Summary

The Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy of the Nuclear-Weapon States

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As in the Cold War era, nuclear deterrence policies of the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are based on their retaliatory capabilities. Each nuclear deterrence strategy, however, reflects its own domestic and external situation. The U.S. has maintained a robust nuclear deterrent, including powerful counterforce capability, in order both to hedge against a resurgent Russia or an antagonistic China and to maintain a credible extended nuclear deterrence for its allies. At the same time, the U.S. has launched stepped-up efforts to attain a denial capability in the form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) largely on the premise that the U.S. nuclear deterrent constructed in the Cold War days would not work well against missile threats from the so-called "states of concern."

Owing to its economic and fiscal difficulties, Russia's military forces, especially its conventional capabilities, have degraded into a poor condition. In order to redress this problem, Russia has increasingly emphasized the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Adoption of a doctrine of nuclear first-use illustrates this trend. Moreover, because of its ever shrinking strategic nuclear force, Russia is opposed to a U.S. NMD program for fear that it will deteriorate further Russia's strategic deterrent.

Among the five NWS, China is the only state that so far has not shown any sign of nuclear reduction. Rather, as observed in the test-launch of its mobile DF-31 ICBM, China even seems to be strengthening its nuclear forces. Because of the excessive secrecy China has maintained on its nuclear matters, it is difficult to have a clear picture of China's deterrent strategy. However, judging from its limited number of deployed warheads, and ICBMs that suffer from poor accuracy, China has gone no further than practicing a policy

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of "minimum deterrence." Nonetheless, depending on the improvement of the accuracy and reliability of its ballistic missiles, China's nuclear strategy may evolve into a "limited nuclear option" variant. Moreover, China criticizes America's BMD programs more sharply than Russia and has good reason to do so, since Chinese ICBMs that can reach the continental U.S. number only twenty or so.

The U.K and France are exploring the rationale for the maintenance of their nuclear forces. France once tried to give new significance to its nuclear force by advocating "Euro-deterrent." The initiative, however, did not bring about positive reactions in Europe. The British and French nuclear forces may continue to exist for the noble cause of an ultimate means for their security.

A nuclear strategy based solely on retaliation is not effective for all contingencies, nor immune from moral condemnation. The biggest challenge for the U.S. and the other NWS is to explore a way to incorporate some defensive elements into a retaliation-dominated strategy without destabilizing strategic relationships.

A New Military Mission for A New Europe: US-European Discord on Crisis-Management Operations

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Despite the controversial issue of NATO’s enlargement in the post Cold-War Europe, both NATO and Russia have realized military stability through the reduction of conventional armed forces as well as the INF Treaty and the START. Above all, the CFE Treaty, the CFE-1A Agreement on military personnel, the Flank Accord for Russia, and the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty have increased military transparency and safety there. On the contrary, ethnic and local conflicts have occurred frequently and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become another source of concern in and around Europe.

In parallel with the dissolution of old confrontations in Europe, NATO has changed its character from a traditional military alliance to a political framework for an international alliance in order to conform to new strategic environment of the post Cold-

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World Europe. The US, who lays its hopes on keeping NATO active so as to continue
playing the leading role for the European politics through NATO, thus has urged European
allies to put crisis-management operations into its core mission. Therefore, it is essential
for the US that European allies should accept the US idea of the Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF) backed by the concept of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)
within NATO. The US also seemed to harbor that the US would direct the Kosovo-type
operations through NATO and confine the European-led CJTF activities in the UN peace
keeping missions.

Europeans felt uneasy about the US proposal. Most European allies, who are
also members of EU, have pursued a different way. The above-mentioned development
of European military stability has been in favor of Europeans for carrying out the so-called
European Identity even in the military field that they had depended heavily on the US
capability in the Cold-War period. Adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty by EU members in
October 1997 was a turning point, which modified the Maastricht Treaty of February
1992 and strengthened executing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In
December 1998, Britain and France issued a joint declaration in which they proposed
creating a rapidly deployable joint formation of at least 30,000 troops in EU so that it
could have a capacity for autonomous action.

When the British-French proposal was endorsed at the EU summit in December
1999, however, the US expressed anxiety that it would lead creating a European Army
outside NATO. The issue may harm US-European security ties that have been fostered for
over fifty years. On the other hand, EU will lose its cohesion if its complex decision-making
process on CFSP with qualified majority voting and constructive abstention does not work
effectively. Europeans may have opened a Pandora’s Box by striving for their identity.

The Future of the Russian State in terms of the federal system

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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia’s state system has been
transformed from the centralized Soviet regime to the democratic federation. However,

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with no key factors of the integration, newly independent Russian Federation is now facing the serious national identity crisis.

The legitimacy of the Russian state has not been authorized yet, because the present Russian federal system formed under the Soviet era is irrational and asymmetrical. In another words, Russia’s state system has changed significantly, but the question of how the country should be governed has not been answered. In the near future we can not expect the division of the Russian sovereignty except Republic of Chechnya, but the separatism movement of the federal components are going on.

Russian new president Vladimir Putin elected in March 2000, seems to control over the federal components by strengthening the central power and try to reconstruct a viable centralized state, but in the long run he will not able to overcome the many kinds of the problems about the federalism. Because it is quite difficult to make the present federal system drastically changed by the democratic means and under the rule of law.

As seen above, we can not conclude that in the foreseeable future the Russian state will become steady and stable. Furthermore, Russian state falling into the malfunction of the federalism still remains one of the uncertain and insecure factors for the security environment in the northeast Asia.

U.S. Arms Transfer Policy after the Cold War: Politics of “Supply Push” in the Clinton administration

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Since its inauguration, the Clinton administration had to face the difficult situation concerning the arms transfer policy. It had to deal with two contradictory demands facing the defense establishment of the United States. One of which is declining defense budget and less procurement fund since the end of the Cold War, and the other is maintenance of military readiness and preparedness with dominant military strength in the world.

There were two answers to this problem. First, it was to develop the arms market in the world. By doing so, the U.S. defense industries can retain certain scale of production-

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line and wait until next generation of armaments and procurement would come. Second, it was to utilize the commercial goods and technologies for development and maintenance of defense goods. Thereby, the U.S. can make the defense procurement more efficient and economical.

Clinton’s conventional arms transfer policy, which came out in February 1995 (PDD34), was a first of its kind since Regan administration. It debacles the political consideration of arms transfer from maintenance and development of arms industry of the United States. Hence, it could escape from criticism from anti-arms transfer groups and pro-arms trade lobby mainly consists from defense industries. In other words, the Clinton administration crafted the policy that both those groups can satisfy to a certain degree. Once some arms transfer was decided not to be politically viable or troublesome for the national security of the United States, the government may assist arms exporting company with its export promotion.

Major problem in the Clinton’s conventional arms transfer policy is about competitiveness of the U.S. arms manufacture and relative strength of the U.S. military strength. Arms export may have a leveling effect, unless the advantageous party make some policy to prevent this to happen, relative strength of the United States would be decreased. However, once the arms trade is established as state-supported policy, it is true that it is difficult to go back. Thus, it is likely that some kind of setback would face the U.S. policymakers in the middle of the 2010’s.

Legal Aspects of the U. N. Authorized Multi-National Forces

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Since 1991, we have frequently seen the use of force by the United Nations member states authorized by the Security Council, under chapter II of the United Nations Charter. The Coalition Forces are generally called “Multi-National Forces (MNF)”. The use of force and the mandate for MNF are explicitly directed in the related U. N. Security Council’s Resolutions. The use of force is strictly limited within the said mandate. In case

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the Council authorizes its power to the Member States, the Council acts in accordance with the Chapter Ⅲ of the Charter. However, it is still a controversial issue whether MNF is one of the modified forms of the Collective Measures taken by the Council to maintain or restore international peace and security.

In this Paper, using U. N. documents, the Author will examine MNF’s practice in the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, to establish MNF’s legal character. For this purpose, it should be recognized that the Security Council has expanded the boundary to make its decision concerning the existence of the threat to peace which is provided under the article 39 of the Charter. As a result, the excessive breach of human rights within one nation could constitute the threat to peace. Adding to this, the vital issues for military operation such as the mandate, and operational span is directed by the Council through the related Resolution. There are two other issues that must also be addressed. U. N. docutantaly facts, the Author will show that when the Security Council “authorizes” an issue, they mean to “delegate” the Council’s power under Chapter Ⅲ of the Charter to the Member State to conduct military operations. Also, at the disposal of member states, ROE’s and operational planning must be investigated. In spite of much argument concerning its legal character, the use of force by the MNF’s is effective measure to maintain or to restore international peace and security. By doing so, the use of force authorized by the Council establishes one of the modified forms of Collective Measures taken by the Council.