
Abstracts

Politics of “Military Options”: Soldiers and Civilians in Use of Force Decisions

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This article examines the three cases of US decisions on military operations: Gulf War of 1991, Iraq Surge of 2007, Afghan Surge of 2009. In each case, central to the issue was “military options.” Civilian leaders intervened in operational matters, military advices were offered from unusual sources, civil-military boundary became blurred, and civil-military tension heightened. It was antithetical to Samuel P. Huntington’s “normal theory of civil military relations.”

In the Gulf War, the military at first refused to provide any plans or ideas on “military options,” that can be taken against Iraqis, despite repeated calls from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Their reluctant attitude, that Cheney found “unacceptable,” was also reflected in the initial CENTCOM plan for ground offensive, that contemplated frontal assault on the Iraqi defensive positions in Kuwait. In the words of Brent Scowcroft, Bush 41’s national security advisor, it was a briefing, that was “unenthusiastic, delivered by people who didn’t want to do the job.” It required usual intervention from top civilian leaders into operational matters for the ground offensive planning to develop into “Left Hook,” which incorporated large-scale envelopment movement trapping fleeing Iraqis.

In case of 2007 Iraq Surge, the commander on the ground, GEN George W. Casey, Jr. advocated accelerating transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqis, while reducing US roles to training the Iraq Security Forces for greater roles. It was George W. Bush who questioned judgment of his military advisors, initiated Iraq strategy review, and ultimately “changed the mission, strategy, force size, and entire leadership team of the American war effort in Iraq.” During Iraq strategy review within the government, military voice provided through normal channel of communication, including JCS, CENTCOM, or MNF-I, did not advocate change of strategy. The calls for change came from usual sources: NSC staffers, former Army vice chief, Jack Keane, and AEI. That led to the implementation of population-

centric COIN operation under the command of GEN David H. Petraeus.

In case of 2009 Afghan surge, President had to struggle with the military's "one option that was framed as three options," in search of real options, from which he can choose. Besides, he had to confront "what seemed like a concerted PR campaign," conducted toward media and Congress by the Nation's senior military leadership, in support of a fully-resourced counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Obama's search for "real options" continued until he finally announced 30,000-troop surge in December 2009.

In conclusion, what can we draw from these cases? First, there need to be alternative sources of military advice regarding military options. There are times the military does not offer "right" options. Second, multiplicity of sources of military advices is necessary for civilian leadership to secure "supremacy in military policy and decision-making."

Russia's Policy on Strengthening the Navy and the Defense Industry

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The Russian government has begun rebuilding the Russian Navy as a part of the military reforms since October 2008. The Russian leadership has set out a clear policy on strengthening the Navy. Furthermore, the "State Weapons Program for 2011-2020," unveiled at the end of 2010, presents that 23.4% of the total budget will be allocated to the procurement and development of vessels. This program and the budgetary measures for its realization have contributed to the gradual progress in the construction of new naval vessels since 2011.

Nevertheless, in order to examine the question of whether these trends will continue and lead to the strengthening of the Navy, a number of factors need to be taken into consideration. First, while the construction of new naval vessels is making headway, challenges remain in the production of missiles to be mounted on the vessels. In particular, Russia has faced problems with the development and production of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) R-30 Bulava to be mounted on the Borei-class strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) – identified by the Russian leadership as a key pillar of its strategic nuclear forces. This in turn has raised concerns over delays in the commissioning of second and subsequent

Borei-class SSBNs. Secondly, questions have been raised as to whether the vessels Russia has procured and developed truly match the demands of the Navy, and whether they really contribute to its capacity enhancement. In particular, some military experts have posed questions regarding the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to be brought in from France. They present the view that the capacities and functions of the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship do not fit with the defense challenges facing Russia. Moreover, Russia has already initiated the necessary large-scale landing ship project 775/775M and project 11711, raising the question of whether Russia needs other large-scale landing ships. Thirdly, the problems confronting the Russian defense industry remain unresolved, putting to question the ability of the defense industry to meet the high procurement targets identified in the State Weapons Program. In short, it is anticipated that unless the structural problems facing the defense industry are fundamentally solved, notably the problems of the inefficient management practices of defense companies, grave declines in the capacities of defense industry professionals due to shortages of skilled engineers, among other reasons, the low level of research and development capacities, and the aging of production facilities, there can be no hopes for rapid increases in production capacity, which would have adverse impacts on the achievement of the State Weapons Program.

Russian-led Multilateral Cooperation in Central Asia: Progress of Collective Defense System and Economic Integration

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This paper attempts to explore regional integration in Russia, which constitutes one of the policy agendas of contemporary Russia, focusing on the developments related to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as well as the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Customs Union. Under the CSTO, Russia has made strides in organizing the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) since 2009. In recent years, international treaty ratification procedures and disclosures have finally moved forward in connection with the organization of KSOR. Additionally, the details pertaining to KSOR's

formation have begun to come to light. In the area of economic integration, attention will be on the schemes of EurAsEC that have made advancements since the beginning of the 21st century, and of its core component, the customs union (comprised of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus) and their actual operations.

Russia's sphere of influence as represented by the geographical scope of CSTO member states has decreased in size compared to during the Soviet Union era. As former Soviet Union countries gained independence and seceded, both the geographical scope of Russia's sphere of influence as well as Russia's military capabilities for governing the sphere of influence have diminished considerably compared to in the past. Furthermore, while some level of progress was seen in the integration process of EurAsEC and its core framework, i.e., the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, it cannot be said that Russia has established a clear framework for securing its sphere of influence towards the future.

While facing such tough challenges, since the 2000s, Russian-led regional cooperation frameworks have been established, and geographically, are beginning to spread to the areas of the former Soviet bloc to the east of the Caspian Sea. Unless dramatic changes in the international order befall this region, it is deemed highly likely that these frameworks will become institutionalized while maintaining a level of stability.

With regard to how multi-layered regional cooperation frameworks in Central Asia will shape out in the future, whether it is a rosy or dark future in the forecast, it is certain that the future picture will be far removed from the revival of the Soviet Union "empire." As a former suzerain state, Russia will likely retain and manage the tangible and intangible assets in this region. Depending on how this is looked at, it can be interpreted as a reorganization of a Russian-centered "suzerain-state system." However, there is no doubt that it will have entirely new geographical scope, equipment, and functions. Even if a Russian-led "suzerain-state system" were functioning in the current Central Asia, this should be seen as a swing-back from an empire (= Soviet Union)-type rule to a system with strong autonomous tendencies led by a pluralistic independent body.

Australian Defence Force's Response to Transforming Peacekeeping Operations: Consideration of Characteristics through ADF Documents and Activities in East Timor

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This paper considers how the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is trying to respond to transforming peacekeeping operations by examining the ADF's perception of and policies on peacekeeping operations as found in public documents as well as the ADF's actual interventions in East Timor. Peacekeeping operations have changed significantly from activities during the Cold War era as they have become a tool for responding to civil war. Broadly speaking, the change can be considered to be taking two directions, namely the use of military force and the goal of peace-building. How to deal with peacekeeping operations being transformed in this way is an issue of importance for various countries in the international community. Thus, as an example of responses to such transformation, this paper focuses on Australia, particularly the ADF, and sheds light on some of the characteristics of how the ADF is trying to respond to the transformation of peacekeeping operations.

The characteristics of the ADF's response to the transformation of peacekeeping operations, which can be noted from an analysis of the ADF's public documents as well as examples of its specific activities in East Timor, are as follows. Firstly, the ADF is broadly responding to new missions arising from both the potential use of military force and peace-building requirements, and has set forth the policy of promoting and strengthening its partnership with civil actors. Secondly, the ADF emphasizes the restoration and maintenance of security related to the possible use of military force and considers this to be the main role required of military units in peacekeeping operations. In East Timor, the ADF played the biggest role in the restoration and maintenance of security. In terms of the characteristics of the ADF's patterns of activities, it can be noted that the ADF opted for intervention by multinational force in situations that posed particularly high military risks, and that the military police played a major role in realizing collaboration with the civilian police. Thirdly, as for missions related to peace-building, the ADF, while assuming that it may be called upon to carry out humanitarian and civil support activities, believes that the activities should

be primarily undertaken by civil actors. Furthermore, the support activities that the ADF provides are positioned to produce a favorable impact on the perception of the population in the operating areas and assist in the execution of the military mission. Fourthly, in missions related to peace-building, the policy of the ADF is to attach importance to security sector reform, which it considers to be an endeavor that should be borne by military units. In East Timor, the ADF has been trying hard to provide East Timor's Defense Force with capacity-building support. Lastly, the ADF gives greater importance to peacekeeping operations undertaken in Australia's immediate neighborhood, maintaining the position of keeping its involvement selective and limited for peacekeeping operations that involve a lesser degree of national interest and that occur in faraway regions.

Role of Social Media in Emergency Responses: An Example from the Great East Japan Earthquake

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Social media, unlike conventional mass media such as television and radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, are a means of transmitting and sharing information with excellent interactivity and immediacy. On the other hand, however, social media is vulnerable to allegations of the dissemination of false information, intrusion of privacy and disparity in utilization among generations. When the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011, social media was utilized, albeit on a limited scale, for the transmission of information, a feature not seen in responses to natural disasters in the past.

At the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, local governments in affected areas and surrounding regions used social media for the transmission of information from affected areas, coordination and sharing of support information from regions surrounding affected areas and the transmission of educational information that was useful for coping with the impact of the disaster. Among these usages, particularly notable were the existence and remarkable

performance of “influencers” which have a significant influence on the transmission of information and “insiders” who directly transmit information from within organizations. However, it must be pointed out at the same time that there is a risk that misinformation is transmitted and left uncorrected, which causes unnecessary misunderstanding.

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) also utilized social media for its information activities and operations, but the utilization was on an extremely limited scale, an indication of its tardy response to social media. Nevertheless, despite some unresolved problems, social media is of extreme importance and offers great potential, and its serviceability as an information tool is deemed high for the SDF as well.

Since the transmission and sharing of information through social media is expected to become more important going forward, it is desirable for the SDF to become capable of proactively using social media. In doing so, in light of the issue of whether the SDF can become an “influencer” with a potential impact on the Internet and an “insider” to gain credibility on the Internet, it is necessary for the SDF to build a wide-ranging relationship of trust with the people through social media and mutually exchange a larger amount of accurate information in an appropriate manner by making use of its special characteristic as an organization made up of a wide spectrum of age groups. The SDF needs to proactively introduce the necessary terminal equipment, and also develop the appropriate environment and respond flexibly to carry out exchanges with volunteers and NGOs on social media. In addition, the adequate utilization of equipment held by individual SDF personnel deserves prompt consideration.

The Great East Japan Earthquake has dealt unprecedented blows to Japanese society. At the same time, it has also demonstrated the great potential of social media, which is quite different from conventional mass media. Under these circumstances, the SDF should raise its sensitivity to social media and expeditiously consider its proactive use. By doing so, the SDF should become capable of utilizing social media not only in dealing with large-scale disasters but also as an effective tool to collect information for the early detection of signs of various crises, and to exchange and transmit information in the event of an emergency.

Post-WWII Rearmament of South Korea and Japan and Activities of U.S. Military Advisory Groups in South Korea and Japan

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After the end of World War II, the United States began providing military assistance to regions other than Europe under the Truman Doctrine, and sent U.S. Military Advisory Groups to help foster military forces in aid recipient countries. In conjunction with this policy, U.S. Army Groups were sent to Turkey and Iran, while a Provisional Military Advisory Group was established in South Korea on August 24, 1948. Subsequently, following the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Korea at the end of June 1949, a U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was established. The principal tasks of the KMAG were to provide guidance and advice to South Korean forces, and develop and supervise the smooth implementation of plans for military assistance provided to South Korea. In order to accomplish its tasks, the KMAG brought under its sphere of activities all areas related to the South Korean forces, including the organization, strategies, education and training, and logistics operations, and drilled its plans and decisions into the South Korean forces through the “counterpart system” for man-to-man guidance and advice. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in particular, the KMAG placed an emphasis on guidance for the education and training of the South Korean forces, exerting influence through the establishment and implementation of systematic training plans for each division of the South Korean forces; the establishment of a range of military academies, and education and guidance there; and military studies overseas for South Korean officers. The KMAG also gave importance to supporting the operations of the South Korean forces, exerting influence on support for irregular fighting against North Korean guerrillas and the development of the defense plans of the South Korean forces.

On the other hand, in Japan, where demilitarization and democratization was emphasized, following the spread of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union to East Asia, the United States shifted its occupation policy to give greater importance to the restoration of Japan as a bastion of defense against communism, and with the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, Japan’s rearmament was expedited.

The method for establishing Japan's remilitarization was the "military advisory group" method, which had a good track record, and the U.S. military advisory group got involved particularly actively in the creation of the ground force. For the establishment of the National Police Reserve, the "Civil Affairs Section Annex" was created under the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces (GHQ), with some 60 officers working at the headquarters to cooperate in the establishment and development of the National Police Reserve, getting involved in a range of activities, from the recruitment of members and preparations for their acceptance, to education and training, and procurement of equipment. To coincide with the transition from the National Police Reserve to the National Security Force in October 1952, the "Safety Advisory Section Japan" was formed, and was later renamed to the "Safety Advisory Group Japan" to help foster the National Security Force. Subsequently, after the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was concluded, the establishment of the U.S. military advisory group was approved officially, with the "Military Assistance Advisory Group Japan (MAAGJ)" organized at the U.S. Embassy in Japan. With the command center put in place there along with the department of army, department of navy and department of air force, the advisory group became an organization to provide military advice and guidance to Japan's Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. Right after the establishment of the National Police Reserve, the tasks of the U.S. military advisory group in Japan involved the recruitment and acceptance of reserve members, education and training, and procurement of equipment, but they were expanded beyond military aspects to political and diplomatic areas after the establishment of the National Security Force and the Self-Defense Forces.

As seen above, the activities of the U.S. military advisory groups played a significant role in the establishment of the South Korean Army and the Ground Self-Defense Force of Japan. But there were some differences in their activities in Japan and South Korea, because of the international and domestic political situations in which the two countries found themselves, as well as the intentions and motives on the part of the United States. The comparison and considerations of these differences are summarized below.

First of all, let us look at the processes of accepting U.S. military advisory groups. South Korea positively accepted the U.S. military advisory group in compensation for the pullout of U.S. forces in South Korea, in order to establish a regular military force in accordance with the law for the organization of a national force. By contrast, Japan

rather passively accepted the U.S. military advisory group, requesting the reduction in the number of members of the military advisory group so as not to give the Japanese people an impression of continued occupation even after gaining independence.

Secondly, let us compare the U.S. involvement in the formation of the concept behind the establishment of a military force. In establishing its military force, South Korea found the legitimate heir of its history and tradition in the Independence Army that was engaged in resistance against Japan in China during Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula, placing the idea of anti-Japan struggle at the core of the concept behind the establishment of its military force. The U.S. military advisory group accepted this, and actively recruited people who fought in the Liberation Army for key military posts, having them play the leading role in the formation of the idea about the establishment of the military force. In the case of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan, on the other hand, as a result of the reflection that one of the causes of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War was the arbitrary actions of the former Imperial Army, which had interfered in politics using the independence of the supreme command as a pretext, the core concept behind the establishment of the SDF was how to break away from the former Imperial Army's way of thinking, and its ideas and organizations. The U.S. military advisory group, albeit indirectly, was also involved in forming a concept befitting the newly born SDF, and gave advice to the leadership of the National Police Reserve.

Thirdly, let us compare the organization of the U.S. military advisory groups. In South Korea, as with the case of an ordinary military unit, the general staff section and the special staff section were established under the head of the advisory group, who is the commanding officer. This is probably because operations of the U.S. military advisory group in South Korea were not limited to the organization of the South Korea Army and introduction of equipment, but included direct guidance and supervision of the education and training of the South Korean forces and support for its campaigns to suppress North Korean guerrillas, and also because there was the need to facilitate guidance and advice through the "counterpart system." Looking at the organization of the U.S. military advisory group in Japan by taking the MAAGJ as an example, the secretariat of the head of the advisory group, headed by the chief of staff, was installed under the head of the advisory group, along with the department of army, department of navy and department of air force. It was closer to an administrative organization than an ordinary organization of military staff. Furthermore, the chain of

command was also directed and supervised by the U.S. ambassador in Japan.

Fourthly, let us compare the activities of the U.S. military advisory groups. The focus of the activities of the U.S. military advisory group in South Korea initially was guidance for the education and training of the South Korean Army and support for irregular fighting. After the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Act took effect in 1949, however, the military advisory group came to assume such add-on roles as assistance to the U.S. ambassador in South Korea in connection with the management of mutual defense assistance programs and the preparation of detailed items of additional military assistance to South Korea. In Japan, on the other hand, the activities of the U.S. military advisory group initially centered on guidance for the education and training of the ground force, the lending of U.S. military equipment and support for the procurement of equipment. Subsequently, in terms of new activities following the establishment of the MAAGJ, the roles of the U.S. military advisory group expanded beyond military aspects to include political and diplomatic areas.