

## **Fiscal 2003 Council of Defense-Strategic Studies—Proceedings—**

### **I. The United Nations, the Alliance, and the Coalition of the Willing after the Iraq War (September 10, 2003)**

#### **A. Presentation (The United Nations, the Alliance, and the Coalition of the Willing after the Iraq War)**

One impact of the Iraq War was that it made it obvious that the alliances and the United Nations (UN) system, as institutions formed during the Cold War, are not able to adequately respond to the “new war” of today’s constantly changing, unpredictable international conditions. If the conditions for “new war” heralded a change in the system that shaped international relations, then the response to those conditions also required a more malleable institution (a pseudo-institution, so to speak), resulting, for instance, in the formation of the so-called “coalition of the willing.” The coalition of the willing did not necessarily take a “Neo-Conservative” (hereafter shortened to “Neo-Con”) tone. While an institution always arises in response to the conditions that exist at the time of its establishment, once an institution has appeared it becomes rigid and inflexible.

The UN is the largest of these institutions. While its size is an advantage in one sense, it can also be a drawback in that it makes it difficult to achieve a change of course. Moreover, the formal nature of the UN makes it a highly rigid institution. Even the UN has been able to respond, however, in an ad hoc manner to unpredictable new situations without resorting to significant changes in the current system, as can be seen both in the past and at present in locations around the world (PKOs, for instance).

One issue to consider here is how the UN should be viewed, or in other words, whether reform at the UN is even possible. Institutions necessarily change under the impact of various events. In particular, conditions in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 leading up to the Iraq War have provided a huge impetus to the movement for thoroughgoing reform of the UN. The door may be open to progress on long-stalled UN reform.

Another issue debated since the end of the Cold War is whether alliances have died. In the past, the debate comparing NATO to the hub-and-spoke alliance network in the Asia-Pacific region had concluded that the Asia-Pacific system could not function as well as NATO. In practice, however, NATO has not fulfilled its role as well as many people had expected. It may well be an alliance that is incapable of changing direction very quickly. By contrast, the relatively loose alliance network in the Asia-Pacific region may turn out to be quite flexible.

The Asia-Pacific’s hub-and-spoke alliance network has the United States positioned at the hub, a type of configuration that gives the United States much freedom of action. An empire with the United States as the hub could be the image of a future global order.

However, the United States does not necessarily think of itself as an empire. To cite one political observer: “In the Third World, Washington D.C. shows interest only in those regions with resource or investment appeal, or failing that, in regions with peripheral countries that are caught up in important strategic conflicts.” This comment is quite close to the mark. The

United States emphasizes its own national interests, and is not aiming to dominate the entire world per se, nor does its thinking run along such lines. If the above comment is accurate, particularly the last part of it, then the United States is assuming the existence of a strategic rival. If so, who could the US's strategic rival be?

In a boldly optimistic view, if the US hub has the vision to take care of the entire "empire," a strategic rival capable of challenging the United States will not appear, at least for the foreseeable future. The current issues will be solved by having the United States sitting at the hub of a coalition of the willing. A number of countries having the requisite will and capability would then share their interests, concerns, and capabilities with the United States. However, such a situation can only arise if these countries, and the United States, can avoid letting their own national interests take top priority when formulating interests and concerns. If these countries can restrain their national interests and move in a direction more consistent with the interests of the whole, they will become able to share responsibility for global order. The result would be more of a policing role than of a military role in the classical sense.

In other words, the situation depends on whether events are seen to have catalyzed a shift from an "international order" based on the sovereign state to a "global order" of a different character. If the global order is viewed as an empire, however, it could lead to confusion because of the image of imperialism this evokes. With the United States at the center of such an empire, however, the crux is whether countries that are prepared to share interests, concerns, and capabilities with the US are willing to move toward a position of support for this imperial order, i.e., "a global order." To contrast the two systems of organization, a global order is more characterized by an imperial sovereignty, while an international order is a coalition of the willing involving sovereign states. Although the present state of affairs remains somewhere in the middle of the continuum between the two types of order, the situation appears to be moving in the direction of a global order.

In conclusion, the foci of this argument will be as follows: First, can the current changing, unpredictable situation really be dismissed as merely "new war?" Will a strategic opponent for the US ever arise in the future? Moreover, a number of countries continue to cling to the idea of a multi-polar international order. If a scenario favoring a multi-polar international order arises, what should Japan do?

Second, with many people in the United States itself detesting the idea of empire, how far will the US go in thinking of itself as the pseudo-ruler of an empire, and act as a pseudo-emperor? Short of actually attaining "imperial sovereignty," one must wonder how far the United States can or will go in acting as if it were an empire.

Third, with an American "empire" already to some extent in de facto existence, objections are already appearing in the form of eruptions of anti-American sentiment in various places of the world. This trend could potentially have a major impact. The question is how best to measure its intensity.

## **B. Discussion**

### **1. Change in the United States**

The current trend in the United States, accelerated by the events of September 11, 2001 and with a strongly Neo-Con tone, is indicative of a long-term change. The United States is not a superpower interested only in maintaining the status quo. Rather, it actively projects its own power to change the world. The idea of conducting a long-running “new war” is gaining steam. As such, gathering as many members for the coalition of the willing as possible is important. Candidacy for the coalition of the willing is not so much a matter of a country’s advanced military power as it is of its capacity to provide a fair number of soldiers.

### **2. The Iraq War**

#### **(1) US Failure in Iraq**

The final conclusion is that the Neo-Cons rushed into this war too quickly, ending in a huge failure. The game plan for many Neo-Cons was to treat Iraq as a springboard toward resolution of the Palestinian issue. The Palestinian issue, however, remains as perplexing as ever.

On the feasibility of the UN resolving the situation, the permanent membership of the UN Security Council does not include any Islamic countries, an encumbrance when it comes to their acceptance of UN legitimacy. Caution is required.

#### **(2) Iraq and the Occupation Experience of Japan**

Looking back on the experience of Japan, resistance in the final days before the end of World War II went as far as the creation of special attack and shock troop units. However, all were disbanded as soon as the imperial order to decommission the troops appeared. After the surrender, the occupation lasted for six years before a peace treaty was signed. In Japan’s case, the country came to be completely dependent on the United States in the ensuing half-century following the war, with the goals of the occupation being achieved. In a country like Iraq, with its stark racial and religious divisions, however, five or ten years will probably not be sufficient even to bring the country under control.

### **3. The UN, the Alliance and the Coalition of the Willing**

#### **(1) The Basic Difference Between “International Order” and “Global Order”**

First, if the term “global” entails some sort of normative standard, it would imply that the state is fettered and sovereignty restricted. “Imperial sovereignty,” therefore, came to be considered a more appropriate term. The problem is not so much that of imperial sovereignty as such, but how to structure the alliance. Since an alliance structure in effect restricts freedom of US action, the coalition of the willing is used instead.

Second, a long-term view of US history reveals that Americans have usually viewed themselves as either exceptional, or as universal. The present US is committed to the entire

world. Whether the American people like it or not, the US has no other option than universalism: Few isolationist options exist.

(2) The UN, the Alliance, and the Coalition of the Willing

The UN has been unable to respond adequately to today's new international conditions. The reform of the organization has become an issue. It is all too easy to become romantically enamored of the UN. Since many issues appeared that cannot be handled well under the correct international law, everyone agrees that something needs to be done with the UN. It is insufficient, however, merely to debate whether reform of the UN is possible or not. UN reform is a must. The order that has existed since the end of World War II needs to be changed, and a sustained effort to achieve this will be required. While the coalition of the willing is made up of those people who agree with the thrust of President George W. Bush's policies, elements of vulnerability remain in that it is not so much an association of states as it is an association of current heads of government.

## **II. The Japan-US Alliance and National Interests (December 11, 2003)**

### **A. Presentation (The Japan-US Alliance)**

There has been a debate in Japan regarding the Iraq War, over whether to give higher priority to the UN, or to the Japan-US alliance. A mistaken assumption behind this debate, however, is that the UN embodies international cooperation, while pursuit of the Japan-US alliance would leave Japan subordinate to the United States. In fact, both the Japan-US alliance and the UN are tools for securing Japan's national interests. Each should be utilized depending on the need.

Considering the Iraq issue from the point of view of national interest, at least four issues are at play: security, humanitarian assistance, recovery, and reconstruction. Early stabilization of the Iraqi situation is of strategic importance to Japan. The stability of the Gulf Region is important for Japan due to its heavy reliance on this area for oil supplies. Furthermore, cooperation in Iraq's reconstruction, in terms of both funding and personnel, is Japan's international responsibility.

Regarding support for the United States, Japan, as a US ally, should be providing as much assistance as possible. Japan has its own problems in dealing with the issue of North Korea. It would be unwise for Japan and the US to be at odds with North Korea watching them. Japan's policy on Iraq must perforce also take into consideration the existence of North Korea. During the run-up to the Iraq War, massive demonstrations occurred in Europe; demonstrations in Japan were nowhere near the scale of those in Europe. This difference was probably due to the recognition among Japanese people of the need for cooperation with the United States in dealing with the North Korea issue.

Japan's national interest on the North Korean issue starts with the need to resolve the abduction problem as a part of the process of normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. Economic assistance cannot be proffered until diplomatic relations are normalized. It is in Japan's interests to ameliorate the unnatural state of affairs that existed in the years up through World War II, to deepen cultural exchanges, and to broaden North Korea's awareness of the outside world. This is the vector to pursue after diplomatic relations are normalized.

Second, while shutting down the nuclear program is an obvious goal, biological and chemical weapons, and the missile export issue, also need to be considered. All these problems are separate from the issue of diplomatic normalization.

Third, the Rodong missile is a weapon that can reach Japan but not the United States. This brings up the possibility of the same sort of problem that once threatened a split between the United States and Europe over the SS-20 missile.

Fourth, a prerequisite for resolution of the North Korea issue is the Japan-US alliance. One point that should be kept in mind is how Japan's response to the North Korea issue will affect the overall Japan-US alliance. Even should there be success at both shutting down the nuclear program and normalizing relations, that will not mark the end of the road for Japan.

Fifth, it would be desirable for the vector going forward to include a cooperative framework for the future stability of Northeast Asia. The Six-Party Talks need to propose just such a framework and employ a specific vision for engaging the issue.

Sixth, when considering the North Korean issue, it is necessary to realize that public opinion in Japan and South Korea is moving in different directions. Public opinion in South Korea has in recent years shifted to the left and become more anti-American, with its people no longer sensing much of a threat from North Korea. Japan, on the other hand, has become more conservative and has strengthened its cooperation with the United States.

Seventh, progress in the Japan-China relationship toward diplomatic cooperation in security policies designed to shut down North Korea's nuclear program is important. This cooperation will surely strengthen the relationship between Japan and China.

Eighth, the Japan-Russia relationship is moving in a similar direction, albeit not as strongly.

Ninth, even farther afield, the issue of the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or Europe that already have diplomatic relations with North Korea also needs to be brought into the picture. Japan needs to make efforts to clearly explain to these countries the significance of the abduction issue.

Tenth and finally, the idea of bringing the North Korean issue to the UN Security Council should be approached with caution. Discussion at this venue can only serve to enhance the influence of the Security Council's permanent members, which include Russia and China. With China already a participant in the Six-Party Talks, it may not be a good idea for Japan to let China enhance its influence still more via the Security Council. As long as Japan and South Korea remain outside of the Security Council, it is probably not in Japan's national interest with regard to North Korea to lay the issue before the Security Council just because the UN is an important institution.

Any thinking about the North Korean issue should proceed with all ten of these points in mind, at the very least. Priorities need to be set by political decisions.

In the area of reform at the UN, cooperation with the United States is important. Japan and the United States together account for 40% of the UN budget. The two countries have been working together as key partners to encourage the streamlining and rationalization of UN expenses. When these two countries stand together, therefore, they can exert a powerful influence.

Political issues include those of disarmament and of the Middle East. Japan's stance on the Middle East follows the US position too closely, which has dissatisfied Arabs and Islamists. Further deliberation on this issue is required. Disarmament is being discussed in Geneva, and nuclear disarmament as it relates to the Japan-US alliance is an issue that needs constant attention.

On the issue of reforming the Security Council, the United States supports Japan's bid for permanent membership on the Security Council, a position clearly held by both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. The Republican Party, as the party in power, particularly appears to view Japan's joining the Security Council as desirable, since it would open the way for Japan to play a stronger role in maintaining international security.

Japan and the United States have cooperated very closely at the UN for reform of the Security Council. After ten years of discussion, the issues have boiled down to just three: (1) How many members should the Security Council have? (It currently has 15.); (2) Which countries should be chosen to become new permanent members of the Security Council?; and (3) What should become of the veto power? Regarding the first point, the United States has asserted that membership should never exceed 21 countries, a number that has caused much dissatisfaction, especially among developing nations, for being too small. On this issue, Japan single-handedly undertook to persuade the United States to reconsider, which the US government announced it would do in April 2000. This incident clearly shows just how closely Japan and the United States are cooperating at the UN. The United States, however, has shown no inclination to exercise leadership in pushing for UN reform, instead opting to follow Japan's lead. Everyone at the UN is watching to see what the United States will do. This is so for Security Council reform as well. Japan understands this situation, but also realizes the importance of actively persuading and working with the United States. While all this takes time, abandoning reforms now would mean de facto acceptance of the current situation, where the victors of World War II dominate the Security Council.

### **B. Presentation (National Interest)**

Two perspectives exist on the definition of national interest. One is objective national interest, in other words, "national interest in terms of power," as defined by Hans Morgenthau. Another is what is believed to be the national interest. When Morgenthau wrote of national interest, he did not mean the moralistic, ideological diplomacy of the United States of which he was so critical, but rather the act of basing diplomacy on pure interest, or *raison d'état*. The view critical of Morgenthau states that national interest in effect becomes whatever the decision-maker believes it to be, or that national interest is a rhetorical tool used by a ruler to justify himself whenever he wishes to depart from the rules. Today, national interest comprises a set of principles used to guide decision-making. The problem with this latter view is choosing who gets to determine the national interest, that is, dealing with the gap that emerges between a government's decisions and public opinion.

Alliance basically consists of state-to-state cooperation and mutual protection designed to ensure security interests, that is, vital interests. An alliance is a system of promises to take joint action, and it always features at its core the problem of the "alliance dilemma." For instance, in the case of Iraq, if Japan supports the United States, this means that Japan must fear being pulled into the conflict. But if Japan does not support the United States, it cannot expect to receive the assistance it needs from the United States with the North Korea crisis. How well a proper balance can be struck between these concerns becomes the key issue for an alliance.

Common political science discussions on alliances can be summarized as follows:

- Balance of power: Strictly speaking, this term can be divided into "balance of power" and "balance of threat." Its purpose is to oppose a dominant power or threat, and was observed in both Anglo and US diplomatic patterns.

- **Bandwagoning:** This term means joining up with a great power, going along with or backing the winning horse. States may follow the strong for two reasons: out of a desire to take advantage of great force, or out of fear. Typical of the latter case is the small states of Europe that allied themselves with Hitler in the 1930s.
- **Controlling:** The great power or victorious nation controls smaller allied countries. Another term used for this is “cap in the bottle.”
- **Hiding:** A situation in which states hide in the shadow of a great power. This is a common alliance pattern for small countries.
- **Give & take:** A transaction in terms of strategic values between a number of allied countries to safeguard one another’s national interests. This form of alliance can be treated as a balance of expectations and interests.
- **Co-binding:** When a system is created, a treaty binds the participants together. When a great power binds a smaller state to itself, the smaller state also uses entry into the system to bind the great power.

Some other terms below could also be added.

Alliances appear at first glance to be a standoff between countries within an alliance and countries outside of it. In fact, while appearances may be otherwise, much power adjustment can occur within alliances, particularly in Europe, according to Paul Schroeder, the foreign policy historian. This is the situation in NATO today.

- **Reassurance:** The very existence of an alliance gives reassurance to heads of government and to neighboring countries. The Japan-US alliance helps to reassure both South Korea and China of stability, not to mention Japan itself.
- **Cortitium:** Coalition in the interest of those in power: This pattern has been used by those in power within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), who use the military power of other countries in their own interest whenever a civil war breaks out in one of their countries.

Important factors that shape alliances may include: (1) deterrence before joint defense; (2) crisis management before major war; and (3) emergence of vertical coalitions, or “vertical integration” of group companies. When the balance of power and interests fails, risk issues appear. One major theme is the allocation of burdens. In the late 1980s, Samuel Huntington criticized Japan for not taking on foreign policy commitments proportionate to its power. His criticism was that Japan was not acting in proportion to its national power when fulfilling international public responsibilities, a negative for the alliance. On the other hand, a positive view of an alliance could be to consider it an asset that can be invested. The question is how to invest the alliance after the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, economists contributed to the argument by introducing concepts such as “network externalities,” or the bandwagon effect, which states that value is boosted by increasing participation. For example, the value of fax machines increases according to the number of people who send faxes. Alliances have a similar effect.

Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command, has used the “Security Community” as a phrase in discussions over the past four or five years. It means a group of allied nations that share an identity involving certain commonly held strategic values,

implying a move beyond alliance to a sense of community. This same argument was used in NATO in the late 1950s.

An even more advanced type of alliance is known as the “Global Commons.” Before, the collective good for states in an alliance almost always signified the collective detriment of members outside it. This point of view fell out of fashion following the end of the Cold War, when the commons argument for NATO and the Japan-US alliance promoted their use as commons for ensuring international security.

Finally, alliance can be treated as a contract with the international community. For instance, when Japan enters into an alliance with another country, this alliance takes on the significance of a contract with the international community, not just a contract between Japan and its ally.

Japan’s first alliance with another country was the Japan-UK alliance, now already more than a century ago. Japan’s mode of alliance has been strongly characterized by the concept of its relationship-building vis-à-vis the international community. For example, Japan clearly positioned its link with the United Kingdom as constituting a connection to the world as a whole. With its strong sense of being an inferior latecomer to European international relations, it had a strong tendency to want to ride a winning horse. For this reason, Japan moreover felt a special affinity with the great powers of the West, which explains, for example, why Japan was so deeply shocked when the Japan-UK alliance broke up.

For Japan, then, alliance has usually meant bandwagoning, adherence to a strong partner. Of course, Japan’s alliances are not limited only to this type; some feature balance of power or other rationales. Nevertheless, for researchers of alliances viewing the situation from outside of Japan, this form seems to be the most striking feature of Japan.

The joint-defense type of alliance is more difficult to analyze. Whether the Japan-UK, Japan-Germany-Italy, or the Japan-US alliances, Japan has always stood respectfully to the rear of its alliance partners, and has had difficulty coming to the fore to take joint action. As a result, Japan has never really had to assume a leadership position, a situation that has only changed in the past ten years or so.

In terms of the “give & take,” it is clear that Japan does not undertake the same tasks with its alliance partners, but instead tends to opt for a division of labor and roles among allies. The alliance dilemma has therefore been particularly strong for Japan, which has always been acutely aware of the possibility of being discarded by its great power partners, in particular the UK and US. While such concerns are less likely to appear in multilateral alliances, Japan tends to experience a greater sense of this type of dilemma since it tends to have bilateral alliances with great powers. This is the character of Japan’s alliances.

Since the 1978 guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation were drawn up, the focus has shifted from response to an emergency to joint defense, although preparations for emergent situations have not been entirely dropped. The precise definition of the term “joint crisis management” is uncertain: it leaves a good deal of room for interpretation, and its meaning has changed over the years.

Asymmetric war refers to the kind of war typified by the “war on terrorism” after 9-11. Since alliances have been premised on the notion of conflict between states, it is not yet clear whether they can be of use in other kinds of conflicts. When it comes to asymmetric war and

terrorism, the issue of whether alliances merely pour fuel on the fire, or whether they can respond properly at all, must be discussed and explored through a process of trial and error.

On the subject of the “Security Community,” Japan will in principle be involved in a bilateral arrangement that can also operate in practice with other likeminded states as a multilateral group, for instance, by adding South Korea and Australia. While not an official relationship, such an arrangement is desirable and will likely become a necessity.

The basic mode for the Japan-US alliance has traditionally been of the “military/non-cohesive” type, but this is an arrangement that will become more complex and multifaceted as economic and political aspects are incorporated and then integrated. In such a context, the role of an alliance changes. Post–Cold War alliances, including the current Japan-US alliance, will function as new “security institutions.” That is to say, they will be responsible not only for prosecution of wars, but also for peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism measures.

As for Iraq, the point of argument is whether it lies within the framework of the Japan-US alliance, or falls slightly outside of it. Although the decision to send troops to Iraq was taken on the assumption that Japan should share the pain as a member of the Japan-US alliance, two separate frameworks for action will be required: one constituted by the Japan-US alliance, and another that consists of Japan’s national interest in the broad sense of the term, which may include interests of the international community that are not strictly Japan’s own.

## **C. Discussion**

### **1. Relationship of the Japan-US Alliance to the UN and the G7/G8**

#### **(1) Relationship Between the Japan-US Alliance and the UN**

The Japan-US alliance and the UN should not be held up in contrast. The Japan-US Security Treaty was instituted to operate until the UN’s own security system could come into effective operation. During the Cold War era, the United States and Japan concentrated on the alliance. After the end of the Cold War, however, the Japan-US Security Treaty and the UN are now perceived as related. Some issues cannot be dealt with effectively at the UN; other issues may require too noble a cause for the Japan-US Security Alliance to base their actions on. Considering how these two institutions relate to each other is therefore extremely important.

#### **(2) G7/G8**

The G7/G8 cannot be a substitute for the UN. The UN operates within the framework of a basic treaty, the Charter of the United Nations. The UN has the authority to mandate the use of armed force, when justified. No matter what the G7/G8 decides, it cannot authorize the use of armed force. In practice, moreover, the G7/G8 members include Germany, France, and Italy, all of which are in the EU, as well as Russia. This gives Europe a powerful voice, which makes it easy for the forum to develop a bipolar nuance, with Japan and the United States on one side, and Europe on the other.

## **2. The Iraq War, and Japan's National Interest**

### **(1) Basic Stance of the Japanese Mass Media on the Iraq War**

During the Iraq War, Japan's mass media provided animated reports whenever the US military suffered a setback, but then sank into despondent silence when Baghdad fell. Their attitude, in other words, was not so much pro-peace as it was anti-American. Moreover, even though peace in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan are inextricably related, the mass media analysis has treated them as if they were completely separate issues.

This applause whenever the United States falls into difficulties is a hint that the national interests of the United States and Japan may not necessarily coincide. Many Japanese believe that the Iraq War is the United States' problem. Their logic runs like this: if the United States is involved because of its own national interest where Japan's national interest is not at stake, then it is certainly acceptable to rejoice whenever the United States runs into trouble. However, even assuming that the two states' interests do not coincide at every point, they may overlap in important areas. It should then be no joy for Japan when the United States encounters setbacks.

### **(2) The Japan-US Alliance, and Japan's National Interest**

The issue here is whether acting together with the United States brings more positives or more negatives for Japan. Excessive reliance on the United States is certainly a problem. This consensus extends despite the differences in political positions. While the Japan-US alliance may be necessary, this is an unhappy situation. At fault is Japan's failure to articulate what its national interest is, a shortcoming for which the Japanese government bears much responsibility. Neither the Defense Agency White Paper nor the Diplomatic Blue Book by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to define Japan's national interest. Even at the political level, there is no debate on the issue. The United States has a clear understanding of the definition of its national interest, what the threats are, which steps to be taken to respond to those threats, what the costs are of taking those steps, and how the people will be asked to bear those costs. Since the Japan-US alliance is a tool Japan uses to pursue its national interest, there must be debate on how that tool should be used, whether it is useful, and how great a cost should be expended to maintain it. Without such a debate, there can be no answer to the question of the Japan-US alliance and Japan's national interest.

### **III. Trends in US Forward Deployment (January 29, 2004)**

#### **A. Presentation (US Forward Deployment)**

US military strategy on forward deployment has changed significantly. The Quadrennial Defense Review used the term “arc of instability” to describe the region of instability spreading from the Middle East to Northeast Asia. Recent US strategy, particularly as it relates to forward deployment, has designated as very unstable the region extending from South America across Africa to as far as Southeast Asia. These are the places where the United States fears that weapons of mass destruction may come into the hands of terrorists, and where failed states exist with the potential to become hotbeds for terrorism. US interest is focused on how to deal with such regions, an effort which has become a major element in military strategy.

The US Army’s “Objective Force Warrior” web page asserts that the US Army infantryman will have quite a different appearance in future wars. In “Network Centric Warfare,” each soldier is envisioned as linking to a central computer that will assist individual battlefield operations. The transformation of the US soldier now in progress will most assuredly also have an effect on US force postures overseas and on forward deployment.

On November 25, 2003, US President George W. Bush stated:

Since the end of the Cold War, the once-familiar threats facing our Nation, our friends, and our allies have given way to the less predictable dangers associated with rogue states, global terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. We have been actively transforming our defenses to address these changes. While we continue to make progress in the transformation of our uniformed military, it remains for us to realign the global posture of our forces to better address these new challenges. Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture.

Moreover, in a speech given on December 3, 2003 at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who has a major role in the US military realignment, said, “This is the most basic and comprehensive review of the global defense posture since the United States became a global superpower.”

First of all, in the background to the realignment of the US military abroad is an international environment that has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has been particularly concerned about any link between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as described in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. While during the Cold War the enemy was easy to discern, it has been more

difficult, since the end of the Cold War, to see clearly from what quarter danger might come. This uncertainty is a characteristic feature of the new era. Regions needing particular attention include the area stretching from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, or from the Sea of Japan to Southeast Asia, as well as around the Bay of Bengal, with a certain attention required for China, as well. Furthermore, in this uncertain world, there is a need to move away from a threat-based force structure toward development of a military force that is capable of responding to any kind of threat.

Second, advances in technology, and particularly IT technology, have made possible a US force transformation, enabling it to enter the era of “Network Centric Warfare,” in which computer networks are used to conduct joint operations of various types of forces under a unified command. As a result, joint operations including long-range air strikes using precision-guided systems will now become possible. This will also enhance the importance of the special units envisioned above, as they demonstrate their improved abilities. In addition, use of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft and other unmanned technologies that reduce risks to military personnel can be expected to rise sharply. Utilization of these technologies will also enhance the importance of outer space. “Network Centric Warfare” directly attacks the enemy’s core position, helping to bring a war to a successful conclusion without causing inordinate amounts of destruction.

With this US force transformation in progress, the US Department of Defense provided a five-point rationale for the impending realignment of US forces overseas on November 25, 2003 as follows: (1) to ensure the flexibility needed to respond to uncertainty; (2) to expand the role of allied states and build new partnerships; (3) to treat threats from a worldwide perspective as well as a regional one; (4) to build the capability for rapid deployment, and for rapid projection of military force into remote locations; and (5) to place more importance on capabilities than force numbers, which had previously been the measure of the US presence or commitment. More detail on each of these is provided below.

First, the transformation will ensure the flexibility needed to respond to uncertainty. US forces abroad during the Cold War took a defensive posture, with US forces positioned so that they would see first contact should an enemy launch an attack, to ensure that the US military became enmeshed in the war. While their actual function was to serve as a deterrent so that no war would occur, this is no longer the case. US forces abroad now need to prepare the environment so that they can move rapidly to distant locations, rather than responding to crises in their area of deployment.

Second, the aim is to expand the role of allied states and build new partnerships. After the transformation, it is argued that US forces will be capable of launching serious attacks directly from the US homeland, which will reduce the importance of US forces overseas. For the

United States, however, resistance to threats requires the cooperation of allies and friendly countries, and alliance relationships or partnerships with other countries will continue to have critical value. Issues for consultation include the stationing of US forces, capabilities in local areas required by US forces, modernization of an allied state's military forces, and so on. These consultations will not be limited to narrow issues revolving around bases, but will also include discussions on the future role of US forces, cooperation with allied states and others, and preparations for joint military postures.

Third, threats will be treated from a broader perspective. In the past, US forces were positioned as deterrence in response to regional issues. Now, however, the response to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction must take a worldwide perspective. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), for example, operates through cooperation between signatory nations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Fourth, the US will work to increase its capability for the rapid deployment of military forces. A system for rapid deployment has become critical as transformation of forces proceeds. Support infrastructure has become important both on a regional and global scale. The US military presence will, in the future, be implemented on a rotation basis. In other words, the US military presence will increasingly take the form of deployment to a country for three to six months to assist in training for that country, followed by a pull-out, and later a return after several months or a half year. Furthermore, there will be more regions with pre-positioned strategic materials, to allow rapid deployment of military forces as needed from the US homeland or other overseas bases.

Fifth, the era in which force numbers were the measure of US commitment is over. The military force numbers after the Cold War have been about 100,000 for Europe and 100,000 for East Asia. Attention to the number, however, is no longer important. In East Asia in particular, while there is no specific figure like 100,000, it is certain to drop. Rather than numbers, what is important is the capability required. Capability can be maintained even with reduced force numbers, and may actually increase in some ways. In other words, consider what capability is needed first, and the force numbers required can then be determined.

Where the hub-and-spoke terminology has previously been used to describe a network of allied states with the United States at the center, this term is now beginning to be used for describing the network of overseas bases. The hubs are to be located in the US homeland, the United Kingdom, and Japan, with the spokes being the array of forward operations bases extending out from them. These forward operations bases will form a ring-shaped network of bases where supplies and equipment are pre-positioned. While bases will be secured in countries adjacent to the regions of highest risk, this does not mean that US military forces will be continually stationed there. Instead, the bases will be in a posture of readiness so that they

can be used when needed. What is important here is that the number of US military bases is to be cut back as much as possible to reduce friction with local communities to a minimum. In Europe, this realignment is proceeding at a rapid pace, while in Asia it is moving ahead in stages.

In a region-by-region look at trends in realignment of overseas deployment, Germany can be expected to retain its base capabilities, but will see a reduction of force numbers. While the focus of risk has shifted from the adjoining countries of Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean, there are no signs at present that force numbers will be increased there. Rotation will be the most likely force posture, with troops stationed on a temporary basis.

In the Middle East, the United States has already withdrawn from Saudi Arabia. While the Prince Sultan Air Base has played a critical role for command and communications systems, the US explains that the footprint is being reduced to ensure that good relations can be maintained with Saudi Arabia.

In Africa, a number of untoward events were observed in the autumn of last year (2003), which probably means that more emphasis will now be placed on Africa. While US forces have advanced into Central Asia as part of the war on terrorism, how events there proceed in the future will be closely watched.

In East Asia, the security environment differs in nature from regions where the war on terrorism is the main focus. In addition to the anti-terrorism elements, the region also harbors legacies from the Cold War and concerns about China. In South Korea, the United States is moving toward a realignment that will increase flexibility in US force operations, in the form of a lightly equipped, rapid, mobile land force. This includes introduction of the most visible representation of that realignment, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. The reason that South Korea is in the spotlight is the movement that has at last been achieved on a long-pending issue, unlike Japan, where adjustments are usually made as a result of long-standing discussions on US forces stationed in the country. This has been an outstanding issue for a long time in South Korea; it did not suddenly arise.

In Japan, the major bases will remain in place. All that will be reduced are a few Marine units in Okinawa. The realignment, therefore, will not result in major changes in Japan.

One point that must be considered here is that the current US thinking regarding US presence is that the bases will function as springboards. This means that the bases are intended mostly to provide launching pads for dispatching forces to distant regions, rather than to defend a local region. As a result, relationships with the countries hosting the bases will need to be reconsidered.

As for the effect on Japan, the issue revolves around the effect on joint operations for Japan's defense. Where Japan places its hopes in United States strike capacity, the US plans to use

small forces to deliver powerful blows against the launching point of an invasion force threatening Japan, or against the deployed units, which means that the enemy's available force for invading Japan may well be smaller. Some analysts say that this will lead to a situation in which the Self-Defense Forces can respond to the threat on their own, while others say that it will not.

US forces will also be active in regions around Japan, particularly in relation to logistics, raising issues about how the force transformation and forward deployment will change, and how Japan will respond to these changes. Here, the two countries will probably need to share logistics information.

In addition, the Self-Defense Forces have been deployed to Iraq. Due to Japan's Constitution and other factors, their role is limited to reconstruction and does not involve security maintenance or peacekeeping. Should it become necessary to assume such roles in the future, however, issues that will need to be addressed include the SDF relationship with US forces, interoperability, and the ability to cooperate.

## **B. Presentation (Realignment of US Military Posture)**

One point that must not be forgotten regarding the realignment of the US military posture is that the US homeland is included in the US's comprehensive strategic global defense review. The debate over which course to take has become a major issue throughout the United States.

The link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is, basically, no longer a regional problem. It has developed a global reach such that no one can now predict where an attack may originate. As a result, the United States wants flexibility in all of its weapons systems.

Another point that one would be remiss not to recall is that the trend of reform indicates that the US concept of a global defense strategy is, at root, focused on "from how far away can we protect the US homeland?" This is where the current review differs from previous ones.

How do recent global troop postures compare with the numbers during the Cold War era? In 1987, the United States had 350,000 troops in Europe. This number shrank to 210,000 after the Cold War ended, and has declined still further to 100,000 at present. In the Asia-Pacific region, the numbers dropped from 130,000 troops to 100,000, and were supposed to decline still further, before various problems on the Korean Peninsula resulted in the drawdown being put on hold. The present number still remains at 100,000. Meanwhile, the total force strength of the US military has dropped sharply since a bottom-up review was performed, and now stands at about 1.4 million troops. Recall that 150,000 of these are currently deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, a situation that appears likely to continue for the long term. This is a new element

in the equation, and this severe alteration in the adjustment of land force levels will have an effect on various force postures.

While force levels in Europe have declined from the 300,000-plus numbers of the Cold War, some permanent installations for defense against the Soviet Union remain in place. The issue of what to do with them remains to be decided. On the Korean Peninsula, the threat from North Korea continues to exist, although that threat is fixed and lacks fluidity. Moreover, South Korea is growing stronger, with the South Korean government in consultations with the United States about plans for a major boost in force strength. This is another major element in the equation, with the oft-repeated “arc of instability” still another.

Finally, various discussions are in progress about how adjustments with Japan should proceed. While major changes are not envisioned, a number of elements still need to be considered. First, the US force transformation will surely have an effect on Japan. Second is the issue of how the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq will be applied to US operational planning for the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. If the current methods for waging war change, the character of the US bases in Japan can also be expected to change. Third, bases in Japan are currently in the process of being scaled back, with plans drawn up for each base. The issue is how to evaluate the progress of these plans. Fourth, if the force deployment to Iraq becomes long-term, it will need to be determined whether this will affect US forces in Japan. Fifth, the United States may be watching to see whether Japan can be relied upon to play its role. The current session of Japan’s Diet is taking up security cooperation legislation, with discussions related to rules regarding airports and seaports, the cooperative relationship with the United States, and expansion of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The focus here is on what impact these measures will have when it comes to utilization of the capabilities of US allies.

### **C. Presentation (US Military Realignment and the Media)**

This is a short description of media reports about some of the major recent moves in the US military’s forward deployment realignment.

One news item that attracted much attention regarding US forces realignment in the Asia-Pacific was a report by *The Los Angeles Times* in late May 2003 that stated, “The Department of Defense is considering transferring the Marine units stationed in Okinawa to Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, and elsewhere. This is quite a large-scale transfer, and all except about 5,000 troops will depart Okinawa.” The report was denied by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was at that time attending the 2003 Shangri-La Dialogue (a meeting of defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region sponsored by the International Institute

for Strategic Studies (IISS)). At any rate, it shows that there are many different opinions. No conclusions have been reached at this point.

This report was followed by one in *The Washington Post* to the effect that “Andrew Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, had developed ideas for how to allocate and consolidate US military bases abroad.” This report presented the idea that bases should be divided into three types — permanent military hub, forward deployment base, and forward operations base. At that time, an announcement of a partial withdrawal of US forces in South Korea was made. The *Post* and others reported this as marking the raising of the curtain on a more general force realignment, coupled with a withdrawal from Saudi Arabia.

Near the end of June, Peter Rodman, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives that realignment in the Asia-Pacific, including Japan, would be small in scale, and that the United States had no intention of leaving Okinawa.

In October, the *JoongAng Ilbo* ran an article questioning how realignment of US forces in South Korea would proceed, stating that “US forces have informed the South Korean government of their intention to expand the area of operations for US forces in South Korea from the Korean Peninsula alone to the entire Far East, to realign as a regional force capable of flexible responses to regional conflicts.” According to this report, the area of operations for the newly realigned regional US force stationed in South Korea was to extend to the north as far as Hokkaido in Japan, as far west as Taiwan, and as far east as Guam. It was reported that this inclusion of Japan in the operations range for US forces stationed in South Korea would require some adjustments to the Japan-defense duties of US forces stationed in Japan, with realignment into a regional force. The US military has not acknowledged this report.

When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Japan in late 2003, he held talks with Shigeru Ishiba, the then Director General of the Defense Agency. Realignment was then one issue of particular interest. At that time, Rumsfeld, in conversation with the accompanying press corps said that “preparatory work on realignment is generally complete,” and that “we have now reached the stage of consultation with our allies.” Regarding the content of this preparatory work, Rumsfeld said at a press conference in Japan that “we have shown a number of concepts and ideas” to the government of Japan. He did not offer any explanation of what these concepts and ideas might be, however. After the various moves, these statements from the Bush Administration marked the first time that the US government had mentioned its determination to commence serious consultations with Congress and with allied nations.

No conclusions regarding Japan have been reached, according to remarks made by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a press conference in January 2004.

He also said that the US's basic stance has not changed and that it is based on two premises. First, the United States is a Pacific country, and second, the security relationship with Japan is the most important relationship in the region for the US military. These two points will remain unchanged no matter how the realignment progresses, Myers said.

The effect this may have on Japan was addressed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, who said in Congress that any reforms would be small in scale, while other US government officials have repeatedly denied that there will be any major changes. This thinking was reflected in *The Washington Post*, which reported the statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Hoehn that "There are no plans to move all of the Marine units. However, we are considering revising the structure of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force."

When these concepts and ideas are actually proposed and consultations begin, some very basic aspects of Japan's own national security strategy will need to be aligned to the US position. It is doubtful, however, whether strategic consultations related to military posture can actually be held between Japan and the United States. Take an example from the past. Although the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security included a statement that force structure consultations would be implemented, it is not clear what form these consultations took, and what results were obtained as far as the media was able to ascertain. In fact, the US side has stated off the record that "Japan does not engage in warfare, so there is really no point in involving such a country in war planning." As long as this situation does not change in Japan, it is doubtful whether real force structure consultations can be implemented, or even whether a strategic dialogue is possible. If troop cutbacks are made, another issue that will arise is who should bear the movement expenses.

Another somewhat substantial issue is how the character of the alliance will evolve. This issue revolves, first, around how the United States intends to utilize and position Japan. However, if the extent of Japan's operations planning becomes worldwide in scale, conflict with the Japan-US Security Treaty's Article 6, which limits the range of operations to the Far East, will become unavoidable.

Still another issue is the double-layered nature of the alliance. Washington states that "there is no more important ally than Japan," but a visit to Tampa, Florida, reveals that US information-sharing is based on the contributions actually being made to the war on terrorism, with the recipient treated as a coalition partner. In Tampa, the Japan-US alliance is but one out of 50 alliances. This contrast between Washington's "no more important ally than Japan" and Tampa's "alliance of one out of 50" shows a clash between the US trend toward an ad hoc coalition of the willing to fight the war, and the desire to maintain alliances that have continued since the Cold War. Some kind of adjustment is needed between the two.

As the structure of the alliance changes, the Self-Defense Forces themselves must also change. The Japanese government has already embarked on a review of Japan's defense capabilities, in a Security Council and Cabinet Decision in December 2003 (the Cabinet Decision in favor of the development of missile defense). The new characteristics of the Self-Defense Forces include improved adaptability, mobility, flexibility, and versatility. With US forces stationed in Japan also intending to emphasize versatility, it has become the key word. The Self Defense Force will be asked how it intends to acquire versatility to help promote Japan-US cooperation.

As described above, the United States has listed five key points in changing its global strategy, the second of which calls for expansion of the role of allied states. The issue here is what form this expansion will take in Japan.

Moreover, expectations for a corresponding cut in the burden borne by local communities will increase as realignment progresses as has been the case in Okinawa in particular. How can we respond to these expectations? While we cannot say whether realignment will actually lead to a large-scale reduction in the military footprint, expectations will probably run ahead of the facts on the ground. The issue here is how these expectations should be managed.

Another issue is the timing of realignment in relation to the situation in North Korea. While the United States has repeatedly asserted that realignment will not lead to any change in battlefield capabilities, it is natural to worry that US forces stationed in South Korea will have less of a presence along the Demilitarized Zone, or that reductions in US forces in Japan could send the wrong message to North Korea. Getting the timing right in terms of realignment vis-à-vis the situation in North Korea will be a very difficult problem.

## **D. Discussion**

### **1. US Thinking on Overseas Bases**

#### **(1) Japan to Become a Hub**

The United States considers Japan to be a hub for Asia. When President George W. Bush visited Asian countries on the occasion of an APEC Leaders Meeting, he lauded the cooperative relationship with the Philippines and Thailand, stating that the US relationship with them was on a level with European allies. Although he did not ask that US forces be allowed to be stationed there, he did ask for access. Singapore has created a framework for expanding cooperation with the United States. This framework will not involve the stationing of troops, but will instead involve a rear support role.

In *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach* in Fall, 2003 by Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, the US military mission is described in terms of: (1) the war on terror; (2) how war will look in 10 years; and (3) how war will look in the future. For future wars, the report looks at various countries, such as Russia or China, which may become rivals to the US in the future. Furthermore, as is also noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the report suggests that the United States aims to convince others that the United States is in possession of irresistible power, although in Asia, policies on the war on terrorism, the legacies of the Cold War, and future rivals tend to overlap.

### (2) US Military Posture in South Korea

In South Korea, redefinition of the alliance has been considered, an example of which is the repositioning of the US Army's 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division to a location farther south. Behind this decision lies the fact that Seoul would be an early target should war break out, and US forces interposed between the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and Seoul would also be engulfed. To forestall such a development, the US forces are being pulled back beforehand. Moreover, the United States has 30,000 troops statically positioned in South Korea, a deployment that has now become a heavy burden. The United States would prefer to have more mobility. In regard to the military footprint, the United States also wanted to avoid the unnecessary friction caused by locating the military command in Seoul. That was one reason for the southward shift. In general, then, while US forces will increase their capability for attacking into North Korea, the real significance of the changes lies in creating the ability to deploy to regions other than the Korean Peninsula when necessary.

### (3) Europe, Central Asia

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has said that the character of NATO is evolving. In an attempt to improve the relatively volatile relationship between Europe and the United States. While the most important problem is how to overcome the issues raised by the Iraq situation, both Europe and the US are striving to narrow their differences.

The US military presence in Central Asia will probably be maintained in the form of bases and stationing of troops. On the other hand, Russia is extremely sensitive about the possibility of the US presence becoming permanent. China has become increasingly alarmed about the threat of encirclement by hostile powers. Meanwhile, countries in Central Asia have noted that US concern and interest has shifted to Iran and Iraq. They are afraid that Central Asia will again be forgotten and forsaken. Any long-term presence of US forces in Central Asia would have a political implication that goes beyond the ongoing war on terrorism. While the United

States used the events of September 11, 2001 to improve relations with Russia and China, relations have again become more difficult due to events in Iraq.

## **2. Japan-US Strategy Dialogue**

While the United States is a country with the ability to wage war, Japan is a country that is legally prohibited from doing so. Of the five points for realignment of US forces stationed in Japan, three of them — flexibility, rapid response, and capability over numbers — are difficult for Japan to achieve. In Japan, the US idea of expanding the role of allied states and building partnerships is a concept that exceeds what is allowed by the Constitution. The concept of “capability over numbers” is also difficult. Where the United States claims to be boosting capability while also reducing numbers, it has in fact continued to maintain massive destructive force. Is this truly an application of “capability over numbers?” This is an area that Japan will have difficulty coping with. “Rapid response” is an intelligence problem. The Defense Agency has fallen far behind in efforts to respond to the information age. As a result, we have serious doubts about whether the Japan-US alliance, which could be the most powerful bilateral combination in the world, is even capable of having a real strategic dialogue.

In the Bush Administration’s foreign policy, the concept of alliance involves emphasis on relationships with countries that share common values with the United States, and on countering terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and rogue states. States that share common values are expected to provide cooperation in the operational sphere. This entails ideas that clearly differ from the traditional concept of alliances. The new concepts became especially clear in the days following the events of September 11, 2001. If the issues of maintenance of US force mobility and modernization of allied military forces are applied to the Japan-US alliance, we find that Japan has had difficulty with modernization while US forces have successfully maintained their mobility. When US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Japan on November 16, 2003, he conveyed a number of concepts and ideas in the course of meetings with top Japanese government leaders. Modernization of Japan’s military force is a serious problem. The fact that the right to collective self-defense cannot be exercised under the Constitution is a barrier against strong US pressure on Japan in military force issues. This is an issue that the government needs to fully debate.

## **3. Issues for Japan**

Japan has other issues in addition to the problem of military force capabilities. Japan should be thinking more in terms of international contributions in the form of PKOs and assistance for Iraq than in terms of the Japan-US alliance. Japan, for example, could assume a post-war clean-up role. Neither Japan nor the United States think that they can go into battle together,

nor do they desire to. The time has arrived for Japan to take an active role that should not be considered only within the framework of cooperation with the United States.

Although the role that military force is expected to play has been declining, giving way to a world in which all capabilities should be utilized, the ability to engage in global military operations is becoming more important. Indeed, the motto for Self-Defense Forces personnel is about to change from “national security” to “international security,” indicating a shift to the ability to respond anywhere in the world at any time.

#### **4. Disparities between Afghanistan and Iraq**

##### (1) Continuities from Afghanistan to Iraq

Regarding Japan’s participation in international security, no issues were raised by Afghanistan. In Iraq, however, the situation changed somewhat. For President George W. Bush, Afghanistan and Iraq are completely linked. After the events of September 11, 2001, the Neo-Cons began arguing simultaneously for action in Afghanistan and Iraq. For Japan, international security has taken on a two-layered structure. One layer is the UN PKOs; the other is President Bush’s global strategy. Although Japan had previously centered its efforts on the UN PKOs, the United States’ global strategy has come to be a part of the framework for the Japan-US Security Treaty. Perhaps a new framework is needed to deal with this situation.

##### (2) Discontinuities from Afghanistan to Iraq

It is misleading to state “Afghanistan led directly to Iraq.” While there was no question on the legitimacy of the Afghan War, the legitimacy of the Iraq War is questionable. As many as 150,000 US troops are currently deployed in Iraq, with hundreds of thousands more troops serving as back-up for them. The US military, therefore, is completely tied down. This is why the idea of transformation has emerged. Japan needs to clearly understand this point. If the US military somehow becomes free to move again, the idea of transformation might also change significantly.

#### **5. The Alliance, the Coalition of the Willing, and the UN: Transformation and Relationships**

While international emergency assistance teams are not a bad way to respond to Iraq, this is not such a simple issue. It does not matter whether the authorization comes from the UN or from the alliance. Flexibility is important.

Japan’s stance in the past has been to use the Japan-US alliance for nearby problems, such as China-Taiwan or North and South Korea, and to use the UN for distant problems, such as

Cambodia. Now, however, the UN has been supplanted by a distant problem that is actually a US war, with the result that Japan must now respond to both kinds of problems using the Japan-US alliance. The former clever division between the UN and the alliance has now become impossible, leading to difficulties.

The United States being a global power, its response will be different from those of other countries when certain problems arise. Members of the coalition of the willing may also play differing roles depending on their relationships with the United States. Some may only have a role in the period after a war is over. For the Iraq operations, for example, Germany allowed US forces the free use of bases on its territory, serving a specific role. Japan is already a major power and is being asked what role it should play to support a peaceful international community. Defining roles has thus become very important.

Japan has joined with the United States to help shape the international order. One major issue, however, is what kind of order Japan is aiming for. In the Middle East, for example, is Japan aiming for a one-sided Israel-oriented security policy like the United States is? Or in North Korea, is Japan aiming for a security policy focused only on weapons of mass destruction? While Japan does not necessarily share the same goals as the United States on these issues, the wars now being fought appear to be aimed at building only the order that the United States desires.

#### **IV. The Japan-US Alliance, and Japan's Role (February 23, 2004)**

##### **A. Presentation (Role of the Self-Defense Forces)**

The roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces are on the agenda of talks between Japanese and US officials on the subject of the form the alliance should take now that the Cold War is over. A major theme is the new role of the Self-Defense Forces in the Asia-Pacific region, including discussion of what role the Self-Defense Forces could play without participating in PKOs or conflict.

At the same time, the "cap in the bottle" theory of the Japan-US security system has lost its efficacy since the end of the Cold War. A public discussion has arisen on what Japan is expected to do. Cooperation between Japan and the United States in the 1990s included joint operations activity for Japan's defense, PKOs, large-scale disaster relief, the PSI, etc., none of which had ever been contemplated. The roles of Japan and the United States in these activities started to draw attention.

The discussion on roles and missions has a history that goes back through 15 years of experiences for Japan. First, PKO activities became a major issue after the end of the Gulf War, and were clearly defined in the Defense Guidelines. Second, when the North Korean nuclear development crisis erupted in 1993 and 1994, Japan not only had to worry about the *raison d'être* of the alliance, but also experienced the intrusion of missile tests and spy ships from North Korea. Third, asymmetric threats such as the September 11, 2001 terror attacks appeared. Fourth, problems with China developed. Japan must also remain aware of resource-rich Russia, a country that will have a larger presence in 10 to 20 years. Japan is surrounded on all sides by military states, including Korea, when it is unified, as well as China and the United States. The issue is what Japan's roles and missions within the alliance should be.

Next is the role of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces. The Self-Defense Forces are probably built into the process for formulating a national security strategy, and certainly should be. At present, there is no real national strategy, and there is probably no need to think about one. But this will certainly not be the case in the future. The Self-Defense Forces need to be aware of the thinking on strategy and methods of engaging in strategy at the Defense Agency. Civilian control in Japan tends to mean one-sided control by civilians of the military. Security diplomacy tends to be handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without regard to the Defense Agency, although the built-in participation of military experts is an absolute necessity. Although a certain amount of discord exists in the United States between the Department of State and the Department of Defense, the Department of Defense plays quite a major role. If the Defense Agency is unable to bring the same amount of interest to the subject, maintaining a sound alliance relationship will be impossible.

Even though the Japan-US alliance is the foundation for Japan's defense, there is no effective way to establish a joint defense structure with the Japan-US alliance as the axis. Bluntly speaking, no effective joint defense has been established in the Japan-US security system for dealing with the threat of North Korean missiles. The nature of the Self-Defense

Forces' roles and missions for defense of the national homeland within the alliance must be clarified.

In their role in contributing to the world's peace and stability, the Self-Defense Forces' PKO experience commenced with an assignment in Cambodia. They have since been active in humanitarian assistance and relief work. The anti-terrorism work in Afghanistan and the postwar reconstruction in Iraq have been clearly different in nature from the earlier PKO experiences. While also being mindful of the constitutional and legal restrictions, what kind of blueprint does Japan have within the Japan-US alliance regarding the role of the Self-Defense Forces in contributing to international peace in PKOs, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction? In reality, Japan has merely reacted to situations as they arise, and has never articulated an actual philosophy. The time has come for a comprehensive legislative overhaul, and to adopt a Basic Law concerning Security. Japan needs to think independently about what role it should play within the Japan-US alliance. Even should the Constitution or the law be changed, Japan will not participate in battlefield actions. Operations should be limited to rear support for the battlefield, within the bounds of common sense. When Japan states that it will remain in the rear, the United States will not need to ask why.

Furthermore, Japan needs to strengthen its response capability against terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Terror poses a major threat to Japan's harbors and commercial vessels. One needs to be aware of the many threats, including those not directly related to terrorism, such as biological or chemical weapon missile attacks, let alone the nuclear weapons issue. It is imperative that the Self-Defense Forces clarify how they will respond to asymmetric threats caused by stateless organizations and such states as North Korea, with links to terrorism that existed before and may still exist today.

Japan also needs to consider the establishment of its own independent intelligence capability. Independence is the bedrock for intelligence. In fact, an essential condition for healthy development of the Japan-US alliance is stronger, independent intelligence from Japan. Moreover, intelligence plays a major role as the foundation for formation of national strategy. No strategy can be accomplished without possession of independent intelligence. Specifically, the kind of intelligence that Japan should pursue is human intelligence (HUMINT). While electronic intelligence and other types of intelligence should be gathered jointly by Japan and the United States, Japan can demonstrate its independence through human intelligence, which should be achievable without even engaging in any spying.

Another area in which Japan's intelligence is weak is in strategic concepts. Intelligence gathering is extremely concentrated on military affairs alone, and broader security or strategy issues are not being covered.

Finally, we here indicate a few issues for the future. First, a basic transition from reacting to events to strategic thinking is needed. Without such a transition, no strategies can be formulated, and building the Self-Defense Forces into the process for formulating national security strategy will be impossible. This transition should be proposed as a fundamental condition for determining the roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces, and as a national security issue for Japan. For example, Japan lacks strategic thinking regarding the Taiwan issue or the maritime security issue. While Japan would not be decisively damaged by a US

failure in the Middle East, a failure in the Taiwan issue would leave Japan with an extremely serious problem, especially if Japan had only been reacting to events.

Second is the development of a political and legal infrastructure. The legal infrastructure consists of Article 9 of the Constitution, and should also include a Basic Law concerning Security. At the present time, the Self-Defense Forces' activities are covered by a patchwork of laws. These should be updated under a comprehensive law, to develop a clearly delineated national emergency law. At the same time, development of the political infrastructure is also needed. In the Cabinet, for example, the Cabinet Secretariat is being strengthened and has been placed in charge of the national emergency legislation. The Cabinet Secretariat, however, is only engaged in strengthening specific projects. Security strategy in its real sense has not really been studied from all possible angles.

Third, a suitable allocation of resources for the security sector is needed. The issues include resource allocation, budgeting, and personnel. Japan's security costs money, as in the case of maintaining the three principles of weapons export. In the area of personnel, as well, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force suffers from a severe personnel shortage, while the Japan Air Self-Defense Force needs time for educating and training its personnel. It is not clear whether these issues are being properly dealt with. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force has introduced a system of ready reserve personnel. While one stage of this program is now complete, the intelligence sector is still markedly understaffed. It will probably remain in an impoverished state for the next ten years, considering the training, personnel development, and education process. These problems need to be taken seriously in terms of resource allocation.

## **B. Presentation (Role of US Forces)**

Potential military action by the United States can be divided into three categories. First, while the likelihood of the US becoming caught up in a large-scale war between states is very small, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are considered to be the exceptions since China looms behind both. Second, the United States believes the likelihood is high that military force will be deployed and used in political conflicts, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. Third, as can be seen in its war on terrorist states or rogue states (failed states), the United States believes there is a reasonable likelihood of becoming militarily and politically involved in wars or conflicts of its own choice.

Next, the strategic environment can be categorized into three types. First, war rarely breaks out between states that are participating in the global economy. The Taiwan issue, however, does happen to be a stand-off between two global economies, China and Taiwan, making it the most dangerous rivalry. Second, among states in the non-global economy, most conflicts occur during the state-building stage. Third, conflicts occur in rogue states and regions, in other words, in states and regions whose conflicts cannot be ignored by neighboring states, examples of which include Afghanistan and Iraq.

Four points can be made regarding the role of the military. First is building stable international relations. This implies actively eliminating unstable elements that may become causes of wars. Examples of removing such unstable elements can include prevention of air or

marine pollution, stabilization of marine transport through navigation aids or exchange of maritime information, investigation of maritime accidents, responses to relief activities, and crackdowns on piracy, hijacking, and smuggling. Second is to avoid the risk of war. This means to prevent or delay the occurrence of wars, and if they do break out, to limit their extent. Specifically, these efforts can include economic and diplomatic sanctions, confidence-building measures (military exchanges or announcements of training exercises), and measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the PSI, as well as peace enforcement operations (PEO) and peacekeeping operations (PKO). Third is to provide deterrence against war. This means to leverage force in order to prevent the other side from thinking about resorting to war, and can include building up stable deterrence postures, promotion of controls on military equipment, and missile defense. Finally, the role of the military is to achieve victory in war. This means attacking enemy units on the battlefield. Here, military force is fully extended, with technology used to pursue the so-called “post-heroic” war.

Military technology expected to be coming into practical use around the year 2020 includes, first, maintenance of a modernized nuclear force deterrent. Preservation of a firm nuclear deterrence can entail the development of a reliable second attack capability and modernization of nuclear forces (reduction of warhead size, improvement of target precision, and preservation of nuclear force resistance). Second is the development of highly efficient force, in other words, of normal battlefield force that does not result in personnel losses. Trends in developing countries will be a particular concern. Third is the use of deterrent force, i.e. the development of weapons that can stop people without killing them. With anti-guerrilla and anti-terror operations, peace enforcement operations, and peacekeeping operations becoming more common, there is a need to restrict inhumane behavior so as to minimize the loss of civilian lives, as well as a need for the development and introduction of non-lethal weapons. Fourth is the arrival of the indiscriminate use of asymmetric force. Here, irregular warfare involving the use of biological or chemical weapons, or information warfare waged in cyberspace, can be expected.

How far can we go in predicting the future strategic environment? The following ten axes predict the strategic environment in 2010: (1) The UN Security Council has limited power; (2) Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles) will be difficult; (3) Nuclear disarmament proceeds slowly, and nuclear weapons will continue to exist; (4) Unipolar superiority of US military and information strength will continue; (5) No rival capable of matching US forces deployed in forward positions in the Asia-Pacific region will appear; (6) Division of the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait will continue; (7) China will continue progress toward superpower status, and others will be confronted with issues related to that advance; (8) The countries of Southeast Asia will face issues related to government democratization, stable economic growth, and national unification; (9) Russian involvement in the East Asia and Pacific region will remain limited; (10) Disparities in military technology (IT technology, gene technology, space technology) will become permanent once they emerge.

The international community shares some common problems: (1) In what kind of situations can preemptive attacks be justified? (2) How much inhumane behavior is justified in order to stop inhumane behavior? (3) How much undemocratic behavior is justified in order to protect a democratic society?

In thinking about Japan's defense capabilities, the first issue is to determine what the essential conditions for Japan's survival are, and to identify the greatest threats to that survival. The four essential conditions for survival include: (1) Resource-rich countries are willing to supply Japan with resources; (2) No conflict occurs along the long sea lanes stretching from the resource-rich countries to Japan; (3) Japan adds value to those resources to make competitive industrial products; (4) Many countries consent to purchasing Japan's products.

Alternatively, the four greatest threats to Japan's survival include the following: (1) Resource-rich countries refuse to supply Japan with resources; (2) Conflict occurs along the long sea lanes stretching from the resource-rich countries to Japan; (3) Japan becomes unable to make value-added, competitive industrial products and software; (4) Other countries refuse to purchase Japanese products.

No country needs peace in the world as much as Japan does. Since peace in Japan is not sufficient on its own, the maximum threat to Japan is to become isolated from the international community. Japan, therefore, needs to make efforts to avoid risk to itself and to fulfill international responsibilities commensurate with that effort, i.e. to transform itself from a state that makes international contributions to one that is capable of fulfilling international responsibilities.

Six areas where Japan relies on the United States in the security sector are: (1) all aspects of nuclear deterrence; (2) strategic strike capability in regular warfare; (3) intelligence required for security; (4) basic aspects of military technology; (5) protection of energy transport routes; and (6) food and water resources. Japan could demonstrate some independence only in the third area, intelligence, where Japan has quite a lot to contribute to the United States.

In conclusion, Japan's defense roles (deterrence, response, expression of the nation's will) and the capabilities it should possess include: (1) the capability for action overseas for the purpose of international cooperation (transport capability for overseas deployment); (2) policing capability (domestic anti-terrorism capability, and capability for emergency evacuations of Japanese overseas); (3) Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) defense capability; (4) a basic capability for homeland defense (amphibious landing defense capability, air and missile defense capability); and (5) denial operations capability, or forward defense capability (pinpoint bombing capability, cruise missile capability). Of these five, the fourth is the most important. Moreover, while the third cannot be implemented by Japan alone, Japan should probably assume quite a large share of the responsibility. Regarding the first and second, Japan should maintain an independent capability. Furthermore, for the fifth, utilization of cruise missiles should be considered as a forward defense capability.

## **C. Discussion**

### **1. Current and Future State of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces**

We should not think that security equals defense and military force alone. When considering Japan's security, a military response alone cannot be sufficient. The roles and missions of the Self-Defense Forces need to be considered in the context of a broad security policy that also encompasses military force.

While military strength and diplomatic strength should be complementary, even the top officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feel political resistance to the US Department of Defense, which is expressed in their stance with the Defense Agency. Emphasizing either one or the other of military or diplomacy, however, is unsuitable. Each can complement the other, with diplomacy impossible without coercive backing, and military force unable to determine everything without diplomacy. We need to build an awareness based on a balance of diplomatic strength and military strength.

In terms of the system, PKO responsibilities are regulated in various parts of the Self-Defense Force Law and various other regulations. If PKOs are positioned as the main responsibility of the SDF, however, there is no legal trade-off. At present, forces in excess of those needed for homeland defense are used in PKOs. If the PKOs are positioned as the main responsibility of SDF, then the problem will be resolved. If a trade-off does occur when Japan is attacked or encounters a situation in which the Self-Defense Forces must be used for world peace and security, a decision can be made depending on the nature of the situation. There is no need to determine the priority beforehand on one or the other, merely because a trade-off exists.

From the viewpoint of the Japan-US alliance, "basic capability for homeland defense" is most important, followed by "sea-lane defense capability." The first capability cannot be achieved without US technology and intelligence, since even training is conducted in the United States. Next in importance is the sea-lanes. Japan cannot possibly defend such wide-ranging sea-lanes on its own. "Policing capability" and "capability for action overseas for the purpose of international cooperation" are Japan's own problems. "Denial operations capability, or preemptive defense capability" is an optional issue that will require a large infusion of US technology.

In the background of Japan's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is the Japan-US alliance. While the effects of the North Korean issue are not being ignored, the Japan-US alliance is at the root of the passage of such legislation as the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law (Iraq Reconstruction Law).

The Japan-US alliance is founded on a security treaty, and its operation is based on Guidelines that were recently amended, with the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan enacted for their implementation. The Guidelines contain some surprising elements. In case of an attack on Japan, for example, they merely state that US forces will cooperate with Japan. An issue for the future is to develop better legal elucidation regarding the foundations of the Japan-US alliance.

(1) Right to Collective Self Defense

The government interpretation of Article 9, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution is that Japan is allowed to have a Self-Defense Force because it has a right to self-defense. Future developments will lead to the recognition that aggressive wars based on non-belligerency pacts, plus UN-sanctioned resistance to wars that disrupt peace and security, are not in violation of Paragraph 2.

Regarding the right to micro-collective defense, it would constitute exercise of a natural right and not exercise of the right to collective defense if a Self-Defense Force unit were to fire in response to an attack on US soldiers in an adjacent position. It is always acceptable to exercise the natural right of using weapons to save people nearby.

(2) Rear or Frontline Support?

On whether to opt for rear support or for the front line, it should be possible to select either option, so that the choice can be made on the spot. Japan is better-suited for rear support, since the Self-Defense Forces have excellent medical, construction, communications, and reconnaissance capabilities. In other words, Japan does not engage in rear support because it lacks fighting spirit, but because it possesses military units with advanced capabilities. Japan should maintain a broad range of choices.

(3) Non-Existence of a Blueprint

No blueprint for the roles of the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces has been shown. While the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Reconstruction Law have been passed, it is still not at all clear what Japan is thinking, and no criticisms or concerns from Asian countries have been expressed.

In the future, the Self-Defense Forces will not engage in battlefield action when they are used for world peace and stability. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the Self-Defense Forces used a new format to participate in overseas operations. Working in rear support, they undertake tasks related to supply, communications, medical, and transport sectors. Although this is clearly stated in the Law, however, the promise that they will “never transport weapons or ordnance” would contradict common sense during a war situation. Nevertheless, Japan’s operations will be limited to rear support.

The Self-Defense Forces are the only organization in Asia capable of offering rear support for US military units. It is not even certain whether South Korea could perform such a task. In Europe, meanwhile, interoperability makes this issue difficult. Japan, therefore, is the country most likely to have a military force capable of providing rear support for the United States.

Around 1999, when Japan was debating the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, the Director General of the Defense Agency explained, “we would only be engaged in rear support, in rear areas clearly demarcated from the battle zone, and would not be engulfed in the battle.” If US forces fight in Northeast Asia, the United States will not be very understanding when Japan’s Self-Defense Forces try to assert that it will be all right for them to hang back in rear areas and just perform rear support. This peculiar restriction of Japan will not be understood or accepted by the

international community. A change in interpretation of the Constitution's Article 9 is at least required.

#### (4) Allow Uniformed Officers in the Prime Minister's Office

An on-going discussion is whether uniformed officers should be allowed in the Prime Minister's Office. If it becomes a formal debate, the Security Council should be the place where security strategy policies are formulated. Another idea to be considered is to nurture the current Office of the Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security Affairs and Crisis Management into an organization for establishing a security strategy as part of a strengthening of the Cabinet Secretariat. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Finance, and other relevant ministries and agencies need to begin serious discussions to develop and refine defense strategies. The Defense Agency should also be involved.

Although it may be possible to bring uniformed officers into the Prime Minister's presence, the definition of "officer" in the National Government Organization Law is clearly marked by such titles as Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) officer, counselor, executive secretary, etc. If a JSDF officer becomes the equivalent of an executive secretary, that officer would have to become a civilian. Can a JSDF officer really take up a post at the Prime Minister's Office without such a change in definition? Coming in as a deputy secretary rather than an executive secretary is not possible under the current system.

The self-defense officers posted to the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) are administrative officials and have completely lost their positions as JSDF officers. While majors in the JSDF can work as Grade 11 civilian officials, the officers are then employees of the Cabinet. They do not wear their uniforms; they would have a difficult time trying to do so.

#### (5) Influence of China and Russia

While Russia's intentions and its capability as a military threat are not debated nearly as much as during the Cold War, it may in 10 or 20 years see new vigor as a resource-rich state that could boost it back to major power status. In such a case, Russia could again become a major military power and, as a resource-rich power, come to have a great deal of influence. This is why Russia must still be taken into consideration when thinking about security strategy.

Japan's foreign affairs and defense officials have not mentioned the military threat from China in an official forum since the end of the Cold War. While the Defense Agency White Paper presents an analysis of China's military strength, it does not discuss the threat that China poses for Japan security. Its intent aside, however, China does pose a threat to Japan's security. Taking into consideration Japan's exclusively defensive policy, recent asymmetrical threats, and China's military capability dissociated from its intent, Japan should be paying serious attention to China's missile threat. China, for example, is rapidly deploying of intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of 600 kilometers, aimed at Taiwan. If the Taiwan issue were to be resolved, where would China aim the missiles next? This is a serious problem for both South Korea and Japan. Although China claims that it has no intention of attacking, a look at China's stance toward Taiwan, or at its behavior in the 1980s and 1990s in

the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, including the use of military force, proves that concern for China's military capabilities, regardless of its intentions, should certainly be one of the roles and missions identified in the Japan-US alliance for the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces.

