious and ethnic conflicts have spread throughout the world. The impact of the rapid progress in information technology is also remarkable. With this background, the face of war as well as our understanding or perceptions of war seem to have changed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan. Some military analysts have already used the term “new war” to describe the recent phenomenon.

Japan has to confront and adapt to these drastic changes. In an attempt to do so, this article examines the essence of military power and its manifestations from historical perspectives so as to shed light on the trends toward joint and combined

* Chief, First Research Office, First Research Department

** Senior Research Fellow, First Research Office, Military History Department

*** Senior Research Fellow, First Research Office, Military History Department

warfare. The article examines such difficult questions as what every state should do, and how it should do it, to establish a more stable order in the international community using its military power; whether or not the face of war has changed; and whether armed forces will play different roles in the 21st century; all this taking a study of history into full account.

First, the article sketches the history of land, sea, and air power as well as that of unconventional warfare. Second, the article examines the impact of technology upon warfare, by focusing upon the problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs (commonly known as RMA), with particular reference to joint and combined warfare. Finally but most importantly, this article advocates establishing a “Japanese Way in Warfare” in order for Japan to meet the new challenges in the 21st century.

The authors are concerned with to distilling lasting wisdom for posterity, rather than offering to advice to our own generation.

Imperial Japanese Army and Navy’s Informational Activities and their Assessments about Russia’s Policy toward Far East

IGARASHI Ken-ichiro*

After China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), western powers began to fight with each other in order to expand their influence over China. Chinese people, who were dissatisfied with the division of Chinese territory by western powers, attacked western people. The nation-wide opposition movement by Chinese people to the division of Chinese territory by western powers was the Boxers Rebellion. At first this rebellion broke out in Shandon province in 1899, later expanded to Zhili province and Manchuria. Western powers and Japan deployed their armies and together tried to repress this rebellion and to make the situation in

* Former Research Fellow, Second Research Office, Military History Department

Beijing and Tianjin region stabilize. The Boxers Rebellion was the first case in which Japanese Army did an operation in cooperation with armies of western powers, and was a good opportunity to show Japanese Army's capability. After this rebellion ended, Japan had to face Russia's threat. Russia that occupied Manchuria began to try to expand its influence to the Korean Peninsula. Japan faced the threat of Russia's expansion to the south and decided to fight with Russia in order to stop Russia's territorial ambition.

Through the period between the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), assessments about Russia's traditional policy of expansion to the south had been the most important for Japan's survival. From the viewpoint of informational warfare history, we can highly evaluate Japanese Army's activities to defend Japan from the threat of Russia's expansion to the south by using secret expenditures.

From the viewpoint of national interest, secret expenditures for such activities should not necessarily be open. Through the Meiji period, Japanese government had tried to balance between securing openness about how to use governmental expenditures and the pursuit of national interest by means of secret expenditures, and had succeeded in balancing between the two factors by means of recognition by the Cabinet Council about how to use secret expenditures. Informational warfare at the middle of the Meiji period was consisted of three factors; (1) information that Army and Navy acquired by means of purchase and loot; (2) non-governmental information that commercial companies and merchant ships acquired and gave to Army and Navy; (3) information that Ministry of Foreign Affairs acquired and gave to Army and Navy.

War and Economy

Japan's Expansion of Production in the 1930s

ARAKAWA Kenichi*

The theme of this paper is Japan's expansion of production in the 1930s. Productive capability is the foundation of military power. The paper argues that the Imperial Japanese Army designed, planned, executed and ended up expanding Japanese industrial productive capacity. In particular, the paper stresses why finally the Army failed in the attempt and in wielding its influence over the Japanese economy.

The argument of the paper evolves by demonstrating several hypotheses with numerical data. The first hypothesis is as follows. The concept of Japan's expansion of production was planned on the assumption that Japan would not engage in a war within less than one decade from that time. However when the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the concept worked to keep the war in progress. (Hypothesis 1)

The following three points served as reasons that the plan for the expansion of production power went unrealized. The set of concepts consisting of the expansion of production, the policy of military build-up, and the Sino-Japanese War together demanded a planned economy. This planned economy centered on the Plan for Materials Mobilization. When a Planning Board was founded, the Plan for Materials Mobilization became a sort of institution. The Plan for Materials Mobilization itself stagnated, and did not serve to expand industrial production power. The Plan for Materials Mobilization was a plan under which the government distributed strategic and specific materials to industrial sectors on behalf of markets. A stagnancy of productive force resulted from ignoring the market function which makes adjustments to demand and supply. (Hypothesis 2)

The second cause of failure of the expansion of production plans was as follows. The Japanese government, or Planning Board, Department of Commerce

* Senior Research Fellow, First Research Office, Military History Department

and Industries, and the Imperial Army adopted a quasi-wartime foreign trade policy in the middle of the 1930s. But this policy could not achieve its aim of realizing the expansion of production plans and executing the Sino-Japanese War. (Hypothesis 3)

At a time when world economies showed a tendency to become autarkies, the British and U.S. economic bloc also boycotted Japanese products that had competitive prices. In such an environment, aggressive behaviors by the Japanese military on the China continent justified and amplified the Chinese, British and American reaction against Japanese products.

Finally, the paper mentions an economic implication of expansion of production plans. The Japanese government implemented the plans using the method of allocating limited resources from civilian industry sectors to defensive industries on behalf of markets. As a case study to demonstrate the implications of this, the paper reviews the changes in the textile machine industry and mother machine industry in the 1930s. The former was a pure civilian industry, but the latter was an industry for military and civilian alike. The paper argues that this method itself wasted resources and fostered an environment that retarded the expansion of production.