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## Abstracts

### **Theoretical Approaches to the Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA): Technology, Organization and Culture as the Driving Forces of Innovation**

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There are historical phenomena where military organizations have undergone drastic transformation as a result of the introduction of new technologies or tactics, leading to the radical increase of military effectiveness. These phenomena are called the “revolutions in military affairs” (RMA), and countries that have achieved RMA can have an overwhelming military advantage over countries that have yet to build up similar capabilities. RMA requires organizational adaptation, which is not easy to achieve. As military organizations are highly bureaucratized and have impregnable hierarchical textures based on a top-down command structure, they tend to show extremely strong resistance to change. That is why research is under way to analyze factors that would encourage innovation in military organizations to realize RMA.

The international environment and technologies are widely recognized as the driving forces in favor of RMA, but they do not fully explain differences in the timing and extent of RMA acceptance among countries. In order to fill the gaps, theoretical models, such as (i) civilian intervention, (ii) inter-service competition, and (iii) organizational politics, have emerged. As a whole, however, research on these models has yet to produce a sufficient level of accumulation of case studies, still falling short of being able to explain a universal case of RMA.

In recent years, cultural factors are drawing keen attention to explain the degree and timing of the acceptance of RMA by different military organizations. In particular, the latest research points out that strategic culture and organizational culture are influencing the acceptance of technologies by military organizations as intervening variables, assuming the existence of technologies as the necessary condition for RMA. At the moment, however, the amount of research employing strategic culture or

organizational culture is very small and the very few case studies on RMA that narrowly focus on Western countries. Thus, this paper argues that, in order to develop the cultural model further, it is essential to accumulate case studies by broadening the coverage of countries and time periods.

## **U.S. Targeted Killing by Drones**

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19-36

Since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the United States has faced a new type of warfare, called the war on terror. In addition, that war has lasted for over 10 years now, with no clear exit from it yet to be found. Against this background, in early April 2010, major U.S. newspapers, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, reported that the Obama administration had named Anwar al-Awlaki, an Islamic militant and clergyman of U.S. citizenship hiding in Yemen, in a short list of targeted killing.

In response, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), one of the most influential nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in the United States, sent a letter addressed to President Obama opposing the administration's decision. The ACLU argued that the latest decision by the administration violates both international law and the U.S. Constitution, that the International Humanitarian Law prohibits targeted killing except when the targeted individuals are to conduct hostile actions, and that if the United States justifies the use of drones or any other means of military force against suspected enemies anywhere in the world, other countries would be justified to take similar actions in the United States. The ACLU, together with the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), another NGO, filed a lawsuit with a federal district court against the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secretary of Defense, with the father of Anwar al-Awlaki as a plaintiff. But the suit to seek the court's ruling that targeted killing as an extra-judicial measure would jeopardize international law and

the U.S. Constitution was thrown out by a federal judge. And subsequently, according to the announcements made by the Yemeni and U.S. governments, Anwar al-Awlaki, along with another militant U.S. citizen, an editor of al-Qaida's Internet magazine, was killed in Yemen by a missile attack from a drone.

As described above, at present, targeted killing by the U.S. government as part of the antiterrorism war has become a new political issue in the United States. And the driving force behind the new mode of warfare, called the Predator drone warfare, that makes targeted killing possible is the existence of drones supported by remarkable technological innovation. However, strikes by drones are associated with serious problems such as collateral damage to ordinary citizens and friendly fire. Targeted killings by drones also involves several issues to be resolved, including suspicions that they may run counter to domestic law prohibiting assassination, the opacity concerning their definitions and military actions, and the impact of whiplash transition. It is also true that targeted killing has become an important subject of research study not only in the United States but also at the United Nations, with full-fledged discussions under way over its advisability. The purpose of this article is to clarify problems with U.S. targeted killing by drones and thereby to consider what lies ahead for this new military action.

## **Functions of Military Force in Peace Operations: The Case of Intervention in Sierra Leone**

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37-66

In peace operations today, military force is being increasingly called upon to function as coercive power. This is because more and more peacekeeping forces are put in situations where fighting is actually continuing. In order to operate in an environment where the cooperation of parties to a conflict cannot be expected, peacekeepers may be forced to use their military power to defend themselves and fulfill their missions. However, the function of military force as coercive power can be exerted in various

ways, and it is important to build up knowledge about how military force should be used to implement peace operations successfully. In order to contribute to the accumulation of such knowledge, this article takes up the case of peace operations in Sierra Leone and looks into how specifically the function of military force as coercive power was exercised in the operations.

Since the civil war started in 1991, Sierra Leone has witnessed a series of peace agreements and then collapses, interrupted by repeated coups d'état. Under the Lomé Peace Agreement concluded in 1999 to break up the vicious cycle, it was decided to deploy the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as a UN peacekeeping operation. The situation in Sierra Leone remained unstable, however, and in May 2000, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel force, launched an attack on UNAMSIL and detained many peacekeepers, with UNAMSIL coming to the brink of collapse. Under these circumstances, British forces intervened in Sierra Leone, providing UNAMSIL with an opportunity to rebuild itself. Subsequently, such additional pressures as the attacks by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), fighting with the Guinean forces and tighter clampdowns against illegal diamond mining, a major revenue source for the RUF, combined to force the RUF to accept a new peace agreement in Abuja, ultimately leading to the disarmament of the rebel force.

The function of military force as coercive power can be classified into four categories: deterrence, defense, compellence and offence. Of these four functions, the former two are designed to maintain the status quo and are passive in their nature. The latter two are designed to change the status quo that is not desirable for the international community and are active in their nature. In the peace operations in Sierra Leone, both UNAMSIL and British forces used their military power in both passive and active modes. While UNAMSIL did not so much use its military power in an active manner, it contributed to the military pressure on the RUF by blocking an expansion of RUF-controlled areas through the passive functions of military force such as deterrence and defense. British forces, on the other hand, can be rated highly for their greater contribution to the active functions of military force, particularly in view of the pressure from rattling sabers, the spillover effects of defeating the RUF in fighting, and the indirect pressure through the training of the SLA.

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## **The Political Leadership Capability of the Communist Party of China: A Preliminary Study on the Impact of Domestic Instability on External Relations**

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The basic question this paper asks is how the domestic instability in China will affect external action. China's society is undergoing a major change in association with its economic growth, with various social contradictions deepening, including gaps between the rich and the poor. These social contradictions occasionally erupted in riots and demonstrations. Scholars have argued what sorts of external action these developments would lead to, on which there are two camps of thought: (i) expansion, and (ii) compromises. Furthermore, among the expansionary camp, there are diversionary theory that contends the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government would seek hard-line external actions in order to divert the public discontent and audience cost theory that asserts they cannot easily compromise on external policies under the watchful eyes of public opinion.

The problem is that for what reasons and through what mechanisms the domestic instability would lead to external actions have not yet been fully clarified. The domestic instability does not necessarily always influence external actions in all countries. It is believed that some conditions have to be there in order for the domestic instability to influence external actions.

This article argues that the intervening variable that links domestic issues to external policy is the stability of the political system. From this perspective, the current instability of China's political system is only limited and the likelihood that domestic problems should be diverted to its external policy is not so high at the present stage.

For the moment at least, China is not in a situation where the domestic instability would lead to hard-line external policy, as suggested by diversionary theory. That is because the extent to which domestic problems in China can make the political system itself unstable is limited. China's political system is maintaining its stability as seen in that (a) the CPC has succeeded in bringing the elite and the middle class over to its side

and that (b) the discontent of farmers and workers has been dealt with through the dual approaches of physical suppression and some conciliatory measures, and even when demonstrations or rioting do arise, they are limited regionally or organizationally.

Meanwhile, regarding the claim that China cannot compromise on external policy under the watchful eyes of the domestic elite or society as a whole, as suggested by audience cost theory, there is both supporting and negating evidence at present. However, it is likely that China may find it more difficult to compromise on foreign and security policy in times of crisis as the audience costs rise in the future with the splintering of the elite. In other words, China, bound by its fundamental positions announced officially, may find it harder to achieve flexible and effective conduct of statecraft.

## **Formation of Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) and Its Transfer to JASDF: Conflict in the Alliance**

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During the Pacific War, the Imperial Army was well aware of the importance of air defense of mainland Japan, but the war came to an end without the buildup of any practical air defense systems or implementation of air defense operations. In postwar Japan, which had been banned from all sorts of aircraft and other military-related research and development activities or manufacturing, it was the U.S. Air Force in Japan that built up the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) system with radar nets and communication systems across Japan. Japan subsequently recovered its sovereignty with the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the transfer of AC&W to Japan, to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) specifically, emerged as an issue following Japan's rearmament and the ensuing reduction and withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Japan. In particular, Japan and the United States thought it would be necessary to coordinate consistency in (i) command relationships (operational control), (ii) rules of engagement, and (iii) operational procedures during the transitional period when the two countries were to use the same system. At the same time, it was anticipated that the

effort to coordinate in these areas would serve as a test for the joint operations of the Japanese and U.S. air forces in a future emergency situation. The purpose of this article is to sort out and analyze the contents and processes of negotiations conducted between Japan and the United States at the time to resolve these problems.

What was presented as the first specific plan in the course of the coordination work was the “Memorandum of Understanding Relative to the Release and Utilization of Those Air Bases and Aircraft Control and Warning Sites in Japan Furnished to the United States Forces, Japan under the Administrative Agreement.” Later, as both countries came to think that consultations at the government level would be needed, they decided to set up an ad hoc committee to discuss technical issues. However, regarding the most important issue of command relationships, while the committee in the “conclusion” of its report noted the importance of the unified command, or the joint headquarters and the general commander, it kept a solution to the issue vague in its “recommendations” apparently by taking into account the political situation in Japan at the time.

Upon receiving the committee’s report, the Director-General of the Defense Agency ordered “measures against a violation of territorial airspace of Japan” to the Air Defense Command, an implementation unit of the JASDF, but the rules of engagement of the U.S. Forces were not adopted as they were. Similarly, it was decided that it would be difficult to set up the joint headquarters to unify the commanding authority and that it would be best for the Fifth Air Force of the United States and the Air Defense Command of Japan to establish the coordination committee and issue instructions to assigned units by their respective lines of command. Under this government policy, the “Agreement between Commander, Fifth Air Force, and Commander, Japan Air Defense Command, on Measures against Violations of Territorial Airspace of Japan” (the Genda-Smith Agreement) and the “Agreement for Conduct of Air Defense of Japan” (the Matsumae-Burns Agreement) were concluded between the Fifth Air Force and the Air Defense Command.

While the air defense issue of the North American continent (between the United States and Canada) and the air defense issue between Japan and the United States were under discussion around the same time, they, despite many points in common, resulted in totally different conclusions: the unified line of command between the United States and Canada and the independent lines of command between Japan and the United States.

Today, Japan and the United States are being confronted with a wave of new issues one after another that cannot be dealt with by any single country, such as missile defense and cyber attacks. While the subjects this article covers are events that happened about half a century ago, they still are of great significance to present-day issues.