

**Program
Participants
Summaries**

PROGRAM

Opening Session

- 13:00 – 13:05 Opening Remarks
Tanaka Satoshi (President, NIDS)
- 13:05 – 13:10 Chairperson’s Remarks
Shoji Junichiro (Vice President for Academic Affairs, NIDS)

Keynote Address

- 13:10 – 13:50 “Reconstructing the History of Modern East Asia”
Nakanishi Hiroshi (Professor, Kyoto University)
- 13:50 – 14:00 Break

Session 1: The Regional Order in Modern East Asia

- 14:00 – 14:20 “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan and the East Asian Regional Order”
Matsuura Masataka (Professor, Rikkyo University)
- 14:20 – 14:40 “Modern China’s Foreign Relations and East Asia”
Liu Jie (Professor, Waseda University)
- 14:40 – 15:00 Comments
Shoji Junichiro (Vice President for Academic Affairs, NIDS)
- 15:00 – 15:10 Break

Session 2: The International Order in Modern East Asia

- 15:10 – 15:30 “Going their separate ways: The British Empire, Japan, and Reordering Asia between the World Wars”
Brian P. Farrell (Professor, National University of Singapore)
- 15:30 – 15:50 “The Soviet Far Eastern Strategy and International Order”
Hanada Tomoyuki (Senior Fellow, NIDS)
- 15:50 – 16:10 Comments
Tohmatsu Haruo (Professor, National Defense Academy)
- 16:10 – 16:20 Break

Overall Discussion

- 16:20 – 17:10 Overall Discussion

Closing Session

- 17:10 – 17:15 Closing Remarks
Kiguchi Yuji (Vice President, NIDS)

PARTICIPANTS

Chairperson

SHOJI Junichiro

Vice President for Academic Affairs, NIDS

M.A., Tsukuba University

Rekishi to Wakai [History and Reconciliation], co-author, University of Tokyo Press, 2011

Kensho: Taiheiyo Senso to Sono Senryaku [Verifying the Pacific War and its Military Strategy], co-editor, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2013

Chiseigaku Genron [Introduction to Geopolitical Principles], co-editor, Nihon Keizai Shimbun Publishing, 2020

Keynote Speaker

NAKANISHI Hiroshi

Professor, School of Law, Kyoto University

B.A., Kyoto University

Kokusai Seiji towa Nanika. Chikyu Shakai ni okeru Ningen to Chitsujo [What is International Politics? Humanity and Order in the Global Society], Chuko Shinsha, 2003

Kosaka Masataka to Sengo Nihon [Kosaka Masataka and Postwar Japan], co-editor, Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2016

Nihon Seijishi no Naka no Leader-tachi [Leaders in the Japanese Political History], co-editor, Kyoto University Press, 2018

Presenters and Discussants

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Ph.D., University of Tokyo

Nicchu Senso-ki ni okeru Keizai to Seiji: Konoe Fumimaro to Ikeda Shigeaki [The Economy and Politics during the Sino-Japanese War: Konoe Fumimaro and Ikeda Shigeaki], University of Tokyo Press, 1995

Daitoa Senso wa Naze Okita noka: Han-Asia-shugi no Seiji Keizaishi [Why Did the Greater East Asia War break out? The Politico-Economic History of Pan-Asianism], Nagoya University Press, 2010

Asia Shugi wa Nani wo Katarunoka [What Did the Pan-Asianism Tell Us?], editor, Minerva Shobo, 2013

Liu Jie

Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Waseda University

Ph.D., University of Tokyo

Nicchū Senso-ka no Gaiko [Diplomacy under the Sino-Japanese War], Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1995

Chugoku no Kyokoku Koso [China's Concept of a Major Power], Chikuma Sensho, 2013

Tairitsu to Kyozon no Rekishi Ninshiki [The Historical Perceptions of Confrontation and Coexistence], co-editor, University of Tokyo Press, 2013

Brian P. Farrell

Professor, Department of History, National University of Singapore

Ph.D., McGill University

The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 1940-1943: Was There a Plan? Edwin Mellen Press, 1998

The Defence and Fall of Singapore, 1940-1942, Tempus, 2005

Empire in Asia: A New Global History, 2 vols. series editor and co-editor, Bloomsbury USA Academic, 2018

HANADA Tomoyuki

Senior Fellow, Military History Division, Center for Military History, NIDS

Ph.D., Hokkaido University

Fifteen Lectures on Showa Japan: Road to the Pacific War in Recent Historiography, co-author, Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for Culture, 2016

Soren to Higashi Asia no Kokusai Seiji 1919-1941 [The Soviet Union and International Politics in East Asia, 1919-1941], co-author, Misuzu Shobo, 2017

Stalin no Kyokuto Seisaku [Stalin's Far Eastern Policy], co-author, Kokon Shoin, 2020

TOHMATSU Haruo

Professor, Department of International Relations, School of Humanities and Social Science, National Defense Academy of Japan

Ph.D., Oxford University

Nihonteikoku to Inintochi. Nanyo Gunto wo meguru Kokusaiseiji 1914-1947 [The Japanese Empire and Mandatory Administrations: International Politics surrounding the South Seas Islands 1914-1947], Nagoya University Press, 2011

Moh Hitotsu no Sengo-shi: Daiichiji Sekai Taisengo no Nihon, Asia, Taiheiyo [Another Postwar History: Japan, Asia, and the Pacific after the World War II], co-author, Chikura Shobo, 2019

SUMMARIES

Keynote Address

Reconstructing the History of Modern East Asia

NAKANISHI Hiroshi

With the end of the Cold War, the perception that the liberal order is establishing itself globally is rapidly fading. The world faces an abundance of serious and difficult-to-solve issues, including the resurgence of competition between great powers, such as the United States and China, the confrontation between liberal democracy and authoritarianism, a widening gap between the rich and the poor alongside political polarization, ethnic and religious intolerance and discrimination, and the emergence of global and non-traditional threats such as pandemics and climate change. In such times, it is meaningful to re-examine the history of the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw one order collapse and another establish itself.

In the 2015 statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, former Prime Minister Abe commented that Japan “attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. [...] With the Manchurian Incident, followed by the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually transformed itself into a challenger to the new international order that the international community sought to establish after tremendous sacrifices. Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war.” His statement reveals common aspects of how Japan’s modern and contemporary history has been viewed during the postwar Showa and Heisei periods. However, the questions of what led Japan to disrupt the international order during this period, and what precisely that international order was, remains.

These questions demonstrate the difficulty of comprehending East Asian history in the first half of the 20th century. This address provides an overview of East Asian history in the first half of the 20th century, based on the following two perspectives.

The first perspective sees international relations in East Asia as the gradual convergence of two timelines during this period. The first axis is one of global synchronicity. It follows the period until World War I, World War I itself, the interwar period, World War II, the postwar period, and the start of the Cold War. East Asia formed an essential part of this period, but it was mostly centered on the Western world. The second axis is the diachronic timeline of East Asia. Events such as the First Sino-Japanese War, the Spanish-American War, the Russo-Japanese War, the annexation of Korea, the Xinhai Revolution and the Chinese Civil War, the Russian Revolution and the Siberian Intervention, the Washington Naval Conference, the Northern Expedition and the confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, the Manchurian Incident and the foundation of Manchukuo, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, had their own beating rhythms. They increasingly converged with the global timeline from just before World War II

through to the Cold War period.

The second perspective to be examined is the relationship between regional orders and the nation states. This period saw dramatic changes at the highest levels, shifting from the traditional East Asian order in the 19th century and the imperialist order based on treaty ports, to territorial imperialism and the expansion of the Japanese Empire, followed by the confrontational order between capitalism and communism led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, and regional orders transcending national borders. At a latent level, it was also a time when regional ethnic groups were building their ethnic identities, and borders were being delineated. This latent dynamism is the driving force that weaves together historical perceptions, territorial disputes, and power politics in East Asia today, at a time when ideological politics have ended, and the national strength of Asian countries has increased.

With the increasing global importance of the Indo-Pacific region, there is a need to firmly recognize the contemporary significance of re-examining or redefining the history of East Asia in the first half of the 20th century.

Session 1

Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan and the East Asian Regional Order

MATSUURA Masataka

In line with the objectives of this forum, this presentation attempts to re-examine the Pan-Asianism in modern Japan as a policy envisioned in response to the “uncertainty over the existing international and regional orders.”

Looking at East Asia and the world today, the security environment surrounding Japan is undergoing dramatic changes, and, at the same time, enormous cross-national economic projects such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, China’s One Belt One Road initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership have been set in motion. There is also a remarkable interpenetration of culture in Asia, including theater, music, video, art, dance, and cuisine. At present, however, the ideology of Pan-Asianism seems to be non-existent. Around the before and after of the formation of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government under Hatoyama Yukio in 2009, discussions related to Pan-Asianism, such as the East Asia Community, had gained momentum in Japan. But with the so-called “nationalization” of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, the deterioration of Japan-China relations, and the deterioration of Japan-Korea relations centered on the Takeshima issue and the so-called “comfort women” issue, such enthusiasm for the concept of East Asia Community has disappeared. Nevertheless, the concern in Pan-Asianism is still high. Is this a phenomenon due to nostalgia for a time when Japan had great influence or a reaction against the world order by either the United States or China, both of which have an overwhelming presence?

Pan-Asianism in modern Japan was a protest against the modern world order of Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. It was also asserted a Japan-centered reorganization of the East Asian order, replacing the pre-modern East Asian order centered on China. The ideology of Pan-Asianism that emerged across Japan during the late Edo period and the Meiji Restoration was both a protest against the Western colonialism powers and a counter to the powerful Qing Empire in East Asia. The movement to reorganize Asian regionalism after World War I was an attempt by Japan to take the lead in reorganizing the East Asian order following the collapse of the Qing and the Russian Empires. It was initially envisioned in a relatively peaceful way, focusing on economic factors. However, when the Kwantung Army caused the Manchurian Incident to counter the United States, based on the theory of “World Final War (Armageddon),” this reorganization transformed into a Greater Asianism centered on opposing the British Empire under a new banner of “Asian nationalism.” This concept came to be asserted by the Japanese Empire when waging the Greater East Asia War as part of its new regional, ideological policies. This was indeed a process of envisioning a policy in response to the “uncertainty over the existing international and regional orders.”

When Pan-Asianism is viewed as a policy from the perspective of military and economic

security, then culture, thought, and ideology, which have been discussed mainly as issues of the history of thought, need to be repositioned in relation to their connections with military, security and economic affairs. According to the above classification of periods, Pan-Asianism initially existed as an ideology to counter the mainstream. However, after World War I, when the international and regional orders changed drastically, it began to emerge as a policy, with the Manchurian Incident leading to its full and rapid adoption and recognition. It then became the ideological pillar of the Greater East Asia War during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In the words of Kajitani Kai, Pan-Asianism was initially based on a universalism aimed at helping the weak, but it became a “monster” and turned into an ideology of the strong after the Manchurian Incident and the foundation of Manchukuo.

In my presentation, I hope to briefly cover the transformation of Pan-Asianism from an idea to a policy in relation to military and economic security, while also reflecting on the current situation.

Session 1

Modern China's Foreign Relations and East Asia

Liu Jie

In 1925, Matsumoto Shigeharu, studying in the United States, discovered the research of Charles Beard, awakening him to the fact that “the China problem is the central issue in Japan-U.S. relations” and that “Japan-U.S. relations” were in the final analysis “Japan-China relations.” Dr. Beard warned of the possibility for war between Japan and the United States over the lucrative Chinese market. A hundred years later, China has transformed itself to the point where it is universally recognized as a competitor to the United States. As the confrontation between the United States and China intensifies, the “China problem” remains a core issue for Japanese diplomacy, which is based around the Japan-U.S. Alliance. A hundred years ago, Japan was adjusting its policies towards China between the Shidehara diplomacy and the Tanaka diplomacy. Today, however, Japan is strengthening its alliance with the United States and, at the same time, looking for ways to maintain friendly relations with China while remaining wary of China's diplomatic stance.

In 2006, Chinese television aired a documentary series called “The Rise of the Great Powers.” The following year, a book of the same title was published by the People's Press. The series outlined the history of nine countries that grew to become “great powers,” namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Japan, and strongly hinted that China, as a new “great power,” must realign its capabilities and interests vis-a-vis the other major world powers. It argued that China's growing presence in the 21st century was predestined by its “long history, brilliant civilization, vast territory, and enormous population.” Since then, concepts such as “great power relations” and “great power diplomacy” have been used frequently in China, with “great power consciousness” spreading rapidly among the Chinese people. But how should China's current state be understood? This is now a significant concern for the international community. Building a future-oriented relationship between Japan and China requires a historical and multifaceted understanding of contemporary China, which is undergoing dramatic changes. The purpose of this presentation is to explore China's current state by examining its external relations, especially those with Japan.

If we look at the characteristics of modern China's diplomacy, three periods become evident. These periods are (1) the “traditional diplomacy period” from the Opium War to 1901, (2) the “modern diplomacy period” from 1901, when the final protocol concerning to Boxer Rebellion was signed, to 1949 and (3) the “major country diplomacy period” since the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

The first period involved the pursuit of a Hua-Yi order and the distinction between China and non-Chinese barbarians based on Confucian traditions. Although the focus shifted from “barbarian affairs” to “Western affairs,” the purpose of foreign relations was to maintain

Chinese authority, the tribute system with vassal states and the trade relations with the outside were seen as privileges bestowed on foreigners, and China rejected modern international law and foreign relations. China was aware of disparity falling behind the Great Powers at the time, but its humiliating experiences fed exclusivism and led to frequent actions against foreign nations, such as the Boxer Rebellion. In addition, there was little active space for professional diplomats, perhaps the symbol of “modernization,” and the views and experiences of consuls posted abroad were not reflected in China’s foreign policy.

In the second period, diplomacy was led by professional diplomats with experience of studying abroad and working in diplomatic missions overseas. Professional diplomats of the Beiyang government period Wellington Koo, Yan Huiqing, and Alfred Sao-ke Sze understood the modern treaty system. Their diplomatic activities, conducted in the national interest, moved the government. The diplomacy of the Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei Nationalist governments in the 1930s also followed this trend, with Chiang Kai-shek recruiting as many professional diplomats as possible and pursuing China’s national interest, while being mindful of international cooperation.

The third period is diplomacy of the People’s Republic of China. This period can be broken down into Mao Zedong period (revolutionary diplomacy), the Deng Xiaoping period (“bide your time” diplomacy), and the Xi Jinping period (major country diplomacy). Mao Zedong proclaimed China the “center of world revolution” (a “major country”) and did not stint with support of Communist regimes in Korea and Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping, who moved China onto the path of modernization, changed the diplomatic strategy to one of “keep a low profile and bide your time” in acknowledgement of the errors of the Mao era, with China creating the peaceful global environment required to build up a modernized China, such as WTO membership. Xi Jinping came to power declaring the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and it has been difficult for professional diplomats to get much input into his “major country diplomacy.” The One Belt One Road initiative and the economic order have raised the suspicions of the United States, Japan, and others, who fear it may signal a return to traditional Sino-centric diplomacy.

Overviewing modern China’s diplomacy in general, we can say that the 30-odd years when elite diplomats led the foreign policy under the Nationalist government (the second period of Chinese diplomacy) was exceptional. Meanwhile, the first and third period were fundamentally linked by their traditional diplomatic concepts and methods. Why has the diplomacy of the Nationalist government failed to change the course of China’s traditional diplomacy? What has China’s traditional diplomacy brought to Asia and the world’s understanding of China?

Meanwhile, what does it mean that the methods of diplomacy pursuing the “national interest” with a “traditional” worldview account for the consciousness of individual citizens? In short, to what extent does China’s diplomacy reflect the country itself? My interest in these issues is what originally inspired this presentation.

It is undeniable that the achievement of China’s process of modernization was “Westernization.” One such “Westernization” was the corps of professional diplomats who represented Beiyang and the Republic of China. However, the scope of China’s Westernization

and the introduction of Western systems did not produce leaders influenced by the West but rather, traditional leadership in a traditional Chinese system of government. The stability of China's governance ideology and structure provides an important perspective for considering the Chinese foreign relations and statehood.

Session 2

Going their separate ways: The British Empire, Japan, and Reordering Asia between the World Wars

Brian P. Farrell

British and Japanese delegations sat down together at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 as allies, having just fought the Great War together. In 1932 the British government terminated its Ten-Year Rule regarding defence spending and estimates of future major war, triggered by the outbreak of fighting between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Chinese forces in and around Shanghai.

By 1936 the IJN designated the British Empire as a future enemy, for planning purposes. The two empires went from looking for ways to maintain their alliance, which had been a cornerstone of regional order in the Asia Pacific, to preparing to fight each other over the future direction of that same order. This change in relations was neither linear nor desired, by either side.

But it proved unstoppable. Why? One way to address that question is to focus on the specific problem that drove the change: the future of China. And a good way to focus still more tightly on the question is to zoom in on the problem that both reflected and drove this parting of the ways: the status and defence of Shanghai, and the international presence there.

This paper will explore the change in relations between these two Empires, over reordering East Asia, by unpacking, primarily from British vantage points, their ultimate failure to see eye to eye on how to 'manage change' in Shanghai in particular, and thus in China in general.

Session 2

The Soviet Far Eastern Strategy and International Order

HANADA Tomoyuki

This paper will explore the Soviet Union's Far Eastern strategy and international order during the two World Wars. It places special focus on war and diplomacy in the history of the Japan-Soviet relations and clarifies the realities of the impact of the Soviet Union on the security environment in modern East Asia.

The history of the Japanese-Soviet relations at this time can be expressed as “a coexistence of war and peace,” based on the great power relations. This can be divided into three periods, taking the Siberian Intervention launched in 1918 and the “tentative occupation” of Northern Sakhalin as historical backdrop. During the first period, as increased tensions in the Soviet-Manchurian border areas due to the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent foundation of Manchukuo, Japan formed an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist regime based on the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. On the contrary, the Soviet Union formed collective security system through military alliances with the Mongolian People's Republic and the Chinese Nationalist Government. Due to the Nomonhan Incident and the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in 1939, these tensions ended with the Soviet military victory in the Far East and the diplomatic victory in Europe.

During the second period, the Japan's strategic perception toward the Far East changed radically and the Japan-Soviet relations succeeded to neutralize. The Second Konoe Fumimaro's Cabinet aimed to dissolve the British Empire's colonial system and divide it into spheres of influence, based on the continental vision of a Quadripartite Entente, which was composed of Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Although this concept of international order did not actually realize, the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was concluded in April 1941, forming stable international relations of both countries in the Far East.

During the third period, while this Pact continued to exist as a diplomatic negotiation route of both sides (the Allied Nations and the Axis Powers) during World War II, the relationship between great powers of Japan and the Soviet Union ended as a result of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan in 1945 (the Soviet-Japanese War) and the Japanese diplomatic failure of Suzuki Kantaro's Cabinet to carry out the war termination with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union succeeded in securing its rights and interests in East Asia, and the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) dispute transformed from the issue of spheres of influence into the issue of national territory.

From these points of view, this paper clarifies the overall picture of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern strategy launched fully after the Manchurian Incident from the perspectives of war and diplomacy. It also focuses on the Nomonhan Incident and the Soviet entry into the war against Japan—the two “war histories” between Japan and the Soviet Union—and points out that the Soviet Union played a key role in the formation of the international order in East

Asia by making the most of its victories in these battles. Moreover, it concludes that the end of the Pacific War not only signified the end of the relationship between great powers that had historically existed between Japan and the Soviet Union; it was also the beginning of the Cold War in Asia.