

SUMMARY

Transactions in the Security Realm: Cases of Bilateral Military Exchange

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Defense exchanges and security dialogues have become fashionable. However, among scholars of security studies, defense exchanges are assigned a marginal status in the context of cooperative security. Based on the model of a security community, we explain how defense exchanges start, what effects they have on security relations among states, and under what conditions they will most probably achieve their object.

We argue that when two states share a common security issue without sharing a common identity as members of a security community, the relative effect of starting defense exchange is high. However, if such exchanges fail to alter the perception of the states involved, so as to create a sense of the “indivisibility of security,” very little achievement is likely. We illustrate this claim empirically by examining three specific cases. The first concerns Japan-Russia exchanges after the Cold War, where non-governmental transactions and exchanges preceded official defense exchanges. The second case deals with the low-key and implicit exchanges between Malaysia and Singapore, where both countries share a common security concern about internal ethnic conflict. The third case focuses on confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan, where contact and exchange measures are totally lacking. We conclude that, although the central actors in defense exchange should be defense officials, both uniformed and civilian, exchanges at the non-governmental level sometime play a positive role. We suggest that coordination between defense officials and non-governmental actors might be considered in planning Japan’s defense exchange program.

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The Revision of the Law on Military Service and the Transformation of the Chinese Defense System

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In December 1998, China revised the former Law on Military Service (hereinafter, the former Law), originally adopted in May 1984. According to Chinese authorities, the former Law was revised because its contents were not suitable to the changes in the situation surrounding the Chinese Army since its adoption.

The most important points of the revision of the former Law were: (1) the shortening of the obligatory term of military service; (2) the reform of the system of reserves; (3) measures to give privileges to servicemen; and (4) the strengthening of penal regulations, etc.

Moreover, in June 1999, China revised the former Service Regulations of Active Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers and tried to transform the defense system of China. The Chinese leadership has considered the volunteer system to be very important, and has been trying to establish a smaller regular army made up of professional military personnel and to carry out a plan for the qualitative consolidation of secondary reserves against wartime. In my view, the Chinese Army has begun to try to achieve the capacity to deal with *regional conflicts* using high-tech weapons.

[ED: "regional conflicts" might mean, for example, between China and Taiwan, or China and another Northeast Asian country. "local conflicts" would imply conflicts inside of mainland China, perhaps ethnic in origin. Please confirm the edit above.]

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War of Conveyance by Sea
Imperial Japanese Naval Warfare
and Breaking the Sea-Lanes Used for Communications

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Why didn't the Imperial Japanese Navy make a point of breaking the sea-lanes used for communication in World War II? The conclusion of my analysis is as follows.

Any consideration of this issue would be amiss without addressing the key role of Rear Admiral Sato Tetsutaro (1866-1942). He was a leader in Imperial Japanese Navy defensive thought before World War II. The core of his concept indicated that the primary objective in naval warfare was "the destruction of the enemy's main fleet." Through the Russo-Japanese War, this concept became a sort of confidence. Thus, his principle of decisive battle between fleets in naval warfare became a united dogma, symbolized by the triumphal image of the battle in the Sea of Japan in 1905. At the same time, the concept, connected with Admiral Togo's authority, passed straight into the untouchable sanctuary of an "order of the Emperor."

It was during World War I when the submarine as an actual weapon appeared on the scene. The Imperial Japanese Navy did not want to employ submarines to break the sea-lanes of communication. That is why the Imperial Japanese Navy could not reorient its style of warfare to the change in the form of war, to "total war," brought on by World War I. Imperial Japanese Naval strategy before World War I was guided by the supreme principle of the decisive fleet battle for the purpose of gaining control or command of the sea. To be sure, the concept of destroying commerce was also present. *But the principle of the decisive fleet battle to gain control of the sea took priority, and became the premise of any consideration of the free destruction of commerce.* So a decisive fleet battle was nothing but the means to control of the sea. In spite of the change in the form of war, this principle of the decisive fleet battle as nothing more than a means became a target and a dogma. It became a virtual "order of the Emperor." "The new reality" of the total war was seen from the point of view of the decisive fleet battle, as well. The appearance of the

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submarine was an event that should have forced the Imperial Japanese Navy to modify its concept of “command of the sea.” But the Imperial Japanese Navy did not modify its concept. It rather dealt with submarines by asking how they could be used in the decisive fleet battle.

The lessons of several maneuvers during the Japan-China War (1937-1941) suggested as follows. A comparison of the use of submarines for a decisive fleet battle to their use for destruction of commerce reveals that the former was less effective than the latter. After all, the Imperial Japanese Navy never responded quickly to the new reality that these exercises brought. As always, it simply stuck with its policy. This choice had a serious influence on submarine warfare by Japan and U.S. in the Pacific Theater in World War II. It brought about the fatal result that decided the outcome in terms of the production of submarines for warfare. In 1941, Japan had three naval building facilities and two private shipbuilders for constructing submarines. On the other hand, the U.S. had only two naval facilities and one private shipbuilder at that time (just after the Pearl Harbor attack, two more private shipbuilders joined in). Though the U.S. had the same shipbuilding facilities as Japan, it built twice as many submarines as Japan during the three years from 1942 to 1944. This is because the U.S. Navy decided to mass-produce a single type of submarine in 1941, the “Gato type,” which had *abilities rather similar to Japanese submarines*. The Japanese failure to compete was a consequence of an organization that could not adapt to the changing environment.

Technology Strategy and Armaments Design of the Japanese Imperial Army Mainly in the Period Following World War I

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This paper deals with the armaments reform of the Japanese army. It focuses on how the Japanese army proceeded with technology strategy as a national security policy during a revolutionary period in military affairs. The Japanese army felt strongly that the

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State's technological power and industrial potential should be further merged, given the inferiority of weapons strength compared with Western countries. Coupled with the lessons of World War I, Japan drew up its technology strategy conceptually distinguishing "quantity" and "quality" of armaments.

The Japanese army revised *Teikoku Kokubohoushin*, which was the national defense policy and military strategy, at the end of WWI. From the next year, which was 1919, Japan commenced with modernization of the corps, such as improvement of armaments and the reform of weapons administration. However, this modernization did not progress readily, because of a lack of understanding of the quality of the armaments. However, at last, the Japanese army began to walk the way to modernization once again (so-called Ugaki Disarmament) in 1925, seven years after the end of WWI.

This reform was a scrap-and-build project that built up the four pieces division to stave off the decline of military power, utilizing meager public finances. The modern weapons that the Japanese army tried to introduce were airplane, tank, and the anti-aircraft gun, and the weapon research emphasized research and development of chemical weapons. This technology strategy was: "A first step preparing the nations for total war, in which new weapons should be imported from the West and urgently improved, such that the results of weapon research emerging from learning from the West ends up besting the West." This strategy was conceived by Kazushige Ugaki, the Minister of the Japanese army.

This reform can be evaluated as a reform that the Japanese army adopted under the concept of clearly upgrading the quantity and quality of armaments, and was the first case that such a technology strategy was advanced. However, this technological strategic thinking did not necessarily have efficacy as a strategy. The reason is because this thought overly hurried the breakaway from following the West to the modernization and Weapons technology of the armaments. This is why Ugaki did not anticipate that weapon exportation after WW I was beginning to move in the direction of strategic worth, in other words, bargaining power. Also, he was disregarding the efforts of Japanese army engineers to bring forth new weapons as such. Moreover, he was not expecting that chemical weapons would not be unable to trigger reform of military equipment systems such as airplanes and tanks.

The revolution in military affairs that happened because of WW I raised new weapons and technology to a status of strategic worth, which grew even to the point of

becoming bargaining power. Technology strategy in this revolution can be understood as one element of bargaining power, whether or not it has the prospects to bring forth bargaining power and induce reform of equipment systems. This view is clearly seen in the lesson of the reform of the Japanese army.