

Summary

Area Defense Activities and Roles in Some Countries

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The present legal systems in Japan do not include any definition of Area Defense Activities. For the purpose of this study, we provisionally define Area Defense Activities as national activities protecting sovereign territory against an invasion that is neither a simple illegal entrance nor a serious armed attack.

Under the present system in Japan, Area Defense consists of police activities primarily carried out by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency and the police of each prefecture. The Japan Self Defense Forces play a supplementary role if the police agencies cannot appropriately implement these activities.

Other countries and regions such as, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Korea, and Russia have different systems for Area Defense Activities depending upon their own circumstances. The government organizations for Area Defense are Coast Guard, Maritime Police, Border Guards, Navy, Army and Air Force, etc. In every case, the most effective Area Defense systems have been built by some kinds of organization. Japan need also optimize both the ability of related organizations and the effectiveness of Area Defense as much as possible.

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Reviewing the U.S. General -Purpose Forces since the End of the Cold War

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The end of the Cold War has forced U.S. defense planners to reshape the nation's general-purpose forces, which focused on the Soviet military threat in the Cold War era. According to Les Aspin, the first Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, identifying a threat to U.S. important interest is the only realistic basis for sizing and shaping the U.S. general-purpose forces even in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the problem for U.S. defense planners is to identify a threat in the post-Cold War era and to structure the nation's general-purpose forces to correspond to the security environment.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration have reviewed the U.S. military strategy and its general-purpose force programs. Through these reviews, the basis of the defense planning of the general-purpose forces has shifted from the global Soviet military threat to regional challenges. The so-called Rogue State Doctrine was the result of these review processes. The doctrine emphasizes countering risks and challenges from the Third World states that possess large military forces and WMD capabilities. The U.S. termed such a state a "rogue state" and identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as such.

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) defense programs of the Clinton Administration were designed to counter aggression by regional powers and, in doing so, to maintain the capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts that might occur nearly simultaneously. According to the BUR, this capability is indispensable for deterring a potential aggressor in one region while combating aggression in another. The BUR, as Aspin pointed out, was the result of a comprehensive review of the military strategy and force structure to fit various but less predictable requirements in the security environment of the post-Cold War era.

The BUR defense programs, however, did not necessarily provide a persuasive blueprint suitable for the security environment of the post-Cold War era. Some specialists

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voiced criticisms that it over-emphasized threats from “rogue states”, and concluded that it would be prudent to adopt a force posture ready to fight and win one major regional conflict instead of two. These critics suggested that there is no consensus on the basis for sizing and shaping force posture in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the most difficult problem facing U.S. defense planners after the Cold War is the lack of consensus on the basis for determining “how much is enough” to meet the diverse and less predictable requirements of the security environment in the post-Cold War era.

The successor to the Clinton Administration will come in power in January 2001. The task of the new administration is to plan a post-BUR defense program suited for the 21st century security environment by exploiting the results of RMA.

How Post-Reunification Germany Views and Presents History: Treatment of the Holocaust

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During the Kosovo dispute, in contrast to its response to the Gulf War, Germany dispatched its armed forces outside NATO boundaries for the first time since World War Two. While the world focused on this action, changes in the way history is viewed in post-reunification Germany, changes ongoing and occurring concurrently with changes in defense policy went unnoticed.

First, a “reappraisal of history” has taken place. In Europe, and especially in Eastern European countries and Russia, this reappraisal has been advancing under the democratization caused by the collapse of socialism, and the accompanying disclosure of historical documents. Similarly, in post-reunification Germany, the former East German regions have taken the lead in reconsidering historical interpretations; specifically, in the revision of an “Anti-Fascist view of history,” which is an ideological interpretation based on socialism. This process is symbolized by the numerous memorials and museums that have been built. There is also now a more relativistic dimension to judgement of Nazism, which has emerged from the trend to criticize the evils of the Socialist past, such as the

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East German state system and the crimes of the Soviet Union.

Second, taboos in postwar Germany are being challenged. Postwar Germany has adopted a negative view of group crimes, put total responsibility on the Nazis, and tried to overcome its past within those boundaries. The *Wehrmacht* (German army) in particular, partially due to its involvement in the attempted assassination of Hitler, has been praised publicly as a rare good example of “purity” during the Nazi period. However, a traveling exhibition showing the *Wehrmacht’s* participation in the Holocaust shook this myth, and invited widespread criticism. Even ex-president Weiszäcker criticized the exhibition, stating that generalizing from individual crimes is dangerous. At present, some of the photos displayed have been proven to be in error, and the exhibition has been discontinued.

Third, a problem is the “overcoming of the past” with respect to the Holocaust. In a discussion over a Holocaust monument planned to be built in Berlin, and in a debate between Walser, a German author, and Bubis, the chairperson of the Central Council of Jewish residents in Germany, it was said that mourning of the Holocaust not only had become a mere “ceremony,” but was also being exploited as a political tool, i.e., Jewish attitudes towards the treatment of the Holocaust came under criticism. It was also suggested that sufficient remorse had already been expressed over the Holocaust.

Dutch journalist Ian Buruma, comparing both Japan and Germany’s methods of coping with their pasts, pointed out the close relationship between the security issue and the “overcoming of the past” in both countries. German cases relating to the viewing of history suggest many interesting points that can be applied to Japan.

Japanese Attitudes toward the Vietnamese National Movement during the Second World War

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“The maintenance of tranquility” was the framework or golden rule of Japanese policy toward French Indochina during the war, and had remained strictly observed until

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the coup de force carried out by the Japanese to overthrow the French colonial regime on March 9, 1945, five months before the end of the war. This policy was clearly incompatible with other goals of the “Great East Asian War,” such as establishment of a “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and liberation of the Asian people from Western rule. The Japanese government and the Military Headquarters, especially that of the Army, considered it more convenient from the standpoint of the smooth execution of military operations to let the French continue to run their colony and collaborate with Japan militarily as well as economically than to immediately grant independence to the three nations in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). That is what the Vietnamese term “joint control by the French and the Japanese.”

In French Indochina, therefore, the Japanese diplomats, officers and soldiers could not openly support any nationalist groups or individuals, even though they might sympathize with the ideal, that is, independence. They at best collected information about nationalists’ activities, except for the *Kempeitai* (Japanese military police), who protected nationalists like Ngo Dinh Diem and Tran Truong Kim from being arrested by the Sûreté (French secret police) and helped nationalists like Kim to obtain political asylum. The *Kempeitai* made approaches to independently-oriented religious sects: Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. But the main Japanese supporters for independence movements were civilians like Doichi Yamane, Mitsuhiro Matsushita (both were in business), Kiyoshi Komatsu (a literary scholar), and others.

Things began to change in the summer of 1944, when the Vichy Government collapsed and General de Gaulle seized power. Tokyo felt it necessary to question the policy toward French Indochina: to continue with the policy of maintaining French colonial rule or to stage a coup d’etat and overthrow it?

Lieutenant-Colonel Hidezumi Hayashi, a staff officer of the Japanese Garrison Army in Indochina, was ordered to draw up a plan to administer Indochina after a coup. He cooperated with Ngo Dinh Diem who had been protected in the Japanese Army hospital in Saigon, and other nationalists. The draft plan completed by Hayashi envisioned granting independence to the three nations there immediately after French sovereignty vanished. Hayashi also planned bringing the highly popular Prince Cuong De of the Vietnamese Imperial family back from his exile in Japan to the throne. Though the idea of granting independence was fundamentally respected, Hayashi’s plan met with opposition from leaders of the 38th Army. It met with especially strong objections from the commander, General

Yuichi Tsuchihashi, who did not believe in interfering with the domestic affairs of a country. He instructed Hayashi to draft a new plan. As a result, the unpopular Emperor Bao Dai was not dethroned. The people were disappointed at the Japanese.

The author is critical of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army for the inconsistency of their policy toward Indochina.

Technology Strategy and Armaments Concept of the Japanese Imperial Army Mainly in the Period Following World War I

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This paper deals with the armaments reform of the Japanese Army. It focuses on how the Japanese Army proceeded with technology strategy as a national security policy during a revolutionary period in military affairs. The Japanese Army felt strongly that the State's technological power and industrial potential should be further merged, given the inferiority of weapons strength compared with Western countries. Coupled with the lessons of World War I, Japan drew up its technology strategy conceptually distinguishing "quantity" and "quality" of armaments.

The Japanese Army revised *Teikoku Kokubohoushin*, which was the national defense policy and military strategy, at the end of WWI. From the next year, which was 1919, Japan commenced with modernization of the corps, such as improvement of armaments and the reform of weapons administration. However, this modernization did not progress readily, because of a lack of understanding of the quality of the armaments. However, at last, the Japanese Army began to walk the way to modernization once again (so-called Ugaki Disarmament) in 1925, seven years after the end of WWI.

This reform was a scrap-and-build project that built up the four pieces division to stave off the decline of military power, utilizing meager public finances. The modern weapons that the Japanese Army tried to introduce were airplane, tank, and the anti-aircraft gun, and the weapon research emphasized research and development of chemical weapons.

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This technology strategy was: “A first step preparing the nations for total war, in which new weapons should be imported from the West and urgently improved, such that the results of weapon research emerging from learning from the West ends up besting the West.” This strategy was conceived by Kazushige Ugaki, the Minister of the Japanese Army.

This reform can be evaluated as a reform that the Japanese Army adopted under the concept of clearly upgrading the quantity and quality of armaments, and was the first case that such a technology strategy was advanced. However, this technological strategic thinking did not necessarily have efficiency as a strategy. The reason is because this thought overly hurried the breakaway from following the West to the modernization and weapons technology of the armaments. This is why Ugaki did not anticipate that weapon exportation after WW I was beginning to move in the direction of strategic worth, in other words, bargaining power. Also, he was disregarding the efforts of Japanese Army engineers to bring forth new weapons as such. Moreover, he was not expecting that chemical weapons would not be unable to trigger reform of military equipment systems such as airplanes and tanks.

The revolution in military affairs that happened because of WW I raised new weapons and technology to a status of strategic worth, which grew even to the point of becoming bargaining power. Technology strategy in this revolution can be understood as one element of bargaining power, whether or not it has the prospects to bring forth bargaining power and induce reform of equipment systems. This view is clearly seen in the lesson of the reform of the Japanese Army.