ABSTRACTS

Peacekeeping Capacity-building Assistance: The Role of the Group of Eight (G8)
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Since the adoption of an action plan at the Sea Island Summit in 2004, the Group of Eight (G8) has addressed the issue of global peacekeeping capacity-building. This article examines the development of this peacekeeping agenda through summit meetings, evaluates its achievements, and discusses its potential usefulness as a multilateral framework in this field. The G8’s peacekeeping agenda now includes assistance to a comprehensive range of peacekeeping capacities including military, police and civilian aspects of peacekeeping, and aims at the development of peacekeeping capabilities worldwide. The record of G8 members’ efforts reveals, however, that although they did launch initiatives to train and equip peacekeepers in developing countries, especially in Africa, their predominant focus on the training aspect of capacity-building (for military peacekeepers in particular) has left the other aspects such as logistic and financial assistance relatively unattended.

The G8 is not, and perhaps will not be, an operational actor in peacekeeping; and it thus has obvious limitations as a contributor to global peacekeeping. However, the G8 is a very high-profile diplomatic framework whose composition and flexible agenda-setting make it a unique and influential global actor. The G8 can be useful in facilitating and legitimizing states and other peacekeeping actors engaged in capacity-building efforts. As a founding member of the G8, Japan can play a more active role in the group’s deliberations in this area, and make better use of the G8 commitments to chart a way forward for its peace cooperation activities in the future.

Coercive Diplomacy and Peace Operations: Intervention in East Timor
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19-48
This paper analyzes the activities of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in the light of compellence or coercive diplomacy, recognizing that the active use of force is also effective in peace operations, and that coercion, especially compellence or coercive diplomacy, is an appropriate concept for such action. East Timor, after the referendum in August 1999 to decide whether or not it should become independent from Indonesia, plunged into chaos due to widespread subversive activities and forced displacement of residents by militiamen who were against independence. In order to restore order, INTERFET
intervened in East Timor and aggressively exerted pressure on the militiamen as well as on some Indonesian forces, driving them to cease their undesirable activities. This INTERFET action may be construed within the framework of coercive diplomacy and it can be pointed out that factors which contributed to its success include the high-level military capabilities of INTERFET and the presence of clear objectives. With regard to suggestions on peace operations in general, it may be pointed out that, in the context of peace operations, coercion through denial seems more effective than punishment, and also making threats of denial is necessary across the area of operations.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Peace Building

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49-64
To enable post-conflict peace to be steadily established, it is necessary to restructure military, police, and other local security organizations and develop them into supporters of "good governance." It is, however, not easy to promote disarmament and security organizations' democratic control, since firearms have proliferated through long-standing conflicts and armed organizations tend to become larger. This leads international organizations such as the UN and NATO to try to restructure local security organizations, and these international efforts are referred to as assistance to Security Sector Reform (SSR). At present, there are two main leading organizations: one is the United Nations and the other is multinational forces. But there are considerable differences between them in terms of approach to the SSR goal. In the UN's PKO, emphasis is placed on a comprehensive approach involving the rule of law, democratization, and respect for human rights, with its security concept coming closer to "human security." In other words, UN-led SSR is a part of medium-to long-term assistance to the capability development for creating post-conflict peace. On the other hand, US-led multinational forces place importance on maintaining order by cultivating security organizations. Namely, as for multinational forces-led SSR, particular attention is paid to its military necessity in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations. Bearing in mind such differences in approach to SSR assistance, a future challenge is to coordinate short-term maintenance of security with medium- to long-term development.

Trend of Islamic Fundamentalism in Somalia:
Foundation Process and Radicalization of Al-Shabaab

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65-88
In Somalia, an Islamic anti-government armed insurgents, Al-Shabaab, still continues fighting
against the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM. The United States designated Al-Shabaab an international terrorist organization in 2008. However, is Al-Shabaab an international terrorist organization that should be resolved by the military operations that the United States is now putting into practice? This paper starts with this question and finally clarifies how and why Somalia has become a "dangerous" country to the United States, while considering matters behind the birth and rise of Islamic extremists like Al-Shabaab.

In Somalia, which became a failed country in the 1990s, Islamic fundamentalist organizations have gradually restored the country's disordered and lawless state in harmony with the interest of Somali clan politics and businessmen. Despite this, external factors such as intervention by neighboring countries and labeling by the United States as “antiterror policy” as well as internal factors such as competing political actors gave birth to and kept radicalizing Al-Shabaab. Somalia's disorder and violence are derived not only from military intervention by alien forces but also from the domestic power structure and its balance. It can be said that essence of the current situation in Somalia lies in Somali society itself which is obscured by the word “terrorism.”

[Research Note]
Counterintelligence in the Army and Navy:
Organization and Education
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89-110
It was around the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War when the Japanese government started to develop the Japanese counterintelligence system. The Army's Police Liaison Squad, which was established around the spring of 1937, was the first organization specializing in counterintelligence in Japan. Later, the Police Liaison Squad expanded its organization and was restructured into the Military Documentation Department under the direct jurisdiction of the Army Minister for counterintelligence-related surveys to be conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of the Army's Service/Military Affairs Bureaus and the Staff Office's Second Department. Furthermore, based on the results of these surveys, military police headquarters and provost guards engaged in various investigations and activities including arrestment. As for counterintelligence training at each unit or school of the Army and Navy, commanding officers at each level conducted education and supervision as part of military service guidance, focusing on cultivating a strict concept of confidentiality, but they presumably failed to yield satisfactory results.