

## **7. US as the Global Power and the Role of the Japan-US Alliance**

There are many strategy documents published by the US. After 9/11, the Bush Administration issued QDR 2001, its first edition of the Quadrennial Defense Review. This report had a significant impact, as it emphasized the transformation of US forces, while largely altering the policy taken by the Clinton Administration in the review of military power composition, facilitating a shift to “1 plus 4 plus 2 plus 1,” which consisted of the defense of the main land; front deterrence in key areas in Europe and Asia; quick overthrow of enemies in two battle areas; and responses to limited, small-scale areas of conflict. Also around this time, by review of its nuclear strategy, the administration raised the concept of ballistic missile defense, shifting its deterrence strategy from the initial goal of retaliatory deterrence to the renewed goal of rejective deterrence. NSS 2002, or the National Security Strategy of 2002, put forward preemptive actions as what was called the Bush Doctrine. During its first 18 months, the Bush Administration was mostly marked with unilateral actions, but after 9/11, it also began concerted actions with NATO, China, Russia and others.

Then came NDS 2005, or the National Defense Strategy of 2005, the administration’s second national defense strategy. This strategy is characterized by an emphasis on transformation and classification of security challenges into four types: traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic. The NDS 2005 report indicated that while emphasis had thus far been placed on the traditional type, the weight would be shifted to irregular, disruptive and catastrophic challenges. The administration then issued NMS 2004, or the National Military Strategy of 2004. This strategy, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes defense strategy from more militaristic perspectives. Next, QDR 2006 was published. This report specifically referred to the establishment and management of troop strength in order to specifically address the four types of challenges. The report also shed light on the overthrow of terrorism, strengthening of homeland defense, formation of options for countries at strategic crossroads, and ways to prevent the proliferation of WMD. NDS 2005 referred to optional crossroads. It also pointed out those attacks that when put to practice would prove the vulnerability of the US, such as attacks from the ocean, cyber attacks and attacks from space. The underlying concern was that, for example, China could potentially acquire such attack means. The same concern could apply to Russia, as well.

The Bush Administration then issued NSS 2006, its second NSS. This was dubbed the second Bush Doctrine, which, not fundamentally altered from the first one, referred to preemptive actions at times of necessity, showing a nuanced change. It clearly put forward a hedge strategy toward China, in that the US would strengthen strategic ties with China but at the same time be prepared for the country in terms of defense. The strategy thus far fully reflected the influence of Donald Rumsfeld, then the Defense Secretary. However, Rumsfeld was dismissed from office as he bore the responsibility for the Iraq issue, being succeeded by Robert Gates, a practical policy maker. As a specific strategic paper under the reins of Gates, we see a new oceanic strategy issued in 2007, which focuses on global-scale friendly oceanic cooperation. In July this year, the new administration issued its National Defense Strategy. This latest report clearly emphasized soft power.

During the above-mentioned two terms of the US administration, there were about four changes in terms of the US national defense strategy. One is that the administration placed homeland defense as the most prioritized task. This may seem unrelated to Japan, but it is highly important for the US, in terms of its homeland defense, that the two countries at the end of the Pacific and of the Atlantic, respectively, maintain an alliance. In this context, the importance of Japan could grow further. The second change is the emphasis on the idea that the US should secure freedom of action abroad. The third change is the stance to respect US national interest, while remaining realistic at the same time. The fourth change relates to international cooperation and specifically a shift to the Coalition of the Willing and multilateral cooperation.

Japan-US relations were emphasized by the Bush Administration in its first term, which was evident given the members of its main staff. The US-Japan alliance was however diluted during the second term of the Bush Administration. There was a shift of immediate concern of the US, from the whole of Asia to the Middle East and Afghanistan. Added to that was the issue of Georgia, among other issues, which at last made the US sensitive about the moves of Russia. Then, there is a hedging strategy toward China. While this sort of strategy is being taken toward China, there are also efforts to not make the attempt to contain China appear too obvious while reinforcing the alliance of liberal democracy and boosting the strategic triangular ties of Japan-US-India and Japan-US-Australia. The second Armitage Report was issued in February 2007. While the first Armitage Report basically focused on the Japan-US Alliance, the second one envisioned future policies to be taken by the US, encompassing not only Japan but all of Asia, specifically including India, Russia and Australia.

What is important is a complementary relationship between US and Japan, which should benefit both countries. Basically, it will also bring about good results to the local community and international society. For Japan, facing its crossroads of rise and fall, it is imminently important to maintain and strengthen the Japan-US Alliance. Concerning the national power and national situations of Japan and the US, it is necessary to consider competitiveness and compatibility. In the context of geopolitical elements, before 9/11, the US had been protected by the two vast oceans of the Pacific and the Atlantic. The country enjoyed the advantage of not having had any battlefields in its mainland. However, the emergence of ballistic missiles and the 9/11 attacks moved the country to the defense of its homeland. Nevertheless, the basic strategy of the US, given its geopolitical conditions, should still be the solid defense of the two oceans and buffer them. The Atlantic is free of concern, thanks to the presence of NATO and the EU. But in the Pacific, there is only Japan. There are also China, Russia and the Korean Peninsula, and in such a geopolitical landscape, the presence of Japan is indispensable for the US. Japan, on the other hand, has no choice but to rely on the oceans as an island country. Therefore, Japan must thoroughly protect the safety of the oceans, globally, regionally and individually. However today, in the time of globalization, it is unrealistic to achieve such protection on Japan's own, given its national power and situations. It is therefore quite natural for Japan to tie with a country that is ready to promote an oceanic alliance and at the same time is competent.

Japan should prove to be solid and fair in order to act as a promising nation and influential power. In the context of Japan's survival and prosperity, it is not realistic for the country to have nuclear deterrent capability on its own, for instance. For the sake of dignified survival,

it is important for Japan to collaborate with a country that has trustworthy extended deterrent capability and that can be strongly committed to oceanic defense. In terms of sustainable prosperity, Japan, after all, is incapable of creating an international economic system on its own. Therefore, it is important for Japan to maintain and develop an international economic system that is advantageous. That could mean in the near term the coexistence and shared prosperity under the system being led by the United States. Given that the ocean represents a basic element for prosperity, it is also important to tie up with countries willing and capable of contributing to the safety of international maritime routes, such as the US and other liberal democratic oceanic nations, including Australia, India and Singapore. Japan should seek international maritime harmony with these countries. Now more than six decades have passed since the end of World War II. Time is due for Japan to have its own national philosophy. Such philosophy should mean a perspective for values. Achievement of survival and prosperity should be followed by the establishment of values. Such values should be accepted by the world and the region. If it is impossible to establish a model of international relations based on Japan's values, it should be necessary to maintain liberal democracy as the common model of international relationships and tie up with those countries that deliver or lead this model. Japan could incorporate its own values in such efforts. Through this process Japan's solidity can play a positive role.

As for choices to be made by Japan for its alliance with the US, the maintenance and reinforcement of this alliance is the first basic choice. Second, it is necessary to achieve true bilateralism in the alliance. A third important point is to construct an inter-state relationship that is mutually complementary through advice and action. A fourth point is the reinforcement of the corporative ties with nations and with alliances that share values with Japan and the US. A fifth point is the construction of an international society that can share values with Japan and the US.

To consider realistic measures in the realm of security, classification into three categories is necessary: deterrence, prevention and measures against invasions. Deterrence of invasions can be achieved by nuclear deterrence. Should Japan possess nuclear weapons or rely on US nuclear deterrence? Ultimately, Japan relies on the US for nuclear deterrence. But at the same time both Japan and the US need to have means of assurance. Under these circumstances, we must review the Three Non-Nuclear Principles from various angles. Moreover even if Japan cannot deter a nuclear attack on its own, it should maintain conventional deterrence capabilities. It should maintain a conventional-type rejective deterrent capability that is commensurate with Japan's national power and its circumstances. To achieve this, Japan naturally must once again consult with the US in the framework of RMC or roles, missions and capabilities.

Concerning prevention of and measures against invasions, four points can be raised. First, as a measure against nuclear threat, Japan should have conventional rejective deterrence capabilities. Discussions for assurance should be necessary concerning extended nuclear deterrent measures held by the US. Japan's own conventional measures must include maritime and air forces, enhancement of mobilized defense capabilities for remote islands, and untraditional countermeasures for threats. Conventional measures to be taken with the US should include maritime defense, comprehensive airborne defense of the homeland (ABCD), and exercise of joint rejective deterrent capabilities.

What Japan should do on its own in the future includes reinforcement of the national security system, active participation in collective security schemes and establishment of a national command headquarters. Added to that should be the early establishment of the general law governing international cooperation. Reinforcement of the defense system is furthermore important and should include the use of space, emphasis on maritime and air defense, SLOC defense, remote island defense and measures against asymmetrical threats. To promote debate on the Constitution, we should actively discuss the use of the right of collective self-defense. Securing financial resources for defense is also important.

The Japan-US Alliance undergoes times of strengthening and times of less strength. There are currently several Japan experts in the US but they are not yet sufficient in number. In Congress, administrative bodies and the public in the US, there is less recognition on the importance of its alliance with Japan than on its ties with NATO and Australia, for instance. This is attributed to the lack of decent strategic documents, especially on alliance strategies. Practically, though, some papers do pick up relevant issues to some extent. These include, for example, the Japan-US joint declaration of 1997, the outcome documents of the 2+2 Conference and the part describing strategies in the National Defense Program Outline. However, it is important to establish strategy documents in more solid and systematic ways. It is important to do so in the forms of alliance security strategy and alliance defense strategy. These documents could naturally be of both confidential and regular natures. However, even if the government could manage to publicize at least the regular version, it would mark significance, as by reading it, people are able to understand what the Japan-US Alliance represents in terms of alliance security strategy and alliance defense strategy.