NIDS China Security Report 2014
Diversification of Roles in the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police

National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
# NIDS China Security Report 2014

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Preface

The NIDS China Security Report is distributed widely in Japan and overseas to provide analysis of China’s security policy and military trends from the mid to long-term perspective conducted by NIDS researchers. Since the inaugural issue was released in 2011, the Report has attracted academic and media interests in Japan and overseas, and the analysis offered in these Reports has allowed NIDS to further exchange and dialogues with research institutions and experts of other countries including China.

This 2014 issue of the Report focuses on the current Chinese security policy and military trends which reflect China’s increasing emphasis on non-traditional security issues, and provides analysis of the missions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP).

The 2014 Report marks the fifth anniversary since its first launch in 2011 and taking this opportunity, the format is updated. A subtitle, “Diversification of Roles in the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police” is added to clarify this year’s theme. The name of authors is inserted at the end of each chapter and the sources of the publicly available texts, media reports and research materials used in the report are referenced in endnotes to meet academic needs. It should be noted that China collectively refers to its military force as “Armed Forces” which are composed of the PLA, PAP and the militia. While this Report focuses on the PLA and PAP showing their increasing roles and responsibilities in relation to the changes in perspective regarding the Chinese domestic and international security policy, it does not contain the analysis of the militia, partly due to limited space, but mainly because its positioning had only changed in a relatively minor way. Similarly, the China Coast Guard, despite of it receiving an extensive attention, is also not covered in this 2014 issue, since it is not positioned as a part of China’s “Armed Forces” and it has already been analyzed in NIDS China Security Report 2012 and 2013.

This Report was authored by Rira Momma (lead author), Masafumi Iida and Yasuyuki Sugiura, with support from Masayuki Masuda, Shinji Yamaguchi and Yasuaki Hashimoto. In preparing the Report, analysis was carried out with reference to publicly available texts, media reports and research materials. The authors thank a number of scholars and affiliates from many countries and regions including China for sharing their views and valuable insights. Views expressed in the Report are those of the authors and do not represent the Ministry of Defense or Government of Japan.

Editorial work was conducted by Yoshiaki Sakaguchi (editor-in-chief), Sukeyuki Ichimasa, Eiko Iwata, Keiko Kono, Masaaki Shintaku, Toshio Yoshitake and Akira W. Jingushi.

March 2015
Yoshiaki Sakaguchi
Director, Policy Studies Department
The National Institute for Defense Studies
Chapter Summary

Chapter 1  The Establishment of the Central National Security Commission and its Background

Since the time of Mao Zedong, the PRC leadership has generally regarded the country’s military strength as playing a decisive role in maintaining national security. However, since the September 11 attacks in the United States and the spread of SARS in China, there has been a growing awareness of the importance of formulating a response to terror attacks, outbreaks of disease and other situations that go beyond the traditional idea of war or social upheaval. China has given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) responsibility over non-traditional security issues, such as disaster relief operations and international “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), including United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) and anti-piracy operations. The Xi Jinping administration has presented a new “comprehensive national security concept”, and established the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) to handle new security challenges that arise. Many of the details regarding the commission remain unclear, but it has a role that is more comprehensive than any party committee that has come before it, and its function is expected to be in making high-level policy recommendations and policy coordination.

Chapter 2  The History and the Future of the People’s Armed Police

The modern People’s Armed Police (PAP) was split off from the PLA in 1983. This was brought about in line with Deng Xiaoping’s intention to have the PLA concentrate on its inherent military duties through removing its responsibility for maintaining public order. The PLA accelerates its modernization in order to better respond to the increasingly complex conflicts on the traditional battlefields of the land, sea, and air, but also in outer space and cyberspace. The PLA is also looking to better respond in non-military security areas, and to reduce its duty burden as much as possible. For these reasons, the PAP is beginning to take over PLA duties such as infrastructure building and internal security like riot control, which helps clearly compartmentalize both its role of domestic missions and the PLA’s role of handling external military operations. The PAP’s position within the Communist Party of China is rising in conjunction with the increasing importance of the role it now plays.

Chapter 3  Disaster Relief Operations by the PLA

The national defense and military reforms pushed by Xi Jinping suggest that the PLA’s ground forces may see large-scale troop reduction in the future. However, with the army’s new MOOTW role, disaster relief operations conducted in cooperation with local government departments are providing an opportunity for the army to show how necessary it is. Since conducting disaster relief activities in response to recent large-scale earthquakes and building the legal framework to do so, cooperation and coordination between the PLA and local party committees and governments have been steadily deepening. The rapid establishment of initial re-
sponse frameworks and an increase in information sharing have resulted in the Chinese government now able to conduct disaster relief services much more effectively than ever before. Regarding command and control of the PLA’s disaster relief operations, the government is gradually acquiring greater authority for the command structure, while the PLA is pursuing exclusive command mechanism to put in place for specific activities.

Chapter 4  UN PKO Policy as Military Diplomacy

The PLA is now actively promoting military diplomacy—international peacetime activities on the part of the military that involve interaction and dialogue with foreign militaries, multilateral security dialogues, joint exercises with foreign armed forces, and international security cooperation. Military diplomacy can be roughly categorized into five fields: 1) human exchange, 2) security dialogue, 3) security cooperation, 4) education and training, and 5) public relations. Of these fields, China is actively participating in international security cooperation through UN PKO, anti-piracy operations, and disaster relief operations in response to disasters in foreign countries. This activities will lead China to improving its images in the global community and build cordial relationships with other major powers and neighboring countries, allow it to create a more desirable international environment, and also should result in the strengthening of its military capabilities. Particularly as it deepens its involvement in UN PKO, its objectives seem to include strengthening function and authority of the United Nations Security Council, increasing China’s influence in the UN as a whole, and serving as an advocate for the respect of national sovereignty and the non-intervention principle.

Chapter 5  Counter-piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

The participation of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden seems to be in line with the “protection of maritime interests” philosophy that Hu Jintao referred to when he announced “the military’s historic mission in a new stage of the new century.” At the same time, participating in these operations may also be an attempt by China to dispel the global concerns it has labeled, “China threat theory.” It is also clear that the PLAN intends to utilize these ship escort operations as opportunities to improve its operational capabilities in far seas through the introduction of various new escort methods, including area surveillance by helicopters and small boats and shipboard security operations conducted by special forces. Furthermore, the PLAN is operating not only in the waters of anti-piracy operations, but is also conducting various exercises in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. As a result, the Chinese Navy is thought to have improved its blue water capabilities in three ways: 1) command and control, 2) logistical support and resupply capacity, and 3) equipment capabilities on various vessels. The PLAN is now actively using those improved capabilities in exercises conducted in the seas surrounding Japan, such as “Maneuver 5.”
### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Area Denial</td>
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<td>ADMM-Plus</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus</td>
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>Academy of Military Science</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASAT</td>
<td>anti-satellite</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCD</td>
<td>Border Control Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CICA</td>
<td>Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia</td>
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<td>CICIR</td>
<td>China Institute of Contemporary International Relations</td>
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<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close-in Weapon System</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<td>CNSC</td>
<td>Central National Security Commission</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>FALG</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GPD</td>
<td>General Political Department</td>
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<td>GSD</td>
<td>General Staff Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMCA</td>
<td>Military Maritime Consultative Agreement</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSLG</td>
<td>National Security Leading Small Group</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>People’s Armed Police</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PLAAF</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Air Force</td>
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<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army Navy</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Rim of the Pacific exercise</td>
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<td>S&amp;ED</td>
<td>Strategic and Economic Dialogue</td>
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<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SHADE</td>
<td>Shared Awareness of Deconfliction</td>
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<td>SOA</td>
<td>State Oceanic Administration</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Africa Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<td>WPNS</td>
<td>Western Pacific Naval Symposium</td>
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Introduction
Introduction

Rising Tensions as China Grows Economically

China has seen remarkable economic growth since Deng Xiaoping first announced the “taoguang yanghui” policy, and its Gross Domestic Product has surpassed that of Japan and stands second only to the United States. China’s external behavior has been becoming more proactive, boosted by the confidence gained from the nation’s rapid economic development. This differs from the strategy of Deng, who proposed the “taoguang yanghui” that China would “keep its ambition hidden, and bide its time while cultivating its strengths.” Departure from this strategy is evident in the “xinxing daguo guanxi” proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the leaders of the United States and Russia. At the meeting with President Obama, Xi insisted that as an essence of the “new type of major-power relations,” there must be mutual respect for each major-power’s core interests and major concerns. This implies China’s attitude to avoid conflicts with other major powers and, at the same time, its pride in the fact that they have become a major power.

The Deng Xiaoping era policies attached paramount importance to economic growth, and through those policies, personnel numbers in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were reduced and defense spending increases were kept relatively low. However, after Jiang Zemin became General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1989, China saw defense spending increase by more than 10% every year to 2014 – except in 2010 when the increase was at 9.8% – and during this period there was a major modernization of both weapons and equipment.

The trends in Chinese economic growth and strengthening military power have produced a number of both internal and external problems. In the midst of societal change associated with economic growth, there were increased calls for political democratization in China between the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were the largest such call for political democratization since the “Reform and Opening up” policy. There is also a worsening trend in public order in ethnic minority areas, and one of the catalysts of that trend is the growing domestic economic disparities arising alongside China’s economic growth. As a result of the Deng’s policy of “xian fu qilai” meaning to let some people get rich first, in the coastal provinces, where the conditions for development of industries were already met, a substantial increase in income was seen. On the contrary, incomes in inland provinces and autonomous regions did not rise as much as they had in coastal areas, and the income gap ended up expanding. To address that gap, the Chinese government has begun since 2001 to invest in “Development of Western China,” at the core of which have been energy development and infrastructure construction.

However, it seems that the beneficiaries of that investment and infrastructure development were less the ethnic minorities who live in Western China and more for the Han Chinese who have lived in or migrated into those areas. People are so dissatisfied with the current conditions – including the influx of Han Chinese into areas traditionally inhabited by ethnic minorities, the friction between ethnic groups due to differences in religion or customs, and the increasingly large economic gap – that uprisings among ethnic minorities and attacks/bombings identified as terrorism by the Chinese authorities are often occurring. In addition, while details remain unclear, similar attacks and bombings are occurring in national and provincial capitals as witnessed in Beijing, Kunming and Taiyuan. There is also a growing trend in protests and uprising among the Han majority. With the increased use of the internet, mobile and smartphones, it has become easier to quickly transmit information about where a protest or uprising is occurring. As a result, the Chinese authorities are putting their efforts into better understanding and control of information on the internet.

The grandiose slogans of the current Xi Jinping administration, including “Chinese Dream,” “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and “Rich Country, Strong Army” seem to clearly show China’s pride in its power and its objective of gaining a better position on the international stage and
strengthening its armed forces commensurable to its power. This is indicated by its external behaviors such as its insistence on "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone," the active implementation of exercises by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in the Western Pacific, and the hard line response by PLAN coordinating with maritime law enforcement agencies regarding the territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. The result of these activities has been an increased sense of alarm regarding China among neighboring countries.

China’s “Armed Forces” Pressed to Respond in Various Security Areas

In China, the term “military strength” does not simply refer to the PLA. It is an all-inclusive term that refers to the PLA, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the militia, and these are referred to in China as the “armed forces.” The Chinese defense white paper published in April 2013 titled “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” defines the roles of the armed forces as “consolidating national defense, resisting foreign aggression and defending the motherland” and participating “in social order maintenance” in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.

The roles of the PLA and PAP are becoming significantly diversified. One reason for this is the expansion of those realms in which the organizations are expected to wield their powers. Traditionally, the armed forces of China were expected externally to defend its national territory from aggression and internally to preserve public order. In particular, the former role was defined as protecting national territory, territorial seas and airspace from foreign enemies. However, that realm has expanded to include their marine interests and safety and interests in outer space and cyberspace. Other than the PLA and PAP, no organization exists that is able to respond to the requirements of such a mission. This is why this Report focuses again on the PLA and the PAP.

Currently, the PLA mainly handles external military operations, but in contrast to other countries' military forces, it also has a history of taking on a variety of duties outside the combat role. This can be seen in their famous “Combat, Working, and Production” slogan which represented their three major roles. The “Working” involves a particularly broad range of responsibilities, including propaganda, organization and militarization of the public, support for the people’s establishment of the revolutionary regime, and the launch of communist party organizations. The three roles of the PLA stem from article 24 of “the Common Program of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,” adopted on the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on September 29, 1949. The article stated: “The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China shall, during peace time, systematically take part in agricultural and industrial production in order to assist in national construction work, provided their military duties are not thereby hampered.” Thus, the PLA was responsible not only for national defense or combat missions but it also played a part in national economic construction projects such as dam and road construction, and large-scale wasteland reclamation. These characteristics of the PLA has remained valid even after the founding of the PRC. The PLA is currently actively involved in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and in international disaster relief operations in areas damaged by earthquakes and typhoons. It recognizes its own responsibilities as a member of the international community and conducts them accordingly, and in doing so, is attempting to dispel its image as a formidable military power applying coercive pressure on its neighbors.

It is mainly the PAP that is in charge of dealing with social disturbances. The PAP was a part of the PLA in the past and was involved in police actions, but the PAP today is expected to respond to the incidents which a regular police force cannot cope with. The PAP has organized its own special anti-terror unit, and is ready to suppress large-scale uprising, restore and maintain order, and respond to sudden hostage crises. At the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) ordered the PLA to mobilize tanks, armored vehicles, and armed soldiers to fend
off and suppress the students and citizens in the Square. This resulted in a number of casualties among the students and citizens, which invited a heavy criticism from around the world. After the incident, the Chinese government no longer used the PLA to restore or maintain internal order but instead began using the PAP. In fact, the PAP was at the front lines of suppressing the unrest in Tibet in 2008 and in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2009 and 2013, eventually restoring public order.

Thus, as described above, the PLA and PAP are expanding their roles. Another reason behind this expansion is the gradual change of security concept in China in conjunction with the widening areas of security.

At the beginning of the Cold War, under the confrontation between East and West, the leaders of the CPC saw the outbreak of the third world war as essentially unavoidable, and their national security concept gave substantial weight to the military power. However, since the Deng Xiaoping era of the late Cold War, the leadership slowly began to recognize the importance of security in various areas including economy, while military power still remained important. Moreover, the Xi Jinping administration has argued that with the continued globalization it is important to pursue security in each area of politics, territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, resources and nuclear. Thus, today the Chinese government and its armed forces are required to deal with these entangled, increasingly complex issues.

Based on these background, *NIDS China Security Report 2014* analyzes, under the subtitle of “Diversification of Roles in the People’s Liberation Army and the Armed Police,” expanding roles of China’s armed forces.

Chapter 1 of the Report reviews how China’s security concept has changed historically from the time of Mao Zedong to the current administration of Xi Jinping, and at the same time, reveals the factors behind the establishment of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and analyzes its role. Chapter 2 looks into the historical transformation of the PAP in the context of its relationship with the PLA and reviews the PAP’s role and its position within the CPC. Chapter 3 shows how the PLA’s ground forces, which have become the target of cutbacks, have fortified their position by adding the new role of disaster relief operation. Chapter 4 examines PLA participation in UN PKO, which China has placed importance on, and analyzes it from a military diplomacy perspective. Chapter 5 reviews anti-piracy operations, which have become increasingly important in recent years for resource security and protection of maritime interests. Finally, two articles offer a brief introduction to and analysis of the PLA’s response to issues in the area of cyberspace and outer space.

(Author: Rira Momma)
Chapter 1

The Establishment of the Central National Security Commission and its Background

1. Transition of Security Concept in China
2. The Role of the CNSC
A Chinese term “xiaozu zhiguo (rule by small groups)” is now used frequently to depict the characteristic of the Xi Jinping government. This term means small groups and refers to institutions under the direct control of the Central of the Communist Party of China (CPC), called “lindao xiaozu” (leading groups), which serve as advisory bodies to the Politburo Standing Committee and Central Committee of the CPC. Xi assumes the chair of the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs, the Central Leading Group for National Security, the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Work as well as Central Leading Group for Finance and Economy. Between 2013 and 2014, Xi created the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, the Central Leading Group for Network Security and Informatization and Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and Military, a sub-committee of the Central Military Commission, and appointed himself the head of those groups.

Of all the newly established groups, the one that attracted most attention was the Central National Security Commission (CNSC), whose creation was announced at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC held in November 2013. This chapter examines the process which China has moved from the traditional security concept focusing on military power for national defense to a new concept of placing emphasis on non-traditional security as well as traditional security issues, then analyzes the role the CNSC is expected to play. Through these analyses, this chapter aims at showing that the Communist government is trying to resolve a wide range of security issues that the existing organizations cannot adequately deal with.

1. Transition of Security Concept in China

(1) The Era of Mao Zedong—Security Concept Centered on Military Power

At its founding, People’s Republic of China was still in a state of civil war. The domestic situation remained unstable as it was taking a long time to suppress the special forces dispatched by Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) government and the bandits that were connected to that government. Externally, China was taking part in the Korean War. Communist China was thus facing troubles both home and abroad. China had to survive tense security situations over the subsequent years, including the two crises on the Taiwan Straits, and border skirmishes with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The security concept of Mao Zedong, formed in those years, was 1) to build a strong national defense forces, 2) to safeguard national sovereignty and interests at all cost, and 3) to revive and develop the national economy. Mao was a politician who had an inherent grasp of military strategy and believed from experience that “governments are born out of a muzzle.” He understood the importance of military power but at the same time he was keenly aware of the necessity to reverse the troop increase resulting from the Chinese Civil War and the following Korean War. Hence Mao argued that the national defense would be strengthened by economic development, decreased its military budget temporarily, used it for economic development, and even ordered army divisions to be turned straight into units which contribute to economic development. However, Mao’s concern gradually shifted from economic-centric to confronting “the invasions by the Imperialists.” The major security objective in those years was to cope with traditional security challenges, namely, to defend its territory and sovereignty from foreign enemies and to wipe out the remnant of Kuomintang forces, thereby consolidating the foundation of the new government.

(2) The Era of Deng Xiaoping – Security Concept Focused on Economic Growth

Whereas Mao Zedong based his thinking on the belief that global war was inevitable, Deng Xiaoping proposed a prospect that “large scale global war will not occur for a considerable time, and...
there is hope that world peace would be maintained.” Based on this view, Deng submitted the principle that “national defense must be built under the larger perspective of economic construction.” As evidenced in this direct expression, “Everything will work out if we put economy first,” Deng had a different security concept from Mao. One million-level troop reduction that Deng carried out was announced at the beginning of this remark. It is also worth noting that Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the CPC, delivered the so-called “peace and development” theory at the 13th National Congress of the CPC in October 1987. With the end of the Cold War, the center of gravity of the Chinese security interest shifted from “the survival of the nation” to “economic security,” and the role of national defense focused on preventing all wars that could impede or destruct the development of Chinese economy.

However, it is questionable whether the dramatic change in the security concept established itself immediately in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Academy of Military Science and the China Association for Military Science (AMS) held the Symposium on Deng Xiaoping’s new National Defense Construction and Military Construction Theory for five days in 1991, and had the PLA officers present and debate Deng Xiaoping’s security concept and the various problems that emanate from it. Through such process, Deng Xiaoping’s security concept of striving at full speed for economic development under a peaceful global environment and modernizing military power with the benefit of the growing economy became the undertone of Chinese policy. Domestically, stability was given priority. This is clear from Deng Xiaoping’s argument that “stability is valued above all else in China. Without a stable environment, nothing can be achieved, and what has been achieved will be lost as well.”

(3) The Era of Jiang Zemin—Proposal of the New Security Concept

It was in the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration in April 1997 that the phrase, “the New National Security Concept” was used in an official document for the first time. The Declaration states that based on the view to establish “a new and universally applicable concept of security” “cold war mentality” must be overthrown, “bloc politics” (by dividing countries into the West and the East) must be opposed, problems and disputes between nations must be solved peacefully, and peace and security must be sought through building mutual understanding and trust based on dialogue and discussion without resorting to force or threat of force and through bilateral or multilateral coordination and cooperation. This declaration was made soon after Deng Xiaoping’s death on February 19, 1997. Since it was a joint declaration by two leaders, wording must have been discussed for a long time, but it does seem that the New Security Concept was announced with the passing of the previous leader. The announcement was also immediately after the 1996 Japan-United States Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-US alliance and at the time when the threat of China was intensifying in Asia because China took over the Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands in 1995. The New Security Concept clearly had the aim to refute the China threat theory.

However, the New Security Concept in the Joint Declaration was only an abstract principle. The definition and formulation of the New Security Concept were established with the speech made by Jiang Zemin at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in March 1999. Jiang declared that the core of the Concept should be “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation,” that the five peace principles are the political foundation of maintaining peace, that mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity constitute the economic guarantee, and that dialogues, consultations and negotiations are the correct approach to resolving disputes and safeguarding peace. According to a Japanese scholar who analyzed the Position Paper on the New Security Concept submitted by the Chinese delegation to the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 31, 2002, the Chinese New Security Concept was an amalgam of “cooperative security” and “comprehensive security” which were introduced after the end of the Cold War on the one hand, and the Chinese assertion of “non-intervention on domestic affairs of other countries” and anti-Cold War.
War thinking on the other. It is also pointed out that by emphasizing a softer approach to security and defence, China aimed to undermine the China threat theory believed by such countries as Southeast Asian countries. However, it seems Jiang Zemin did not completely discard the security concept since Mao Zedong which sought national security through military power even as Jiang advocated the New Security Concept. This is clear from the fact that China’s military budget expanded every year and increased tenfold by the time he retired as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in 2004, as well as from the fact that he pushed for modernization of national defense strategy and the PLA. Two months after the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001, China founded the Cooperating Small Group for National Anti-Terror Work. According to scholars of the PLA, this group consisted of the Publicity Department, Central Propaganda Department (both under the direct control of the CPC Central), Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, State Security, Civil Affairs, Agriculture, Health, State Environmental Protection Administration (currently Ministry of Environment Protection), General Administration of Quality Supervision, State Oceanic Administration (SOA) (ministries and institutions under the State Council), General Staff Department and People’s Armed Police. The terrorist attacks on the US seem to have served as a trigger for China to understand the need to deal with terrorism.

(4) The Era of Hu Jintao—Inheriting the New Security Concept

According to Ma Chen-kun, a Taiwanese expert on the Chinese military at the National Defense University, Hu Jintao basically inherited the New Security Concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation advocated by Jiang Zemin. But the international environment surrounding China has become more intense while domestically there was increasing social dissatisfaction, and it had become necessary to improve the ability of Armed Police Force and security institutions to calm riots and deal with unforeseen incidents. It has also become necessary to adjust the economic policy which realized the 25-year-long rapid economic development and to distribute national resource more evenly within various parts of the society. Under these circumstances, although Chinese leadership recognized the need to accelerate the development of military power, it made it clear to the outside world that it was eager to maintain international order and pursue peace and stability. This was not only a useful way to sustain China’s rapid economic growth but China also intended that by stabilizing its external relations, it could concentrate on resolving the crisis of legitimacy to rule which was becoming more serious within the country. Riots in Tibet in 2008 and in the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region in 2009 are examples of the crisis that questioned the CPC’s political legitimacy. Self-reproach from having been unable to prevent these riots from occurring or to stop them expanding is reflected in the security concept of Xi Jinping which will be described in the next part.

When Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread in 2003, the Chinese government was criticized domestically and internationally for being slow in dealing with the problem. This became the opportunity for non-traditional security issues to gain attention. As non-traditional security issues, Chinese academics include economic security, financial security, ecological security, information security, natural resources security, terrorism, arms proliferation, spread of disease, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, and money laundering as threats against sovereign state and against existence and development of mankind in addition to military, political and diplomatic collisions. Dealing with unforeseen incidents besides wars and riots emerged as a challenge after the outbreak of SARS. Hu Jintao stated in the “new historic missions of the PLA in the new stage in the new century,” announced in December 2004, that the PLA “must provide strong strategic support in order to protect national interests” besides playing a military role. Within such a context, non-traditional security operations like disaster relief operations and international military operation other than war such as United Nations peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations were included as new missions for the PLA.
The national security concept of Xi Jinping, who took over the powers of Hu Jintao, also basically inherited Jiang Zemin’s notion of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.” However, at the first meeting of the CNSC on April 15, 2014, Xi introduced a new idea called “Comprehensive National Security Concept.” This puts importance on external security, internal security, traditional and non-traditional security alike and covers eleven areas of security, namely politics, national territory, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, natural resources and nuclear. According to the PLA Daily, China is in the environment which domestic security issues are internationalizing and international security issues are domesticated. If China cannot deal adequately with “domestic problems” it could have a negative ripple effect on international affairs, and if it cannot deal adequately with “international issues” it could worsen domestic instability. Thus, CNSC started under the security concept that China was faced with a large number of inter-connected domestic and international security issues.

“Asian security concept” proposed by Xi Jinping at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in May 2014 resembled the New Security Concept in that it aimed at responding to the strengthening of the Japan-US relations and denying the China threat theory. Comprehensive National Security Concept does not negate the security concepts of the past. On the contrary, it is better to understand it as expanding into areas that were not considered important. The upgrading of the Cooperating Small Group for National Anti-Terror Work to the Leading Small Group for National Anti-Terror Work in August 2013 was part of the same development. Guo Shengkun, State Councilor and Minister of Public Security, was named the Director of the Group. Wang Yongqing, Secretary-General of Political Science and Law Committee and Deputy Secretary-General of State Council, Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, and Wang Jianping, Commander of Chinese People’s Armed Police Force, were named Deputy Directors. Li Wei, Director of Anti-Terror Studies Center, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, points out that by changing the name of the organization from “Cooperating” to “Leading” the authority of the small group to “lead and make comprehensive plans” was strengthened, and its area of authority expanded. According to Li, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, State Security, People’s Armed Police, and General Staff Department are the regular members and the Ministries of Transportation, Civil Affairs, and Health are the non-regular members which play a subsidiary role.

Although official information on the CNSC is still limited and many aspects remain unclear, the following is what is generally accepted. The communiqué announced at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC reads that “establishing the National Security Commission to improve the national security system and strategies and to guarantee the country's national security.” This statement is included in the paragraph that deals with social governance issues and specifies some of the objectives as to improve the quality of social governance, safeguard the national security, ensure that the people live and work in peace and contentment, and that the society is stable and orderly, and to create systems that can effectively prevent and solve social contradiction, thereby improving the public security system. Because of this statement, some understood the aim of the Commission to be mainly dealing with domestic problems, solving social unrest and improving social welfare.
To explain the need for the establishment of the Commission, Xi Jinping stated “China faces two separate pressures, one external, concerning national sovereignty, security, and maintenance and development of interest, and the other internal, concerning political and social stability.” Xi argued then that the existing organizations that are currently dealing with national security “are not adapting to the demands to maintain national security and therefore a powerful platform is necessary to plan national security in a unified manner. We must immediately create the National Security Commission to strengthen concentrated and unified leadership on national security. The main responsibilities of the National Security Commission will be to make and implement national security strategy, promote the rule of law on the national security, to establish policies on the national security as well as research and resolve major issues of national security.” This made it clear that the CNSC was not created to deal with just domestic issues.

Establishment of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform was also announced at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC. Although this leading group has “Central” as a part of the name of the group indicating that it is an organization of the Communist Party, the National Security Commission did not. This implies that the Chinese leadership initially intended the National Security Commission to be a state organ. However, at the Central Political Committee held in January 2014, it was revealed that 1) the name of the Commission will be the CNSC, 2) Xi Jinping, General Secretary, will be the Chair of the Commission, while Li Keqiang, Premier, and Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, will assume vice chair positions, and there will be a few standing committee members, and 3) the Commission will function as a decision making as well as coordinating body of the CPC Central’s national security related agenda and will be responsible for the Politburo and its standing Committee.

The reason why the CNSC was established as a party organ and not a state organ has not been unveiled. But if the Commission had been created as a state organ with extensive powers, its relationship with the Party could be complicated. One way to solve the dilemma is to create the same organization, one in the Party and the other in the state, like the CMC, and have two fronts to one organization. But if an organization was to be created from scratch, it might have been considered that it was better to establish it as a party organ under the Politburo.

2. The Role of the CNSC

The first meeting of the CNSC was held in April 2014. At this meeting, President Xi Jinping, chair of the Commission, emphasized that “the objective (of this Commission) is to enable China to better adapt to the new national security environment and new challenges, create intensive, unified, efficient and authoritative structure and to strengthen the leadership on our efforts for national security.” This comment together with the decisions taken by the Politburo in January suggest that this Commission is more comprehensive than any of the Party organs (Leading Groups) founded before, and has the authority to make high level policy proposals and coordination.

Professor Meng Xiangqing at the National Defense University identifies four roles of the Commission: 1) developing and implementing national security strategies, 2) ensuring and promoting the rule of law on national security issues, 3) making plans and policies on national security operations, and 4) studying critical issues on the national security. National security issues that the CNSC is responsible for range into eleven areas: politics, homeland, military, economy culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, resources and nuclear. This means that non-traditional security issues are likely to be counted as an important agenda of the CNSC. Since the authority
to command the PLA is vested in the Chairman of the CMC, CNSC would not involve itself in the command of the PLA or Armed Police directly but is likely to make high level policy proposals.

It is reported that the Liaison Office that carries out the daily duties of the CNSC is in the General Office of the CPC and that Li Zhanshu, a member of the Politburo (member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee), has been posted as its head.41 Since a member of the Central Committee is usually appointed as the administrative head of a standing committee or a leading group of the Party, the fact that Li became the head of the Liaison Office seems to suggest that the organizational rank of the CNSC is higher than existing organizations. Although specific names are not mentioned, it is reported that standing as well as other members of the Commission, and directors of the Party Central and other related state organs attended the first meeting. In addition to Li Zhanshu, Meng Jianzhu, the secretary of the Politics and Law Commission and who controls public security, is said to be a standing member of the CNSC.42 Since the Commission is expected to comprehensively cover eleven areas of security, there are likely quite a number of members. Besides other members of the Politburo, members of the PLA (CMC), People’s Armed Police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Security, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology may become the members of the Commission. The downside of increased membership is that swift decision making would become more difficult.

With the development of the Chinese economy and globalization, Chinese national security can no longer be confined to military issues that have been the core since the country was founded. While maintaining the security concept that evolve around military power, the Communist government has established various “Leading Groups” to meet the expanding security concept and to have them make various policy recommendations and coordination among various organizations. The CNSC seems to have the most comprehensive and expansive responsibility in the security area among all the existing leading groups.

In the following chapters, this report explains how the organizations that the Chinese describe as “armed forces,” including the People’s Armed Police and the PLA, have been given increasing roles as the security concept expands.

(Author: Rira Momma)
Chapter 2

The History and the Future of the People’s Armed Police

1. The History of the PAP and the Reorganization of the PLA
2. Current Structure of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force
3. The Role of the PAP Force
4. Status of the PAP in the CPC
5. Public Security related Expenditures beyond National Defense Expenditure
The development and expansion of the Chinese security concept, as described in chapter 1, shows the diversification of the problems China faces. One example is the worsening social security issues not only in the ethnic autonomous regions where many Uighurs and Tibetans live but also in the regions where Hans take the majority. It is under this circumstance that there is more focus on the role of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) responsible for controlling domestic violence and terrorism. The PAP is one of three entities that form China’s “armed forces” along with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and militia. Its role has expanded to be responsible for the internal security, whose role has been historically played by the PLA.

There is a complex historical relationship between the PAP and the PLA until the PAP takes the role. This chapter will show how the repeated reorganization of the PAP has been closely related to the reorganization of the PLA, the complicated historical background of how, with the exception of a very short period, the PAP had been under the command of the PLA, and the structure of the PAP. In addition, by analyzing the members and their appointment and responsibilities of the upper echelon of the PAP, this chapter will argue that the position of the PAP has been strengthened within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and show both the cooperation and separation of the role between the PLA and the PAP, and clarify the current state and the future of the PAP that sustain the CPC along with the PLA.

1. The History of the PAP and the Reorganization of the PLA

(1) Chinese People’s Public Security Corps (September 1949 – September 1951)

Article 20 of the “Joint Platform of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” adopted on September 29, 1949, the eve of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), provided that “the People’s Republic of China will establish a unified military. Under the command of the People’s Revolutionary Military Committee of the Central People’s Government, the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Public Security Corps will have unified command, system, formation and regulation.43

After winning the Civil War in China, 180,000 personnel from the PLA were repositioned to the Public Security Corps (20 divisions and 23 regiments), and the Public Security Corps Headquarters was instituted on the basis of the command structure of the 20th Corps, North China Field Army in November 1950 - Luo Ruiqing became the Commander and Political Commissar.44 The fact that the precursor of the PAP, the People’s Public Security Corps, was structured with the PLA at its core and that its Headquarters was manned by the senior members of the 20th Corps, the PLA indicate that the leaders of the CPC tended not to regard the military and the Public Security Corps as separate entities. This is most likely because many of the leaders of the government, such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, had actually commanded the military and because the PLA had historically not only engaged itself in battles but also in production, political works, and public security.

At the time, Liu Shaoqi instructed that 80% of the Public Security Corps should be members of the CPC.45 If this instruction had been followed to the letter, many of the bright and politically motivated members would have been transferred to the Public Security Corps and that could have weakened the battle-capability of regular forces of the PLA. As a result, the transfer of such huge proportion to the Public Security Corps was to be gradual,46 but such decisions are good evidence of how much the leaders of the CPC placed importance on the quality of the Public Security Corps.

In December 1950, the Public Security Command,of the Military Regions took over the responsibility to command, control and train regional Public Security Corps. However, this meant that forces up to 322,700 personnel47 were under the command of the public security institutions of Military Regions. This caused various problems in
accomplishing their mission and Luo Ruiqing proposed to Mao Zedong that all the regional Public Security Corps should be unified.\(^{48}\)

(2) People’s Liberation Army Public Security Corps (September 1951—July 1955)

In September 1951, following the proposal of Luo Ruiqing, the CPC Central and the Central People’s Military Revolutionary Committee decided to unify all internal security units (forces in charge of policing and public security, and in dealing with emergencies), border defense units and regional public security forces as the PLA Public Security Corps, downsize and reorganize it, and place it under the unified command of the Central People’s Revolutionary Military Committee by the first half of 1952.\(^{49}\)

As the armistice negotiations of the Korean War began in July 1951, decisions were taken to downsize the PLA to 3.41 million by the end of 1954 following the “Military Reorganization and Restructuring Plan” passed by the Enlarged Meeting of the CPC Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC).\(^{50}\) The Ministry of Public Security and the Public Security Corps held a congress between November and December 1951 and planned to decrease the forces by 100,000 from 642,000 (out of which 165,000 were counted as National Defense Force). The goal was reached by the end of June 1952.\(^{51}\) Public Security Corps around the country were unified, restructured and reorganized as the PLA Public Security Corps and became responsible for internal security and border defense.\(^{52}\)

(3) People’s Liberation Army Public Security Army (July 1955—August 1957)

When the armistice of the Korean War was reached in July 1953, the PLA began its modernization under former commander and political commissar of the People’s Volunteer Army, Peng Dehuai and restructured the military, including the Public Security Corps. The decision was taken to downsize the military to 3.5 million by December 1953. In the course of organizational restructuring, the PLA Public Security Corps were renamed the PLA Public Security Army, and formally became a military branch of the PLA in July 1955 under the orders of the Ministry of National Defense. This measure seemed to counter the policy to scale down the military pursued since 1949, but through it the prefecture-level public security forces were reorganized as “PAP” and placed under the regional public security organizations, which meant that the public security organizations and the PAP were completely separated.\(^{53}\) By separating the regional public security forces, the PAP Public Security Army was downsized, and the forces under the command of the Public Security Army Headquarters became about 400,000 personnel consisting of 32 Public Security Divisions and 12 Independent Public Security Regiments.\(^{54}\)

Besides guarding cities, important institutions in the capital, important rail lines, bridges and tunnels, the core mission of the Public Security Army in this period was to fight “tewu,” the special forces of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang: KMT) and “tufei.” “Tewu” in Chinese means spies, but their activities did not only include the normal intelligence gathering and intelligence stealing but also subversive activities. “Tufei” usually mean locally connected bandits but there were many who cooperated with the KMT to fight the CPC, and they had been seen as significant threats since the Civil War that must be obliterated to maintain regional security and safeguard the regional governments.

(4) People’s Liberation Army Public Security Corps (September 1957—December 1958)

The sentence “national defense budget and administrative expenditure will be seriously cut” was incorporated into the “Political Report Resolution” adopted at the 8th Party Congress in September 1956.\(^{55}\) Accordingly, the CMC Enlarged Meeting held in January 1957 made the decision to eliminate the unit number given to the PLA Public Security Army and the leadership structure in order to decrease the number of PLA forces. The Public Security Army Headquarters was downsized and restructured and became the PLA General Staff Security Department. In effect, it began operating
Figure 1: Transformation of the PAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper Command Structure</th>
<th>Name of Forces</th>
<th>Background for Restructuring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Security Department, Central Military Commission</td>
<td>The Chinese People’s Central Column of Public Security</td>
<td>Created with the founding of the new China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People's Revolutionary Military Committee of the Central People's Government Regional Public Security Organizations in regional districts</td>
<td>(1) The Chinese People’s Public Security Corps (September 1949 – September 1951)</td>
<td>Necessity to nationally unify the forces which were under disconnected commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central People’s Military Revolutionary Committee</td>
<td>(2) Chinese People’s Liberation Army Public Security Corps (September 1951 – July 1955)</td>
<td>Downsizing the PLA after the Korean War armistice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
<td>(3) Chinese People’s Liberation Army Public Security Army (July 1955 – August 1957)</td>
<td>Downsizing the PLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department</td>
<td>(4) Chinese People’s Liberation Army Public Security Corps (September 1957 – December 1958)</td>
<td>Slimming down military structures due to cutting of military budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission The Ministry of Public Security (Regional public security organizations)</td>
<td>(5) Chinese People’s Armed Police (January 1959 – January 1963)</td>
<td>Reverting to the name generally accepted by the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission The Ministry of Public Security (Regional public security organizations)</td>
<td>(6) Chinese People’s Public Security Corps (February 1963 – June 1966)</td>
<td>Elimination of the Public Security Army and its unification with the military and reorganization ordered by Mao Zedong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
<td>(7) Public Security Corps were incorporated into the PLA structure (July 1966 – April 1983)</td>
<td>Separation of public security responsibilities from the military as part of the review of the organization and the role of the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Military Commission The Ministry of Public Security</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Armed Police (April 1983 – present)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the Public Security Corps on September 1, 1957.56

(5) Chinese People’s Armed Police (January 1959—January 1963)

In order to build the country at a faster pace by cutting defense budget, the CMC held from May to July 1958 decided to abolish many of the military units. The Public Security Corps was involved in those restructured and on January 1, 1959, the PAP was officially created under the command of Regional Public Security Organizations.57

On November 23, 1961, the CPC Central adopted the “Report on the Improvement of the Leadership Structure of the PAP” which the Ministry of Public Security had proposed.58 The PAP was under the leadership of the Ministry of Public Security but could not shake off the influence of the military. It had to accept a double command by the military and the Public Security Department. This structure has been maintained to this day and is the most important characteristic of the PAP.59

(6) Chinese People’s Public Security Corps (February 1963—June 1966)

The Chinese People’s PAP was renamed to the “Chinese People’s Public Security Corps” on February 1, 1963 under the orders of the CMC and the Ministry of Public Security. The reason is said to have been that the name, Public Security Corps, was well-known to the public and the missions of the force reflected the name. The dual command of the Ministry of Public Security and the military was maintained.60

(7) The Period when the Public Security Corps was Incorporated into the PLA structure (July 1966—April 1983)

Following the decision made by Mao Zedong to eliminate the Public Security Corps and to unify it into the PLA, decisions were made to reorganize and incorporate the Public Security Corps Headquarters into the Second Artillery Headquarters that was planned to be established in 1966, and to place the public security departments in various provinces and cities uniformly under provincial military regions. Public Security Corps around the country which totalled 377,613 personnel was transferred to military regions from July 1 and the Public Security Corps was reorganized into 25 independent divisions, 1 security division, 1 policing division and 2 independent regiments.61 The role and the existence of the military swelled during the Cultural Revolution in all areas, and by incorporating the Public Security Corps into the military, the role of the public security division, such as policing and internal security, were carried out by the military. However, as the heat of the Cultural Revolution subsided, companies in military sub-districts, provinces and cities returned under the management of the public security departments, and renamed themselves “PAP.”62

2. Current Structure of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force

In June 1982, the CPC Central resolved to establish the PAP.63 This was in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s intention to revert the PLA to its primary responsibility by separating the public security mission from the PLA through its reorganization.64 On April 5, 1983, the PAP General Headquarters was established in Beijing.65 Since it adopted more or less the same equipment as the PLA army,66 it was not altogether suited for its mission, but in the subsequent years, suitable equipments were gradually distributed to the PAP. In June 1986, there were 600,000 officers and soldiers in the PAP.67 In March 1995, the State Council and the CMC placed the PAP in the organizational hierarchy of the State Council and placed it under the dual command of the two organizations. This determined the current institutional position of the PAP.
The historical characteristic of the PAP, of constantly being influenced by reorganizations of the PLA, still holds today. One good example is the incorporation of about 200,000 personnel of 14 Infantry Divisions of the PLA into the PAP when General Secretary Jiang Zemin announced a cut of 500,000 personnel at the 15th National Congress of the CPC in 1997.

Figure 2: Chinese People’s PAP Force

Note: Solid line (---) represents command and control structure, dotted line (---) represents leadership structure.

(1) Internal Security Forces

The main duty is to maintain security and they are under the direct command of the PAP General Department Headquarters.  

<General Force Units> There is a total of 32 general force units deployed in various provinces, autonomous regions, direct controlled municipalities and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Their main responsibilities are 1) protecting bridges, tunnels and airports, and armed patrol in cities, 2) dealing with various kinds of unforeseen incidents, 3) assisting national economic development and disaster relief, and 4) cooperating national defense operations in wartime. As there have been numerous incidents of mass demonstrations in recent years, a large number of personnel have been mobilized for armed patrol in major cities and important facilities since 2000.

Local general force units seem to be aiming to increase their mobility by using helicopters. It was reported that they conducted joint training in five fields of long-range maneuvers, propaganda of “three warfares,” air reconnaissance, health services and rescue missions.

<PAP Maneuver Divisions> The organization, equipment and training of the 14 PAP Maneuver Divisions deployed around China are the same as those of the PLA infantry. Generally, the PAP Force unit trains while conducting normal duties but the PAP Maneuver Divisions concentrate on military training in peacetime and prepare for emergen-
(2) Professional Forces

The Professional Forces, which is under the dual command of the relevant departments of the State Council and the PAP General Department-Headquarters, can be seen as a kind of a specialized unit. It is usually involved in engineering work such as infrastructure building commissioned by the government but is responsible for maintaining public order and deals with unforeseen incidents in the vicinity of their camp. There are Gold General Force (in charge of geological survey in search of gold, policing gold excavating areas and excavation), Forestry General Force (in charge of protecting forests from fire, extinguishing fire and protecting forest resources), Hydroelectric General Force (in charge of large-scale dam and water-related installation construction), Communications General Force (in charge of road and rail construction and maintenance).

(3) Public Security Related Units

There are the Border Public Security General Force (in charge of defending the border frontier), General Fire Force and Police Force Divisions (in charge of protecting VIPs) under the Ministry of Public Security.80
3. The Role of the PAP Force

The PLA is rushing its modernization as it is forced to cope with more complex wars in the battlefields including space and cyber along with the traditional land, sea and air. There is also demand for it to participate in activities in the non-military security areas such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) and anti-piracy missions, so it needs to lighten its responsibilities as far as possible. Hence the PAP has been taking on more responsibilities, rules and regulations concerning the PAP have also increased.

However, it was not clear whether the PAP has the right to investigate in the general clauses of such laws and the internal regulations of the PAP. The necessity to provide a new law to manage the complex PAP organizations in a unified manner was acknowledged, and in August 2009 “Law on the PAP” was promulgated. The law clarifies the missions and the nature of the PAP from the legal point of view as follows:

Missions related to security, defense operations, relief activities, and national economic construction assigned by the State. (Article 2)

1) armed protection of the VIPs, targets, important activities regulated by the State, 2) guarding critical infrastructure, 3) cooperating in arrest, pursuit, escort operations conducted by public security institutions and national security organizations, 4) managing incidents on social unrest such as rebellion, riot, significant violent crime, terrorism, and 5) other national security missions assigned by the State. (Article 7)

Defense operations mentioned in Article 2 includes operational activities such as protecting...
The History and the Future of the People’s Armed Police

Table 2: PLA and PAP Representations in the Various Levels of the Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Party Representative</th>
<th>Central Committee Member</th>
<th>Member, Politburo</th>
<th>Member, Politburo Standing Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA 253</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAP 37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2002-2007)</td>
<td>Total 2,114</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA unknown</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAP unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2007-2012)</td>
<td>Total 2,213</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA 249</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAP 47</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2012-2017)</td>
<td>Total 2,309</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLA 251</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAP 49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The number of Party Representatives does not include members by special invitation.

valuable targets, blockading border, managing refugees, supporting PLA’s maneuvers in regions, and maintaining social order in the rear areas in cooperation with the PLA during joint operations. National economic construction implies activities by the Communications General Force, the Hydroelectric General Force, the Gold General Force, and the Forestry General Force.

Article 7 clarifies that the PAP does not have the right to investigate normal crimes nor the right to arrest, but cooperates with the institution such as the Public Security Department.

The PAP is supervised by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. (Article 3)

Police rank system shall be adopted and its practical application shall be determined by the State Council and the CMC. (Article 6)

Supervision mentioned in Article 3 implies that the highest command authority of the PAP lies in the CPC Central and the CMC, and the PAP must follow the orders of the CPC Central and the CMC at all times. Orders to the PAP by the State Council are carried out through the relevant departments in the State Council but the orders by the CMC are understood to be conducted on organizational structure, officers management, command, training, and political operations.82

4. Status of the PAP in the CPC

There are various figures that are used when the PLA is referred to as “one huge power” in Chinese politics: the PLA is an armed organization that has over 2 million personnel, the officially announced military budget in 2014 was over RMB 808.2 billion (about 12.9 trillion Yen). The number of representatives in the CPC upper echelon is a clear pointer of how much political influence an organization has in a country of one-party rule. Of the 205 members of the 18th Central Committee there are more than 38 personnel from the PLA. On the other hand, there are only two personnel from the PAP, who are PAP General Wang Jianping, a commander, and PAP General Xu Yaoyuan, a Political
Commissar. This is because it has been established, with some exceptions, 83 that military officers appointed as members of the Central Committee must hold the military ranks equivalent to or higher than that of General or Lieutenant General such as commanders and political commissars of seven major military regions. As a result, the PAP began to send its own representatives separate from the PLA beginning with the 15th National Congress of the CPC. PAP commanders and Political Committee members have been constantly sent representatives to the CPC Central Committee from the 14th Congress and the 15th Congress respectively. 84 The current two representatives were elected as 18th Central Committee members in November 2012. 85 These examples indicate that the PAP has come up in status within the CPC, but still, there are only 49 PAP representatives in the National Congress, which is 1/5 of the PLA representation, and when it comes to the Party Central Committee, the ratio decreases drastically to 1/19. Although the top two from the PAP have become members of the CPC Central Committee, the PAP is still a small faction in the CPC compared to the strong representation of the PLA. All the members of the CMC are from the PLA, and there are a total of 38 PLA personnel in the CPC Central Committee including a few deputy chief of general staff, commanders of the seven military regions and the president of the Academy of Military Science, PLA. Whether the PAP will have a stronger political influence in the future will depend partly on whether the CMC will allow a post equivalent to commander of regular military region to be created within the PAP. There are other examples of the rising importance of the PAP. The CMC decided in 1995 the PAP General Headquarters to be equivalent to the regular military region, and the rank of PAP Gen-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Former military post</th>
<th>Post before the former one</th>
<th>Immediate past post</th>
<th>Years as commander of the PAP Final rank (year of promotion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Li Gang</td>
<td>Deputy Division Commander, Division Commander, General Staff Military Training Department Commander</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Beijing Garrison</td>
<td>Deputy Commander, Beijing Garrison</td>
<td>1983-1984 None (before the ranks were revived)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba Zhongtan</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Staff, Nanjing Military Region</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff, Nanjing Military Region</td>
<td>Commander Shanghai Garrison</td>
<td>1993-1996 Lieutenant General, PAP Force (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Shuangzhan</td>
<td>Deputy Army Commander, Group Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Beijing Military Region</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, PAP Force</td>
<td>Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, PAP Force</td>
<td>1999-2009 General, PAP Force (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Jianping</td>
<td>Commander, 40th Group Army 120th Division, General Commander, PAP Tibet General Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, PAP Force</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, PAP Force</td>
<td>Deputy Commander PAP Force</td>
<td>2009-2014 General, PAP Force (2012)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ☆ and number under names indicate when the person was a member of the Central Committee. The highlighted section indicates the career in the PAP Force. Though not included in the above table, Chen Chen Fukuo, Chief of Staff (Major General of the PAP Force) was elected member of the 16th Central Committee.

eral was established. This allowed Lieutenant General Yang Guoping as PAP commander to be promoted to General for the first time in March 1998. PAP commander came to be equivalent to the commanders of the seven Military Regions such as in Shenyang and Beijing.

Promotion to PLA general needed the approval (signature) by Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the CMC but promotion to PAP General was approved by both Li Peng, Premier of the State Council and Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the CMC. This arrangement has been followed since then. This can be reflecting the Article 3 of the PRC Law on the PAP, which states that “the PAP is supervised by both the State Council and the CMC, and operates within a structural arrangement where unified supervision and command reflecting the ranks of both organizations are integrated.” However, no Premier has ever attended the promotion ceremony including Li Peng, Premier of the State Council, which shows that the approval of the Premier is only a formality.

On July 30, 2012, two PAP Lieutenant Generals, Wang Jianping and Xu Yaoyuan were promoted to PAP General along with four PLA lieutenant generals. The ceremony was called, “the Promotion ceremony of the CMC to the military rank and PAP rank of General” and shows that the ranks in the military and the PAP are differentiated. In the front row stood Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC (at the time) surrounded by Xi Jinping, vice chairman, two uniformed vice chairmen, and all the other members of the CMC. In the second row were those receiving promotion. But Wen Jiabao, the premier of the State Council who was the other member responsible for the promotion to the PAP General was not in attendance. The rule is that the PAP promotion to ranks above major general is discussed by the Standing Committee of the CMC based on the report of the General Political Department, and the final decisions are made by the Premier of the State Council and the Chairman of the

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**Table 4: Successive Political Commissars of the PAP Force (1983-2014)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Previous post</th>
<th>Tenure as political committee member of the PAP Force Rank (Year of Promotion)</th>
<th>Additional information (subsequent posts, etc)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Cangbi</td>
<td>Minister, the Ministry of Public Security</td>
<td>1982-1984 (Additional post of Head of the Ministry of Public Security). Civil servant, no rank available.</td>
<td>Member, Central Advisory Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Zenjun</td>
<td>Deputy Political Member, PAP Force and Director, Political Department</td>
<td>1984-1985 None (before revival of ranks)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xiufu</td>
<td>Zhejiang Political and Judicial Committee Secretary</td>
<td>1985-1990 Major General, PAP Force (1989)</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Judicial Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Shouzeng</td>
<td>Deputy Director, Political Department, Beijing Military Region, (Mayor General)</td>
<td>1990-1992 Lieutenant General, PAP Force (1990)</td>
<td>Deputy Political Commissar, Lanzhou Military Region (Lieutenant General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Shutian</td>
<td>Director General Political Organization Department (Major General)</td>
<td>1992-1996 Lieutenant General, PAP Force (1994)</td>
<td>retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Yaoyuan</td>
<td>Assistant Director General Political Department (General)</td>
<td>2010-2014 General, PAP Force (2012)</td>
<td>Political commissar of Academy of Military Sciences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ☆ and number under names indicate when the person was a member of the Central Committee. The highlighted section indicates the career in the PAP Force.

As the following career of the commanders of the PAP show, there is hardly room for the State Council to express its opinion since the PLA supply the members of the PAP to begin with. All the commanders of the PAP come from the PLA army, but those with long careers in the PAP are gradually being promoted to commander. For example, commander Wang Jianping automatically became an officer of the PAP when Jiang Zemin announced the downsizing of the PLA by 500,000 within three years at the 15th National Congress (September 1997) and the 120th Infantry Division 40th Group Army of the PLA was transferred to the PAP unit. Subsequently he became the General Commander of the PAP Tibet Force (1999-2000), Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander and Commander of the PAP. Once the PAP profession is acknowledged and the education and training system is improved, career PAP officer is likely to be promoted to Commander.

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Table 5: Breakdown of the Chinese Defense Expenditure and Public Security Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National defense expenditure</td>
<td>2,979.38</td>
<td>3,554.91</td>
<td>4,178.76</td>
<td>4,951.1</td>
<td>5,333.37</td>
<td>6,027.91</td>
<td>6,691.92</td>
<td>7,410.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public security expenditure</td>
<td>2,562.26</td>
<td>3,486.16</td>
<td>4,059.76</td>
<td>4,744.09</td>
<td>5,517.7</td>
<td>6,304.27</td>
<td>7,111.6</td>
<td>7,786.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP Force</td>
<td>388.03</td>
<td>585.17</td>
<td>664.13</td>
<td>866.29</td>
<td>933.84</td>
<td>1,082.02</td>
<td>1,246.01</td>
<td>1,393.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,057.67</td>
<td>2,354.89</td>
<td>2,816.31</td>
<td>3,265.62</td>
<td>3,610.45</td>
<td>3,938.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Prosecutor’s Office</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>464.29</td>
<td>513.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Courts</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>543.95</td>
<td>596.32</td>
<td>667.55</td>
<td>741.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Department</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>159.69</td>
<td>185.65</td>
<td>211.77</td>
<td>229.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-smuggling Police force</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>17.57</td>
<td>17.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public security related expenditure</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>69.18</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>144.26</td>
<td>163.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: In 2006, expenditure of the Police, Public Security, Public Prosecutor, Law Courts and the Justice Department were kept in separate accounts but they have been combined as public security expenditure.
In contrast, all members of the Political Commissar of the PAP General Force belonged to the PLA until becoming its member. It is not clear whether this is because it is difficult to move up the career ladder within the PAP which is much smaller than the PLA or is reflective of the intentions of the CPC Central to maintain political uniformity between the PAP and the PLA. However, military officers who held high ranks in the PLA such as a political commissar of military regions or a chief assistant in the general political department have been named political commissars of the PAP, which shows that the CMC appreciates the importance of the PAP. It is important to keep an eye on the personnel movement of the upper echelons of the PAP.

5. Public Security related Expenditures beyond National Defense Expenditure

The above diagram “comparison of Chinese defense expenditure and public security expenditure” compares China’s national defense expenditure and public security expenditure on reported basis. Looking at the breakdown of the public security expenditure, PAP, Police, Public Prosecutor’s Office, Law Courts, Justice Department, Anti-smuggling Police, and other public security related expenditures are disclosed for the first time in 2012. Both the national defense expenditure and the public security expenditure are increasing year by year. Although these figures are for public consumption, we can see that the public security expenditure overtook national defense expenditure in 2010, and that the PAP Force related expenditure increased to RMB 139.3 billion (about 2.45 trillion Yen) in 2013. The CPC has to make much of dealing with terrorism and riots, which will be likely to shake the government, and the expenditures on PAP in charge of public security will increase.

Although China is dealing rigorously with terrorism and riots by minorities, and imposing harsh punishments, the tactics do not seem to be working well. However, the CPC has learned the downside of using the PLA in issues related to public security through the experience of the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Since then, the CPC has been using the PLA for wars and skirmishes with foreign countries but the PAP for internal public security issues including actions when Marshall Law is in place.

The PLA is modernizing to win wars in the modern age of information technology. In the process of the transformation, the issue downsizing the PLA force or its army in particular is likely to emerge again. In that case, although military personnel has to be encouraged to go into the private sector, the largest institution to accept them will be the PAP, considering the relationship between the PLA and the PAP, the role and the importance of increasing missions of the PAP.

The status of the PAP has been on the rise since the 1990s. The number of its personnel and its expenditure will be expected to be both on the rise, but will it be able to acquire political status within the CPC government commensurate with such increases? Currently, as the relationship between the PAP and the PLA is extremely close on personnel management, there is no room for any major problem to occur. However, as the PAP education and training system become established, it will be expected that more senior career leaders take key positions in the PAP. There is a possibility that some tensions would occur within the CPC government if the PAP tries to draw a line between itself and the PLA and more aggressively demand the status which better reflects the power the PAP regards itself to have. The capabilities of the PAP are directly connected to the survival of the CPC government and to maintaining social security. The PAP needs to be more closely monitored.

(Author: Rira Momma)
Chapter 3

Disaster Relief Operations by the PLA

1. Possible Reduction in PLA Force under the Reform of National Defense and Military

2. Participation in Disaster Relief Operations in the Sichuan Earthquake

3. Development of Military-Local Government Cooperative Relations in Disaster Relief Operations
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese Army that had traditionally served as the core of the entire People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has been the target of the force reduction campaign. This is consistent with the reform of national defense and military headed by Xi Jinping, suggesting the possibility of major personnel reduction of the Army. Meanwhile, the Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW),90 a new role given to the PLA, such as disaster relief operations, are gaining importance. In effect, these disaster relief operations in large-scale earthquakes conducted in collaboration with local administrative departments seem to provide the PLA with an opportunity to exhibit to the people its presence and necessity.

1. Possible Reduction in PLA Force under the Reform of National Defense and Military

At the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in November 2013, Xi Jinping, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman declared his intentions to begin the reform of national defense and military in parallel with the other national reform projects.91 In response, the Leading Group for Deepening Reform of National Defense and the Military, a newly created subcommittee of the CMC, held its first meeting on March 15, 2014.

Xi’s national defense and military reform consists of three major pillars: 1) the reform and adjustment of military system and establishments; 2) the reform and adjustment of military policy system; and 3) the development of army-civilian integration. The first pillar 1) deals with the rationalization of CMC and the Four General Headquarters (the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Armament Department), strengthening the system for joint operations, coordination of force balance between the Army, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Forces, and reduction of non-combat divisions and personnel within the PLA. The second pillar 2) addresses the importance of professionalization for the officers, reform of the conscription system, the noncommissioned officer system and the reemployment system for military veterans, and eradication of corruption within the military. The third pillar 3) refers to the promotion of civil-military cooperation in development of equipment and facilities, reform on national defense education, and coordination and rationalization of border security management mechanisms in the maritime boundaries and air space borders.92 Thus, the Xi administration is about to undertake a comprehensive reform of the national defense and military.

One focus of attention in the reform of national defense and military is whether or not the PLA will embark on undertaking major cuts in its forces. Since the declaration of the reform of national defense and military in November 2013, while Wenweipo, a Hong Kong newspaper pointed out that possibility,93 the spokespersons of the Ministry of National Defense had not admitted anything to the press conferences.94 However, the fact that both the People’s Daily and the PLA Daily in 2014 have mentioned reduction in force in its editorials introducing China’s past efforts of the reform and adjustment of military system and establishments may suggest that similar actions are to be taken under this national defense and military reform.95

Meanwhile, at the enlarged meeting of the CMC held in December 2004, former President Hu Jintao put forth a goal “to provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests” as one of “the historic missions for the PLA in the new period of the new century.”96 As a result, the PLA assumed a new role to participate in MOOTW including counter-terrorism security operations, emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, public security tasks, international peacekeeping operations and international emergency rescue activities, all of which are of similar importance to those missions under the traditional national defense policies. In fact, in “China’s National Defense
2010” published in 2011, China specifies maintenance of social stability and emergency rescue and disaster relief as examples of “providing effective support to safeguard national security and development interests.” Also, the white paper on China’s national defense entitled “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” released in 2013 defines the fundamental policies and principles that China’s armed forces should adhere to, one of which is “effectively conducting MOOTW.”

In this respect, in the face of force reduction of the PLA, and the Army in particular, might be seeing these disaster relief operations in large-scale earthquakes as an opportunity to exhibit its presence and necessity to the people of China.

2. Participation in Disaster Relief Operations in the Sichuan Earthquake

Among the series of MOOTW, one activity particularly worth noting is the disaster relief operations in large-scale earthquakes. The PLA’s participation in large-scale disaster relief operations received frequent press coverage in the PLA Daily and other state media, and also published in books written by PLA researchers. According to PLA researchers, PLA’s participation in disaster relief operations is beneficial for demonstrating the excellent capabilities of the PLA and training its forces and strengthening the capability of them.

Specifically, in the aftermath of the earthquake in the Sichuan province in May 2008, one of the largest-scale operations were carried out with a total of 146,000 personnel dispatched from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) as well as 75,000 additional personnel from the militia and Reserve Corps. A total of 4,700 aircraft and helicopters and 533,000 vehicles were deployed, rescuing 3,338 survivors, transporting 1.4 million disaster victims, and distributing 1,574,000 tons of relief supplies. Additionally, 210 units consisting of medical corps, psychological counselors and health officers were dispatched to treat 1,367,000 injured Chinese nationals. The series of relief operations were highly acclaimed by then General Secretary Hu Jintao and among PLA leaders at that time.

In these disaster relief operations, it was clear that coordination between the PLA and the government departments were essential factors. However, at the initial stage of operation after the Sichuan earthquake, the PLA allegedly refused to send helicopters requested by Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, and only agreed to do so when the order was given by Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC. In fact, the memoirs of Chen Bingde, the commander of the Army Command Group for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster—the PLA’s supreme command organized the day after the earthquake—depicts how the PLA continued to send necessary forces under the orders of Hu Jintao. It was speculated that the trouble at the initial stage triggered mutual mistrust between Wen Jiabao and the PLA commanders.

Meanwhile, the opinion that the mechanism to coordinate the PLA and the relevant government organizations in response to the Sichuan earthquake was dysfunctional needs to be judged with some reservation. For example, Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of the CMC and other uniformed leaders of the PLA were part of the members of the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster, which was led by Wen Jiabao. Also, the Army Command Group
for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster organized and led the army’s relief operation in line with the overall arrangement made by the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster. For example, Wen Jiabao dispatched Ge Zhenfeng, Deputy Chief of General Staff, who was the deputy commander of the Army Command Group for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster, to a levee that had the danger of collapsing.108

Further, it was decided that the National Development and Reform Commission would be responsible for arranging necessary supplies for relief activities, and the Commission responded to the requirements of the PLA General Staff Department without delay.109 Such evidence shows that, except for the initial stage, the coordination mechanism between the PLA and government departments seemed to have functioned to a certain level under the leadership of the Party’s Central Committee and Hu Jintao.

The mechanism to coordinate the PLA and the government on a local level also seemed to have functioned to some degree.110 What allowed this was the existence of a close relationship established between the PLA and the Party/government organizations. For example, provincial military districts (Garrison districts, Patrol districts), military districts (Patrol districts), prefectures (city, ward), the People’s Armed Forces Department, and Reserved Corps are placed under the dual leadership of the military’s command structure and the Party’s local committees.111 Considering the existence of the collaborative relationship between the army and local committees, the researcher in the PLA suggested that the provincial military districts should play an important role in MOOTW.112

However, in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, Chinese media revealed that there had been conflicts of command and complications of responsibilities at the initial stage because various organizations of the PLA and government organizations entered the disaster-stricken area in great numbers, and that such situation was resolved only after the Chengdu Military Region Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster was set up.113 The Chengdu Military Region Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster was under the command of the Sichuan Province Command Group for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster.114

In the books published after the Sichuan earthquake, some PLA researchers pointed out that the command structure for disaster relief in modern
China faces issues such as: 1) lack of a nation-wide, unified comprehensive command collaboration mechanism and system across the military and local governments, relevant command structures and departments; 2) divisions in organizations and responsibilities with fragmented commands within the vertical structure at the provincial levels and above having different adaptabilities. As in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, researchers assessed that despite the discussions at the joint meetings by the leaders of each department, these command structures lacked enforceability and authority, and the final results were dependent on the cooperativeness of each leading organization. In conclusion, the researchers suggested that the command structure was not the best method even though it had yielded a certain level of achievement.\textsuperscript{315}

3. Development of Military-Local Government Cooperative Relations in Disaster Relief Operations

One of the reasons that coordinate in the initial stage of the Sichuan earthquake did not function well was the lack of definite relevant regulations about PLA and government departments. There were no definite provisions setting forth the relationship between the PLA and the government departments in any of the related laws such as the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters (promulgated in 1997), the PLA Regulation on Participation in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief (promulgated in June 2005), and the Emergency Response Law (promulgated in August 2007).

For example, Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters merely states that “the PLA, the PAP and the militia shall carry out the tasks of protecting against and mitigating earthquake disasters assigned to them by the State” (Article 8) and does not refer to the relationship between the PLA and the State Council.\textsuperscript{316} The PLA Regulation on Participation in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief allows government departments such as the State Council and local governments to request the dispatch of the PLA for disaster relief operations, but states only that the army “should handle such request in accordance with the relevant regulations of the State Council and the CMC” and lacks specific descriptions on the command structure between the military and government departments.\textsuperscript{317} The Emergency Response Law, which is the basic law concerning crisis management, states that “the PLA, the PAP and the militia shall participate in emergency rescue, relief and management in accordance with the provisions of this Law and of the relevant laws, administrative regulations and military regulations as well as the orders issued by the State Council and the CMC” (Article 14), but it lacks further clarification on the command and control structure between the military and the State Council.\textsuperscript{318} From these contents, the authority of the State Council is limited to dispatching the PLA to participate in disaster relief operations, and does not include any right to give commands or orders.

Then, in December 2008, the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters was revised. The revised law states that “the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster has responsibility of leading, commanding and coordinating the resistance of earthquakes and relieving of disasters throughout the country” (Article 6). Under this provision, commanding and coordinating various departments will be carried out by the State Council whenever a large-scale disaster relief operation becomes necessary. The revised law also states that “the PLA, PAP and the militia shall carry out their resisting quakes and relief duties in accordance with the provisions of this law, other related laws, administrative and military regulations as well as the orders of the State Council and the CMC” (Article 9), stipulating the relationship between the PLA and the State Council and obliging the former to follow the orders of the latter. By placing the State Council above the military, progress has been made in structuring the coordination between the
State Council and the PLA. However, a concrete command structure in case of earthquakes between the PLA and the State Council was not clarified. PLA researchers point out that the revised law is not clear on the command authority in a joint emergency command mechanism and that the existing laws only provide for general rules and lack practical regulations. Other PLA researchers suggest that while a relationship of cooperation between the PLA and local governments is important in disaster relief operations, the PLA should maintain independence in terms of specific command authority.

Such structural changes were tested by the Yushu earthquake on April 16, 2010. The epicenter was in Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai province and recorded a magnitude of 7.1. More than 2,700 people were listed as dead or missing. As in the case of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, the CPC Central Committee recognized the seriousness of the situation and dispatched a total of about 13,000 servicepersons from the PLA and the PAP for lifesaving, rescue and transport, and relief supply distribution. Although Hu Jintao was away in Brazil at that time, the civil-military command and coordination mechanism under the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster worked more smoothly than during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and together with the army’s improved capabilities in disaster rescue and relief operations, it was said to have contributed to mitigating the extent of damage.

Marked progress in coordinating functions between the PLA and government departments was seen in the improvement of information sharing structure. Immediately after the earthquake struck, the Office of the PLA Leading Group for Handling Emergencies not only dispatched troops to the earthquake hit area, but put in place a communication mechanism with the State Council Emergency Management Office and other government organizations. The Ministry of National Defense made efforts to share information promptly by holding joint meetings every day with more than 20 departments under the umbrella of the State Council and
striving to grasp the situation on the ground by strengthening the mechanism to share information between the military and the local governments.\textsuperscript{126}

However, because there was no legal provision to clarify the command structure involving the PLA and government departments, the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster did not give orders on the concrete actions that the PLA should take. The PLA followed the orders of the CPC Central Committee, the CMC and President Hu Jintao and operated under the command of the Army Coordination and Command Group for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster to carry out the decision made by the State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster.\textsuperscript{127} The \textit{PLA Daily} pointed out that the command structure stipulated by the Regulations on Emergency Command in Handling Emergencies by the Armed Forces, which was just about to be promulgated, worked effectively in conducting the operation. It was also assumed that the PLA also appreciated the coordination mechanism where the PLA could share information with the government organizations and take leadership in the operation.\textsuperscript{128}

In April 2013, a magnitude 7, large-scale earthquake hit Lushan, Sichuan province. President Xi Jinping ordered the PLA and the PAP to immediately send forces for the disaster relief operation. On that morning, the State Council held an emergency meeting in Zhongnanhai, and State Council Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster was formed, and Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council headed for the earthquake-stricken area at the request of the CPC Central Committee and Xi Jinping.\textsuperscript{129} The CMC also convened an emergency meeting to share the instructions of CMC Chairman Xi Jinping and the requests from the relevant departments of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, and to discuss the measures that should be taken by the PLA and the PAP. In this meeting, it was decided that each force should promptly engage in disaster relief operations under the unified leadership of the
Sichuan Party Committee and the provincial government and under the unified command of the Chengdu Military Region Command Headquarters. In fact, in this disaster relief operation, the Chengdu Military Region Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster consciously followed the leadership of Sichuan Province Command for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster, and the commanders of each force including the provincial military joined the command structure of each local command group for resisting quakes and relieving disaster, which enabled the PLA’s disaster relief operation to be conducted, from beginning to end, under the command of the regional party committee and the provincial government. Chinese media including the PLA Daily praised that, based on the lessons learned from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there was substantial progress in the disaster relief operations for the Lushan earthquake as marked in the establishment of a quick initial response system, enforced information sharing between the relevant departments, and improved transportation of relief supplies.

In August 2014, an earthquake that recorded a magnitude of 6.5 or greater occurred in Ludian in Yunnan Province. Again, Xi Jinping reacted quickly by immediately requesting the dispatch of the PLA, and the PLA also dispatched forces consisting of the Army, the Air Force and the Second Artillery Force from the Yunnan provincial military district, Chengdu, and Beijing Military Regions, and they worked together in the disaster relief operations with the PAP and the Ministry of Public Security under the command of the Chengdu Military Region Command Headquarters. Particularly noteworthy was that the Yunnan provincial military district set up its command headquarters within 20 minutes after the earthquake.

Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang, who visited the disaster-stricken area immediately after the earthquake, gave instructions to set up a unified command structure led by the local authorities based on the experience of the Lushan earthquake. The State Council went so far as setting up the Command Headquarters for Resisting Quakes and Relieving Disaster, but judging from the extent, magnitude and impact of the disaster, the State Council gave notice to deal with the situation on a local level. Under such leadership, the PLA undertook the disaster relief operations with the cooperation of the regional party committee and the local government.

China continues to develop its legal systems and gradually deepening the coordination mechanism between the military and government departments while accumulating experience. In particular, the relationship is becoming closer between the local military regions and the local party committee/local government departments. As a result, China successfully achieved the establishment of a quick first response system and enforced information sharing and has become more capable of conducting effective disaster relief operations. While the military acknowledges the dominance of the government departments under the command and order mechanism in disaster relief operations, it still tends to pursue independence in terms of command authority of specific activities. However, the superiority of the government departments under the command and order mechanism in disaster relief operations is gradually becoming more prominent in reality and in name.

(Author: Yasuyuki Sugiura)
Chapter 4

UN PKO Policy as Military Diplomacy

1. Intensifying Military Diplomacy
2. The Purpose of Participating in UN PKO
3. Issues Ahead
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently promoting military diplomacy, including dialogues and interaction with foreign militaries and participation in international security cooperation, as a way to utilize its military capabilities during peacetime. After examining the characteristics and aims of China’s military diplomacy, this chapter analyzes the background and objectives of Chinese policy toward United Nation’s Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO) in which the PLA has actively engaged itself. It concludes with reviewing issues the PLA may face as it strengthens its involvement in UN PKO.

1. Intensifying Military Diplomacy

The PLA is currently actively promoting military diplomacy—the international activities performed by the military during peacetime that include exchange and dialogue with foreign armed forces, multilateral security dialogue, joint drills with foreign militaries, and international security cooperation. It was in a defense white paper released in 1998 where the phrase “military diplomacy” was first used in an official Chinese document. This white paper noted that “China’s foreign military contacts” are “an important component of China’s overall diplomacy.” It stated that “China has been active in developing an omni-directional and multi-level form of military diplomacy.” It stated that “China has been active in developing an omni-directional and multi-level form of military diplomacy” and emphasized China’s plan to increase military exchanges and to also cooperate with foreign countries and become engaged in multilateral military diplomacy activities.140

Since then, the phrase began to be used more frequently, even in official media and in statements made by senior military officers. While there is a variety of research on the definition of military diplomacy in China, Professor Guo Xinning of the PLA National Defence University conducted an extensive review of the existing research and defined it as follows:

“Military diplomacy refers to institutions or individuals granted the authority by defense departments and/or armed forces of sovereign states to interact, negotiate and engage with relevant bodies of other states, group of states or international organizations with the aim of enhancing and realizing national interests and security particularly with regards to national defense. It is an important aspect and component of a state’s external relations and overall foreign policy, and embodies the national defense policy within its overall foreign relations.”141

The concept of military diplomacy in China remains vague, but it has three characteristics: 1) it is a component of the state’s overall diplomacy with the aim of promoting national interests; 2) the PLA and the Ministry of National Defense are its central agents; and 3) it involves interaction, negotiation and joint activities with foreign militaries and defense institutions, multilateral security frameworks, and international institutions.

The Xi Jinping leadership has laid out a policy for more active promotion of military diplomacy. The political report adopted at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012 set forth that, “[China] will continue to increase cooperation and mutual trust with the armed forces of other countries, participate in regional and international security affairs, and thus play an active role in international political and security fields.” The report from the 17th Congress contained no such statements, and according to Qian Lihua, director of the Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office in charge of handling military diplomacy, “The report from the Party’s 18th National Congress for the first time explicitly laid out a direction of military diplomacy, and recognized the importance of military diplomacy as a component of national defense and force building.”142

China’s military diplomacy has covered various fields, but it can be generally sorted into the following five areas. The first is in personal exchange, examples of which include the dispatch of military attachés to embassies in other countries, overseas visits by senior military officials such as the Minis-
UN PKO Policy as Military Diplomacy

The second area is in security dialogue. China is conducting bilateral security talks with a large number of countries. For example, they periodically engage with the United States (US) through the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), and they are talking with Japan for the establishment of a maritime communication mechanism. China also participates in multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

The third area is in security cooperation. The PLA takes part in international cooperative activities to deal with various security challenges. Examples include UN PKO and the anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and rescue and support operations after large-scale disasters in foreign countries.

The fourth area is in education and training. The PLA sends personnel to study at foreign military educational institutes and accepts foreign military personnel for study at PLA National Defense University and other facilities. Foreign personnel are also provided training in techniques such as mine-clearing. In addition, the PLA actively engages in joint exercises with foreign militaries including bilateral joint drills aimed at counter-terrorism and search and rescue, and joint multinational drills through such organizations as the SCO.

The fifth area lies in public relations. China has released a national defense white paper on a roughly biennial basis since 1998. The Ministry of National Defense has also created the position of spokesperson, holds regular press conferences, and has placed a spokesperson in each service to provide a means for dissemination.

China’s primary objectives in actively engaging in military diplomacy seem to be: 1) to create an international environment conducive to the promotion of China’s national interests; 2) to improve the international reputation of China; and 3) to enhance the capabilities of the PLA.

Stable economic growth is of critical national interest in China. In order to achieve that, China needs to build amicable relationships with the major powers and neighboring countries to create an international environment that allows Beijing to focus on economic development. The PLA is attempting to stabilize its relationships with foreign powers through active promotion of dialogues and joint drills with both the US and Russian militaries, through enhanced military exchanges based in the SCO with Central Asian countries, and by engaging in talks with Southeast Asian countries through the dispatch of senior officers and participation in the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

On the other hand, impressing China’s position on issues related to Taiwan and maritime claims is considered to be part of the national interests that military diplomacy should pursue. China cites arms sales to Taiwan as a reason for suspending its military exchanges with the US, halts dialogues with other claimant countries when issues arise in the East and South China Seas, and harshly criticizes opposing countries during multilateral meetings. All of these suggest that China sees military diplomacy as a means to promote and attain national interests.

Security concerns about China are rising with the rapid modernization of the PLA and its forceful maritime expansion. While regarding its disadvantaged position in the struggle over international propaganda as a source of the so-called “China threat theory,” China is intensifying counter-argu-
ments to criticism of the opacity of the PLA and its coercive activities through publishing national defense white papers and holding press briefings by the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense. In an attempt to improve its international reputation, China has also contributed to global security by promoting international cooperation on non-traditional security issues through active participation in UN PKO, anti-piracy operations, and disaster relief activities.

Military unit exchanges with foreign armed forces, particularly joint drills conducted with advanced militaries provide the PLA with a valuable opportunity to gain experience and knowhow as it promotes military modernization, and can also be considered a “whetstone” for the PLA—a way for it to increase its combat capabilities. By conducting joint exercises with Russian forces and participating in the US-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise, the PLA learns mission command, unit training procedures, and equipment operation among others, and at the same time, it is able to review its capacity for fulfilling the PLA’s own duties. China is also promoting military technological cooperation with Russia and purchasing advanced military equipment while successfully raising the standards of PLA equipment and technologies.

2. The Purpose of Participating in UN PKO

Of all the military diplomacy activities China engages in, it is worth examining its participation in UN PKO.

Table 6: UN PKO Participation by the PLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Operation Title</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Started</th>
<th>Ended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union - United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in UN PKO for which the PLA continues to dispatch large numbers of military units overseas. At a high level meeting on UN PKO held at the UN in September 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that China is now the sixth-largest contributor to the UN budget for PKO and that it has dispatched more than 25,000 personnel to UN PKO thus far with more than 2,100 personnel in the field at that time. He also emphasized that China would continue this policy of active participation in UN PKO.

However, China has not always been consistent in its support of and participation in UN PKO. Up until the People’s Republic of China (PRC) joined the UN in 1971, UN PKO was seen as a tool of US imperialistic interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the name of UN, and China strongly opposed such operations. Even after it took up UN membership and its seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC looked at UN PKO negatively and did not show clear support for it until the late 1980s. China joined the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1988, and began to show its intent to contribute to UN PKO. In April 1990, China sent five military observers to work with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the first time the PLA participated in UN PKO.

China gradually increased its involvement in UN PKO. It dispatched small numbers of military observers and liaisons in 1991 to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). In 1992, the PLA sent a 400-person non-combatant unit primarily made up of an engineering battalion to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and this was the first time one of its military units took part in actual peacekeeping operations. After the UNTAC mission ended in 1993, China sent military observers but no units on several missions such as the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and other missions.


China has been directing its participation in UN PKO primarily toward Africa for more than ten years. As participation in UN PKO is one facet of China’s military diplomacy, it is possible to highlight the three main objectives by analogy to those of their military diplomacy mentioned previously.

First, it seems that China intends to increase a role of the UN for dealing with international security issues through its active participation in UN PKO, in order to create an international environment more conducive to the promotion of China’s national interests. With the Taiwan issue and ethnic problems in the Tibet and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions, China highly emphasizes the
founding principles of the UN such as respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Thus, China has found distasteful the western countries’ inclination in the post-Cold War toward humanitarian interventions for protecting human rights and the use of force for counter-terrorism without UN resolution. By actively supporting UN PKO, the UN’s primary means of conflict resolution, China seeks to enhance the authority and function of the UN, particularly the UN Security Council, of which China is a permanent member, in dealing with international conflict, and by doing this, China aims to increase its influence within the UN and champion the principles of the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.148

China also expects to strengthen its relationships with African countries and expand its interests on the continent through focusing its PKO efforts there. China has supported the independence movements of a number of African countries since the 1960s by providing economic assistance and has built friendly relationships with them. These amicable relations with a large number of African countries have become a diplomatic asset for China and contributing to African stability through UN PKO is likely to make those relationships even deeper. Moreover, China’s economic ties with Africa have become stronger in recent years, and the regional stability and increase of China’s influence brought about by UN PKO will likely create a favorable environment for China to acquire natural resources and expand trade with Africa.149

Improving its international standing is another important aim of China’s participation in UN PKO. China has seen significant economic development and is now the second largest economy on the planet. Its armed forces are also becoming steadily stronger and it has established its position internationally as a great power. With China’s new status as a great power, there are increased calls in the international community for China to contribute more to international peace and stability. China aims to respond to those expectations through increased involvement in UN PKO, thereby establishing China’s reputation as “a responsible great power.”150 In recent years, China has repeatedly emphasized that it contributes more personnel to PKO than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.151

China also seems to expect that the increasing anxiety felt towards it in the international community will be reduced through its participation in UN PKO. China criticizes the increased wariness against it among its neighbors and the West, which created the existing system, as a groundless “China threat theory.”152 Within the existing framework of the UN, playing a role in maintaining peace and stability alongside other countries through UN PKO is seen as a way to promote understanding toward China in the international community, to increase international trust in China, and reduce the world’s fear regarding China’s continued development. It is thereby seen as an effective counterargument to the “China threat theory.”153

Deploying PLA units to countries far from the homeland and conducting missions with foreign military units are likely to improve Chinese military capabilities. Through participation in UN PKO, the PLA obtains an opportunity to work with foreign militaries and particularly those from advanced Western countries. It is able to learn about the operation of military units and about trends in advanced equipment and technologies. It seems that the UN PKO provides the PLA with a way to adapt to the world’s rapidly advancing military technologies and improve its unit capabilities.154 Also, the PLA is able to improve operational capabilities and test the training levels, equipment standards, and emergency response capacity of their units by dispatching them to areas with harsh natural conditions such as those found in Africa.155

3. Issues Ahead

As discussed above, China is actively participating in UN PKO as part of its military diplomacy with a number of objectives in mind, and it seems to have achieved considerable success thus far.
China will continue its participation in UN PKO as an important part of its military diplomacy policies, but the nature of its increased involvement is departing from its original position regarding UN PKO.

China has placed a heavy emphasis on respecting sovereignty and non-intervention, the basic principles of the UN, and it has consistently argued for the observance of these principles even in regards to UN PKO. Thus, China has continued to emphasize the three principles upon which UN PKO is based, namely: 1) regarding a conflict, the consent of the host country and/or conflicting parties must be obtained for UN PKO deployment; 2) neutrality, meaning that UN PKO must not take sides; and 3) non-use of force except in self-defense. However, UN PKO in recent years has begun to evolve from their traditional mandates of managing interstate conflict to having much more diverse mandates that include the provision of humanitarian support and dispute settlement between parties in civil wars, and restoration of civil order. In an increasing number of cases, the consent of host nations or involved parties has been unstable and it has become difficult to remain neutral when carrying out a mission. China is now facing a challenge in balancing the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, things which China has traditionally emphasized, and the more recent concept of peacekeeping which encompasses “the protection of civilians” and “peace enforcement.”

Alongside this transformation in UN PKO, China also needs to deal with the issue of how to protect their units in UN PKO. Emphasizing the self-defense principle, China has been cautious about the use of force in UN PKO activities. China has mainly dispatched lightly-armed, non-combatant units such as engineers, medical personnel, and transport units for peacekeeping. However, the safety of peacekeeping personnel is being increasingly threatened in recent years with personnel being captured by warring parties and sometimes attacked. There have also been cases in which UN PKO personnel have been killed by armed groups, particularly during operations in Africa.

As a result of these developments, Chinese units were accompanied by security personnel for the first time when dispatched to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. Moreover, in September 2014, China announced that it would be sending a 700-strong combat infantry battalion to join the engineers and other non-combatant personnel already taking part in UNMISS. The Ministry of National Defense clarified that this infantry battalion would be outfitted with light arms and armored fighting vehicles, and explained that their objective would be to, “offer protection to the maximum extent possible to local civilians and personnel engaged in peace operations, humanitarian aid, economic construction and other activities.” Within China, there still exists opposition to the use of force during UN PKO operations, but the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of dispatched units is rising. Therefore, the PLA will need to grapple with the issue of how it can realistically interpret the self-defense principle of UN PKO. In addition, as the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense noted, one of the objectives of the infantry battalion being dispatched is to protect “local civilians.” It is worth paying attention as to whether China will actively take on the responsibility of “the protection of civilians” during peacekeeping missions.

The PLA’s active participation in UN PKO as a part of China’s military diplomacy has provided some good results in regards to promoting China’s national interests, improving the international reputation of China, and strengthening the PLA’s military capabilities. China has been aiming to diversify the use of its military strength in peace time, and in this way its peacekeeping efforts have been a success. However, as the PLA deepens its involvement in UN PKO, it will likely have to adapt its actions to the reality on the ground and adapt its thinking to better match the common understanding of the international community.

(Author: Masafumi Iida)
Chapter 5

Counter-piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

1. Participation in Counter-piracy Operations and China’s Intents

2. Enhancing Naval Capabilities through Counter-piracy Operations

3. Building on Experience
In December 2008, China made the decision to dispatch the vessels of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to participate in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. Since then, PLAN has been continuing its counter-piracy activities. Through its participation in these activities, PLAN intends to accumulate experience and enhance operational capabilities in distant seas.

1. Participation in Counter-piracy Operations and China’s Intents

On December 20, 2008, China decided that they dispatched the PLAN vessels and those fleets participated in the United Nations-led counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Since then, PLAN’s participation in counter-piracy operations has been done on a regular basis. By December 2014, PLAN took part in 19 counter-piracy missions and sent a total of 17,000 servicepersons in 54 vessels. These operations were conducted by surface combatants with helicopters and special force units, and a Song class submarine was dispatched for the first time in September 2014.

The dispatch of the PLAN vessels was initially requested by the Chinese shipping industry, and the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as specialists on the issue studied that request in detail. In the end, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, the State Council, Central Military Commission (CMC) and Hu Jintao made the final decision. For the government departments, the decision to participate in these operations was not made merely to respond to the request from domestic shipping industry — there was also a diplomatic consideration that this could serve as a way of enhancing China’s status in the international community as a “responsible

Sources: Compiled from PLA Daily and other media reports.
Counter-piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden

major power.”

The PLA also shared these objectives in that participating in counter-piracy operations would fulfill its new role to protect maritime rights and interest set forth in Hu Jintao’s instruction, “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” As the commander of the PLAN, Wu Shengli stated in April 2009, “the PLAN would plan and implement in a scientific manner to incorporate the development of non-combat capabilities into all areas of naval modernization and preparation for military conflicts; incorporate blue water operational and strategic power projection capabilities into its force development system; and incorporate other improvements of specialized capabilities in areas of non-combat activities such as maritime emergency search and rescue into its overall development of naval strength.” Through participation in counter-piracy operations, the PLAN was aiming to enhance the operational capabilities of its units in far seas. And similar to the MFA, PLA also recognized the importance of diplomatic effect in this decision.

In carrying out counter-piracy operations, the PLA has established a good relationship with the government departments. In order to improve its command and control functions at the strategic level in far seas, the PLA established an emergency command mechanism with relevant government departments such as the MFA and the Ministry of Transportation. The PLA utilizes this mechanism to facilitate inquiries and reporting, inter-agency interactions and expedite timely decision-making so that the PLA can ensure its leadership in these operations. The Ministry of Transportation also acknowledged that PLAN should take initiative in escorting operations and that the role of the Ministry was to cooperate with the PLAN. By obliging the escorting ships to register in advance and sending the collected information to the PLAN, the Ministry of Transportation contributes to the smooth running of the escort operations. Relevant organizations such as the MFA, Ministry of Transportation, local governments and Chinese companies cooperate with the PLA by sending personnel and ships to the area to assist in supply and recovery activities.

By propagandizing the achievements of PLAN’s counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, China intends to erase the “China threat” theory among the international community. In the White Paper entitled “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” published in April 2013 by the Chinese Information Office of the State Council, the counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden are introduced that: 1) China is escorting foreign ships; 2) China has maintained good coordination mechanisms with fleets from other countries through exchange of visits of commanders and flotillas, joint escort operations and joint exercises; 3) China participates in the Shared Awareness of Deconfliction (SHADE) group for international counter-piracy efforts. At the Western Pacific Navy Symposium (WPNS) in April 2014, the PLAN commander Wu Shengli also named its counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden as an example of the PLAN’s proactive commitment to international obligations. The PLAN twice dispatched its hospital ship to the area in 2010 and 2013 under a mission called “Peace Ark” to provide physical examinations and treatment not only to the Chinese servicepersons but also to the nationals of the coastal countries of the region, aiming to enhance its international images.

2. Enhancing Naval Capabilities through Counter-piracy Operations

The PLAN’s counter-piracy operations are conducted by two surface combatants (destroyers or frigates) equipped with helicopters. The PLAN adopts various escorting methods including convoy by surface combatants, area patrols with helicopters and small vessels and onboard guards by special forces. No major problem has been reported in relation to the operations, and the PLAN’s escort capabilities are said to be comparable to other Navies.
Under the slogan of “escorting in far seas, training in far seas, and combating in far seas,” the Chinese flotillas aim to coordinate escort missions and long-range cruise training, and conduct various training activities not only in the Gulf of Aden but in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean areas as well. Some of the major far seas training activities carried out by the PLAN include: 1) applied tactical training by special forces units; 2) coordinated training involving vessels, helicopters and special force units at sea; and 3) escorting training with the participation of ships to be escorted. The 6th escort flotilla’s Type 071 amphibious transport dock *Kunlun Shan* also conducted guarding and surveillance training with fast patrol craft and air cushion landing craft in the South China Sea.

In August 2014, the 17th and 18th convoy fleets held confrontation drills, focusing on capabilities of planning, operational commands, joint operations and emergency responses of precision-guided attacks using the information systems, and aimed to enhance capabilities in surveillance and guarding, information transmission and decision-making.

The PLAN has also conducted joint exercises with foreign countries off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In September 2009, the Chinese flotilla of the 3rd escort mission carried out joint exercise with the Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden called “Blue Peace Shield 2009,” in which the two countries conducted seven items of drills including flotilla conjunction, vessel maneuvering, replenishment, joint inspections, and Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) firing for the purpose of preparing model procedures for joint command, communications and cooperative activities. The 5th escort flotilla jointly conducted exercises including mutual delegation of authority with the Korean Navy in May 2010.

The 8th escort mission convoy fleets participated in the “Peace-11 Exercises” in the waters close to Karachi, Pakistan in March 2011 along with Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Pakistan. The 8th escort flotilla also conducted joint counter-piracy drills in April with the Pakistan Navy in the Gulf of Aden. In September 2012, the 12th escort flotilla carried out its first joint counter-piracy exercises with the US Navy. The 14th escort mission participated in the multinational joint naval maneuver named the “Peace-13 Exercises” in March 2013, followed by the second joint counter-piracy exercises with the US Navy in August of the same year. In March 2014, the PLAN conducted joint counter-piracy exercises with EU nations including France, Germany and Spain, and in October another joint counter-piracy exercises with the Pakistan Navy.

The series of counter-piracy operations are seen to be contributing to the improvement of the PLAN’s capabilities. For one, PLAN’s command and maneuvering abilities in far seas have improved. The PLAN has upgraded its information and communications systems to ensure that it can maintain command and control over the dispatched flotillas. Through the escort missions, the PLAN has become capable of departing from the low-level hierarchical chain of command and implementing a flatter organizational structure. In particular, the orders from CMC and the PLAN command can now bypass the vessel command or base and reach the fleets directly, therefore, by delegation, the front line commanders may be given greater authority to take flexible approaches to the situation.

In order to deal with pirates promptly, the response time of the flotillas needs to be reduced by agile commands. For this purpose, the PLA has decided to grant to the extraordinary Party committee of the dispatched flotilla, sufficient authority regarding decision, command and response and to transfer a certain amount discretionary power.
Important items are discussed collectively at meetings of a flotilla’s extraordinary Party committee consisting of a commander, political commissars, command staff officers, and those responsible for surface ships, helicopters and special forces. The Party committee system characterized by the principle of collective leadership, which forbids arbitrary decisions by individuals and takes majority opinions, is also maintained throughout the counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, a commanding officer can make provisional decisions in a time of emergency to ensure readiness. For example, when a Chinese ship was attacked by pirates in November 2010, the command organ of the 7th escort flotilla took initiative in rescue operation based on the decisions made by the escort flotilla’s extraordinary Party committee. However, even in such extraordinary cases, the military commander who has made the interim decision is obliged to report to the Party committee after the event for a review, so the principle of collective leadership still seems to be maintained.

The second highlight is the improvement in PLAN’s logistics support capabilities. PLA researchers point out that assessing replenishment activities during the escort missions will provide important benchmarks to measure the growth of the PLAN’s overall maritime replenishment capability. According to reports in the Chinese media and memoirs by accompanying journalists, the flotillas succeeded in: 1) food storage for 40 to 60 days by means of improved storage technology; 2) replenishment in far seas under bad weather conditions; 3) simultaneous replenishment of two vessels by operating, side-by-side, three surface combatants including one supply ship; and 4) vertical replenishment by helicopter.

These escort activities have allowed the PLAN to gain various experience on appropriate replenishment framework for long-term overseas deployment. In December 2008 when China decided to participate in international counter-piracy efforts, PLA officials argued that the dispatched flotillas would not need to anchor for replenishment because the Chinese replenishment vessels were highly capable and they would be able to carry out all the necessary replenishment missions in a long-term escort deployment. In fact, the two destroyers of the first escort mission never called a port in the countries near the Gulf of Aden, and engaged in continuous offshore operations for over 120 days.

However, during the second escort mission, the PLAN modified this practice and gradually shifted from temporary calling at ports for replenishment to more regular in-port replenishments. Based on this experience, the PLAN came to emphasize the importance of the flotillas regularly calling at port to be replenished and to rest. As of December 2014, all flotilla vessels have stopped at ports in the coastal countries. The second escort flotillas adopted a replenish method in which merchant vessels transport supplies from China to the deployed fleets at sea. While the PLAN continues this style of replenishment, since merchant vessels are not designed to engage in military transport, their delivery of goods at sea is inevitably inefficient, and as the escort flotillas became more accustomed in-port replenishment at the ports in the countries near the Gulf of Aden, merchant vessels are used less frequently.

Thirdly, China field-tested and enhanced the capabilities of their weaponry and equipment through the series of counter-piracy operations. As the commander of the first escort mission, Rear Admiral Du Jingchen (Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet) and deputy commander Yin Dunpin noted, one definite achievement was the examination of the capabilities of their armaments in long-term overseas deployment. The results gained from these examinations are applied in building new PLAN vessels. The second ship of Type 071 amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan has undergone over 100 modifications from the first ship. To provide for the PLAN’s routine exercises in the far seas and the noted shortage of large replenishment vessels to support the counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, two large 20,000-ton Fuchi class replenishment ships, Taihu and Chaohu were assigned in 2013 to the North Sea Fleet and East Sea Fleet, respectively. In August 2013, Taihu was dispatched to the Gulf of Aden and participated in counter-piracy missions. The flight altitudes and structural strengths of the helicopters used in the counter-pi-
racy escort missions were also said to have been verified.217

3. Building on Experience

Commander of the 5th escort flotilla, Rear Admiral Zhang Wendan (Deputy Chief of Staff, South Sea Fleet) stated that the conduct of counter-piracy operations to defend the sea lanes in distant seas constituted a frontier of the PLAN’s peacetime strategic operations and provided a rare historic opportunity in terms of achieving its missions in far seas.218 Professor Li Daguang of the PLA National Defense University has pointed out that by deploying flotillas to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN was able to acquire first-hand operational experience in counter-piracy activities, and to confirm its standard operational capabilities (its equipment deployment level, quick-reaction capability, special forces capability, joint operational capability, logistical support capability and drill standards, etc.).219

In December 2010, the PLAN held a forum to commemorate the second anniversary of its escort operations, inviting participants from the MFA, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Transport, at which the PLAN summarized the main outcomes and experience gained through the counter-piracy operations.220 In December 2013, on the fifth anniversary of participation in counter-piracy activities, the PLAN Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Vice Admiral Ding Yiping stated that the PLAN has successfully enhanced its capabilities, such as command, communication, positioning, logistical support and joint operation integrating different fleets, and that it has improved its ability to conduct non-military operations in far seas and successfully complete diversified military missions.221

The PLAN is using the various lessons learned in the counter-piracy operations to enhance its naval power. Some of these efforts are seen in the coordinated combat drills, the “Maneuver-5” exercises conducted in the Western Pacific in October 2013 with elements from all three PLAN fleets — the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet. Firstly, among the 11 surface combatants that participated in the Maneuver-5 exercises, 7 vessels had experience taking part in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.222 Secondly, the focus of the Maneuver-5 exercises was to improve the PLAN’s strategic implementation and operation capabilities in far seas using information technologies, one of the important themes being to verify the PLAN’s current command systems and its command and maneuvering abilities in far seas.223 Throughout the exercises, the PLAN used China’s navigation satellite BeiDou and other long-range information systems to provide information support to the participating units.224 All units that took part in the exercises, from the PLAN command to the command organ, from each flotilla to each airport, were integrated by way of information platform and information system, according to Chinese media.225 Since such improvements in command and control capabilities are similar in content with the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it is likely that the achievements of the operations were utilized.

As such, the PLAN successfully improved their 1) command and control capabilities, 2) logistical support and replenishment capabilities, and 3) combat power of each flotilla in far sea operations from their counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden. As manifested in their Maneuver-5 exercises, the capabilities gained in such ways are proactively utilized in PLAN’s exercises conducted in the waters off Japan.

(Author: Yasuyuki Sugiura)
Conclusions
Conclusions

Over the previous five chapters, this report analyzed the reasons for and background behind China’s diversification of the roles of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s Armed Police (PAP). Internally, this diversification is represented as a response by the armed forces to the increasing demonstrations and unrest in both Han majority areas and ethnic minority areas. Externally, this diversification is needed to alleviate the anxiety felt by China’s neighbors in regards to the rapidly-modernizing PLA and the increase of defense budget in proportion to China’s expanding national power. In addition, as the number of domestic users of internet increases, information control is becoming more difficult than ever before for the Communist Party of China Central Committee. Moreover, the number of domestic sources of social unrest within China is almost innumerable, including rising anxiety about food safety, environmental degradation due to atmospheric pollution and water contamination, and fear of the outbreak of avian flu. With the domestic criticism of the rampant corruption in the country, all of these issues have the potential to become serious contingencies that could shake the very basis of the CPC government. Such serious incidents would not necessarily arise individually; multiple events could potentially occur concurrently. For the communist government, the PLA and PAP are among the means a way to prevent such incidents from occurring or to minimize the damage from them. To fortify its foundation, the communist government will likely continue to enhance the armed forces to address various new security challenges.

The CPC has established an unprecedented high-level Leading Group called the Central National Security Commission (CNSC). The CNSC is an organization designed to respond to current complex situations both at home and abroad, so its role will not be limited to solely military affairs, but also to cross-cutting security issues. However, the CNSC does not have the commanding authority of the PLA or PAP that the Central Military Commission retains. It is presumed therefore that the mission of the CNSC is to make comprehensive security policy proposals to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. That coherent control of the armed forces is exerted by the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC is clear from cases such as the appointments of general in the PAP, and PLA’s relief operations undertaken in Sichuan after the large-scale earthquake in Lushan County, Sichuan province, in 2013. Thus, command over both the PLA and the PAP is undoubtedly held in the hands of the Central Committee and the CMC, and when Japan makes any comprehensive governmental approaches to China in the future, the target of such approaches will continue to remain the CPC.

This being said, China’s decision-making process is not necessarily clear from the outside, and this has often ended up becoming an obstacle to communication with China. When the Politburo and its Standing Committee as the highest decision-making bodies of China make political decisions, it is unclear which branch is involved and to what extent. Therefore, in order to ensure that Japanese political intents are correctly conveyed to the Politburo, Japanese diplomats must always take great pains to determine which channel should be used. Under these conditions, while the CNSC was established as new Leading Group, the members of the Commission and its role remain unknown. However, as was clarified in Chapter 1, if the CNSC does exert some level of influence on the decision-making of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, it is worth for Japan making some level of contact with it. This has the potential to become a new channel for communication between Japan and China, and it could also function as a high-level crisis management mechanism in the long-term.

This report also argued that as China continues its economic growth, it has expanded its security concept and the roles of the PLA and PAP have been diversified. In the meantime, since the deployment of the First Japan Ground Self Defense Forces Engineering Unit of 600 personnel to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, it has actively contributed to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In addition, based on the Anti-Piracy Mea-
sures Law, approximately 580 personnel including eight officers of the Japan Coast Guard have been involved in conducting anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, operating two Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers and two P-3C maritime patrol aircrafts since 2009. Disaster relief operations are not limited to domestic events either, with international disaster relief activities also being expanded. Thus, Japan and China are both engaged in these activities, and a defense exchange bringing the experiences of each country could be possible in the future. While the establishment of a new, high-level crisis management mechanism between Japan and China is expected, field-level confidence building exercises could also contribute to the two countries building a better relationship with each other.

As China has started placing more emphasis on non-traditional security concept other than the military affairs, it will possibly use more diplomatic measures than it has done thus far. This can be seen in the country’s active use of military diplomacy to improve its image internationally, for example through combining the military affairs and public relations such as the publicizing of the military exercises by media, and in the use of its military in PKO and anti-piracy operations. While China expands its security concept and diversifies the roles of its armed forces, Japan has established the National Security Council and will further international contribution by the Self-Defense Forces. In this context, channels of diplomacy and defense exchange between Japan and China will also increase. It will be important to identify channels that can contribute to a more stable relationship between Japan and China, and to further enhance Japan’s approach towards its neighbor.

(Author: Rira Momma)
China as a Major IT Power

The advent of open PC architecture in the 1990s provided a way for businesses to break into the IT industry. China’s vast potential in the emerging market would be provided by its abundant and inexpensive workforce supported by a large population. With these factors, China was able to create and rapidly develop IT related businesses, and as of 2013, not only did China account for close to 12% of the global IT market, it also accounted for close to one quarter of the global internet population, 620 million. This number is only 46% of the population of China as a whole, so that number is expected to continue to grow. In other words, China is now the world’s leading IT power and IT market, and it will only get bigger. In response to this situation, the Chinese government formed the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group in 2014 headed by Xi Jinping, and it seems to be limiting the freedom of expression on the internet and providing guidance in the fight against cyberwarfare. Additionally, in October 2014, the Central Military Commission (CMC) instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to reinforce information security including the cyber realm.227

Conversely, cyber-attacks around the world are increasing and taking on more diverse forms, causing damage to nations, businesses, and individuals. For major IT-capable countries, this means that cyberspace security is a new priority, and this has influenced China’s PLA and led to their formation of a so-called cyber-unit.

The PLA’s Cyber Military Unit

In 2011 China first recognized the existence of China’s cyber military unit in the Guangzhou Military Region. However, it is thought that this unit must have existed within the PLA earlier than 2011. The unit that China has acknowledged is known in China as the “Cyber Blue Army.” Its role has not been clear, but friendly units are thought of as red and enemy units as blue. Judging from the Chinese way of color representation, it is thought cyber blue army has served as an aggressor opposing force for training to strengthen the PLA’s defense capabilities in cyberspace.

However, it is also thought that there are yet units other than this cyber blue army, the role of which is to explore foreign cyber-security capabilities and if possible, penetrate target systems. According to the 2013 report by the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, the US Transportation Command and its affiliates have been infiltrated by the Chinese military for several years, and it has been pointed out that future attacks could potentially cripple the US military logistic services.228 In 2014, five officers of PLA General Staff Department Unit 61398 (thought to be in charge of US and Canadian operations) were placed on the US Justice Department’s Cyber Most Wanted list for their roles in the
theft of information from US companies.230 This incident suggests that China’s cyber unit is involved in state-sponsored industrial espionage.231 These incidents have even arisen in Japan, for example in 2011, when The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies came under cyberattack. Information was stolen from the organization’s systems and used to spoof identities to send emails to members of the organization, some of which are part of the defense industry, infecting their computers with viruses and resulting in further leaks Chinese government.232 Chinese government has denied involvement in these incidents, but it was thought that the attacks originated in China. This situation has led to suggestions that China, now a major IT power, could potentially place viruses into computers and other telecom-related components manufactured in Chinese factories before they are shipped around the world, and that hacking incidents such as these may increase in the future.

The Cyber Militia’s Potential

The security anxiety is not directed only at the official PLA units however. The Chinese militia system is incorporated into the workplace at IT companies and in courses in university engineering departments, suggesting that cyber militia are active in these environments too.

As mentioned above, China is now a major IT power, and there are a vast number of people related to the IT field working at businesses and studying at universities throughout the country. It must be recognized that these people could all potentially be involved in future Chinese cyberattacks.

In addition, there is also the hacker group known as the Honker Union (The Red Hacker Alliance), though its relationship with the Chinese government is unclear. This group of hackers has been known to conduct cyberattacks on countries with which China is currently involved in disagreements, apparently in a show of patriotism. As the Chinese government is not thought to have taken any action to prohibit such attacks, though the group is not part of the official militia structure, various actors should be aware of their ability to launch cyberattacks.

(Author: Yasuaki Hashimoto)
China’s Space Capabilities

Space Development to Date

On April 24, 1970, two months after Japan launched its first satellite, *Osumi*, China successfully launched its own *Dong Fang Hong I*, thereby becoming the world’s fifth space power. Over the next 40 years, China has continued to expand its space exploitation capabilities.

At the time, China was developing its atomic bomb, hydrogen bomb, and satellite programs under the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” slogan. The rocket used to launch a satellite uses the same fundamental technology as a ballistic missile used to carry a nuclear warhead, meaning that continued development of their rocket program essentially meant continued development of their missile program. The *Chang Zheng* (Long March) rocket is currently China’s main launch vehicle, and it is capable of lifting payloads to various orbits. The country has an array of satellites, including remote sensing satellites (Yaogan satellite series, possibly used for military reconnaissance), high resolution civil remote sensing satellites (Gaofen satellite series), navigation satellites (Beidou satellite series), telecommunication satellite on Geostationary Orbit (Fenghuo satellite series), and weather satellites (Fengyun satellite series). It should be noted that all of these satellites can be used for military purposes. China also has manned spaceflight capabilities with the Shenzhou, space station construction capabilities in Tiangong (due to be completed in 2020) and anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) through the use of ballistic missiles. In the past, only the US and Soviet Union (now Russia) had those capabilities, and by successfully gaining these capabilities, China has now clearly influential power to the world in space development along with the US and Russia.

In China, state-owned enterprises handle the development of both launching systems (rockets) and satellites under the direction of the China National Space Administration (CNSA). CNSA is affiliated with the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and has a fundamentally strong relationship with the PLA. In addition, launches and operations of satellites are under the control of the PLA General Armament Department, which is directed by the Central Military Commission. In other words, the PLA exerts a strong influence over China’s space development and exploitation programs.

The PLA’s Space Utilization Potential

China is actively developing a broad range of satellites with practical applications. Yaogan and Gaofen allow for observation of conditions on both land and sea, Beidou provides accurate positional measurement in the air, on sea or land, and Fenghuo can be used to transmit amounts of information. Of course, Fengyun is useful for gathering weather data. These satellites can most assuredly be used to improve the daily lives and economic state of
Chinese citizens. However, these satellites can also be used for military applications. China is said to have adopted an A2/AD (anti-access area denial) strategy to ensure foreign militar-ies are unable to approach Chinese territory, territorial waters or adjacent seas, but in order to effectively implement such a strategy, the satellite systems mentioned above might play a vital role. Yaogan satellites are already said to be used for military purposes, but they can be categorized into some different groups, with some following sun-synchronous orbits in which they pass over the same coordinates at the same local time (set to pass over a number of different times), and some following non-synchronous orbits at altitudes of 600 kilometers or at almost two times that height. These different satellites are thought to be mounted with optical sensors, radar, signal interception devices and infrared detection systems, making them capable of observing and intercept signals day or night, in any weather conditions, on both sea and land. By using the Yaogan satellites and the civilian Gaofen satellites, it is thought that China is capable of detecting approaching foreign naval vessels at a distant far from their homeland and confirming the composition of such naval unit in detail. When such vessels reach a position beyond which China wishes to pre-vent their passage, the country could then engage in defensive combat operations.

It is likely that such an operation would involve the use of cruise or ballistic missiles, and some of those missiles do not depend on the satellite positioning systems of foreign countries, for which their use may be subject to limitations. They are guided by China’s own Beidou satellite positioning system, meaning that missiles could potentially have greater accuracy and more success reaching their target. Compared to missiles that rely on on-board inertial guidance systems alone, missiles guided by satellite positioning should have much better circular error probability. Communications satellites will be used for inter-unit communication, and weather satellites will send valid weather data from space to be used in deciding upon troop maneuvers.

China is developing and maintaining its ability to take more effective action, and this ability has likely led to a greatly increased sense of risk among states that wish to approach to Chinese territory. Future Chinese space development programs are likely to continue to have potential military applications, and therefore careful observation of those programs will be necessary.

(Author: Yasuaki Hashimoto)
Endnote


2 “Western” points to regions that include six provinces, all five autonomous regions and one direct-controlled city, including Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang Uyghur, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, Tibet, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia.


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75 新京报 [Beijing News], 10 April 2014. This seems to be a way to capture the hearts and minds of the masses. There has been frequent news coverage of his penning calligraphy while visiting the troops for a similar purpose.

76 解放军报 [PLA News], 30 January 2013.

77 When founded in December 2012, the unit was called, “Snow Wolf Commando Unit” but it was later named “Snow Leopard Commando Unit” by the Commander of the Armed Police in August 2007. Hu Jintao, who was the head of the CMC, ratified the unit name and the regiment flag was awarded.

78 旺报（电子版）[Want Daily (web version)], 7 May 2014.

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83 Vice Admiral Tian Zhong, Vice Commander in the Navy was Commander, North Sea Fleet, equivalent of Deputy Commander of a military region at the time of the 18th National Congress of the CPC and was elected to the Central Committee.

84 Zhao Cangbi is an exception as he was the Chief of the Public Security Department as well as a Political Member of the Armed Police Force.

85 Commander Wang Jianping’s promotion to the Central Committee from the Candidate Central Committee (He
ranked fourth in the Candidate Central Committee at the time of the 17th National Congress of the CPC) was approved at the 17th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the CPC (November 4, 2012) just before the 18th Party Congress. 人民日报 [People's Daily], 5 November 2012.

87 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 31 July 2012.
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