

2. America's Internal Affairs and their Links to its Foreign Policy and Security

Instead of representing the results of strategic consideration, US foreign policy rather strongly reflects factors such as rivalries among government departments, concern for domestic policy and internal fights among bureaucrats. The rivalries were particularly evident during the lead up to the Second Iraq War, with fierce competition and bargaining among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the intelligence services and the National Security Council (NSC). These groups engaged in power games to exceed their rivals and beat them, sometimes on their own and sometimes in alliances.

At that time, there were three groups that were hardly covered by media. The first one was an intelligence group for anti-terrorism evaluation, set up within the Defense Department in October 2001, under the initiative of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith. This group was aimed at presenting key administration officials irrefutable proof of a link between 9/11 and Iraq, and to justify the invasion of Iraq. This intelligence team compiled a report about the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and links among Islamic extremist groups in a brief for Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, respectively. This group strongly distrusted the CIA.

The second group was the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was aimed at advancing plans for war in Iraq. Then-Undersecretary Feith called the State Department naive and insisted that it should follow the Defense Department's decisions.

The third group was the White House Iraq Group, which was established within the White House. The group met in the Situation Room of the White House to draw up media tactics.

The intelligence team led by Undersecretary Feith selected intelligence data from reports from the US and Israel to send them to OSP. OSP in turn offered background briefings to government senior officials. The intelligence team used information sources of Iraqi dissidents to pave the way for war against Iraq. The team received intelligence data on Iraq related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and links to al-Qaeda from Ahmed Chalabi, an anti-Iraqi-government activist and leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was an overseas exile group that advocated the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein. Chalabi was evaluated in widely different ways by the State Department's Middle East experts and by the Defense Department's pro-war group.

According to Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, two totally different reports were submitted when the NSC met in the presence of the President. The difference was huge and left little room for compromise, thus making it difficult for the NSC to make important decisions.

The second element at play is religion. It is difficult to picture today's America without the presence of evangelicals, or conservative Christians. Evangelicals are characterized by such ideas as the Bible being the sole authority of knowledge on God and guidelines for the lives of Christians, Jesus Christ being God incarnate and savior of a sinful mankind, and the need for personal conversion. Evangelicals also serve as principal players in political movements. A survey found that President George W. Bush was supported by 68% of white evangelicals in the presidential election of 2000 and by 78% of them in the 2004 election. This suggests the importance of evangelicals as the key constituency in a dead-heat race. In 2004, one out of

four lawmakers in both legislative Houses identified themselves as evangelicals. The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) has 52 denominations with about 45,000 churches and 30 million members. Religious factors have become increasingly important in elections.

A frequently-heard term in the US is Bible diplomacy. Changes in the religious landscape of US society have significant influence over the country's foreign policy. An NAE senior official showed confidence by saying that religion leads politics, not the other way around. In the backdrop is a dramatic increase of Christian populations in Africa, South America and Asia. Evangelicals traditionally held strong motives for missionary work and charity, as well as a global-scale perspective on religion. Now, globalization of their faith has remarkably narrowed the distance to fellow believers overseas, helping US evangelicals receive increasingly more information about humanitarian issues, such as human rights abuses, AIDS and poverty. From the middle of the 1990s, evangelicals launched campaigns against religious suppression in China, human rights abuses in North Korea and international human trafficking of women and girls. They also promoted pro-Israel policies and campaigns to liberalize religious conversion and write-off debts, contributing huge amounts to these ends. They strongly lobbied for this agenda with the Bush Administration. Evangelical bodies call for support for Israel as the foremost issue of US foreign policy, while a majority of the Republican's constituency is strongly committed to pro-Israel policy. These tendencies also affect the selection of policies.

However, evangelicals, too, face internal rifts. One of the new phenomena is the movement of linkages between the religious right and the liberal left, including environmental and feminist groups. An international conference on human rights issues was held in November 2005 with the bi-partisan sponsorship of Sam Brownback, a leader of the religious right and Republican senator, and Madeleine Albright, a liberal who served as the Secretary of State in the Clinton Administration. While the religious right and the internationalist left pose a stark contrast in US politics, both camps share some ground in humanitarian issues. Some key evangelical figures find common fronts with liberals offensive.

A third element involves political parties and elections. Karl Rove, an aide to President George W. Bush, attributed the defeat of Bush Sr. in 1992 to the moves of the Republican conservatives, who, Rove sees, were disappointed by his centrist stance and left him. This suggests, as a lesson learned from Bush Sr.'s defeat in 1992, that one should never slight conservatives within the Republican Party or they can never win an election. This view affected US foreign policy. Since the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, what Rove noted as foremost was how to satisfy the Republican constituency in order to achieve the reelection of President Bush in 2004. A critic to this stance was Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor under President Bush Sr., saw that President Bush Jr. and Rove were tailoring the foreign policy in ways to appeal to Republican conservatives, their domestic support base. Scowcroft was also critical of the Iraq policy taken by the Bush Administration.

Next, we see the difference between the Republicans and the Democrats. The difference has widened since the Second Iraq War broke out. In a Pew Research Center opinion poll from March 2007, the idea suggesting that "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength" was supported by more than 70% of Republicans and 40% of Democrats. Another survey, conducted by CNN around the same time, found that one out of four Republicans opposed the Second Iraq

War, while more than 90% of Democrats did. A third survey by the German Marshall Fund in June 2006 found that 35% of Democrats thought that “the US should support democratization in other countries,” while 64% of Republicans thought the same. A TV poll by CBS at the end of 2006 showed that about two-thirds of Democrats believed that the US should not intervene in the affairs of another country, while only one-third of Republicans believed so.

As for party image, the Republican Party had an advantage in terms of whom to trust in foreign policy. Through the changes after the Vietnam War, the US public increasingly identified the Republican Party as the party of strength and safety, and the Democratic Party as the party of weakness and instability. The key members of President Bush’s diplomatic and security team included Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, who had undergone elections as a federal lawmaker and candidate for Vice President, with experience and pride in communicating directly with voters; and Secretary of State Colin Powell, a field veteran who had led the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Democratic Party lacks this breadth of human resources in its foreign and security policy machinery. That marks the difference between the Republican and Democratic Parties.

Finally, we observe a variety of approaches employed by observers. To start with, four approaches were introduced by Philip D. Zelikow, an adviser to the State Department and aid to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in his speech “Practical Idealism: Present Policy in Historical Perspective,” at Stanford University in May 2005. They were social Darwinism, practical idealism, pacifist idealism, and isolationism.

Secondly, another set of four approaches was introduced by Francis Fukuyama, Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University. He laid out the four approaches in his book “America at the Crossroads,” which drew public attention for its criticism of neoconservatism. His version consists of: neoconservatism, realism in the tradition of Henry Kissinger, liberal internationalism, and Jacksonian American nationalism. Fukuyama also introduced a new approach of a more realistic Wilsonianism, which he says differs from classical realism by taking seriously as an object of U.S. foreign policy what goes on inside states. Realistic Wilsonianism also “differs from neo-conservatism (and Jacksonian nationalism) insofar as it takes international institutions seriously.”

A third set of four approaches were raised by Walter Russell Mead and include Hamiltonianism, Jeffersonianism, Wilsonianism and Jacksonianism. These four have been quoted in various articles.

A fourth set of approaches is raised by Scowcroft. They include traditionalism and transformationalism. He sees the Bush Sr. team as being traditionalists and the Bush Jr. team as being transformationalists, and he says they were in competition with each other.

A fifth type of approach is introduced by Yasushi Watanabe, assistant professor of Keio University: Trends within conservatives.

Among such a variety of approaches, what has left the most remarkable impression is that of neoconservatism. The essence of what neocons assert is clearly illustrated in a speech by Charles Krauthammer, “Democratic Realism – an American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World” delivered at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) in February

2004. The essence is first seen in the idea of democratic realism. Krauthammer says that the US will intervene only in places where there is a strategic necessity, meaning places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom. Secondly he sees significance in democratic realism as it takes into account where the overthrow of radicalism and the beginnings of democracy can have a decisive effect in the war against the new global threat to freedom, the new existential enemy, the Arab-Islamic totalitarianism that has threatened the US in both its secular and religious forms during the quarter-century since Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution.

A common characteristic of neoconservatives is intense distrust toward international organizations, the United Nations in particular. Another characteristic of this group is Reaganism. Neoconservatism is essentially the revival of Reaganism. Neoconservatism also has deep roots in ideological fights during the Cold War era. It is an integration of the strong union between power and principles; the strong power of will to change a regime and an evangelical belief that democracy is the only legitimate system.