

The Japanese Army's Measures against Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines in the First Half of the Pacific War*

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Abstract

After capturing the Philippines in the early stages of the Pacific War, the Japanese army took various measures to restore and maintain public order in the region. This paper focuses on the first half of the Pacific War, corresponding roughly to the period of military rule by Japan between December 1941 and October 1943, when the Philippines gained “independence.” There were 3,514 incidents of rebel attacks, terrorism, arson, false propaganda, and other forms of public disturbance during this time, and anti-Japanese guerrillas were responsible for the majority of these incidents. The army took various measures in response, including crackdowns, surrender and submission maneuvers, propaganda and pacification, and investigations and arrests. “Indoctrination” was also adopted as a policy for submission maneuvers. Although it had some success, the Japanese could not entirely secure the Philippines before “independence.” This paper clarifies the nature of these incidents of public disturbance in the Philippines during Japanese military rule and the army’s response to them. It primarily relies on historical documents related to the military police, examining their responses from the perspective of effectiveness and the problems that arose.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the first half of the Pacific War, the period corresponding to Japan’s military rule, from the outbreak of the war in December 1941 to the Philippines’ “independence” in October 1943. It clarifies the nature of the security disturbances caused by the anti-Japanese guerrillas, etc., and the various measures taken by the Japanese army to restore and maintain security in the region, examining military responses from the perspective of effectiveness and the problems that arose.

This paper relies mainly on historical documents stored by the Ministry of Defense’s National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). Missing sections are supplemented by recollections from and interview transcripts of those involved. The documents were produced mainly by the headquarters of the Japanese army’s 14th Army (located in the central Philippine city of Manila), the headquarters of its military Police Corps (including its predecessor, the 1st Field Military Police

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Corps), and the Military Police detachments and contingent forces¹ stationed in key locations in the Philippines. NIDS has a vast collection of documents related to the military police, which operated in the Philippines during the Pacific War as part of its vital mission of maintaining public order. In total, there are more than 160 volumes in the NIDS collection. However, these historical documents have rarely been used for research relating to security. As far as can be told, the only previous studies on the same subject as this paper are Ota Koki's "Japanese Military Government in the Philippines: Focusing on Security Measures,"² which clarifies security measures from the perspective of the legal system, and Tachikawa Kyoichi's "The Japanese Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Movement in the Latter Half of the Pacific War,"³ which covers a different period than this paper. In that sense, this paper attempts to address a subject that has rarely been directly addressed, based on historical documents that have rarely been used for that purpose.

1. Details of Security Disturbance Incidents: The Number of the Incidents as a Basis for Analysis

Table 1 was prepared by the author based on the "Table of Security Disturbance Incidents by Region"⁴ prepared by the headquarters of the Japanese army's 14th Military Police (*Hito Kenpeitai*) in Manila on October 20, six days after the Philippines' "independence" on October 14, 1943. It reveals the number of security disturbance incidents in the Philippines by year, victim, and type since December 1941, when the Japanese army arrived.

Table 2 shows the number of security disturbance incidents in the Philippines from the Japanese army's arrival until October 1943, when the Philippines became "independent," by month, victim, and type. This table was prepared by the author based on the "Public Order Summary Table (Military Damage)" and "Public Order Summary Table (Non-military Damage)," which were attached as separate sheets to the "Monthly Security Reports" prepared by the 14th Army Military Police (from February to May 1942, its predecessor, the 1st Field Military Police Corp) Headquarters (the name of only the document for February 1942 was not "Monthly Security Report" but "General Public Safety Situation in the Luzon Plains," and the table describing the general situation of various incidents is not a separate sheet but integrated with the main text⁵).

¹ As of August 1, 1942, the military police squadrons included 2 military police detachments and 22 contingent forces. The 14th Army Military Police had a total of 995 personnel, of which 550 were military police and 275 were auxiliary military police (Satake Hisashi, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen: Wakaki Kenpei no Jugun Kiroku* [The Floating Luzon Front: A Record of Military Service by a Young Military Police], [Misaki Shobo, 1973], pp. 98-100).

² Ota Koki, "Firipin ni Okeru Nippon Gunsei: Chian Taisaku o Chushin ni [The Japanese Military Government in the Philippines: With a Focus on Security Measures]," *Seiji Keizai Shigaku* [The Journal of Historical Studies], no. 172 (September 1980).

³ Tachikawa Kyoichi, "Taiheiyō Senso Kohan no Firipin ni Okeru Rikugun no Chian Iji [The Japanese Army and the Philippine Guerrilla Movement in the Latter Half of the Pacific War]," *Senshi Kenkyū Nenpo* [Military History Studies Annual], no. 23 (March 2020).

⁴ *Hito Kenpeitai Honbu* [Headquarters of Philippine Military Police], "Chian Kakuran Jiken Chihobetsu Hyō [Table of Security Disturbance Incidents by Region]" (compiled on October 20, 1943), "Parawan Kenpeibuntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri [Palawan Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 14, 1942, to July 9, 1944," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense.

⁵ "Ruson Heiya ni Okeru Ippan Chian Jokyo [General Public Safety Situation in the Luzon Plains]" (February 23, 1942), "Daiichi Yasen Kenpeitai Kankei Shiryo [Historical Documents Related to the 1st Field Military Police], 1942," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "Chian Geppo (Shigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansurukun Hokoku 'Tsucho' [Report on the Submission of the April Monthly

Table 1: Security Disturbances in the Philippines (By Year)

Year	Total	Victim	Total	Rebel Attacks	Terrorism	Destruction	Arson	False Propaganda	Broadcasts	Other
1942	1,305	Japanese army	602	230	23	241	9	86	2	11
		Non-military	703	320	173	44	90	31		45
1943	2,209	Japanese army	591	348	21	217	3	2		
		Non-military	1,618	681	658	97	66	91		25

Note: The year 1943 does not cover the entire year (from the beginning to the end of the year), but rather from the beginning of the year to October 14, when the Philippines became "independent."

Source: Produced by the author based on the *Hito Kenpeitai Honbu* [Headquarters of the Philippine Military Police], "*Chian Kakuran Jiken Chihobetsu Hyo* [Table of Security Disturbance Incidents by Region]" (compiled on October 20, 1943), "*Parawan Kenpeibuntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Palawan Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 14, 1942, to July 9, 1944," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense.

Security Report, 'Notice']" (May 13, 1942), "*Iroiro Kenpei Hakentai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Dispatched Unit Police Documents], April to May 1942," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 12, 1942), "*Iroiro Kenpei Hakentai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Dispatched Unit Police Documents], May to June 1942 2/2," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Kugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the September Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (October 12, 1942), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 12 to December 27, 1942," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Jugatsu)* [October Monthly Security Report]" (November 10, 1942), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], 1942 1/2," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Juichigatsu)* [November Monthly Security Report]" (December 12, 1942), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 12 to December 27, 1942;" "*Chian Geppo (Junigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the December Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (January 13, 1943), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], January to March 1943 1/2," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Ichigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the January Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (February 12, 1943), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], January to March 1943 2/2," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Nigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the February Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (March 13, 1943), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], March 1 to April 17 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Sangatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the March Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (April 13, 1943), *ibid.*; "*Chian Geppo (Shigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the April Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (May 13, 1943), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], May to June 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 14, 1943), *ibid.*; "*Chian Geppo (Rokugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the June Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (July 15, 1943), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Shichigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the July Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (August 15, 1943), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Hachigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the August Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (September 16, 1943), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], August 11 to October 20, 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; "*Chian Geppo (Kugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the September Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (October 15, 1943), *ibid.*; "*Chian Geppo (Jugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'*

However, some of the “Monthly Security Reports” could not be found (March, June, July, and August of 1942) by the time this paper was prepared, so the figures of those months are missing.

The “Monthly Security Reports” are thought to have been prepared based on documents regularly submitted to Military Police Headquarters once a month, every half month, or every ten days by military police detachments, contingent forces, and dispatched units stationed in key locations in the Philippines.⁶ Therefore, the numbers are based on information obtained by the military police in each area and reported to the headquarters. In addition, the figures in the aforementioned “Table of Security Disturbance Incidents by Region” by the Philippine Military Police Headquarters, on which Table 1 was based, were presumably calculated based on the “Public Order Summary Table (Military Damage)” and “Public Order Summary Table (Non-military Damage)” attached to the “Monthly Security Report” by the same headquarters, on which Table 2 was based.

As shown in Table 1, comparing the years 1942 and 1943 reveals that the number of security disturbances increased by 904 in 1943 over the previous year: 1,305 incidents in 1942 to 2,209 incidents in 1943. Examining these figures, we have to assume that for the Philippines as a whole, security was worse in 1943 than in 1942, or at least not improving.

Regarding the increase of 904 incidents, the per-victim numbers shed some more light on the truth. In 1942, there were 602 incidents related to the Japanese army and 703 cases related to the non-military, a difference of about 100. However, in 1943, Japanese army-related incidents decreased only slightly to 591 (remaining almost the same), while the number of non-military cases increased significantly to 1,618, a gap of more than 1,000 cases. Non-military security disturbance incidents themselves increased by 915 cases. Although this is only one way of looking at it, the figures seem to indicate that the number of security disturbances in which the victims were non-military increased drastically between 1942 and 1943, being the main factor preventing stable public order. The term “non-military” (referred to as “*chiho*” [“region” in the literal sense] in the “Monthly Security Reports”) here does not simply mean civilian; it also implies any but officers and soldiers, civil workers for the military, equipment, facilities, etc., of the Japanese army and navy. It includes not only the general population (Filipinos, Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, etc.) and their possessions (houses, cash, precious metals, food, clothing, etc.), but public figures such as key individuals in Philippine central politics, local chiefs, officials, police officers, etc., and public institutions and facilities such as government offices, police stations, schools, etc.

What can we learn from the different types of public disturbances such as rebel attacks, terrorism, destruction, arson, and false propaganda? Firstly, there were many rebel attacks, and the numbers increased significantly from 1942 to 1943. For example, the number of rebel attacks in which the victims were Japanese military was 230 in 1942 and increased by over 100 incidents to

[Report on the Submission of the October Monthly Security Report, ‘Notice’] (November 14, 1943), “*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], 1943.”

⁶ For more information on how the “Monthly Security Reports” were edited, see, for example, Satake Hisashi, “*Genba no Wakaki Kenpei kara Mita Gunsei* [Military Government as Seen by a Young Military Police in the Field]” (*Intabyu* 7 [Interview no. 7]), *Nippon no Firipin Senryoki ni Kansuru Shiryo Chosa Foramu* [Forum for Document Research on the period of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines], ed., *Intabyu Kiroku Nippon no Firipin Senryo* [Interview Records: Japanese Occupation of the Philippines] (*Nanpo Gunsei Kankei Shiryo* 15 [Historical Documents Related to Military Government in the Southern Region, vol. 15]) (Ryukeishosha, 1994), pp. 257-259.

Table 2: Security Disturbances in the Philippines (By Month)

Year	Total	Victim	Total	Rebel Attacks	Terrorism	Destruction	Arson	Looting	False Propaganda	Other
1942										
February	10	Japanese army	3	2	1					
		Non-military	7		1		6			
April	85	Japanese army	56	4		42			5	5
		Non-military	29	14	4		8		2	1
May	91	Japanese army	45	6	6	29			3	1
		Non-military	46	24	7	3	3		9	
September	129	Japanese army	50	21	2	14	2	1	10	
		Non-military	79	51	11	5	4	2	3	3
October	98	Japanese army	51	23	2	15			11	
		Non-military	47	24	15	2	2		2	2
November	207	Japanese army	100	63	3	24		2	8	
		Non-military	107	32	46	8	3	7	8	3
December	385	Japanese army	153	82	1	59	2		9	
		Non-military	232	51	70	22	61	24	4	
1943										
January	193	Japanese army	55	28		27				
		Non-military	138	45	50	3	20	10	10	
February	258	Japanese army	91	52	1	38				
		Non-military	167	62	61	8	13	15	8	
March	283	Japanese army	111	83		25	3			
		Non-military	172	140	12	6	8		6	
April	215	Japanese army	59	34	7	16			2	
		Non-military	156	27	109	3	13		4	
May	227	Japanese army	43	24		19				
		Non-military	184	73	93	10	3		5	
June	280	Japanese army	59	36	4	19				
		Non-military	221	90	107	2	7		15	
July	282	Japanese army	66	39		27				
		Non-military	216	82	97	33			4	
August	232	Japanese army	62	31	6	25				
		Non-military	170	71	61	23			15	
September	246	Japanese army	45	21	3	21				
		Non-military	201	91	75	9	2		24	
October	191	Japanese army	34	19	2	13				
		Non-military	157	52	70	6	3		26	

Note: The figures for February 1942 are as of February 23, 1942.

Source: This table was prepared by the author based on the "Public Order Summary Table (Military Damage)" and "Public Order Summary Table (Non-military Damage)," which were attached as separate sheets to the "Monthly Security Reports" prepared by the 14th Army Military Police (from February to May 1942, its predecessor, the 1st Field Military Police Corp) Headquarters (the name of only the document for February 1942 is not "Monthly Security Report" but "General Public Safety Situation in the Luzon Plains," and the table describing the general situation of various incidents is not a separate sheet but integrated with the main text).

348 in 1943. However, the number of non-military incidents more than doubled in this time, from 320 in 1942 to 681 in 1943.

For terrorism, the Japanese military was only targeted in a few incidents, remaining almost unchanged at 23 in 1942 and 21 in 1943. However, the number of non-military attacks increased nearly fourfold in the same period, from 173 in 1942 to 658 in 1943. There is some uncertainty about the difference between rebel attacks and terrorism.⁷ However, leaving this uncertainty aside, there was a marked increase in both types of incidents where the victims were non-military. The combined increase in the number of rebel and terrorist attacks in which the victims were non-military was 846 incidents, more than 90% of the total increase of 904 incidents.

Concerning destruction, the number of incidents in which the Japanese military was attacked was overwhelmingly higher, being 241 in 1942 and 217 in 1943, compared to 44 in 1942 and 97 in 1943 for non-military. However, if we look at the changes from 1942 to 1943, the number of incidents in which the Japanese military was attacked decreased by about 10%. By comparison, the number of incidents involving non-military was more than doubled.

There were only 9 incidents in which the Japanese military was a victim of arson in 1942, followed by 3 in 1943. By comparison, non-military incidents numbered 90 in 1942 and 66 in 1943. Thus, although the number of incidents was much lower between these years, there were many more non-military victims.

The number of false propaganda incidences in which the Japanese military was targeted decreased significantly from 86 in 1942 to 31 in 1943. By comparison, the number of incidents in which the target was non-military tripled from 31 in 1942 to 91 in 1943. As far as can be told, the cause of these incidents is unclear. However, it is easy to imagine that in the case of false propaganda, the nature of these acts made it difficult to identify the victims and the degree of damage. As can be seen from Table 2, in 1943, except for two cases in April, all other cases were classified as non-military, so we can assume that from January of the same year, it was probably decided to classify all false propaganda as incidents in which the victims were non-military.

Table 2 reveals the increase and decrease in the number of incidents by month and when and what types of incidents were most common.

Month by month, the most significant increase in the number of public disturbances occurred during November and December of 1942. Although not all the figures are available for every month in 1942, there were 85 cases in April, 91 in May, 129 in September, and 98 in October, with only September showing a definite increase in numbers. The overall trend, however, was only a slight increase. This trend was followed by a definite increase in November and December, at 207 and 385 incidents, respectively. In particular, the 385 incidents in December are the highest known for both 1942 and 1943.

In 1943, the number of cases increased and decreased on a two-month cycle. There were relatively high numbers in February (258 cases) and March (283 cases), and June (280 cases) and

⁷ While it can be argued that the actors (perpetrators) in rebel attacks were guerrillas, and not necessarily in terrorist attacks, there were many cases involving guerrillas which could be classified as terrorist attacks. In any incidents classified as terrorism, the victims were physically harmed while alone or in very small groups (including non-moving targets), but similar cases can be found in the incidents classified as rebel attacks. Regardless, there appears to be no clear criteria for distinguishing between rebel attacks and terrorism, and the classification of the two types may not have been necessarily strict.

July (282 cases), with at least 50 more cases than in the months before and after (January [193 cases], April [215 cases], May [227 cases], August [232 cases], September [246 cases], October [191 cases]). The second to the fifth highest number of incidents by month throughout 1942 and 1943 were also in these months, with March being the second highest, July the third, June the fourth, and February the fifth.

Examining the number of incidents by the victim, the number of incidents involving the Japanese military, and the number of incidents involving non-military victims remained close until November 1942. However, after December of the same year, when the number of incidents was the highest throughout 1942 and 1943, incidents involving non-military victims greatly exceeded military victims. In April 1943, the difference in incidents was 93. From the following May, the difference was always more than 100 cases. From this, it can be assumed that the thought of those creating public disturbances may have changed after December of 1942.

In terms of types, destruction, arson, and looting occurred most frequently in December of 1942, when the number of incidents was the highest, but rebel attacks, terrorism, and false propaganda did not. The largest number of rebel attacks occurred in March 1943 (83 cases against the Japanese military, 140 cases against non-military, 223 cases in total), the largest number of terrorist attacks occurred in April 1943 (7 cases against the Japanese military, 109 cases against non-military, 116 cases in total). The second-highest number occurred in June of the same year by a small margin (4 cases against the Japanese military, 107 cases against non-military, 111 cases in total). Incidents of terrorism reached their peak from April to July of that year. Additionally, most of the victims were non-military. The highest number of false propaganda cases was 26 in October 1943, and the second-highest was 24 in the previous month of September. It is probably safe to assume that the reason for this increase is connected to the Philippines' "independence" (the end of Japanese military rule).

2. Various Measures by the Japanese Army: Effectiveness and Problems

The "Public Order Summary Table (Military Damage)" and "Public Order Summary Table (Non-military Damage)" which were attached as separate sheets to the "Monthly Security Reports" produced by the 14th Army Military Police (and its predecessor, the 1st Field Military Police Corp) Headquarters, had a "Damage (Impact)" column, which provided an overview of the actors (perpetrators), victims, and damage caused by the public disturbances.

Examining the public disturbances by focusing on the actors, we can see expressions such as "defeated soldiers," "defeated rebels," "army rebels," "enemy rebels," "remaining enemies," "anti-Japanese group," "anti-Japanese army," "lawless group," "communist rebels," "local rebels," "rebel group," "bandits," and "guerrillas." These are seen amongst incidents classified as "rebel attacks" and in almost all other types of incidents. The variety of similar expressions used may be due to the slightly different nature of the actors and choices by the providers of information or the authors of the documents. However, if we combine them into one commonly used modern expression, we can see that most of these incidents were caused by what we would call guerrillas. There were relatively few incidents in which the actors were classified as Filipino, Americans, Chinese, thugs, outlaws, recalcitrants, and delinquents or criminal groups named after their purpose for existing, such as bands of robbers or groups of bandits. Therefore, from the perspective of the Japanese

army, guerrillas were the main barrier to restoring and maintaining security from 1942 to 1943.⁸

To address the public disturbances caused by the anti-Japanese guerillas, the Japanese army (the 14th Army) took action, using crackdowns to have these groups surrender and submit to Japan's control through propaganda and pacification, and investigations and arrests. From here, we will examine the various measures taken by the army to restore and maintain public order, examining their effectiveness and the problems that arose.

(1) Crackdowns

Crackdowns (also known as “clean-ups,” “punitive clean-ups,” etc.) were the primary means used by the Japanese army to combat anti-Japanese guerrillas. Guerilla crackdowns commenced in parallel with the Philippine campaign and continued even after its “independence,” but they were particularly thorough between August 1942 and March 1943. The 14th Army believed that “aggressive and bold crackdowns” were the most effective means of dealing with the guerrillas. Therefore, while making ample use of diversions and false rumors, it attempted to establish public order by applying “continuous and uninterrupted armed pressure” through “surprise raids” and “capturing and eliminating” the primary guerrilla forces, especially their leaders. At the same time, the Army was aware that head-on attacks would not be effective. At the time, Major General Wachi Takaji, Chief of Staff of the 14th Army, and Colonel Takatsu Toshimitsu, Staff Officer (Intelligence), frequently used words such as “novel tactics,” “use of vigorous ingenuity and creativity,” “creative improvement,” “creative ingenuity,” “creative effort,” “divine plan,” “divine strategy,” and “novel and unconventional new ideas” in their remarks at meetings. These words suggest that they were searching for new tactics that would be effective against guerrillas.⁹

⁸ At a meeting of intelligence chief officers held on December 25, 1942, Lieutenant Colonel Kodama Kazuma, Chief of the Police Section of the 14th Army's Military Police Headquarters, “reviewed the past year's security situation in the Philippines and mentioned measures for the future.” Kodama described the guerrillas in the Philippines at the time as (1) “defeated rebels” (former U.S. and Philippine military officers who fled during the fighting with the Japanese or after the surrender and who wanted to continue fighting against the Japanese, or who were already continuing to do so. These organizations were made up of Americans, Filipinos, and a mixture of both), (2) “sympathizers or uninformed and unemployed who were anti-Japanese who found guerrilla warfare attractive,” (3) communist rebels (*Hukubalahap*, formed in February 1942), (4) petty thieves (“war unemployed and those whose houses have been burned”), (5) Moro lawless groups (Muslim residents of Mindanao and Sulu in the southern Philippines, and of Palawan in the west who obstructed or harmed the Japanese), and (6) mixed rebels (groups consisting of two or more of [1] through [5]) (“*Chian Taisaku Shiryō Sofu no Ken* [Regarding Sending of Security Measures Materials],” *Hikenko Dai 499 Go* (December 26, 1942), “*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 12 to December 27, 1942.”

⁹ *Dai 14 Gun Shireibu* [the 14th Army Headquarters], “*Heidancho Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Gun Sanbocho Koen Yoshi* [Key Points of Presentation by the Chief of Army Staff at the Strategic Group Leaders' Meeting]” (September 22, 1942), “*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], June 29 to December 30, 1942,” collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; *Watari Shudan Shireibu* [Watari Group Headquarters], “*Sakusen Shunin Sanbo To Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Gun Sanbocho Koen Yoshi* [Key Points of Presentation by the Chief of Army Staff at the Meeting of the Chief Staffs of Operation and Others]” (October 31, 1942), *Hito Kenpeitai Honbu* [Headquarters of the Military Police in the Philippines], “*Hito Kenpeitai Kankei Shiryotsuzuri* [Documents Related to the Military Police in the Philippines], 1942,” collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; “*Heidan Sakusen Shunin Sanbo To Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Kokyu Sanbo Setsumei Yoshi* [Summary of the Explanation Given by the High-ranking Staff Officer at the Meeting of the Strategic Groups' Chief Staffs of Operation and Others]” (October 31, 1942), “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Shitsumu Sankotsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Reference Materials for Office-work], May 25 to December 5, 1942,” collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense.

One of the effects of these crackdowns showed up as changes in behavior on the part of the guerrillas. For example, as mentioned earlier, in 1942, there were 230 incidents of rebel attacks in which the victims were the Japanese military and 320 incidents in which the victims were non-military, a difference of 90 incidents. However, in 1943, the former increased only slightly by 100-odd incidents to 348, while the latter more than doubled to 681. The number of the latter overwhelmingly outstripped that of the former. The difference more than tripled to 333 incidents. For terrorism, initially, there were few incidents in which the victims were related to the Japanese army and more to non-military. However, after November 1942, there was a sharp increase in terrorist attacks involving non-military victims. In other words, the guerrillas began to avoid the Japanese military and target more vulnerable non-military. This behavior change is likely because they became aware of the Japanese army's capabilities after fighting. Their strength declined as they were forced to make some sacrifices, and they wanted to avoid further sacrifices and further declines in their strength by continuing to fight the Japanese army.¹⁰ In May 1943, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, who was looking for an opportunity to launch a counter-offensive from Australia, issued an order to the guerrillas in various parts of the Philippines to avoid major battles with the Japanese.¹¹ They obeyed MacArthur and "avoided active resistance, going underground to rebuild their forces."¹² However, it is also quite possible that the guerrillas began to target non-military to plunder the money, food, and clothing they needed. This change could also be attributed to the exhaustion through crackdowns on behalf of the Japanese army.

A significant barrier to defeating these groups was that counter-guerrilla tactics had not been established. In the early stages, this resulted in human casualties that could have been avoided and waste of ammunition. The units that carried out the crackdowns needed to be creative and ingenious, having to find effective counter-guerrilla tactics through a process of trial and error before fully implementing them within their units. A shortage of manpower was also a headache for the Japanese side and there were concerns that this would lead to enemies being overlooked. In addition, gaps were likely to occur near the borders of the areas that the garrisons were in charge of, allowing the enemy to flee.¹³ In addition, there were times when the army wanted to carry out

¹⁰ Japan estimated that the guerrilla force, which numbered 24,000 to 25,000 individuals around November 1942, had been reduced to about 10,000 by March 1943 ("*Kenpeitaicho Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Hito Kenpeitai Jokyō Setsumei An* [Draft of Briefing of the Situation Surrounding the Military Police in the Philippines at the Military Police Chiefs' Meeting]" [April 1, 1943], "*Parawan Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Palawan Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 14, 1942, to July 9, 1944," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense).

¹¹ At the same time, MacArthur was also attempting to strengthen the anti-Japanese guerrillas by sending operatives, arms, ammunition, and other supplies, especially radios, to the Philippines by submarine. This action was with the aim of gathering accurate information and enabling coordination among guerrilla organizations (see, for example, William B. Breuer, *MacArthur's Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions* [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995], pp. 85-89, 113-115 and 126-127).

¹² "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'*" [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 14, 1943).

¹³ "*Hachigatsu Iko Shukusei Tobatsu ni Kansuru Saibu no Shiji (Nagano Shitai)*" [Detailed Instructions on Crackdowns from August Onward (Nagano Detachment)]" (no date), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], June 29 to December 30, 1942," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense).

crackdowns but had to abandon them due to a lack of reserves.¹⁴

During these battles, the troops often operated in unfamiliar territory, so gathering information was especially important, but this was not easy. For example, local chiefs often only pretended to obey and would betray the Japanese. Others had connections to the enemy or knew of enemy affairs but would not speak out for fear of reprisals.¹⁵ Gradually, it came to be realized that information was best gathered from prisoners of war and that raids to acquire them were vital.¹⁶

At the same time, they also used Filipino secret agents to gather information. This action seems to have paid off, especially in early crackdown efforts. However, the secret agents included thugs and ex-convicts, and some of them threatened residents and plundered money and goods during their activities. These issues caused locals to become antagonistic, making it difficult to gather useful information. In addition, since the guerrillas saw the secret agents as Japanese collaborators, they were at risk of being killed or kidnapped.¹⁷ Additionally, some worked as double agents.¹⁸

As mentioned earlier, the guerrillas, depleted by the Japanese army's crackdowns, changed their tactics and began to launch attacks against non-military targets, making increased use of terrorism. Ironically, the success of the crackdowns led to an increase in the number of incidents in which non-military personnel were harmed, creating an unfavorable situation.

(2) Surrender and Submission

During the Philippine campaign in the first half of 1942, surrender and submission maneuvers were carried out alongside arrests. These maneuvers mainly targeted Communist Party members.

According to historical documents, about 2,000 people submitted by the end of April and 5,780 by the end of May, with another 1,500 expected to submit soon.¹⁹ Thus, surrender and submission maneuvers were effective to a certain extent as countermeasures against the Communist Party in the early stages of the war. However, there were also limitations, and it seems that many of the party members who did not agree to submit sought to join the remnants of the defeated soldiers.²⁰

As mentioned prior, the summer and fall of 1942 was a period when crackdowns were carried out particularly thoroughly as a countermeasure against anti-Japanese guerrillas. In parallel with

¹⁴ Kumai Toshimi, *Firipin no Chi to Doro: Taiheiyo Senso Saiaku no Gerirasen* [Blood and Mud in the Philippines: The Worst Guerrilla Warfare of the Pacific War] (Jiji Tsushinsha, 1977), p. 82.

¹⁵ *Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai* [the 11th Independent Garrison], "*Tobatsu Yoryo* [Essentials of Crackdowns]" (October 19, 1942), "*Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], June 29 to December 30, 1942."

¹⁶ "*Hachigatsu Iko Shukusei Tobatsu ni Kansuru Saibu no Shiji (Nagano Shitai)* [Detailed Instructions on Crackdowns from August Onward (Nagano Detachment)]."

¹⁷ Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], p. 116.

¹⁸ Kumai, *Firipin no Chi to Doro* [Blood and Mud in the Philippines], pp. 62-63.

¹⁹ "*Chian Geppo (Shigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the April Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (May 13, 1942); "*Kyosanto Kijun Kosaku Sonogo no Shinchoku Jokyo ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Subsequent Progress of Submission Maneuvers vis-a-vis the Communist Party, 'Notice']" *Ichiyakenko Dai 172 Go* (June 1, 1942), "*Iroiro Kenpei Hakentai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Dispatched Unit Police Documents], May to June 1942 2/2."

²⁰ "*Chian Geppo (Shigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the April Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (May 13, 1942); "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 12, 1942).

these operations, surrender and submission maneuvers were carried out as necessary. However, the purpose of these was to improve the results of the crackdown efforts. Surrender and submission maneuvers were only one extra means of armed subjugation.²¹

As these efforts progressed, propaganda also gained attention and came to be more often used to have anti-Japanese guerrillas submit to Japanese rule.²² In the same month, guerrilla leaders on the island of Luzon were arrested one after another. Many others also surrendered and returned home due to lack of food and disappointment over the lack of support from U.S. troops.²³ In addition, to the military police's knowledge, about 4,000 people surrendered or submitted themselves to Japanese rule in December.²⁴ It is difficult to say whether that was because the propaganda was having an impact. It also could have been a synergistic effect of the crackdowns.

As part of the background for the emphasis on surrender and submission maneuvers as part of crackdown efforts, we can speculate that the ideas of Colonel Nagahama Akira, who arrived as the 14th Army's Military Police Commander in September, may have had an influence. Nagahama followed the tactical maneuver used by Zhuge Liang Kongming in the *Records of the Three Kingdoms* against an enemy general, "capture seven times and release seven times," making it his policy to capture anti-Japanese individuals and groups, educate them on Japan's ideology, and release them. This action was repeated until they stopped their anti-Japanese activities.²⁵ In December, the 14th Army issued an order to "thoroughly destroy" the remaining guerrillas by March of the following year and to "ensure the safety" of the Philippines.²⁶ At the same time, a "Propaganda and Pacification Plan" based on the order mentioned above was formulated by the 14th Army's Press Department. The focus was placed on surrender and pacification maneuvers for defeated soldiers and pacification work for residents of regions where crackdowns were performed.²⁷ A "policy of indoctrination" was then issued in a statement on January 24, 1943. This policy made it clear that anti-Japanese guerrillas and other rebels' lives would be guaranteed after their arrest.²⁸ The effect

²¹ "Hachigatsu Iko Shukusei Tobatsu ni Kansuru Saibu no Shiji (Nagano Shitai) [Detailed Instructions on Crackdowns from August Onward (Nagano Detachment)];" *Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai* [the 11th Independent Garrison], "Tobatsu Yoryo [Essentials of Crackdowns]."

²² "Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai Senden Senbu Keikaku [the 11th Independent Garrison's Propaganda and Pacification Plan]" (November 10, 1942), "Takuroban Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri [Tacloban Military Police Detachment Police Documents], June 29 to December 30, 1942."

²³ "Chian Geppo (Juichigatsu) [November Monthly Security Report]" (December 12, 1942).

²⁴ "Chian Geppo (Junigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho' [Report on the Submission of the December Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (January 13, 1943).

²⁵ Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], p. 109; Utsunomiya Naotaka, "Minamijujisei o Nozomitsutsu [Gazing at the Southern Cross]" (August 1981), p. 110, collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense. On the other hand, we cannot deny that the guerrillas tended to intensify their hatred of the Japanese army as a result of being captured, taking an even harsher stance than before (Kumai, *Firipin no Chi to Doro* [Blood and Mud in the Philippines], p. 64).

²⁶ "Dai 14 Gun Meirei [Order of the 14th Army]," *Watarishusakumei Ko Dai 775 Go* (December 28, 1942), "Parawan Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri [Palawan Military Police Detachment Police Documents], October 13, 1942, to December 28, 1943," collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense.

²⁷ "Watarishusakumei Ko Dai 775 Go ni Motozuku Senden Senbu Keikaku [Propaganda and Pacification Plan Based on the Operation Order Issued by the 14th Army, A, no. 775]" (December 29, 1942), "Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], January to March 1943 1/2."

²⁸ "Kenpeitaicho Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Hito Kenpeitai Jokyo Setsume An [Draft of Briefing of the Situation Surrounding the Military Police in the Philippines at the Military Police Chiefs' Meeting]."

was immediate,²⁹ being followed by a steady stream of individuals surrendering and submitting. By the end of April, 60 officers and 482 enlisted men from the guerrillas had been captured.³⁰

Also, the surrender of “Charles Joseph Cochin,”³¹ the American commander of the guerrilla forces (a self-proclaimed major) in Pangasinan Province, was another achievement during this period. According to a historical document, Cochin had organized 15 companies of about 2,500 guerrilla troops to carry out anti-Japanese operations. The Japanese let secret agents infiltrate these guerrilla groups to gather information. In early February 1943, the military police placed Cochin’s wife under house arrest and encouraged her to surrender by appeasing her. At the same time, garrisons thoroughly cracked down on the guerrillas. On March 6, the military police and the Philippine Police raided Cochin’s hideout, and the garrisons blocked his exit route. Cochin, who was surrounded, was advised by the mayor to surrender. On the following day, the 7th, Cochin surrendered alone and pledged to cooperate with the Japanese army.³²

After that, in June, it was believed that “the mass surrender of army rebels had nearly ended,”³³ but this was only temporary. In August, the number of surrenders and individuals submitting to Japanese rule increased again. For example, from August 14 to 19, “Colonel Dominaldo Fernandez,”³⁴ commander of the 6th Brigade of the U.S. unconventional rebel forces in the Philippines, and 752 others surrendered at once. Around the same time, the Japanese side used a lone surrender to encourage the guerrillas to fully surrender and had 21 officers submit to Japanese rule.³⁵

The surrender and submission maneuvers in parallel with crackdown efforts had remarkable results, and their effectiveness was even recognized amongst Filipinos at the time of “independence.”³⁶ As for the factors behind the effectiveness of the surrender and submission maneuvers, we must first point out the synergistic effects of cracking down on the rebels. However, it is also possible that there was a compound effect caused by the successive arrests of guerrilla

²⁹ Hitomi Junsuke, “*Dai 14 Gun Sendenhan/Hodobu o Megutte* [Issues surrounding the 14th Army’s Propaganda Team/Press Department]” (*Intabyu 14* [Interview no. 14]), *Nippon no Firipin Senryoki ni Kansuru Shiryō Chosa Foramu* [Forum for Document Research on the period of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines], ed., *Intabyu Kiroku Nippon no Firipin Senryo* [Interview Records: Japanese Occupation of the Philippines], p. 511.

³⁰ “‘*San Paburo*’ *Shi Shuhen Hidan Toko ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Surrender of Rebel Groups in and around San Pablo, ‘Notice’],” *Hikenko Dai 516 Go* (August 30, 1943), “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], August 11 to October 20, 1943.”

³¹ The correct English notation is unknown as it is not recorded in historical documents.

³² “*Beijin Hishu Koshin Shosa no Toko ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Surrender of the American Rebel Commander Cochin, ‘Notice’],” *Hikenko Dai 167 Go* (March 13, 1943), “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], March 1 to April 17, 1943.”

³³ “*Chian Geppo (Rokugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Submission of the June Monthly Security Report, ‘Notice’]” (July 15, 1943).

³⁴ The correct English notation is unknown as it is not recorded in historical documents.

³⁵ “‘*San Paburo*’ *Shi Shuhen Hidan Toko ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Surrender of Rebel Groups in and around San Pablo, ‘Notice’].”

³⁶ “*Chian Geppo (Jugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Submission of the October Monthly Security Report, ‘Notice’]” (November 14, 1943). After the end of the war, the First Demobilization Bureau compiled a document called “Outline of the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Relation to the Southern Campaign” in May 1946. In its “Annex no. 1: Overview of the Philippine Military Administration (Draft),” it was noted that “the impact of the maneuvers was great, with four to seven hundred people reporting every month” (*Daiichi Fukuinkyoku* [First Demobilization Bureau], “*Nanpo Sakusen ni Tomonau Senryochi Gyosei no Gaiyo* [Overview of the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Relation to the Southern Campaign]” [May 1946], collection of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense).

leaders, the lack of food, and the disappointment produced surrounding inadequate support from the U.S. troops.³⁷ Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the Japanese side openly adopted a so-called “indoctrination policy.” The policy involved not punishing captured guerrillas but instead educating them on Japan’s thought and releasing them. It is clear that the promise to guarantee their lives made it easier for the guerrillas to choose to surrender and submit.³⁸

However, the biggest problem with surrender and submission maneuvers was that the Japanese army took too long to formally focus on them. As mentioned earlier, the surrender and submission maneuvers, which had already proved effective against Communist Party members, were positioned as “an auxiliary means of armed crackdown”³⁹ in the summer of 1942, when the army was aiming for thorough subjugation. The emphasis on surrender and submission maneuvers came after Nagahama, who espoused the theory of “capture seven times and release seven times,” was appointed commander of the 14th Army Military Police in September of the year.

This paper has already mentioned that the “indoctrination policy” based on Nagahama’s ideas was successful, and the number of surrenders and those submitting to Japanese rule increased. However, problems were lurking behind this success. Some guerrillas surrendered under false pretenses, taking advantage of the fact that they would be released even if caught. Their true purpose was to obtain information from the Japanese side. These individuals returned to their comrades with the information they had obtained.⁴⁰

The success or failure of a surrender and submission maneuver also depended on the skill of those in charge. In some cases, maneuvers were performed by the military police, while in others, they were performed by Filipino collaborators. Such operatives and agents were in constant danger because they either spoke to the guerrillas’ negotiators or were in direct contact with the guerrillas, revealing their faces. This disadvantage led to repeated tragedies, seeing operatives and agents killed, injured, or abducted through terrorism or other means.⁴¹

(3) Propaganda and Pacification

The primary purpose of the 14th Army’s propaganda and pacification efforts was to bring about and maintain security by educating the Filipino population on and indoctrinating them to Japan’s war aims. In addition, there was a further aim of convincing the Philippine people of Japan’s victory so that they would break away from their dependence on the U.S. and cooperate with

³⁷ “*Chian Geppo (Juichigatsu)* [November Monthly Security Report]” (December 12, 1942); “*Chian Geppo (Junigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku ‘Tsucho’* [Report on the Submission of the December Monthly Security Report, ‘Notice’]” (January 13, 1943).

³⁸ For example, “the Survey of Surrender (Submission) Status” prepared by the Iloilo Military Police Detachment almost every ten days shows that in many cases “the motive for surrender was relief that their lives would be spared” and “advice of those who had surrendered (*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment], “*Nigatsu Nijuichi Nichi Iko Toko [Kijun] Jokyo Chosa Hyo* [Table of Survey of Surrender (Submission) Status after February 21]” [February 28, 1943]; *idem*, “*Sangatsu Tsuitachi Iko Toko [Kijun] Jokyo Chosa Hyo* [Table of Survey of Surrender (Submission) Status after March 1]” [March 10, 1943]; *idem*, “*Sangatsu Hatsuka Iko Toko [Kijun] Jokyo Chosa Hyo* [Table of Survey of Surrender (Submission) Status after March 20]” [March 31, 1943], “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Keimu Shoruitsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Detachment Police Documents], January to March 1943 2/2”).

³⁹ “*Hachigatsu Iko Shukusei Tobatsu ni Kansuru Saibu no Shiji (Nagano Shitai)* [Detailed Instructions on Crackdowns after August Onward (Nagano Detachment)].”

⁴⁰ Kumai, *Firipin no Chi to Doro* [Blood and Mud in the Philippines], pp. 64-65.

⁴¹ See, for example, Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], pp. 72-73, 109.

the Japanese military operations and military administration. For this reason, each unit of the 14th Army formed a propaganda and pacification team. These teams emphasized Japan's war aims, the capabilities and results of the Japanese army, the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the U.S.'s responsibility in starting the war, the history of U.S. oppression in and exploitation of the Philippines, the inferiority of the U.S. and British sides, the pointlessness of dependence on the U.S. and resistance to Japan, and the necessity to work hard to develop the Philippines.⁴² This propaganda was carried out by making speeches in prioritized areas, putting up propaganda posters, and distributing leaflets.⁴³

Furthermore, the Japanese side also dealt with anti-Japanese propaganda. Although there is no way to measure the effectiveness of this propaganda, an element of public disturbances was propaganda from the United States and Australia, which was also a source of rumors.⁴⁴ U.S. and Australian propaganda was mainly conducted through radio broadcasts.

The Japanese prevented Philippine residents from receiving propaganda broadcasts from the U.S. and Australia by changing their radio receivers from short-wave receivers to medium-wave receivers and monitoring what they listened to. In particular, anti-Japanese guerrillas not only listened to U.S. and Australian broadcasts on the radio but also communicated with the U.S. and Australian sides via ultra-short-wave radio. Therefore, the Japanese performed operations to search for and seize and destroy these radios.⁴⁵

Examining the progress of these operations, it seems that changes of the radio receivers did not proceed as expected until around the middle of 1943. For example, by the end of January 1943, only about 10% of the expected changes had been completed around Manila.⁴⁶ However, after the summer of the year, as the guerrilla crackdown and surrender/submission maneuvers progressed, enemy radio stations and radio factories were discovered and eliminated, with the seizure of radios and parts.⁴⁷

Although it is difficult to assess the effects of propaganda and pacification, the fact that the guerrillas were forced to attack the general population and plunder money, food, clothing, and

⁴² *Watarishudan Shireibu* [Wataru Group Headquarters], "*Senden Keikaku* [Propaganda Plan]" (June 10, 1942), "*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Shitsumu Sankotsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Reference Materials for Office-work], May 25 to December 5, 1942;" "*Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai Senden Senbu Keikaku* [The 11th Independent Garrison Propaganda and Pacification Plan]."

⁴³ See, for example, Kumai, *Firipin no Chi to Doro* [Blood and Mud in the Philippines], p. 55.

⁴⁴ "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 14, 1943).

⁴⁵ See, for example, *Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai* [The 11th Independent Garrison], "*Tobatsu Yoryo* [Essentials of Crackdowns];" "*Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai Senden Senbu Keikaku* [The 11th Independent Garrison Propaganda and Pacification Plan];" "*Heidan Sakusen Shunin Sanbo To Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Kokyu Sanbo Setsumei Yoshi* [Summary of the Explanation Given by the High-ranking Staff Officer at the Meeting of the Strategic Groups' Chief Staffs of Operation and Others]" (October 31, 1942); Utsunomiya, "*Minamijujisei o Nozomitsutsu* [Gazing at the Southern Cross]," p. 90.

⁴⁶ "*Chian Geppo (Ichigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the January Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (February 12, 1943); "*Chian Geppo (Gogatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the May Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (June 14, 1943).

⁴⁷ "*Chian Geppo (Hachigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the August Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (September 16, 1943); "*Chian Geppo (Jugatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the October Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (October 15, 1943); "*Chian Geppo (Juichigatsu) Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the November Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (November 14, 1942).

other survival items is proof that the general population was no longer supplying the guerrillas with these items. In other words, the separation of the rebels and civilians⁴⁸ had progressed, indicating that to some extent, the propaganda and pacification by the Japanese side were effective.

However, a significant issue with propaganda and pacification was that, as with the earlier surrender and submission maneuvers, the importance of these actions was not initially recognized at first. Instead, the Japanese army had to begin such activities in the field with entirely inadequate preparation. According to Hitomi Junsuke, who was a member of the 14th Army's Propaganda Team at the start of the war, none of the group's early members had received any specialized training. There were also no documents to serve as the basis for their operations, and only a few basic policies or orders and instructions were given.⁴⁹

The following problems also arose regarding lack of preparation. Obviously, the most effective way to explain Japan's position to the local population was to speak in Tagalog, the local language. However, neither the propaganda team members nor the army interpreters were not able to speak Tagalog, even though they could speak English. They, therefore, sought the cooperation of Japanese residents. Unfortunately, although these individuals were acquainted with simple conversations, they did not have the language skills necessary to explain the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. However, even if there were individuals with sufficient language skills, the locals couldn't understand the difficult content, requiring that concepts be explained with plain and straightforward expression. It took a patrol of the countryside until the team realized this.⁵⁰

Because of the relatively small number of troops carrying out propaganda and pacification, alongside the need to avoid alarming the general population, defenses were generally spread thin. Furthermore, the Japanese propaganda and pacification were hated by the guerrillas. As a result, the units that carried out the propaganda and pacification operations were easy targets for rebel and terrorist attacks and received damage.

(4) Investigations and Arrests

During the war, investigations and arrests were the primary means used by the Japanese side to deal with security disturbances caused by anti-Japanese guerrillas and others, along with crackdowns. These investigations were handled by the Japanese army's military police and the Philippine police. Typically, the military police and the Philippine police conducted their investigations independently, but they also cooperated depending on the nature of the case. To make the investigation more fruitful, the Japanese helped develop and strengthen the

⁴⁸ In this case, separating rebels and civilians did not imply measures to make contact with the guerrillas physically impossible by moving the general population en masse and isolating them. Instead, it implied preventing the general population from supporting the guerrillas through psychological detachment. For example, the Japanese side worked to draw attention to the "tyranny and inhumanity" of the guerrillas to arouse a sense of hatred in the local population, persuade the Philippine side to cooperate with the Japanese in stamping out the guerrillas to maintain peace. They also worked to encourage locals to cooperate in gathering information, recovering weapons, and defending themselves in their villages, thus fostering a feeling of detachment between rebels and civilians ("*Dai 11 Dokuritsu Shubitai Senden Senbu Keikaku* [The 11th Independent Garrison Propaganda and Pacification Plan]").

⁴⁹ Hitomi, "*Dai 14 Gun Sendenhan/Hodobu o Megutte* [Issues Surrounding the 14th Army's Propaganda Team/ Press Department]," pp. 485-489.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

Philippine police force. One specific method was to revise the Philippine police system and train police officers.

At the start of the Pacific War, the Philippines had a constabulary⁵¹ established in 1901 and “local police.”⁵² The constabulary was under the command of the central government, and local chiefs had no authority over it, while the “local police” were under the command of the local chiefs and the central government branch had no authority over them. Japanese revision involved unifying the constabulary and local police into a national police system, like the Japanese police system at the time, to improve its efficiency.⁵³

The Japanese side opened police training camps in Manila, Baguio, Cebu, and Davao to train Filipino police officers, providing about two months of education. Trainees were divided into high-ranking police officers who worked in the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Security Bureau and general police officers (lower-ranking officers and below). For the former group, “those with high character and experience among senior POW officers” were selected. For the latter, “POWs with sound thought and solid mind” were selected. It is believed that about 20,000 police officers were trained under this system between May 1942 and March 1943.⁵⁴ Still, the number of graduates was limited, so existing police officers were relied on for much of the work.⁵⁵

In parallel with the development and reinforcement of the police, a system of self-policing (*hoko seido*) by the general population was established and implemented from August 7, 1942.⁵⁶ According to the “Outline for the Establishment of the Baojia System,”⁵⁷ the policy was to encourage “self-restraint and self-discipline” among the general population by having them take part in patrols and to “further perfect the maintenance of public order” through its “organic utilization.”

⁵¹ The Japanese side called them “*junkeitai* (patrol forces).”

⁵² In this paper, the term “*chiho keisatsu* (local police)” is used, but in *Daiichi Fukuinkyoku* [First Demobilization Bureau], “*Nanpo Sakusen ni Tomonau Senryochi Gyosei no Gaiyo* [Overview of the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Relation to the Southern Campaign],” they are referred to as “*shu keisatsu* (provincial police),” and in Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front] as “*shichoson keisatsu* (municipal police)” (Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], p. 91).

⁵³ *Daiichi Fukuinkyoku* [First Demobilization Bureau], “*Nanpo Sakusen ni Tomonau Senryochi Gyosei no Gaiyo* [Overview of the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Relation to the Southern Campaign],” Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], p. 91.

⁵⁴ *Daiichi Fukuinkyoku* [First Demobilization Bureau], “*Nanpo Sakusen ni Tomonau Senryochi Gyosei no Gaiyo* [Overview of the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Relation to the Southern Campaign],” Satake, *Hofutsutaru Ruson Sensen* [The Floating Luzon Front], p. 90. According to Ota Koki, one officer training camp and six general training camps were established (Ota, “*Firipin ni Okeru Nippon Gunsei* [The Japanese Military Government in the Philippines],” p. 39). Also, according to Satake Hisashi, the general training period was about three months, with the training of officers being about six months (Satake, “*Genba no Wakaki Kenpei kara Mita Gunsei* [Military Government as Seen by a Young Military Police in the Field],” p. 260). Incidentally, the first entrance ceremony of the police training camps was held on June 1, 1942, and the first graduation ceremony was held on August 29 of the same year (Ota, “*Firipin ni Okeru Nippon Gunsei* [The Japanese Military Government in the Philippines],” pp. 42-43).

⁵⁵ “*Kakushu Keisatsutai Honbu Sosetsu ni Kansuru Tsucho* [Notification Regarding the Establishment of Police Headquarters in Each Province],” *Watari-gunseinai Dai 275 Go* (September 3, 1942), attachment: “*Keisatsutai Honbu Sosetsu Yoryo* [Outline of Establishing Police Headquarters],” “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Shitsumu Sankotsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Reference Materials for Office-work], May 25 to December 5, 1942.”

⁵⁶ Ota, “*Firipin ni Okeru Nippon Gunsei* [The Japanese Military Government in the Philippines],” p. 38.

⁵⁷ “*Hoko Seido Sosetsu Yoko* [Outline for the Establishment of the Baojia System]” (July 6, 1942), “*Iroiro Kenpei Buntai Shitsumu Sankotsuzuri* [Iloilo Military Police Reference Materials for Office-work], May 25 to December 5, 1942.” The “*hoko*” units were made up of teams of households, with the “*ko*” (teams) consisting of between 5 and 15 households. The “*ho*” (units) themselves consisted of between 5 and 15 *ko*.

Investigations by the military police and the Philippine police were also successful. In particular, the arrest of guerrilla leaders led to the weakening and destruction of the groups under their control. Guerrilla groups that lost their leaders and top members due to these arrests declined in strength and either refrained from aggressive activities while rebuilding, were dispersed and destroyed, or merged with other groups. Thus, the investigations and arrests reduced the overall strength of the guerrillas and calmed their activities.

The fact that the Philippine police conducted investigations and made more arrests based on their findings is an indication that their capabilities improved.⁵⁸ Therefore, it is probably fair to say that Japan's training of the Philippine police was effective.

However, the shortage of skilled Filipino police officers was also a problem when it came to investigations and arrests. This problem was gradually resolved by training police officers at the police training camps established by the Japanese. However, as mentioned earlier, the number of graduates was limited, so the execution of duties had to rely mainly on the existing police officers. Their old habits plagued reformist efforts in the early stages.⁵⁹

Similar to crackdown, surrender and submission maneuvers, Filipino secret agents were also used in investigations. As mentioned prior, since the guerrillas and criminals saw them as Japanese collaborators, they were at risk of being killed or kidnapped. Similarly, Philippine police personnel was quite frequently victims of killings and abductions by terrorism and other means. On the contrary, they were also often recruited by the guerrillas. Police officers not only had information about the Japanese and learned how their investigations were conducted, but they also possessed weapons and were used to handling them. Those were additional reasons for recruitment by the guerrillas.⁶⁰ It seems certain that some police officers took their weapons and joined the guerrillas. However, the majority ignored the guerrillas' recruitment efforts.⁶¹

Conclusion

This paper focused on the first half of the Pacific War, the period corresponding to Japan's military rule, from the outbreak of the war in December 1941 to the Philippines' "independence" in October 1943. It clarified the nature of the security disturbances caused by the anti-Japanese guerrillas, etc., and the various measures taken by the Japanese army to restore and maintain security in the region, examining military responses from the perspective of effectiveness and the problems that arose. As described in this paper, the various measures taken by the Japanese during this period were

⁵⁸ In the "Monthly Security Report" of October 1942, there was a negative description of the Philippine police: "It is difficult to overcome the ill effects of sentiments and allegiances, and it is also difficult to have confidence in them." However, in the following month's report, there was a complete, positive turnaround: "The attitude of the police toward cooperation is gradually becoming more serious.... The areas controlled by these police units are gradually getting on track Police who have good qualities and training have achieved considerable results ..." ("Chian Geppo (*Jugatsu*) [October Monthly Security Report]" [November 10, 1942]; "Chian Geppo (*Juichigatsu*) [November Monthly Security Report]" [December 12, 1942]).

⁵⁹ "Chian Geppo (*Jugatsu*) [October Monthly Security Report]" (November 10, 1942).

⁶⁰ "Chian Geppo (*Junigatsu*) *Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the December Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (January 13, 1943); "Chian Geppo (*Hachigatsu*) *Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the August Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (September 16, 1943); "Chian Geppo (*Kugatsu*) *Teishutsu ni Kansuruken Hokoku 'Tsucho'* [Report on the Submission of the September Monthly Security Report, 'Notice']" (October 15, 1943).

⁶¹ Ota, "Firipin ni Okeru Nippon Gunsei [The Japanese Military Government in the Philippines]," p. 41.

effective to some extent, but they did not achieve their goal of entirely securing the Philippines.

The 14th Military Police Headquarters analyzed the causes of the deteriorating security situation in the Philippines as it conducted its thorough crackdowns.⁶² The main thrust of its analysis is as follows.

The causes of the deteriorating security situation in the Philippines were diverse and complex, but there were two root causes. Firstly, U.S. rule before the war was not overly disliked by the local population. On the contrary, they felt that there were benefits from the U.S. administration and also dearly longed for the return of U.S. troops and believed that they would come back.

Secondly, since the start of the conflict between Japan and China, U.S. anti-Japanese propaganda that painted the Japanese military as reckless became unexpectedly widespread and ingrained among the public. Some Japanese military personnel and civilian workers for the military also acted in a way that credited these beliefs, causing the general population to fear the Japanese military more than necessary.

Based on this analysis, the Japanese army tried to find a way forward by adopting an “indoctrination principle” against the guerrillas as described in this paper. It was successful in this action. However, the anti-Japanese guerrillas, who escaped crackdowns, went into hiding to regroup, partly due to MacArthur’s orders. The anti-Japanese guerrillas—who until that point had existed as multiple small groups, each operating independently—also began to work together with the support of the U.S. military, in communication and coordination. These were just some of the new forms of resistance the Japanese army would have to deal with after October 1943.

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⁶² “*Kenpeitaicho Kaido Sekijo ni Okeru Hito Kenpeitai Jokyo Setsumei An* [Draft of Briefing of the Situation Surrounding the Military Police in the Philippines at the Military Police Chiefs’ Meeting].”