

## Abstracts

### **Proliferation of Precision-Guided Munitions and Its Impact on East Asia**

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Precision-guided munitions have caused a revolutionary change in the way of warfare since the early 1990s. In the Gulf War of 1991, precision-guided munitions were employed extensively by the U.S.-led coalition forces, which led some observers to conclude that a “revolution in military affairs (RMA)” had occurred. Since then, many countries have developed precision-guided munitions and introduced them into their force structures.

Arguably, however, precision-guided munitions are proliferating more slowly than initially expected, and the degree of adaptation in one country widely differs from that in another. In East Asia, China is proactively adopting precision-guided munitions and exploring a unique way of warfare by employing them. As a result, a situation is arising where U.S. forward operating bases in Asia have become vulnerable, jeopardizing U.S. force projection in the Western Pacific. In addition, stimulated by China, its surrounding countries are also acquiring precision-guided munitions, namely ground-based anti-ship missiles which would hamper freedom at sea in the region. Furthermore, since precision-guided munition technologies are being widely proliferated, not only state actors, but also non-state actors can acquire them relatively easily. In particular, short-range precision-guided munitions are estimated to proliferate quickly because of their ease of use, low unit prices, and multiplicity of supply sources, which would similarly have a significant impact on the security environment of East Asia.

The proliferation of precision-guided munitions would greatly affect the security of Japan as well. In order to exploit the emerging technologies, Japan will also emphasize precision-guided munitions in its defense buildup, and may consider counter-strike capability around such munitions in the near future. Accordingly, it would be critical to fully grasp the potential of precision-guided munitions and take precautionary measures ahead of other nations as a hedge in an uncertain security environment.

## **Security Sector Reform, and the Roles of the Military and the Police: The Case of Sierra Leone**

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Security Sector Reform, which aims at building effective and accountable security institutions, is increasingly recognized as essential for peacebuilding. In particular, the military and the police play critical roles as security providers and as the most visible state apparatus in post-conflict countries. While the roles of the military and the police and their division of labor are vague and often overlap in Africa and elsewhere, little attention has been paid to how and on what basis they are determined in the SSR process.

Through a theoretical lens of “hybrid peace,” this paper analyzes the SSR process in Sierra Leone. The aim of this paper is twofold: First, it shows that the roles of the military and the police are not predetermined or unchangeable; rather, they are strongly conditioned by multiple, fluid factors such as history, culture, the perception of political leaders and the general public, and the security situation. Therefore, their roles could change especially during the post-conflict period when those factors tend to change quickly and substantially. Second, what external actors think ideal security institutions and practice are unlikely to be transplanted and rooted into a post-conflict country in their entirety. An understanding of the political dynamics of the host country (“demand side”), as well as the policies of external actors (“supply side”), is needed.

In Sierra Leone, the military and the police had taken the path of decay after independence, and when the Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group, started civil war in 1991, the government failed to suppress it. The military colluded with the RUF to prey on ordinary people and also led several coups during the civil war. These events strongly affected the SSR process after the conflict. Sierra Leonean leaders initially sought to disband or downsize the military while expanding the role of unarmed police. Without a substantial external threat, the Sierra Leone military lost its identity and *raison d’être* until the Military Aid to the Civil Power policy was introduced in 2004, and troops began to deploy to international peace operations in 2008.

In contrast, an effective defense against the RUF during the conflict dramatically changed

the perception of the Operational Support Division, an armed wing of the police force, which had been notorious for its oppressive acts against the population as a de facto private force of the president. As result, the OSD was expanded after the conflict, and remaining concerns about the military's growing role often fuel further expansion of the OSD. The Family Support Unit was newly established within the police by a Sierra Leonean police officer to respond to the rampant sexual violence. The FSU was later supported by external donors. These examples show that the particular context of the country determined and changed the roles of the military and police in post-conflict Sierra Leone.

The fact that external donors can have only a limited impact, and that a “hybrid” security sector tends to emerge, implies the importance of “flexibility” in the SSR process. A deeper understanding and appreciation of the context of a country and the limits of external donors are essential to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of SSR.

### **Efforts of Major Developed Countries to Protect Their Own Nationals Abroad**

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When an overseas accident, such as occurrence of a natural disaster, deterioration of public order, or outbreak of an armed conflict, endangers the safety of nationals staying there, the home government comes under pressure to take some actions for securing the safety of its own nationals abroad. While the duty of a government is to maintain the independence and peace of its own country and to protect the life and property of its own people, to secure the safety of nationals abroad is primarily the responsibility of the host country. Nevertheless, if the government of the country in question cannot fulfill its responsibility for some reasons, the home government will undertake an operation to rescue and repatriate its own nationals staying abroad. This is an action called Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). Although it is essentially the diplomatic agency that judges this NEO within the government, defense authorities are also involved if necessary. With respect to the NEO, some countries have incorporated governing

laws into their domestic legislation, while, even in the case of absence of such specific laws, it is judged on a case-by-case basis such as in light of international law as to whether or not it should be carried out. The parliament's involvement in decision-making is different in one country from that in another, and not always internationally the same. Targets of the NEO are basically its own nationals abroad, but sometimes foreigners also come within the range. Ordinarily, private-sector assets (including aircrafts and vessels) are used, but it is the armed forces that ultimately serve as a principal organization when the situation becomes more dangerous. In executing the NEO, it is desirable that consent is acquired from the government in question, but it may be carried out even without such consent. Due to the risk of their duties, dispatched members of the troop engaged in rescue/transport operations are often armed if necessary. It is, however, carefully judged in light of the Rule of Engagement (ROE) whether or not weapons should actually be used for self-defense.

Respective countries are differently characterized in terms of such matters as legal basis, consent acquisition, the decision maker for execution/parliamentary procedure, implementing organization, the roles of military sectors, the people to be protected, and cooperation with foreign countries. With reference to an actual operation exemplified by the Libyan case in 2011, each country rescued a large number of its own nationals and foreign people in Libya in a short period of time while offering bilateral cooperation to a considerable extent under its own legislative system. It is particularly interesting that the United Kingdom, geographically close and with many nationals of its own staying there, played a central and leading role in NEO coordination. Such coordination role, in the recent Libyan case, to adjust activities with units dispatched from various countries and non-governmental organizations for the protection of respective nationals abroad was played by the United Kingdom in Malta, near Libya.

Implications for Japan include; (i) the preparation of various legal bases to avoid, as far as possible, a situation where an activity is beyond the scope of the law, (ii) efforts to acquire consent from the related country in carrying out the NEO, and if it is impossible, construction of a theory which permits activities of some sort, (iii) consideration of frameworks to permit the minimum prohibitive use of weapons if necessary for executing the task, as approved by many countries, and (iv) prompt dispatch of Japanese personnel to the group for NEO coordination with other countries, and in case of an activity near Japan, consideration to act as the leading country within such a NEO coordination group.

## **Russia's Conventional Arms Exports to India, China, and Vietnam**

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This article examines Russian exports of conventional weapons to Asian nations as a factor affecting the security environment in the Asian region. The Russian decision-making process and specific details concerning arms exports are not so clear, and published information is also not so complete. This article uses a comparison of arms export cases to different nations as an approach to make up for such lack of clarity regarding internal situations. More specifically, security cooperation with and arms exports to India, China, and Vietnam, as Russia's important business partners in Asia, are briefly examined with a focus on common trade problems and different tendencies. Russia's arms exports are the second largest in value to the United States, but the unique point is the ratio of this value to military expenditure, which is well over 10% in the Russian case while ratios are below 6% in other major exporters. The Russian value of domestic arms procurement had long remained on a lower level than arms exports and even after it turned higher than arms exports, the defense industry heavily depends on exports for its revenue. The Russian authorities help the defense industry's business in order to develop the Russian technology level beyond military purposes, and to secure more employment around the industry.

For India, as the most important customer of Russia's defense industry, Russia has sold products and provided technologies using relatively new technologies. With parts production technology granted in the days of the USSR and maintenance capabilities in hand, India provides services to Malaysia, for example. Su-30MKI fighter planes for India, fabricated at the Irkutsk Aircraft Manufacturing Plant (IAPO, currently Irkut Corporation), are a special model which employs Russia's relatively advanced technologies with the AL-31FP engine equipped with a vectoring nozzle to enhance mobility and also Indian, French, or Israeli technology for its radar and avionics, while Su-30MKK planes for China lack many of these technologies. Russia and India co-produced BrahMos ultrasonic cruise missiles and, at present, also share the technology and fund each other to promote development/production under the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) project. It seems that Russia will remain in cooperation with India for high-level military technology based on trust.

In contrast, less trust is found between the Russians and the Chinese over technology transfer issues and in the area of security relations, which results in protracted negotiations before they agree on conditions for each contract. Shenyang Aircraft Industry Corporation of China tested J-11B fighter planes in flight in 2002 but, on the Russian side, many view this as a problem, saying they are “illegal copies” of Su-27 fighter planes. The production of such planes, however, was possible only with the cooperation of USSR-era engineers and Ukraine, and it may not be easily possible in the newer models. Moreover, engines of Chinese manufacture are below the required level, therefore China has no other choice but to continue to purchase AL-31 series engines from Russia.

Also within the Russian defense industry, a problem was raised over FC-1/JF-17 fighter planes co-produced by China and Pakistan. Although Russia exported the Klimov’s RD-93 engines to China and Pakistan only for their own use, the Russian side found the possibility of FC-1 being sold to third countries, and the United Aircraft Corporation, whose MiG-29 fighters would be challenged by FC-1s, issued a statement of opposition to exports of RD-93.

China’s current imports from Russia are only those of engines and other advanced parts, after large-scale purchases of finished products from the 1990s to the early 2000s, but in recent years, contracts for S-400 defense missile systems, Il-476 transport planes, Lada-class submarines, and Su-35 fighter planes are reportedly under negotiation. A news report in 2012 says China’s desire to buy only four Su-35 planes struck a compromise with the Russian side’s proposal of 48, resulting in the purchase of 24 planes.

Vietnam purchased MiG-29 and Su-30MK2 fighters. It also signed in 2009 a contract to buy 6 Kilo-class submarines (Project 636 or Varshavyanka), and their lead ship was delivered to the Vietnamese side in November 2013. The Russian side does not appear to be particularly aware that this will radicalize the confrontation in the South China Sea. To China, 10 submarines of Project 636 were already delivered earlier, and it will take time until Vietnam becomes capable enough for submarine operation.

Remarks made possible by this comparison are as follows: In the first place, the Russian technology cooperation level remains high for India but low for China. Secondly, Russia does not appear so much concerned over a change in military balance due to its arms trade. Thirdly, demand from each customer drives Russian exports more than relations between customers. One can hardly observe a sign of Russia stopping trade with China in favor of India, or issuing higher-performance weapons to Vietnam to buttress its defense against China.

These facts show that, in general, Russia regards profits of the defense industry as a major driving force, and is promoting exports to every country while taking care about technology issues. Despite the growing sense in Russia of China's military power, exports to China are not very likely to come to a halt, but difficulties to be negotiated (experience gradually accumulated by both countries) serve as a factor to hamper progress. The Su-35 fighter plane contract, for which negotiations over sales quantity and prices are continuing between Russia and China, is not very likely to be agreed upon early for the delivery of products.

### **ASEAN Centrality:**

#### **From the Viewpoint of Intra-/Extra-regional Relations**

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the “centrality” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), focusing on the dynamics of intra-/extra-regional relations in Southeast Asia. The centrality of ASEAN means that ASEAN plays the central role in a variety of multilateral cooperation frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region, and more specifically, ASEAN takes the initiative in multilateral framework meetings of different levels and joint exercises. ASEAN's initiative has been secured by regular meetings within each framework held around July or November every year, as part of an ASEAN-related series of meetings, as well as by ASEAN's exercise of its leadership in agenda-setting for multilateral meetings and wording coordination for joint statements under the Dialogue Coordinator system.

The ASEAN centrality now faces a diversity of challenges. These challenges are both internal and external, and they are closely associated with each other. Internal issues include the changing position of ASEAN in Indonesia's foreign policy, and newly emerging concern over a split of ASEAN due to the rise of China and the recurring South China Sea issue, while external issues include the rise of China, the U.S. return to Southeast Asia, and U.S.-China competition for influence over ASEAN.

Among multilateral frameworks in terms of security cooperation where ASEAN should maintain its centrality, the ARF and the ADMM-Plus have respectively developed, and their

overlapping roles may become an issue. A vector is, however, exerted on both to prevent such duplications, with the emphasis of ARF joint exercises placed mainly on civil-military cooperative operations, while on the other hand, the ADMM-Plus focuses on the strengthening of cooperation systems and confidence- building between militaries in any EWG areas of HA/DR, anti-terrorism, maritime security and PKO. Japan's defense cooperation with ASEAN will successfully contribute to maintaining ASEAN centrality by supporting institutionalization of the above multilateral frameworks and substantial strengthening of cooperation, and bilaterally, by helping each country of ASEAN expand its strategic choices.

### **Japanese Pre-War Military Attaché System**

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The purpose of this article is to comprehensively examine the system of military attaché which has hardly been studied in earnest so far, focusing on military/naval attachés to embassies/legations of Japan up to the Second World War period, and to briefly summarize what it was like.

Relying mainly on official documents owned by Center for Military History, the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense, and Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as primary historical material, and at the same time, using diaries, memoirs, and statements of those having experience of being a military attaché in pre-war days, and their acquaintances, the author examines, in particular, the establishment and transition of the Japanese military attaché system (e.g., its origins, an increase in the number of or changes in countries in which military attachés served, and its termination), the status of military attachés (e.g., status under international law, status at the embassy/legation, status within the military forces), aspects of the "Office of Military Attaché" (e.g., office room, staff), and personnel affairs (e.g., candidates, personnel management, place of appointment, reappointment, and locally limited assignment).

Military attachés to embassies/legations of Japan were military personnel subordinate to the head of their respective military command, and at the same time, they were diplomats who were placed on the diplomatic list, and bestowed diplomatic privileges and immunities as

embassy/legation staff members supervised by their respective ambassadors/ministers. Although a military attaché's office room was sometimes located within the embassy/legation building, it was very often established in another place, and any military attaché generally had a different office room from the naval contemporary. Accounting was also independent of embassies/legations to be covered by army/navy estimates, and each military attaché received a service allowance in addition to his basic salary, and was granted secret funds as necessary expenses, such as for entertainment and information gathering. The countries in which military attachés served before the First World War were major western powers and countries neighboring Japan, while after the war, medium-sized/small countries neighboring the United States or the Soviet Union also became places of appointment. In wartime, the value of neutral states increased. Military attachés began or resumed to be sent out to them, and their functions strengthened. The country in which a military attaché would serve was determined based mainly on the foreign language he learned, as well as on his specialization. In general, military attaché personnel were Army War College/Naval Academy graduates having excellent academic results, and experience of residing in a foreign country.