

Abstracts

Future Outlook for Arms Control / Disarmament Talks on Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces

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1-23

Following the ratification of the US-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2011, the U.S. president Obama expressed willingness to incorporate non-strategic (tactical) nuclear forces into the agenda for new bilateral talks, which has not been covered by the past nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties between the U.S. and Russia. With this regard, due to the absence of a consistent definition of non-strategic nuclear weapons, a variety of discussions have been held by practitioners and scholars over the definitions of non-strategic nuclear weapons since the Cold War era. In addition to the issue of definition, there have been a number of obstacles to promote the U.S.-Russian bilateral talks on the non-strategic nuclear forces, such as the re-evaluation of non-strategic nuclear forces in the national security strategy, difficulty in grasping the whole picture of non-strategic nuclear forces particularly in Russia and verifying its reduction and elimination, and also the existence of politically-touchy issues related to the oversea deployment of those weapons.

Therefore, it should be essential to consider the difference between the U.S. and Russia in degrees to which non-strategic nuclear forces are deemed important. In the U.S. at present, the military significance of those weapons is decreasing and it becomes difficult to prove the meaning of their existence except for almost exclusively demonstrating to allied countries their political commitment of extended nuclear deterrence in a visible manner. As a nuclear alliance, NATO, which has been hosting the U.S.'s B-61 nuclear bombs in the territory of several member states, referred to its desire in the "Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)" to seek a reciprocal reduction of non-strategic nuclear forces with Russia, while appreciating the presence of U.S.'s non-strategic nuclear forces in terms of nuclear deterrence of NATO. In contrast, Russia is increasing its dependence upon non-strategic nuclear forces to overcome strategic inferiority to NATO and the U.S.'s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability. In October 2012, Russia declared not to extend the duration of

the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program beyond 2013, which has so far remained for 20 years. This means that Russia tries to limit the U.S. access to sensitive information relating to the country's nuclear forces. According to think tanks and non-governmental institutes, it is inferred that there is a huge gap in the non-strategic nuclear arms possessed by the U.S. and Russia. Thus, an issue arises how the reciprocal reduction of non-strategic nuclear forces should be achieved in a balanced manner between the two countries in the near future.

Based on the above-mentioned observations, this article reached a conclusion that any progress in non-strategic nuclear arms control / disarmament talks between the U.S. and Russia will require a significant change in the strategic environment, e.g., (1) both two countries become hardly able to maintain their present scales of nuclear forces such as due to fiscal deterioration, (2) the threat faced by the U.S. and / or Russia substantially changes, making it necessary to review its / their deterrence posture, (3) the pressure from allied countries to promote nuclear arms control / disarmament is increasing than ever before, forcing the U.S. and Russia to review the present posture of deployment and stockpile of their non-strategic nuclear forces, or (4) the U.S.-Russian relationship is improved significantly enough to lessen the priority of non-strategic nuclear forces issues among any other important security agenda. This article focused on the recent press release by the U.S. Department of Defense and examines new options for further reduction of strategic nuclear forces, in order to seek a balanced agreement with Russia on a reciprocal reduction of nuclear forces including deployed / non-deployed stockpile of non-strategic and strategic nuclear weapons.

Development/Operation Trend of UAV and Japanese Security

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25-48

On 17 March, 2011, a Global Hawk came flying over, and captured the images of the stricken Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. It is fresh in our memories that the pictures were sent to the Ministry of Defense and Prime Minister's office for use in reviewing measures responsive to the nuclear disaster. Several days later, a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) manufactured in Japan also took clear images of the damage situation. It was demonstrated that UAVs can be

used in an emergency like in the case of a large-scale disaster. Although there are not so many specific discussions of such vehicles in Japan probably due to their unfamiliarity, UAVs are now becoming an indispensable element in military operations.

UAVs are about to extend their sphere of activities to spaces inaccessible to human beings, and further to far above that of manned aircraft. Generally, UAVs are said to be suitable for 3D tasks at which manned aircraft are not good: Dangerous (tasks which risk the crewman's life), Dirty (tasks in a polluted airspace), and Dull (tasks repeated monotonously). Technology development has now further enlarged the scope of their activity with Demanding (tasks beyond the physical capability of human beings) and Different (tasks presumably impossible with manned aircraft). This will allow extensive applications such as ISR(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), communication, transportation, and decoying, including attack.

UAVs are therefore considered to become more important for security in the future. Several UAVs can be connected by way of communication, which will extend the sphere of intelligence gathering activity from land to ocean. Although UAVs are mostly controlled on an individual basis, technology development for autonomy is under way so that UAVs can fly in formation for action. This feature will hopefully be available for complex fighting activities in the future. Considering international trends, it is expected that technology development of UAVs will be promoted mainly in the United States and Israel, as well as that their role will be further diversified in terms of applications.

At the same time, there are problems with respect to the utilization of present UAVs. The position of UAVs in international laws remains unclear. Although the United States uses UAVs for attacks under the pretext of protecting its people, many civilians have been victimized. It is said that about 60 countries use UAVs, and there is no denying the possibilities of armed UAVs being used limitlessly everywhere worldwide. Specialists from PMC (private military company) are engaged in activities such as the control of UAVs and advice to military personnel in the same operation room, unconsciously playing some parts of combat operations. While the legality of UAVs is being discussed, there is an accomplished fact. Environmental improvement for the safe operation of UAVs has also faced difficult assignments including accident prevention measures and air traffic management with manned aircraft.

Following such UAVs trend, the Ministry of Defense agreed in August, 2012 with the US Department of Defense to more closely examine joint warning/surveillance activities including long-endurance UAV-related bilateral cooperation as a specific measure for dynamic defense

cooperation. Since the position of UAVs in Japan is expected to be examined in earnest in the future, consideration was given to operation scenarios in which UAVs are expected to play a part in terms of security. Based on their characteristics, UAVs will undoubtedly be found useful in a variety of scenarios including imminent operations and peace-time intelligence gathering activities. With Japanese defense policies borne in mind, however, UAVs may hardly be used for attacks or intelligence-gathering in the airspace of other countries. Consideration of role sharing with manned aircraft will be required on the basis of necessity due to lack of available substitutes.

If UAVs are used to watch the sea which is deemed a common asset of mankind, partnerships and/or cooperation with other countries are required. In particular, efforts to share intelligence involving the Asia-Pacific region neighboring sea areas of the United States and Japan are important. Furthermore, due to the successfully demonstrated usefulness of UAVs in the nuclear power plant accident, it is expected that UAVs will come to be utilized more widely in Japan. It is also necessary to keep a close eye on the efforts of Western countries for airspace management, as UAVs will inevitably be used in the airspace for manned aircraft in the future.

Debates on Military Use of Outer Space in the Past, Present and the Future: Drawing on Space Power Theory of the US

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49-64

Outer space is a domain of human activities comparable with land, sea, air, and cyberspace. It is in 1957 that the use of outer space started in earnest, triggered by the world-first success in launching an artificial satellite by the Soviet Union. Since then, more than 7,000 satellites have been launched around the globe, of which approximately 1,100 are still active. While these satellites have been utilized for various purposes, the central utility remains military application. Compared with land, sea and air, outer space has higher ratio of military use and it is said that 75-80% of satellites launched during the Cold War were for the military purpose. Since 1980s the commercial use of outer space in satellite communications and remote sensing has become active, but it does not mean that the military use of outer space has shifted to a minor key. Adapting to

such changing strategic environments, new military values of outer space have been found.

This paper looks at debates on military use of outer space in the past, present and the future by drawing on Space Power Theory of the US. During the Cold War, the focus of debates was how space systems could contribute to nuclear deterrence and the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union. Since the Eisenhower administration, the sanctuary school in which the main military value of outer space consists in the capability to observe other sovereign states' territories, had formed the mainstream of debates and been the official doctrine of the US government. However, entering the 1980s, the Reagan administration, which promoted the Strategic Defense Initiative, relativized the thought of the sanctuary school. As a result of such government move, the high ground school gained momentum claiming that ballistic missiles should be intercepted from outer space. In addition, responding to the increased importance of outer space for the military purpose, the concept of space control as a precondition for the space use started drawing attention.

After the Cold War, the focus of debates shifted and the value of outer space in a conventional warfare came to be discussed. Through the First Space War, i.e. the Gulf War in 1991, the military value of space systems for C4ISR was widely recognized. Since then, the US continued to recognize such value in its military operations from 1990s to 2000s and now space systems have become essential components of the US military operations. At the same time, as the general value of space systems has increased, the idea of space control has expanded its influence.

In considering the course of debates, however, space control has challenges in terms of its feasibility waiting for further advance of related technologies to make the argument more convincing. In the longer term, the possibility of using outer space as a "high ground" could be the focus of debates, but it also needs to overcome technological challenges in order to realize space-based BMD system and so forth.

Post-Vietnam Redux?

U.S. Army's Responses to the End of the "Today's Wars"

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65-81

In the United States, controversy has arisen over what kind of missions the U.S. military should be ready to carry out for the Nation in the coming years' with the end of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in sight. What was discussed above all is whether weight should be laid on irregular warfare including counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, or on preparation for high-end conventional wars. Among the four Services, such a question should more properly apply to the Army, which shouldered the lions's share of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking back to its history, after the withdrawal from Vietnam, the Army, in particular, tried to discard whatever related to their experiences in Vietnam, including their hard-won lessons of COIN operations. Instead, the Army looked to military standoff against the Warsaw Pact in the West European battlefield. With the operation in Iraq having receded into history, and the troops beginning to return from Afghanistan, how the Army will respond to the end of peripheral wars this time?

The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) published in 2009 and the Army Operating Concept (AOC) published in 2010 required the Army forces to be ready "to defeat what some have described as hybrid enemies: both hostile states and nonstate enemies that combine a broad range of weapons capabilities and regular, irregular, and terrorist tactics; and continuously adapt to avoid U.S. strengths and attack what they perceive as weaknesses." Flexibly responding to such threats, the concepts stated, requires the capability to conduct a full-spectrum operation where offensive, defensive, and stability operations are simultaneously conducted, and to this end, the Army forces should have two core competences, namely, "Combined Arms Maneuver" which focuses on defeating enemies, and "Wide Area Security" to create a stable and secure conditions through controlling areas and populations. Flexible combination of these two competences, as the AOC argues, would enable the Army forces to respond to any and all cases in full spectrum of conflicts. Such a concept was adopted because there is a strong tendency of what GEN Martin Dempsey, then serving as commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) termed "false dichotomy," within the Army, where the people tend to see future

missions and required capabilities through the prism of exclusive choice of either conventional war or irregular warfare.

Among the four schools on the role of US military in the future categorized by Frank G. Hoffman at the National Defense University ((i) COINdistas, (ii) traditionalists, (iii) utility infelder school, and (iv) division of labor school), the above the Army responses seem to follow a policy close to (iii) “utility infelder” school. It is, however, often pointed out that if one adopts this type of approach, it is difficult to have proficiency and capabilities in either of conventional or irregular warfare. For compensation, it is necessary to promptly capture the prognostics of any change in situation and quickly adapt to it. For this reason, the Army’s present doctrine puts particular emphasis on “adaptability.” However, since adaptability of an organization depends upon the capabilities of people who constitute it, this approach undeniably has an aspect where success or failure of an organization is attributed to individual members’ capabilities. Despite their recognition of difficulty in swift adaptation, Army leaders have also expressed an opinion to the effect that it is possible to secure actual adaptability, citing such a capability proved by Soldiers in the decade of the Global War on Terror. Needless to say, flexibility and adaptability as well as initiatives on the field are needed when considering the present security environment and the characteristics of present battlefields often called a “captain’s war.” However, it is rather unclear how far “adaptability” can substitute lack of sufficient forces in responding to any and all types of threat in the entire spectrum of conflicts. The limits of the “utility infelder” approach is probably found in this point.

Ideological Transition of Radical Islamists: Focusing on Controversy in and after the 1990s

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83-98

The traditional Islamic political thought prohibited rebellion against muslim rulers from the standpoint of preserving social order and avoiding anarchical chaos. Hence, Sayyid Qutb, a radical Islamist, devised a new concept of “self-appointed muslim” in the 1960s in an attempt to justify rebellion against muslim administrations theoretically. By defining rulers as

“self-appointed muslims”, namely non-muslims, radical Islamists succeeded in justifying rebellion against muslim rulers without renouncing the traditional political thought.

The radical Islamism theory was formed in the 1960s and it deemed communism as a major hostile ideology, and on the other hand, did not regard capitalism and secularism as serious threats. However, because of the defeat of Arab countries in the Six-Days War of 1967 and the collapse of the Communist Bloc in and after the 1980s, communism was weakened. And instead of that obsolete ideology, as a dominant ideology in the Capitalism Bloc, secularism emerged as a new threat to radical Islamists in muslim countries. Therefore, they had to counter it. In this new environment, Muḥammad Quṭb, a younger brother of Sayyid Quṭb, advocated use of the word “lādīniya” (literally, meaning anti-religion or atheism) instead of the so-far used word “almāniya” (literally, meaning intellectualism) as an Arabic translation of secularism in order to criticize and defame secularism. He attempted to hurt the image of secularism by replacing the word having a positive image with one having a negative image. It could be said that Muḥammad Quṭb adapted his brother’s thought to the new situations where capitalism and secularism became dominant, and thereby he contributed to the sustainable development of Sayyid Quṭb’s thought.

In the 2000s, Ayman al-Zawāhirī in al-Qā’ida, a typical radical Islamists’ organization, claimed that muslims should have a friendly relationship only with muslims and must be hostile to non-muslims including Christians and Jews. Under the circumstances where governments in muslim countries cooperated with the United States and many muslims did not support extremists like al-Qā’ida, he stressed the necessity for muslims to be hostile to non-muslims. In that argument, he insisted that his theory is immune from any sectarian bias because it is based on the al-Qur’ān and authoritative muslim scholars in medieval times through frequent citation of these sources.

While radical Islamists have developed their theories from the 1960s to the 21st century as mentioned above, disputes on their ideologies occurred among them. For instance, in the 1990s, al-Jamā’a al-Islāmiya, a radical Islamist group in Egypt abandoned the armed struggle, and disputed with al-Zawāhirī who opposed it. This conflict of opinions was partly due to differences in their situations. While al-Jamā’a al-Islāmiya, which remained in Egypt and was clamped down by the Egyptian administration, was forced to take a realistic stance, al-Zawāhirī who had left Egypt and then stayed outside the country was able to maintain his idealistic position.

In another case, in the 2000s, Sayyid Imām, an influential radical Islamist, recanted his previous position by claiming that armed conflict with administrations be prohibited under Islamic law, and disputed with his old ally, al-Ṣawāḥirī.

Meanwhile, both al-Jamā‘a al-Islāmiya and Sayyid Imām converted in prison after long years of imprisonment. For this reason, these disputes have an aspect of being fabricated under pressure from the administration. In countries whose authoritarian regimes collapsed by the so-called “Arab Spring” in and after 2011, many Islamists were released after long-term of imprisonment, and now they are able to speak freely. This new situation will have impacts on the theory and argument of Islamists in the future.