Chapter 6

The New US Strategy and the Japan-US Alliance

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Abstract

The Obama administration gives an explanation on its Asia-oriented strategy by using the term “Pivot”. This term is also used in the thesis titled *The Geographical Pivot of History* of 1904 by Sir Halford Mackinder, a geographer from the UK.

The author of this chapter considers that a book titled *The US Strategy in World Politics* of 1942 by Professor Nicholas Spykman, a geopolitician who taught international politics at Yale University, and a world map attached to the book might shed a light on the understanding of the US new strategy.

Strategic importance of the South China Sea will be clearly understood in the Spykman’s map. It is widely known that Sir Mackinder places emphasis on the “Pivot Area” in the Eurasian Continent, whereas, Spykman focuses on the area of the Inner or Marginal Crescent of the Eurasian Continent named the “Rimland” as a center of power. However, few people realize that Spykman reinforces the importance of the “Three Mediterraneans” in the world in terms of strategy: the Mediterranean which places a border between the Eurasian Continent and the African Continent, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico between the North and the South America, and the “Asiatic Mediterranean” between the Eurasian Continent and the Australian Continent. The South China Sea is the largest part of the Asiatic Mediterranean. The map of Spykman centering on St. Louis clearly shows how important the “Asian Mediterranean,” i.e., the South China Sea is as a part of sea lane encompassing the Eurasian Continent. More specifically, the map makes it clear how the “freedom of navigation” in the sea, which means the freedom of travel of US merchant ships and warships, is crucial for the US
strategy in Asia and the world.

Spykman describes that the “Asiatic Mediterranean” must be controlled not by the naval power of the UK, Japan, or the US but by the air power of China in the future since Beijing would build a lot of bases on land facing the sea. Although the air power of China is no match for the US and the Japan-US alliance yet, a large number of missiles deployed throughout the coast of Taiwan Strait could pose a significant threat to Japan and the US. The US began to strengthen so-called “Air-Sea Battle” concept in order to counter China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability.

Spykman anticipated that the country which will actually have power in Asia would not be Japan but China. While the power of this huge neighboring country is expanding, Japan needs to facilitate its ties with a “Power Far Away (Masataka Kosaka),” meaning the US. The Power Far Away (the US) also needs closer ties with Japan on the alert for a rapid increase of the power of China. Both Tokyo and Washington demand closer relations with each other. What is required in order to strengthen the Japan-US alliance? While wide-ranging discussions would strengthen the alliance, Japan should make an effort to understand the US new strategy and develop diplomatic and security strategy synchronizing with the US. Then, Tokyo needs to possess knowhow for managing Japan-US alliance based on the two strategies.

Introduction

While I was watching the Third Discussion of the US Presidential Election, President Obama explained the Asia-oriented strategy by using the term “Pivot.” Observers say “Pivot” was created by the State Department for the president, who is a basketball fan. This is not certain but the term gives us an image of a “Pivot Turn” of basketball play.

When Secretary Clinton used this term last year, the European countries immediately expressed their concerns over the term. This may be due to the fact that the term gave them an image of the “Pivot Turn” because the US, having been placing emphasis on the Middle East and Europe suddenly turns around to Asia as if it is showing its back to Europe. The State Department immediately tried to ease the Western countries concerns with the wordings that the term “Pivot” should be replaced with “Rebalancing,” that means the “shifting of weight.”

“Pivot” gives us the image of “Pivot Turn” in the field of sports. What image is given by this word in the field of the international politics? Indeed, the term could remind the author of another image.

Sir Mackinder, a geographer of the UK, wrote a famous article titled The
Geographical Pivot of History in 1904. In his article, Sir Mackinder used the term “Pivot” in the following manner. Sir Mackinder named the steppe of the Eurasian Continent and its northern forest area (the Central Asia and Siberia) the “Pivot Area,” assuming that the area would be a mainstay for moving world history. Certainly, the term of Sir Mackinder made a large impact on the progress of geopolitics, which marked the birth at the end of 19th century.

In addition, the geopolitical term “Pivot” of Sir Mackinder reminds me of a book, which would help us to understand the new strategy of the US. The book is America’s Strategy in World Politics (Nicholas J. Spykman, Transaction Publishers, 2008) of 1942 including a piece of the world map attached to the front cover and back cover of the book. Professor Spykman taught international politics at Yale University as a geopolitician before and during the World War II.

Today, in consideration with the nature of the new strategy of the US with reference to the map (see the end of this chapter), the author of this paper will promote an idea for the sake of enhancing the Japan-US alliance in the future.

How to Understand the Times

This study explains a little about the prospective view of the era before referring to the map.

In the meeting the time before last, I put it: “When studying the history, even when there are various interpretations of a definition of the start and the end of 20th century, the history of the 20th century starts from the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and ends with the Transfer of the Sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997 in the light of the rising of the Asia-Pacific region. It has been 15 years since the Transfer of the Sovereignty of Hong Kong, during which conflict over the leadership of the rising Asia-Pacific region becomes increasingly severe. While it may be fair to say that the rising China is taking a leading role in this conflict, Japan would not merely be contented with being a backset player in the conflict with assistance of the power of the Japan-US alliance,” This report is based on this understanding of the times.

The current status of the relationship between Japan and China, which became increasingly severe due to the Senkaku issue, needs to be considered in the context of the conflict.

How about the 20th century if one views as the “American Century” (Henry Luce)? In this case, the 20th century started from 1914, the eruption of World War I, which defined the decline of Europe, and ended in 1991 when
the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended and the US became the only superpower.

It has been 20 years from the end of the Cold War. Some people say it is the era of a unipolar of the United States, while other observers argue it is the era of power-shifting during which a multipolar world has been developing: the birth of EU and its expansion, the rise of China, the increase in the number of developing countries and the Restoration of Russia.

It seems that the 20th century is not a multipolar, but rather a unipolar world. However, in this case, a unipolar world could be composed of the US and its allies.

The victor of the Cold War was not the US but the US and its allies. This point should be emphasized when it comes to studying the world order. As seen in the Iraq War and the Afghan War, the US is indeed invincible but it does not mean that the US is omnipotent. It should be noted that a unipolar world cannot be realized without assistance of NATO and the Japan-US alliance. Diplomat Robert Cooper of the UK put it “a world composed of a sole military superpower and a lot of political superpowers,” i.e., “a world order in which the US having an overwhelming advantage in the military power and paying a certain amount of attention to the opinions and the understandings of the other major powers.” Indeed, there seems to be a “mono-polar world”.

As Cooper says, it is important for the world to make an effort to accept China in the world order established after the Cold War. The latest effort made by the Washington appeared to be realized as the new strategy which has been revealed in these couples of years.

Immediately before the end of the Cold War, from the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 to the recent Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress and the change of its leadership, the policy of the US toward China is roughly summarized as follows. Namely, the US tried to adjust the balance between engagement and hedging, i.e., between the attractive and expectable economic growth in China and the political dissatisfaction to the single-party regime of Chinese Communist Party and cautiousness regarding the rising military strength of China. More specifically, the US has been taking an ambiguous attitude against China.

Recently, however, aspects of cautiousness and hedging have come to be apparent. The Obama administration initially counted on the progress of the US-Chinese cooperation and showed appeasement toward China. Nevertheless, these measures did not work well and thus Washington rather became more skeptical about Beijing’s intention.

Before the killing of Osama bin Laden in May, 2011, some members of
the Obama administration, e.g., the National Security Advisor to the President Tom Donilon, claimed that the US should shift the power balance not to the Middle East region but to the Asia-Pacific region, where the economic progress was being rapidly made and the rise of Chinese military power was remarkable. Nonetheless, the assassination of the supreme leader of Al Qaeda at once brought the war on terror to an end and could accelerate withdrawal from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which apparently were not fully supported by Americans. Such a circumstance surely enabled a shift to occur.

*“What is important not only to Japan but also to the whole world is what type of nation China is trying to be. Does China grow to ensure national security with its military power and seek for the goal of being a military superpower like the US? Or does China grow to accept a world composed of a singular military superpower and a lot of political superpowers like Japan and the Europe? In other words, the latter is the world order in which the US, having a 10-to-1 advantage in military power, pays a certain amount of attention to the opinions and the understandings of other major powers. We should endeavor to have China choose the latter world.” (Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London: Atlantic Books, 2003, Translated in Japanese by Itaru Kitazawa, Nikkei, 2008, p. 21)

Geopolitical Perspective

That a current circumstance where there exist the cautiousness of the US against the rise of China and the backlash of China against it, which gives rise to US-Chinese conflict, seems to be structural problem.

In addition to the general theory of international politics, such as cautiousness of other countries to the rising in power of one country, there may be three other factors. Firstly, as previously noted, the war on terror is coming to an end and the US and China are losing their common adversaries.

Secondly, Washington attempts to take domestic manufacturing-oriented measures as well as export-oriented economic policy after Lehman Shock. Such a trend is likely to cause an economic frictions between the US and China, which is currently introducing export-led recovery.

One of the main reasons for the Obama administration to confront China could be Beijing’s challenge to the US grand strategy. More specifically, China challenges the US’s basic strategy that the Washington would not allow
any opponent to dominate areas that have a serious influence on the world power balance.

China's challenge became apparent when State Councilor of the PRC, Dai Bingguo said "The South China Sea is also China's core interests" to Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg who visited China in March, 2010. Just a year ago, five Chinese naval ships encircled the ocean surveillance ship USNS *Impeccable* and obstructed its navigation on the high sea of the South China Sea. Considering the fact that Beijing has serious territorial disputes with its neighboring countries around the South China Sea, the term "core interest" used by a key figure in Beijing's diplomacy which gave rise to concerns in Washington.

It was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who firstly announced the new strategy of the US against the term. The secretary clearly stated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July, 2010, that "the freedom of navigation of the South China Sea is a national interest of the US."

The terms "the South China Sea" and "the freedom of navigation" are very important. The terms directly or indirectly became casus belli for two wars of the US in 20th century.

Firstly the "freedom of navigation" or "freedom of seas" was a serious cause for the US to participate in the World War I. The US reacted negatively to the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany and thus entered the War in 1917. It is well known that this principle was raised in the second clause of the so-called "14 Articles" of President Wilson that indicated the objective of the War for the US.

Secondly, the South China Sea indirectly was the cause of participation of the US in World War II. More specifically, the oil embargo by the US made Japan attack the Pearl Harbor, and the embargo was the US reaction against the entry of Japanese troops into southern French Indochina (the southern part of Vietnam). The reason why the US could not ignore the entry of Japanese troops into southern French Indochina was because the US interpreted Japanese occupation as a first step for conquering Southeast Asia and felt this was a serious threat to the UK's and US’s Asian bases or territories (colonies), for instance, Singapore, the Philippines, and Hong Kong in the South China Sea.

Then, this paper refers to the map of Professor Spykman.

There are several reasons for introducing the map in relation with the new strategy of the US. Firstly, the map clearly shows the strategic importance of the South China Sea.

Professor Spykman, following Sir Mackinder’s idea, considered that having the freedom of the Eurasian Continent, the world largest continent,
from any opponent is the essence of the national security of the US and North and South America, i.e., of the new world.

Sir Mackinder placed emphasis on the “Pivot Area” in the Eurasian Continent, whereas the professor focused on surrounding areas of the Eurasian Continent named the “Rimland” as the center of the power. Specifically, US strategy was shaped by recognizing three critical areas: China’s coastal areas as an eastern keystone, Europe as a western keystone, and India as a potential keystone.

Although these ideas became widespread, however, the fact that the professor had paid attention to the strategic importance of the “Three Mediterraneans” in the world was hardly recognized. The “Three Mediterraneans,” nodal points connecting five continents, are keystones for controlling the world. Needless to say, one of the “Three Mediterraneans” is the Mediterranean in Europe, which separates the Eurasia Continent from the African Continent. The second one is the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico which the professor calls “American Mediterranean.” This second one divides the Americas.

The third one is the “Asiatic Mediterranean” which is enclosed by a line connecting Taiwan, Singapore, and Cape York in Australia and at the same time separates the Eurasia Continent from the Australian Continent. The South China Sea occupies the greatest part of the “Asiatic Mediterranean.”

The map of Spykman with St. Louis as the center clearly shows how important the “Asiatic Mediterranean,” or the South China Sea is as a portion of a traffic line of the sea enclosing the Eurasian Continent, and how essential the “freedom of navigation” in the sea, i.e., the freedom of sailing of the merchant ships and the warships of the US on the sea is, not only for the Asian strategy but for the world strategy of the US.

Access to any place in the world and freedom of action in the world are the bases supporting the world strategy of the US as a maritime nation. The map shows a sea lane, starting from San Diego in California on the West Coast of the US, passing through Hawaii, Guam, Japan, Taiwan, and Philippines (sometimes stopping by) entering into the South China Sea, passing through Singapore, and coming into the Indian Ocean. Though it is not illustrated in the map, military ships can be supplied at Diego Garcia and can pass through the Persian Gulf, the Coast of Somalia, the Red Sea, and the Suez to enter the Mediterranean. The home base of the US 5th Fleet is located in Bahrain in the Gulf. There also exists a base in Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea. When the ships enter into the Mediterranean, they stop by Naples in Italy to travel through Gibraltar and across the Atlantic Ocean, and return to Norfolk in Virginia on the east coast.
An essential sea lane making a clockwise turn around the Eurasian Continent from the US perspective was clearly illustrated in the map, regardless of the actual movement of the US navy vessels. If China behaves as if Beijing monopolizes the South China Sea as the Inland Sea of China with the term “core interest,” such activities would be a serious challenge against the world strategy of the US. Therefore, the map clearly indicates the situation.

The importance of the South China Sea is explicitly expressed in the Defense Department Document of January of this year (2012) “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” It states that the national security and the economic interests of the US are tightly linked with the development of the “arc extending from the western Pacific and the East Asia to the Indian Ocean area and the South Asia.” Certainly, the center of this arc is the South China Sea. It is often said that the US shifted its attention to the Asia-Pacific area in the new strategy. It would be more appropriate to answer that the US shifted its attention to the South China in the Asia-Pacific region.

The map of Professor Spykman shows another significant aspect from an economical point of view. Spykman stressed that the region around the South China Sea, that is the Southeast Asian, is vital for the prosperity of the US and the world since the region is the largest exporting area of raw materials and resources to the US.

Currently, it is not the era of colonial rule by Europe and economic importance in this sense is relativized owing to the development of resources and the growth of technologies in the other areas. However, the value as a market and investment destination is rapidly increasing and thus the economic progress of the Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, where President Obama spent his boyhood, becomes a large expectation for the world economy. The US falls behind China with respect to the trade with and investment to this area, so Washington seems to desire to strengthen its economic relationship with this area in the future.

The other reason why I introduce the map is because of a prediction made by Professor Spykman. The professor says that what controls the “Asiatic Mediterranean” with an important meaning to the US is neither the naval power of the UK nor the naval power of Japan. And, it is not the naval power of the US. He believes that what controls the sea, if any, must be the air power of China, which can secure a lot of bases on land facing the sea.

Considering air power as a three-dimensional war capability added with missiles, the air power of China in recent times has progressed dramatically and thus its self-confidence is growing as well. The air power of China does not match that of the US yet, nor that of the Japan-US alliance. However,
missiles deployed on the Taiwan Strait coast have become a serious threat.

One of the reasons why the US disperses the armed forces deployed throughout East Asia is for the purpose of defense against the missiles. The US has begun to strengthen a so-called “Air-Sea Battle” concept in order to counter China’s A2/AD capability using the missiles and air-sea power. It is assumed that the US will manage to avoid the situation that Spykman predicted, namely the situation where China controls the South China Sea.

Spykman also seems to have considered that the control of the South China Sea and the dominance of the entire East Asia by China could be avoided if Western countries make adequate efforts. The book “The Geography of Peace” was published in the next year when he died at the age of 49 (1943). The book includes notes and maps the professor left behind, and contains the following description.

“If the main western countries would like to maintain their power of influence so as to remain throughout areas over the earth, they need to place their bases on islands in the sea. In view of the limit of power that China is fatally going to have, bases on islands would be sufficient effective for opposing to such a possible future movement of China attempting to completely dominate the Far East.” (Nicholas J. Spykman, Fuyo Shobo, 2008, p. 120)

The wording “need to place their bases on islands in the sea” is the most interesting phrase to us since we know the history after the publication of this book.

The new Asia-oriented strategy of the US in the light of the South China Sea shows a strong suggestion of military counteraction against China. This is not predicted by Spykman, though. The South China Sea is beneficial for China to render nuclear submarines carrying SLBM submerge in the future. Therefore, the US needs to be cautious against it with military power.

The new strategy of Washington defines the attitude of the US against China in not only military but also political and economic spheres. President Obama stated in Canberra in November 2011 that the US shall keep a cooperative relationship with China but, at the same time, would suggest that Beijing should respect the international norm as well as protect human rights. President Obama stressed that all the nations can decide their ways to go by themselves, but freedom of speech, publication, meeting, and religion, and “freedom of citizens to choose their leader” are universal human rights. He thereby encouraged China to change its style; he is provoking a quarrel with China.

The TPP as the US initiative for promoting trade is the idea of establishing an economic grouping in order to prevent China from exerting exclusive
influence on the countries of the Asia-Pacific region by using its economic power.

Can such a new strategy be called a China containment strategy? It seems that the situation is not at this level.

When considering the current power of China, with the limits to economic progress that are recently appearing in China, various contradictions such as the issues of widening gaps, and, the worst of it, the lack of philosophy and ideology for leading the world, China has only a low potential to have the power for seeking global hegemony like the Soviet Union and the power for bringing the Eurasian Continent under control. Perhaps, the US regards China in this way. In other words, Washington considers that the threat of China has not reached a level matching the term “containment” yet.

As to the nature of the new strategy, the author of this article agrees with the viewpoint of Professor Walter Russell Mead of Columbia University. He puts it: “The US encourages the Asian countries to participate in the US-centered international system seeking for the freedom and prosperity in Asia and Pacific region. Whereas, the US concurrently makes an effort to prevent China from seeking regional hegemony as well as to give China an option to become a member of the system.” (Walter Russell Mead, “America’s Play for Pacific Prosperity,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 30, 2011)

The purpose of the US strategy seems to be “engaging China” with conditions, rather than the “containment” of China. The conditions include; Beijing should refrain from military operations, seriously consider protection of freedom and human rights in China, and respect international laws and norms.

**Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance**

Spykman had the opinion, soon after the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, that the US needs to cooperate with Japan in Asia after the war, i.e., after the defeat of Japan in a manner like the US has established cooperation with the UK in Europe in order to prevent its opponent from dominating the Eurasian Continent. The opinion was strongly criticized at that time; however, when observing what happened in the following years, it might be fair to call Spykman the father of the geopolitics in terms of Japan-US alliance. Spykman forecasted that the country that would have the power in Asia in future would not be Japan but China. He seemed to believe that Japan would have no other choice than to establish cooperation with the US to counter its huge neighboring country that would rise after the war.
Kosaka Masataka, who taught international politics at Kyoto University, also pointed out the geopolitical significance of the cooperation with the US, the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the Japan-US alliance for Japan in his first book *Kaiyokokka Nihon no Kousou (The Concept of Japan as a Maritime Nation)* published in 1965 as follows on the basis of the similar aspects.

"It is very difficult to defend self-identity from a huge neighboring country. (ellipsis) If Japan tries not to take a position either on the Eastern side or on the Western side, Japan should have closer ties with the Power Far Away in order to make a balance with the power near Japan." (Masataka Kosaka, *Kaiyokokka Nihon no Kousou (The Concept of Japan as a Maritime Nation)* Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1998, p. 242)

In the midst of age when the power of the huge neighboring country keeps expanding, Japan needs to establish closer ties with the Power Far Away, i.e., with the US. The Power Far Away (the US) also requires closer ties with Japan in order to take precautions against the rapid expansion of the power (China) near Japan. More specifically, closer ties of the Japan-US alliance are essential for both Japan and the US.

What is required for strengthening the Japan-US alliance? The answer would be the efforts of both Japan and the US. Actually, a wide range of discussions are necessary between the countries. Three vital efforts which Japan has to make must be considered in the following part.

The first point is to understand the US new strategy well and to establish a diplomatic and security strategy of Japan that will synchronize with Washington. Tokyo needs to strengthen the knowhow to operate the Japan-US alliance based on the two strategies. In other words, Japan needs to synchronize and adjust the strategies. This will results in using the Japan-US alliance not only for the peace and safety of Japan but also for the East Asia and the world, or for the formation of the world order of freedom and prosperity.

It is against this backdrop that the US new strategy places emphasis on the "arc extending from Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean." This idea might coincide with "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," which Japan came out with several years ago based on the concept of the further expanding arc beyond the Indian Ocean, such as the Middle East and Africa. The concept means that Japan should cooperate with the US by providing not only non-military cooperation, including anti-piracy measures, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities, but also public-private overseas economic cooperation for the sake of assisting the development and stability of countries within the Arc.

Japan has already started defense exchanges with Singapore, India, and
Australia, and has cooperated with Southeast Asian countries with respect to anti-piracy measures, and participated in the international anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, constructed a base in Djibouti, and dispatched the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops for PKO operations in South Sudan, isolated from Sudan with which China has a tight relationship by importing oil. Japan recently plans to provide a large patrol vessel to the Philippines as ODA, which is in conflict with China for the territory of the Scarborough Reef in the South China Sea.

Needless to say, the “adjustment” might be started between Japan and the US.

The second point is the preparation for an increased share of the cost. The enhancement of Japan-US alliance requires costs. Since the military budget is reported to be further decreasing in the US, it becomes more important for Japan to increase its national defense budget.

The national defense budget in Japan has decreased over the last ten years. The fall of the budget may invite degrading of deterrent power and even a decline in national defense capabilities. Thus, an immediate improvement of the air power is required and the defense budget should be raised at least by three or four hundred billion yen.

If the international environment deteriorates, there might be no choice other than to increase the national defense budget to the level that NATO is aiming at, or 2% of GDP. If Japan can show its resolution that it will raise the budget in spite of its financial austerity, Tokyo could convey its strong message to the world. Although the achievement in that level seems to be nonsense, this issue first and foremost must take into account the security of the nation. In addition, national defense budget in the middle of the 1950's when Japan started heading for the remilitarization with the gradual expansion of the defense power and the prioritizing economic recovery was about 2% of the GDP. At the time, the US demanded that Japan should raise the percentage up to about 4%.

The third point is to strengthen cooperation through the Japan-US alliance. This can be realized by cooperating with each other with good grace so that both nations can deepen mutual cooperation. In other words, it is most important to promote harmonization between people. To save space here, the author would like you to refer to his recent book (Kazuya Sakamoto, Nichibei Domei no Nanmon—“Kanreki” wo Mukaeta Anpojouyaku (Challenge for Japan-US Alliance—Ju Security Treaty Meeting the Sixtieth Anniversary), PHP Kenkyu Sho, 2012). In short, the book refers to the reinforcement of the Japan-US dialogue. As part of cooperation based on the alliance, the cooperation by lending bases (coordination between product and
manpower) should be rationalized, whereas cooperation between the SDF and the US military forces (cooperation between manpower and manpower) should be strengthened. The rationalization of the former one, of course, includes a resolution of the Futenma Air Base issue. Further, efforts should be made on the change of the constitutional interpretation of the right of collective defense as the basis of cooperation in the Japan-US alliance.

In relation to the strengthening of the Japan-US alliance, the setting of a “new guideline” is scheduled. However, the author claims that in the Guidelines of 1978, the division of each role such as “SDF takes the role of acting as a shield, whereas the US military forces as the pike” should not be fixed, but rather SDF should also take the role of the pike according to the situation. The Guidelines of 1997, “rear area support” should be changed to “logistics”.

The study presented the opinion about the new strategy of the US and the Japan-US alliance in the future. The article might not have covered everything in details, however, the aforementioned explanation is composed of “heaven, the earth, and the people”, i.e., heaven as time showing the aspect of the era, the advantage (sense) of the earth as the geopolitical perspective, and the balance of manpower as the Japan-US alliance. At least, this paper sums

up author’s view and it may become a basis for a further discussion.

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Reference


