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Arctic Policy of the Russian Federation: Reasons Why Russia Sets a High Strategic Value on the Arctic
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On August 2, 2007, Russia’s arctic expeditionary team reached the 4,300 meters-deep North Pole seabed by two bathyscaphes for the first time in history, setting up a titanium flag of the Russian Federation on the seabed as well as conducting large-scale marine geological/resources surveys. Russia will apply to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) once again for elongation of the continental shelf under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by the end of 2013, and one of the purposes of setting up its national flag on the North Pole seabed was to demonstrate that its own continental shelf continues until it creeps under the North Pole, and to gather scientific data for reapplication to CLCS. Taking this as an opportunity, Russia made clear its stance to set a high strategic value on the Arctic with a view to securing rights to and interests in the Arctic, and is involved in drawing up a long-term national strategy for the Arctic issue.

Geographically, Russia’s territory and population occupying the Arctic Circle northward of latitude 66˚33˚is the largest of all Arctic basin countries. The Arctic area in Russia accounts for 11% of the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 22% of Russia’s total export value, playing a certain role in Russian economic activities. In the Arctic seabed, mineral resources including gold, silver, iron, zinc, tin, nickel, and diamond, as well as about a quarter of unconfirmed world oil and natural gas reserves, have been allegedly untouched, and large amounts of the natural resources possessed by Russia concentrate on the Arctic. Such resources in the Arctic are not only of strategic importance, but also playing a primary role for Russia’s economic growth and modernization of economic structure. In addition, Russia is claiming further expansion of its territorial rights to the continental shelf based on its standpoint of the Siberian continental shelf continuing to the North Pole.

As another reason why Russia has started to set a high strategic value on the Arctic, it is pointed out that the shrinkage of permanent sea ice due to global warming has given birth to the
Northern Sea Route. With respect to the Northern Sea Route, half a year from November to April every year witnesses sea ice coverage, and vessel navigation is limited to a certain period of summer. However, since sea ice coverage of the Arctic Ocean has been shrinking rapidly, it is assumed that the annual navigable period will become longer and year-round navigation will be possible in the future. This will shorten the distance of a route connecting Europe with east Asia to two-thirds of that via the Suez Canal, and some point out that, combined with the absence of key choke points or the piracy problem, a “Shipping Revolution” which changes future worldwide physical distribution may substantially break out. Since the Northern Sea Route passes through Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), foreign vessels are required to comply with Russia’s Rules for Operation on Ice-Covered Waters which provide for pre-application of a passing vessel, structural requirement for a passing vessel, route control, obligation for escort by an icebreaker, etc., based on the grounds of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the end of July, 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the “Federal Law Concerning Administration of Commercial Use of the Northern Sea Route” providing for, in February, 2013 the installation of a Northern Sea Route administration, hastening to firmly establish a system to manage the Northern Sea Route.

On September 18, 2008, then President Dmitrii Medvedev approved a national document entitled “Principles of the Russian Federation’s National Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2020.” This is an official document which identifies Russia's prospective national interests, long-term objectives and major problems in the Arctic region, as well as the strategic order of priority to put Russia’s national policy into practice. This document clearly states that the Arctic region will be used as a strategic base of resources in order to solve the social/economic development problems of the nation. It contained descriptions such as secure utilization of the Northern Sea Route, development of a coast guard system to protect Russia’s national interests and assure security in the Arctic region, prompt improvement of border security infrastructure in the Arctic region, and strengthening of the border security organization’s guard capabilities. In the military sphere in particular, it was clearly stated that the Russian Armed Forces and other paramilitary forces (especially, border guards) shall establish a “special Arctic troop” capable of assuring military security under various military circumstances in the Arctic.

In May, 2009, the “National Security Strategy of Russian Federation to 2020,” an official document describing Russia’s medium-/long-term national strategy, was modified. It states that long-term interests of international politics will concentrate on securing supply of energy
resources in the Arctic, alleges that the possibility of competition for resources being settled with military power are not excluded, and that the balance of power will likely be lost near the Russian Federation’s border. Moreover, it identifies a policy to intensify border control in the Arctic and Far East. Further, on February 20, 2013, in accordance with President Putin’s decree, the Russian government made public a document entitled “The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and National Security for the period up to 2020”. This document provides for specific policy problems, and implementation tools, etc., to be addressed by the government in society, economy, scientific technology, information, international cooperation, military affairs, and other fields involving the North Pole to embody the “Principles of the Russian Federation’s National Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2020.” It means that this has completed formulation of a specific action plan for Russia’s Arctic policy down to 2020.

Under the policy specified in these national documents, Russia shows a trend of enhancing its military presence in order to protect its national interests in the Arctic. For example, the Russian Navy has started activities to continuously warn the Arctic Sea since July, 2008, and considers future residence in the Arctic area of a “special Arctic troop” to be formed mainly by the Navy and border guards. In May, 2008, meanwhile, Tu-95 Bear-H bombers started their periodical patrol flight along the Arctic Region’s U.S.-Canadian border, and the Russian Ministry of Defense has expressed its intention to augment submarine activities in the Arctic Region. Concerning ground troops, the formation of two Arctic brigades has been set up, aiming at the reinforcement of military operations in the Arctic Region.

The thawing of the Arctic Ocean is a grave problem for Russia also from the viewpoint of military affairs. In the Cold War era, despite its position as a strategic front at which the U.S. and the Soviet Union directly face each other, the Arctic was not targeted for any military operation since it is a region where military deployment is impossible, which lies only on the nuclear missile launch route. If the Northern Sea Route is born, the field of Navy vessels’ activities will broaden, thus giving birth to waters from which military deployment to the ground is available, and therefore not only Russia but also other Arctic basin countries will suffer from the surfacing of a new strategic front. Russia will thus be provided with a new fourth strategic front in its northern part (Arctic) in addition to the western part (Europe), southern part (Caucasus, Central Asia), and eastern part (Far East). This will require a change in Russia’s classic geopolitical theories and military theories, and influence the future formation of the
Russian Navy and border guards.

As a new factor which is influencing Russia’s Arctic policy, there is a move by China to advance into the Arctic by way of the Northern Sea Route. Some Russian military exercises carried out in the Far East area have, therefore, appear conscious of China’s advancement into the Arctic, and President Putin is also showing his stance to make efforts for strengthening the naval force in the Arctic and Far East. With the above situation in mind, among eight Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines scheduled to be procured by 2020, No. 1 vessel Yuri Dolgorukiy and No. 2 vessel Alexander Nevsky will be incorporated into the Navy in 2013 and 2014, respectively, and 23.4% of estimated expenditures for the entire equipment plan down to 2020 will be allocated to Navy reinforcement.

What is noted in the national documents regarding the Arctic policy is a parallel expression of the Arctic and the Far East. This means that the Arctic and Far East on which Russia sets a high strategic value are connected by the Northern Sea Route, and Russia has started to deem the two areas as one strategically integrated theater. The Russian attitude of setting a high strategic value on the Arctic in this way is associated with Russia’s move to strengthen its naval force in the areas by designating the areas as one. Given the situation, when observing the Russian Navy’s movement around Japan, instead of cutting off the Far East alone, the Arctic should also be brought into perspective, and at the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to trends in China which has started to advance northward into the Arctic.

**Trend Analysis of the U.S.-China-Taiwan Relationship, and the Security Environment in the Taiwan Strait in 2012**
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This study is to explain the trend of the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship and the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in 2012 using media news available on the Internet as main source. It firstly examines difference in interpretation of the framework of the China-Taiwan relationship between China and Taiwan based on the words of leaders of both countries. China’s framework to specify China-Taiwan relations is based on “One Country, Two Systems” and
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maintains the principle of “One China” and the stance to strictly observe “1992 consensus,” as well as stresses the stance to be absolutely against the independence of Taiwan. Although this framework has been passed down to Xi Jinping, President for the next term, it should be noted that they additionally use a highly political framework of “Chinese Nation.” This holds true for Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, and it is notable that he takes a positive stance toward the China-Taiwan exchange (especially, cultural exchange) using a nationalism called “Chinese Nation.” On the other hand, the framework of China-Taiwan relations advocated by the Ma Ying-jeou administration of Taiwan allows both sides to express their respective notion of “One China” while admitting the framework of “One China” itself. This is what China fails to refer to, and is understandably an important point of difference between the two.

The paper then describes the present state of China-Taiwan exchanges. Summit talks between working organizations such as the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits of China and the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan which had been at a standstill since 1999, the year of Lee Teng-hui’s administration, were resumed in 2008, accelerating exchanges mainly in the economic and trade fields. Among the “Three Links” (direct postal, trade, and transportation links), transportation (direct flight and sailing between China and Taiwan) whose complete implementation had been delayed, has become a regular service. Tourists from China also gradually expanded not only in group tours but also as solo travelers, resulting in a sharp increase in the number of travelers. ECFA, a kind of free trade agreement, was also signed. In addition, in August, 2012, the “Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement” and the “Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement” were signed. In 2012, the Beijing Mayor, Fujian Governor, Hubei Governor, and Committee Deputy Secretary of Jiangsu Province, and in June, the Hunan Governor visited Taiwan one after another, with a delegation from each county and city. These mayor and province governors are only at the rank of Central Committee members or alternate members in the Communist Party, and no higher rank, i.e., Political Bureau members, have been to Taiwan. An important point to be noted in the future is whether or not there will be any unprecedented Political Bureau member visits to Taiwan.

Thirdly, this study shows that China has more than often taken its hard-line stance for matters in which sovereignty is involved. Regarding the Senkaku Islands, although the United States more than once made it known that Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty shall apply to the Senkaku Islands, when US Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta called on China in September, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie expressed his determined opposition to the application
of said provisions to the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, when at the Japan US foreign ministerial meeting held in Washington on January 18, 2013, US State Secretary Hillary Clinton checked China by repeating that the Senkaku Islands shall be subject to Article 5 of the Japan -US Security Treaty, and stating that the country would oppose any unilateral acts trying to harm Japanese administration of those islands. In response, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson not only expressed strong displeasure and firm opposition to the US stance, but also even said, “Be careful in your words and actions.” These words made China’s cautious stance on any form of US involvement in the Senkaku Islands understandable. In the South China Sea, China has established Sansha City on Woody Island of the Paracel Islands. The People’s Liberation Army has also set up a Hainan Province Sansha Garrison. The Philippines and Vietnam reacted sharply and the United States expressed concern about such actions taken by China. China then started construction of a sewage treatment station, etc., on Woody Island in the name of environmental protection, thereby strengthening effective control of the South China Sea in an attempt to justify its territorial rights. In this way, China has come to act undaunted by friction with nearby countries in sea areas of the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, behind the growth of national strength and the improvement of military power. Even though a stable global environment is a prerequisite for China’s further economic development, China displays no willingness to budge on issues of sovereignty and territorial rights.

Fourthly, the paper gives a birds-eye view of China-Taiwan relations in 2012 from the perspective of military security. Taiwanese Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu expressed the perspective that although the tension in the Taiwan Straits has been gradually eased, China is still preparing for battles against Taiwan, and will establish military strength for invasion into Taiwan and achieve operational dominance along the first/second island chains before 2020. Due to late progress of arms modernization, which prevents independent plotting of a strategy, and also probably less possibility of fighting between China and Taiwan, it seems that Taiwan’s cautiousness and hostility to China have been gradually fading. In 2011, a previously highest-ranking active major general was arrested on suspicion of leakage of confidential information, and in another incident, a retired officer was apprehended due to spying allegations in 2012.

Lastly, Chapter 5 tried to analyze the relationship between the United States and China/Taiwan. As for US-China relations, it could be ascertained that military exchange, S&ED, and other dialogues are still being continued, even though China was offended by the
Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia” policy, and there was an incident of a human rights activist seeking asylum in the United States. Regarding US-Taiwan relations, the present situation of weapons funneling by the United States was confirmed. Taiwan has in the last few years requested the United States to sell 66 F-16C/D fighters as a substitute for superannuated F-5E/F fighters and 8 conventionally powered submarines, only two of which are now serviceable in actual warfare. Nevertheless, these arms are what China has called a “red line” to check their actual sales and, therefore, the United States has not yet softened its careful stance toward selling. The situation is that, despite the lack of knowhow to manufacture these arms independently in Taiwan, not a few are getting tired of waiting too long, and a proposal for Taiwan to build its own submarines is starting to be made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan International Shipbuilding Corporation, and some legislation committee members.

WMD Non-Proliferation and CBRN Protection: Emerging Issues and Countermeasures in Major Countries
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In and after the post-Cold War era, the nature of threat caused by weapons for mass destruction (WMD) changed substantially from that in the past. The possible WMD attack in the context of nation-to-nation and chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) attack by non-state actors including international terrorists to government organizations and urban infrastructure and civil societies constitute a veritable threat for the international community. On the other hand, horizontal/vertical proliferation of WMD, in particular of nuclear weapons, is becoming critical, and in recent years, a number of proliferation concerns have taken place in such countries as North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, and Syria. In the face of such WMD proliferation, international community has so far deployed patchwork-like responsive measures through mainly four approaches as follows; treaty-based international non-proliferation regimes, coalitions of like-minded countries, non-treaty based gentleman’s agreements, and UN Security Council
Resolutions. However, a wide range of problems has emerged due largely to structural weakness of the non-proliferation regime. History shows the existence of determined proliferators and one must consider the risk of WMD which could fall into the wrong hands of international terrorists. The proliferation threat gives rise to additional proliferators, as well as structural problems over WMD between “haves” and “have-nots”.

On the other hand, turning to the trend of CBRN threat that may be derived directly or indirectly from WMD proliferation, there is concern of a CBRN incident because of technical progress capable of weaponization of hazardous materials and the increase of threats of severe accident caused by natural disaster or human error at nuclear power plants or any other facilities treating hazardous materials, along with the potential risk of terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear weapons.

Under such circumstances, major countries (U.S., NATO countries, South Korea, Australia, and China) have almost fallen into step against WMD proliferation by participating in basic multilateral treaties such as the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), they are not always in monolithic cooperation for new treaties including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and the activities of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It can therefore be said an important problem to consider how WMD countries’ commitment to non-proliferation should be secured in the future and how to improve governance for WMD non-proliferation within each country. Meanwhile, amid strong concern over the risk of a CBRN attack by non-state actors, in addition to the risk of a WMD attack made within the conventional nation-to-nation context, improvement of CBRN consequence management and countermeasures capabilities is accelerating, particularly with the 9.11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. as a turning point. Although such efforts encounter by-country/region capability gaps as well as difference in degrees of enthusiasm, interest, commitment, this study found that the role of CBRN response capabilities, particularly, of the military has been thoroughly examined and developed, which is a common factor in major countries cited in this paper.
Oral History programs in Military Organizations

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The National Security Policy Division of the Center for Military History (formerly 2nd Military History Research Office of Military History Research Department) started an oral history project in 2003, and succeeded in interviewing many Defense Ministry (Agency) people about what they had experienced through their careers or regarding specific subjects. However, all of the interviews were from an academic perspective, attempting to bring post-war defense policy-related matters to light. In contrast, this paper tries to examine the role and potentialities of oral history from the viewpoint of the Self-Defense Forces as a military organization in a more specific sense, and to arrive at some suggestion to create an oral history activity and its utilization.

This paper begins with reviewing and examining oral history cases within the Imperial Japanese Army/Navy. The first section entitled “Japanese Military Organizations and Oral History” presents a research and analysis of how the interviews were regulated in the guideline for compilation of the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War histories, as well as how the interviews were utilized. Many documents relating to the compilation of the Imperial Japanese Army/Navy military history were lost due to burnout or scattering at the end of the Pacific War. However conceptual differences and the results between the Army and Navy military history compilation were clarified to some extent by the study of historical documents stored in the Military Archives of the Center for Military History. In general, however, there is no example that clearly indicates that it was gathered for lessons learned at the time or for compiling military history neither in the Army or Navy. In addition, as seen in the Navy cases, even the first-hand accounts that were gathered on battlefields were sometimes forced to deviate from primary objectives. Some of these accounts were gathered not only to supplement military history documents but also as sources for press release. This contrasts well with the U.S. Army, which made a clear distinction between these two functions during World War II. Regarding the Russo-Japanese War and the Pacific War, a number of round-table talks and interviews were held with the public and private sectors respectively, apart from military history compilations. This paper also analyzed and examined their content and meaning. However, many of these round-table talks and interviews were conducted 20 to 30 years after the aforementioned wars.
Due to the lack of contemporaneity and the decreasing number of survivors of these wars as military history compilation, their contents inevitably had something in common with each other. Some round-table talks gave a variety of witnesses, while on the other hand, the influence of hierarchical relationships in those days and delicate human relations could not have been denied in some cases.

Next this paper examines how oral history interviews have been placed and conducted as a part of military history compilation in the U.S. Army, which is said to have recognized the importance of oral history and began an oral history program early on, also examining its specific achievements.

The second section, “The History of Oral History in the U.S. Army,” gives a birds-eye view of the oral history program, which is said to have started before the U.S. Army existed. It particularly focuses on the fact that the “military history detachment (MHD),” which succeeded as a mobile troop to record and analyze the activities of small units during World War II, has so far continued to play a substantial role in gathering military history material for compilation, particularly in conducting interviews in the field. Needless to say, many interviews gathered mainly from the military history detachment, served as precious historical material when the official history, the “U.S. Army World War II History Series,” was written. While it is said that, since World War II, many historians employed oral evidence for studying and writing military or political histories, the influence of the U.S. Army's military historians and their method on such historians cannot be overlooked.

The third section, “The Status of Oral History and its efforts in the U.S. Army,” examines how oral history has been practiced and utilized in military history organizations of the U.S. Army. In the U.S. Army, during World War II, a history sector came to be established and military historians were allocated to various unit levels, i.e., armies, corps, and divisions around the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), to compile military history and to gather historical material as required for such a compilation. This chapter verifies the U.S. Army's military history organizations, and at the same time focuses on and analyzes the role of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Above all, it is used as a clearing-house for the oral history program in the Army at all levels of command. This reveals that the U.S. Army had established four main pillars for conducting oral history interviews: (1) the exit interview (an inquiry made when retiring from an important post), (2) a biographical interview or the career interview, (3) the subject interview, and (4) the after-action interview or combat after-action interview. The U.S.
Army also tries to improve the efficiency of oral history records and its utilization by designating responsible organizations or personnel according to the type of oral history interviews. If necessary, this will be done to standardize the destination for reporting and distribution. There are many lessons that the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces can learn from military history organizations of the U.S. Army in the future, not only for conducting oral history interviews, but also in terms of preserving military history records (including the annual histories of Defense Ministry, Self-Defense Forces and military units).

The third section also examines how oral history was adopted in Army Regulation AR850-7 “Military History: Responsibilities, Policies and Procedures” and Field Manual FM1-20 “Military History Operations,” which are bases and guidelines for compilation of military history by the U.S. Army. It also includes some information concerning the “detailed guidance on Army oral history methods and procedures,” which the U.S. Army Center of Military History is ordered to publish, and large-scale oral history interviews with Pentagon personnel just after the terrorist attacks on 11 September, 2001. In Japan, it is also a major problem how the Self-Defense Forces conduct overseas missions and their rescue operations during a large-scale natural disaster like the Great East Japan Earthquake, which should be recorded for effective operations in the future. Case studies of the U.S. Army oral history program will be instructive in this respect as well.

Finally, this paper suggests what type of oral history interview is required or should be conducted by the Self-Defense Forces as a military organization. The greatest importance in gathering and compiling military history material, including oral history interviews, is not to leave them behind simply as a pile of records or readings from the past. It is understood that the objective and role of compilation of military history and the collection of oral history interviews are to examine how we should respond to similar events in the future, or what we should do to avoid them.