

The Kuomintang Army in the War Termination Process of 1945: From Counterattack against Japan to Restoration of Authority*

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Abstract

In regard to the Sino-Japanese War termination process, conventionally there has been a focus on the “cooperative” relationship between the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) government and Japan’s China Expeditionary Army, as well as the support from the United States. In contrast, this paper focuses on the role played by the KMT army especially in the early stages of the war termination process, and clarifies the proactive and internal factors of the KMT government that enabled the early war termination process. Before the end of the war, the KMT government had been building its military posture since January 1945 with a view to conducting a counterattack against Japan with the full support of the U.S. forces in China. After the ceasefire, the KMT government shifted its military posture to a nationwide operation to restore authority, which made it possible to carry out the war termination process immediately after the war ended. On the other hand, when competition surrounding restoration of authority with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intensified after the war, the KMT army returned to its wartime methods and tried to prevent the expansion of the CCP’s power by using the Wang Jingwei regime’s forces. In this way, the war termination process conducted by the KMT army smoothly transitioned from the wartime to postwar stage, and its influence can be said to have extended to the postwar confrontation between the KMT government and the CCP.

Introduction

On August 15, 1945, Japan announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and unconditionally surrendered to the Allies. Due to this, Japanese troops that had been fighting in China surrendered to the KMT government. On September 2, a delegation of the government of Japan signed the instrument of surrender in front of delegations from various countries, including the Republic of China. On September 9, Japan’s China Expeditionary Army signed the instrument of surrender at an assembly hall of the army headquarters in Nanjing. This signified the official termination of the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had lasted since July 1937.

At the end of the war, the KMT government had not expected Japan to surrender, which is said to have caused chaos in the war termination process with disorder among organizations in charge and looting by unofficial armed groups.¹ As pointed out in previous studies, on the

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¹ Sho Ikurin, *Konichi senshori no zengo- chugoku kara mita shusen shiwa* [Before and after the victory of the war against Japan: The end of the war from the Chinese perspective] (Jiji Press, 1968), 112-118.

other hand, it is also true that the KMT government succeeded at least in the initial operations to restore authority in mainland China (excluding Manchuria) early in the war termination process.² If the KMT government lacked sufficient preparation and had internal disorder, why was it able to control the situation smoothly to some extent at the initial postwar stage?

Regarding this issue, previous studies have long emphasized the influence of the factors of the “cooperative” relationship between the KMT government and Japan’s China Expeditionary Army as well as the support from the United States. Both of these factors stem from the political situation in postwar China. In terms of Japan-China relations, while the KMT government hastened the war termination process to prevent the CCP growing power,³ Japan’s China Expeditionary Army deliberately took a cooperative stance with the KMT government in order to support the national unification promoted by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).⁴ The United States also supported the war termination process in response to domestic public opinion calling for swift demobilization and from the perspective of supporting the KMT government’s unification of all of China including Manchuria.⁵

However, while such “cooperation” with the Japanese side and support from the United States may explain the external factors that actively promoted the restoration of authority, they do not answer subjective and internal questions on how the KMT government succeeded in centrally controlling and promoting the operations to restore authority. Therefore, this paper focuses on the role played by the KMT army, which led the early war termination process. In the first place, for the KMT government, the series of operations in the war termination process from the ceasefire to the restoration of authority in the areas controlled by the Japanese side had the aspect of a military operation to send a large number of occupation troops from its base in the deep southwest of China to the whole country. For this reason, the role performed by the KMT army in the early war termination process is considered to have been extremely significant. This paper seeks to clarify the internal factors that made it possible for the KMT government to handle the early stage of the war termination process by analyzing the actions of the KMT army and the posture that supported it.

Previous studies on the KMT army in the latter half of the Sino-Japanese War has focus

² Lin Tongfa, *Cong jieshou dao lunxian – zhanhou pingjin diqu jieshou gongzuo zhi jiantao* [From Expropriation to Fall - A Review of Postwar Expropriation Work in Pingjin Area], (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi [The Grand East Book Company], 1997), pp. 79-80 and Momma Rira, “Riyō sareta haisha: nihongun buso kaijō o meguru kokkyō ryōto no kakehiki” [Utilizing the defeated: Tactics of the KMT and CCP over disarmament of the Japanese army], in *Nichū senso no gunjiteki tenkai* [Military situations of the Sino-Japanese War] (Keio University Press, 2006).

³ For more information on the relationship between the two parties before and after the end of the war, see Oh Cho Ko, “Sengo chugoku wo meguru katto- konichi senso shori zengo ni okeru kokkyō ryōto oyobi nihongun no kakuchiku [The conflict over postwar China: The competition of the KMT and the CCP as well as the Japanese army before and after the victory in the war against Japan] in *Nichū senso no gunjiteki tenkai* [Military situations of the Sino-Japanese War], (Keio University Press, 2006).

⁴ For more information on “cooperation” between Japan and China, see Momma, “Riyō sareta haisha,” and Kato Kiyofumi, “Kokkyō naisenka no sengo nicchu teikei [Postwar Japan-China alliance during the Chinese Civil War]” in *Nichū shusen to sengo ajia no tenbo* [The end of the war between Japan and China and postwar prospects of Asia], eds. Hatano Sumio et al. (Keio University Press, 2017).

⁵ Kato Yoko, “Haisha no kikan- chugoku kara no fukuin hikiage mondai no tenkai” [The return of the defeated: The development of the issue of demobilization and repatriation from China], *Kokusai Seiji* [International politics], no. 109 (May 1995).

to the counterattack plan against Japan and U.S.-China relations.⁶ However, although these studies evaluate the role of the KMT army from the perspective of operations against Japan and wartime diplomacy, they do not extend to discuss the relationship with the postwar situation, such as restoration of authority and civil war. By contrast, this paper emphasizes the historical continuity before and after the ceasefire, and analyzes the impact of the actions of the KMT army, which shifted from war against Japan to restoration of authority on the chaotic postwar situation, including the confrontation with the CCP. Through the above, this paper aims to clarify the posture and actions of the KMT army before and after the end of the war, which led to the swift war termination process, as well as revealing its influence on the chaotic postwar situation.

1. Military Posture Before the End of the War

In order to analyze the KMT army's efforts for the war termination, it is first necessary to understand its military posture before end of the war. In 1945, the KMT army was in the process of recovering from the damage inflicted by Japan's Operation Ichi-Go the previous year. This process also had a major impact on the war termination process by the KMT army.

The impact of Operation Ichi-Go was far-reaching, from the frontline areas of Hunan and Guangxi to the inner circle of the KMT government. The fall of strategic points such as Guilin, Liuzhou, and Changsha not only undermined the prestige of the KMT army, which had been undergoing reorganization since 1943, but also diminished China's strategic value as a bombing base against Japan. In particular, distrust between the United States and China reached its peak. In October 1944, U.S. military advisor General Joseph W. Stilwell was removed from his post at the request of Jiang Jieshi.⁷

At the same time, Stilwell's dismissal also marked a turning point for the United States to redefine the role of military support for China. Stilwell's successor, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, sought to support the KMT government's continuation of the war against Japan by expanding military support and building a system for close cooperation with the KMT army, including by improving relations with Jiang Jieshi. When Wedemeyer assumed his post in November 1944, the war situation on the Chinese front had extremely deteriorated due to the Japanese invasion into Guizhou Province, located directly south of Chongqing. The U.S. side took the situation very seriously and prepared for the worst-case scenario of the fall of Chongqing, including the relocation of the capital from Chongqing to Kunming City in Yunnan Province and the evacuation of U.S. citizens.⁸ Although the Japanese Army soon withdrew from Guizhou, Wedemeyer and his command in China took the opportunity to rebuild their strategic posture centered on Kunming.

Wedemeyer's plan to rebuild the KMT army came to fruition in January 1945 as the ALPHA

⁶ Qi Xisheng, *Jian ba nu zhang de mengyou taipin yang zhazheng qijian de zhongmei junshi hezuo guanxi (1941-1945)* [Allies at Odds: U.S.-China Military Cooperation during the Pacific War (1941-1945)], (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan [Academia Sinica], 2011); Su Shengxiong, *Kangzhan moqi guojun de fangong (1945)* [The Counter-Offensive of the KMT Army at the End of the War (1945)], *Guoshiguan guankan* [The Journal of Academia Historica], vol.51, 2017; Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

⁷ Kato Koichi, "The 'Stilwell Incident' and the Chongqing National Government" in *History of the Chongqing National Government*, ed. Ishijima Noriyuki and Kubo Toru (University of Tokyo Press, 2004) p. 156.

⁸ Acheson to the Secretary of State, December 5, 1944, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, China*, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 199-200.

plan.⁹ The gist of the ALPHA plan was to use Kunming as a base and equip the 36 KMT army divisions with U.S. weapons and training, and then launch a counterattack against the Japanese army after they had built up their strength by the summer of the same year. The KMT government accepted Wedemeyer's proposal, dismantled six divisions and allocated them to the plan, and later promoted the modernization of 39 divisions including the troops stationed in India that had participated in the Burma campaign.¹⁰

The organization on the Chinese side that carried out and operated the ALPHA plan was the Chinese Combat Command (CCC) headquarters. The CCC was officially established in Kunming on December 25, 1944, with Chief of the General Staff, Military Affairs Commission He Yingqin as its commander. According to the operation guidelines, the CCC's duties were to block the advance of the enemy from central and south China into Kunming and Chongqing. And it took command all troops south of the Yangtze River, except for reserve units directly under the Military Affairs Commission and troops under the III, VI, VII, and IX War Zone.¹¹ As of its establishment on December 25, the military forces under the CCC's direct control totaled 86 divisions in seven groups, or 25.9% of the nation's total military force.

The Third Area Army and Fourth Area Army, the main force units of ALPHA plan, were given priority in deployment of U.S. military support.¹² For example, the two divisions under the command of the 18th Army (belonging to the Fourth Area Army, organized into three divisions) had 80% of its equipment replaced as of April 1945.¹³ Furthermore, the CCC's Logistics Command was established on February 1, and the CCC's logistical support posture was strengthened in cooperation with the U.S. Army's logistical section Services of Supply (SOS).¹⁴ By building a system of close cooperation with the U.S. Army, the CCC became a military organization that led the U.S.-China joint effort from logistical support to combat with ground forces on the front lines.

While the army was being reorganized at Kunming as its base to prepare for a counterattack against Japan, the military posture north of the Yangtze River was also being revamped. The main defensive front area, such as Hunan and Henan provinces, had been in a precarious situation before

⁹ Su Shengxiong, *Kangzhan moqi guojun de fangong* (1945) [The Counter-Offensive of the KMT Army at the End of the War (1945)], p. 107.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 107-109.

¹¹ The Second Historical Archives of China ed., *Junlingbu ni zhongguo lujun zuozhan jihua dagang* (1945 nian 2 yue 12 ri) [The Board of Military Operation Preparing an Outline of the Chinese Army's Battle Plan (February 12, 1945)], *Kangri zhanzheng zhengmian zhanchang (shang)* [The Frontal Battlefield of China's Anti-Japanese War vol.1], (Nanjing: Fenghuang Chubanshe [Phoenix Publishing House], 2005), pp. 167-170.

¹² Su Shengxiong, *Kangzhan moqi guojun de fangong* (1945) [The Counter-Offensive of the National Army at the End of the War (1945)], p. 106.

¹³ *Meijun zongbu tiaozhi “Aerfa jun bofa junxie qingkuangbiao (1945 nian 4 yue 15 ri)”* [Table of Allocation Status of Military Ordnance (April 15, 1945) by U.S. Army Headquarters], *Chen Cheng fuzongtong wenwu “Kangzhan moqi meiyuan kangzhan junshi sunshi ji jieshou riben peichang ziliao”* [Vice President Chen Cheng Collections: “Information on the Military Losses of U.S. Rescue Forces in the War and the Compensation Received from Japan at the End of the War”], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 008-010701-00015-002.

However, according to Su Shengxiong, the amount of equipment transported by the U.S. forces and the rate of equipment conversion for the entire ALPHA plan seems to have been limited. (Su Shengxiong, *Kangzhan moqi guojun de fangong* (1945) [The Counter-Offensive of the National Army at the End of the War (1945)], p. 111)

¹⁴ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Army, 1959), p. 345.

Operation Ichi-Go due to slackened military control and the infiltration of the CCP.¹⁵

For this reason, the defense posture was strengthened by reorganizing the command structure and units and by enforcing discipline.¹⁶ In the west of the Beiping-Hankow railway, which was the main line of defense in North China, the KMT government settled two defense areas. The I War Zone had jurisdiction over part of Shaanxi Province and Henan Province, and the V War Zone had jurisdiction over northern Hubei Province, southern Henan Province, and southern Shaanxi Province.¹⁷ Furthermore, although the Hanzhong field headquarters (commanded by General Li Zongren) existed as a senior command, in reality the I War Zone was given a higher strategic position. I War Zone had its headquarters in Xi'an and was commanded by General Hu Zongnan, who was highly trusted by Jiang Jieshi. At that time, Xi'an was also the center of military construction in the north of the Yangtze River, including the training base of U.S. military advisors.¹⁸

In this way, the KMT army, which had suffered a blow in Operation Ichi-Go, was preparing its strategic posture from the beginning of 1945, focusing on the consolidation of its military structure and the modernization and enhancement of its military strength.

2. The KMT Army's Preparations for the Counterattack against Japan, and the Response to the Wang Regime and the CCP

From the beginning of 1945, Jiang Jieshi began to conceive of a counterattack against Japan in mainland China, and considered the specific details with the General Staff and U.S. forces in China, including Wedemeyer. In the end, this idea converged into two operational plans: RASHNESS and CARBONADO.¹⁹

The two plans were to be carried out in August by the ALPHA force under the command of the CCC and the U.S. military headquarters in China. First, RASHNESS was to break through the Japanese Army's defense line from the southern bank of the Yangtze River to Hankow and advance toward Jiangxi Province, aiming to strike a blow at the strategic posture of the Japanese Army in central China. It also aimed to advance to French Indochina as a sub operation to eliminate the Japanese military threat to South China.²⁰

Next, the plan for CARBONADO was to capture South China. Specifically, it aimed to seize the coastal areas of Guangdong and Guangxi, and open the way for U.S. forces to land

¹⁵ Su Shengxiong and others ed. *Chen Cheng riji* [The Diary of Chen Cheng], June 16, 1944, (Taipei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2015), p. 580. (Hereinafter, the notation will be unified by the date and page number of the *Chen Cheng riji* [The Diary of Chen Cheng])

¹⁶ *Chen Cheng riji* [The Diary of Chen Cheng], June 16, 18, and 30; July 7, 1944, pp. 462-465.

¹⁷ *Kangri zhanshi Yuxi ebei huizhan* [The Battle of West Henan-North Hubei], (Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, Historical and Political Editing and Translation Bureau, 1981), pp. 6-7.

¹⁸ Cai Shengqi and Chen Shiju eds. *Hu Zongnan riji* [Hu Zongnan Diary], January 28, 1945, (Taipei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2015), p. 431. (Hereinafter, the notation will be unified by the date and page number of the *Hu Zongnan riji* [Hu Zongnan's Diaries])

¹⁹ Su Shengxiong, *Kangzhan moqi guojun de fangong* (1945) [The Counter-Offensive of the National Army at the End of the War (1945)], p. 114 and Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, p. 355.

²⁰ *Bingren zuozhan jihua* [Plan Rashness], *Chen Cheng fuzongtong wenwu* "Junzheng buzhang rennei bingren baita zuozhan jihua" [Vice President Chen Cheng Collections "Planning the Rashness and the Beta during the term in the office of the Chief of the Military Administration Department"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 008-010701-00031-001.

in Guangdong by cutting off contact with French Indochina.²¹ It can be said that the strategic significance of this plan was to open the way for a full-scale counterattack against Japan in mainland China in conjunction with the U.S. forces landing in Guangdong Province.

The KMT army's plan for the counterattack against Japan called for a system of close cooperation between the CCC and the U.S. military headquarters in China, exerting all efforts of the military strength developed by ALPHA plan. Therefore, the preparations for the counterattack formed a core of the KMT government's military posture at the end of the war. In his diary entry on January 13, Jiang Jieshi cheerfully wrote that decisions had been made for the southeast command structure, the coordination bill for the I War Zone, and the reintegration plan for the 36 divisions, and that all problems had been resolved.²² The "southeast command structure" referred to by Jiang indicated the CCC, and the "reorganization of 36 divisions" indicated the ALPHA plan. As symbolized by this, all preparations for the counterattack against Japan were inextricably linked to the military posture of the KMT army in 1945.

While preparations were underway for the counterattack centered on the CCC and the U.S. military headquarters in China, the military posture was also linked to the KMT army's actions for the Wang Jingwei regime and the CCP. At the end of the war, the Wang regime's forces numbered approximately 628,000, and that could not be ignored in the counterattack operations.²³ In early 1945, at the same time that Jiang Jieshi ordered the General Staff to plan a full-scale counterattack, he also ordered Zhang Zhizhong, the head of the Political Department in charge of political maneuvering, to work with the Military Affairs Commission's Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) to formulate and execute a plan for "counter maneuvering" to make the "fake army" (referring to the Wang regime's forces) changed sides in North China.²⁴ The BIS was a special agency that mainly dealt with military intelligence, and conducted various intelligence maneuvers and guerrilla operations.

"Counter maneuvering" against the Wang regime's forces was also pursued in South China. For example, the BIS succeeded in contacting the Guangzhou city security commander, Gui Zhangzan, and making him change sides.²⁵ In February 1945, the KMT government was planning to have an

²¹ *Junshi weiyuanhui weiyuanzhang shicongshi diyichu han Chen Cheng wei jian tong baita jihua* [The First Section of the Secretariat Office of the Military Affairs Commission Wrote to Chen Cheng for the Inspection of Plan Beta], *Chen Cheng fuzongtong wenwu "Junzheng buzhang rennei bingren baita zuozhan jihua"* [Vice President Chen Cheng Collections "Planning the Rashness and the Beta during the term in the office of the Chief of the Military Administration Department"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 008-010701-00031-002.

²² *Jiang Jieshi riji* [The Diaries of Jiang Jieshi], January 13, 1945.

²³ Calculated based on a report on the status of restoration of authority by the Wang Jingwei regime's forces prepared by the Military Administration Department of the Military Affairs Commission after the end of the war. (*Weijun bianqian zhuangkuang yilanbiao (1945 nian 12 yue 31 ri)* [Collaborationist Chinese Army Dispatch List (December 31, 1945)], *Chen Cheng fuzongtong wenwu "Chen Cheng ren junzheng buzhang ji canmou zongzhang rennei zhengjun ziliaoj (er)"* [Vice President Chen Cheng Collections "Information on the Military Rectification during the term in the office of the chief of the Military Administration Department and Chief of Staff (2)"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 008-010704-00018-006).

²⁴ Handwritten note from Jiang Jieshi to Zhang Zhizhong (Jimi jia di 5456 [Confidential Level A, no. 5456]), January 10, 1945, *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu "Geming wenxian – kangzhan fanlue: dihou zuozhan"* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections "Revolutionary Literature: Strategies for Resisting War - Operations behind Enemy Lines"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-020300-00005-111.

²⁵ Liu Ximing, *Weijun – qiangquan jingzhu xia de zuzi (1937-1949)* [Collaborationist Chinese Army - Pawns in the Race for Power (1937-1949)], (Taipei: Daoxiang Chubanshe [Daoxiang Publishing], 2002), p. 370.

insurrection launched in conjunction with the landing of U.S. troops east of the Kowloon Peninsula.²⁶

On the other hand, the KMT army clearly tried to prevent the CCP's expansion from early 1945. The military leaderships such as Jiang Jieshi and Xu Yongchang, developed the plans for offensive operations against the CCP in various regions such as Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and northern Shaanxi.²⁷ In particular, there was intense consciousness of the CCP's presence in Shaanxi Province. The I War Zone Command had been paying attention to the expansion of the CCP's power in northern Shaanxi since its establishment in January 1945.²⁸ When Commander-in-Chief Hu Zongnan visited the Hanzhong field headquarters at the end of January, he discussed with the staffs of the field headquarters about the CCP's threat. According to Hu, to deter the CCP, they concluded that the KMT army must maintain control over the Xiangfan Estuary, Jingziquan, Shangnan, and Tongguan as the lifelines.²⁹ Furthermore, the expansion of influence by the CCP forces were reported not only from north of the Yangtze River but also from Guangdong Province.³⁰ As pointed out in previous studies, the KMT government was forced to shift its strategic focus to the suppression of the CCP as the defeat of Japan was becoming a matter of time.³¹

Additionally, information about Japan approaching to the CCP increased the concern of the KMT government. The Koiso Kuniaki Cabinet of Japan was seeking the peace settlement via the Soviet Union as Japan's defeat was becoming more and more likely. Therefore, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and others were considering options such as approaching the CCP with tolerating communism.³²

Although the KMT government was not fully aware of these moves by the Japanese government, it sensed the subtle changes in the relationship between the CCP and the Japanese military or the Wang regime's forces. The KMT Central Committee had received a report that Japan's North China Area Army had suspended its operations against the CCP since February 1945, and that the General Staff of the First Army Command was exchanging information with the CCP. According to the same report, the CCP was approaching the Wang regime's forces in Jiangsu Province and elsewhere.³³ Recognition of the threat of collusion between the Japanese military or

²⁶ *Guanyu guangzhou shi guanxia fanwei an* [The Documents concerning on Jurisdiction of Guangzhou City], *Tezhong dang'an* [Special Archives], Guomindang Dangshihui [Party Historical Commission of the Guomindang], Archive No. Special 30/357.7.

²⁷ Wang, "Sengo chugoku wo meguru katto," p. 352. There are also other indications that Jiang Jieshi and others were considering an operation against the CCP. Examples include a telegram from Xu Yongchang to Jiang Jieshi (February 6, 1945). *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu Yiban ziliao - minguo 34 nian (1)* [General Material - 34th year of the Republic of China Part 1], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-080200-00301-027.

²⁸ *Hu Zongnan riji* [Hu Zongnan's Diaries], January 30, 1945, p. 431.

²⁹ *Hu Zongnan riji* [Hu Zongnan's Diaries], January 28, 1945, p. 431.

³⁰ *Baogao gongdang huodong qingxing* [Report on Communist Activities], *Tezhong dang'an* [Special Archives], Guomindang Dangshihui [Party Historical Commission of the Guomindang], Archives No. Special 30/515.

³¹ Wang, "Sengo chugoku wo meguru katto," pp. 355-356.

³² Hatano Sumio, "Senso makki no nicchu senso to nisso kankei" [The Sino-Japanese War and Japan-Soviet relations at the end of the war] and Tobe Ryoichi, "Taiheiyo senso makki ni okeru nihon no taichu heiwa kosaku" [Japan's peacemaking efforts toward China at the end of the Pacific War, in *Nicchu shusen to sengo ajia no tenbo* [The end of the war between Japan and China and postwar prospects of Asia], eds. Hatano Sumio et al. (Keio University Press, 2017).

³³ *Baogao gongdang huodong qingxing* [Report on the Status of the Communist Party's activities], *Tezhong dang'an* [Special Archives], Guomindang Dangshihui [Party Historical Commission of the Guomindang], Archive No. Special 30/515

Wang regime's forces and the CCP seems to have been a factor in the KMT government's urgency to restore public order after the war.

3. Shift from a Counterattack to Restoration of Authority

On August 10, when the Japanese government announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration via shortwave radio, the KMT government began to take concrete action to end the war. As a result of discussions with the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the other Allied nations, it was decided that the KMT government would take charge of disarmament in China (excluding Manchuria), Vietnam north of the 16th parallel north, and Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

On the same day, Jiang Jieshi, who had discussed the war termination process at a military conference, issued an order to the Military Affairs Commission, the CCC, and the various headquarters regarding specific actions to be taken thereafter.³⁴ The main contents were as follows. The “Supreme Commander of the Enemy in China” (referring to General Okamura Yasuji, Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Army) was to issue a four-point order within two hours: (1) to suspend all military operations in their present form, (2) to prohibit destructive activities and disturbances of public order, (3) to follow the instructions of the CCC and the War Zone commands, and (4) to respond to these orders within 24 hours. In addition, the CCC and each War Zone commands were ordered to (1) deploy one army unit to monitor and disarm the Japanese forces, (2) advance to designated major cities with one army per direction, and (3) station units at designated bases in each direction to suppress the advance of “wicked people” (presumably referring to CCP forces).

What is noteworthy here is that the instructions to the CCC and the Hanzhong field headquarters were limited to saying that each of their Area Army (each War Zone) should monitor and disarm the enemy in the front, and follow any other orders regarding subsequent actions. Following this, in view of the fact that all operations to restore authority were to be centralized under the command of the CCC, the posture on authority restoration based on the August 10 order should be considered to have ultimately only been provisional.

Therefore, the KMT government leadership discussed about how to proceed the restoration of authority. There were two options. One was for the CCC to control the restoration of authority in all areas, and the other was to divide the areas into several districts and proceed with the restoration of authority in each of them.³⁵ In the end, the two sides of the debate were unable to reach a consensus, and Jiang Jieshi decided that the CCC would take unified control of the authority restoration, with the commander of the CCC He Yingqin appointed to be in charge.³⁶

Of the 12 items in the orders given to the CCC, the main duties were as follows.

(1) Commander-in-chief He Yingqin, as a special representative of Jiang Jieshi, the supreme commander of the China Theater, assumed full responsibility for the operations of the disarmament

³⁴ *Jiang Jieshi riji* [The Diaries of Jiang Jieshi], August 10, 1945; a telegram (signed no. 324, 1945) from the General Staff to the CCC and the commander of each War Zone.

³⁵ Xiao Huilin, *Xiao Yisu shangjiang yishi* [Anecdote of General Xiao Yisu], (Taibei: Shuxiang Wenhua [Shuxiang Wenhua], 2005), p. 153.

³⁶ Wang Zhenghua ed., *Shilue gaoben* (62), 1945 [Jiang Jieshi's manuscripts (62)] August 18, 1945, (Taibei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2011, p. 221.

of Japan. (2) The CCC instructed each War Zone and Area Army to take care of all operations to process disarmament of enemy forces by region and time period. (3) Issuance of all orders to the top commanders of enemy forces in the China Theater. (4) Close cooperation with U.S. military in the China Theater, and taking over the handling of enemy forces after their surrender. (5) Provision of relief to refugees in requisitioned areas and restoration of transportation, communications, etc. (6) Provision of instruction to each War Zone and Area Army to restore authority from the “fake army” by region and time period, and to reorganize and dissolve surrendered enemy forces or eliminate them if they did not follow orders.³⁷ In short, the CCC was granted full authority by Jiang Jieshi to cooperate with the U.S. military.

On the other hand, even after August 10, there was serious discussion within the KMT government leadership about the possibility that the Japanese would continue to fight. According to Xu Yongchang, Chief of the General Staff, Wedemeyer had told KMT army officials that if the Japanese did not agree to surrender by August 25, the U.S. military had decided to conduct landing operations at various bases in mainland China. Wedemeyer also suggested the possibility of using atomic bombs.³⁸

Concerns about the continuation of the war were not eliminated even after Japan formally announced its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. At the same time, the KMT government received reports that the Soviet Army that had invaded Manchuria were continuing advance south.³⁹ In addition, even though the Japanese government had surrendered, it was unclear what moves Japan’s China Expeditionary Army would make, and the KMT government was waiting to see what would happen with a strong sense of distrust. One of the intelligence officers dispatched to North China to liaise with the Wang regime’s forces warned that some of the Japanese military did not accept the surrender and were considering resistance.⁴⁰ The decision to centralize the operations to restore authority under the CCC was made in the midst of this tension over the end of the war.

The CCC and its army began to restore authority while maintaining its posture at the end of the war to prepare for a counterattack. After receiving orders from Jiang Jieshi on August 18, the CCC hurriedly decided on the military deployment. It first contacted Japan’s China Expeditionary Army to stop fighting. On August 21, the KMT government summoned a delegation of Imai Takeo, Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the China Expeditionary Army, and four others under him to Zhijiang. It read out the first proclamation issued by the Supreme Commander of the China Theater (referring to Jiang Jieshi) to the Japanese military personnel in China, informing them of the surrender procedures and requisition. At this time, the Chinese delegation was composed of General Xiao Yisu, Chief of Staff of the CCC, General Leng Xin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the CCC, and General Haydon Boatner, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army command in China. Most of the high-ranking generals who attended the ceremony were also commanders supported by the

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Xu Yongchang *riji* [The diary of general Xu Yongchang], August 12, 1945.

³⁹ Xu Yongchang *riji* [The diary of general Xu Yongchang], August 10, 13, 16, 1945.

⁴⁰ Telegram from Li Dongyuan to the central party department (September 6, 1945). *Tezhong dang'an* [Special Archives], Guomindang Dangshihui [Party Historical Commission of the Guomindang] Archive No. special 30/236.3.

ALPHA plan.⁴¹ The August 21 press conference also served as an opportunity to indicate the policy on disarmament of Japan, and for the CCC and U.S. military command in China to demonstrate within and outside the country that they were in complete control of the war termination process.

In addition, the backdrop for this appeal by the KMT army was a need to show that the CCC had complete control over the operations to restore authority. Immediately after the ceasefire, the existence of a huge number of militias in China became a problem. It is said that there were a total of about 780,000 commando and militia members in China at the end of the war, with an exceptionally large number in North China, numbering 440,000.⁴² Chaos had erupted surrounding these commando and militia members, including forcible requisition from Japanese military members and civilians without receiving orders from the central command.⁴³ The KMT government was concerned about how to control its own forces.

The Japanese government seems to have approached Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, about the requisition-related chaos at a meeting accompanying the signing of the ceasefire agreement in Manila on August 20.⁴⁴ Jiang Jieshi reacted furiously to this. He wrote in his diary, “Our commandos, the Loyal Patriotic Army (the guerrilla force of the BIS), and the like are all fighting ahead, disobeying orders, and demanding the surrender of enemy forces, which led Japan to protest to MacArthur. Because of this, the honor of the army and the dignity of our country have all been affected, and I feel unbearably indignant...”⁴⁵

Jiang took the situation seriously and instructed He Yingqin to strictly control the Japanese side’s words and actions. Due to this, the Chinese side lodged a strong protest to the Japan side in an official meeting on August 21. Moreover, in a working-level discussion held on the same night, General Cai Wenzhi (Deputy Chief of Staff of the CCC) revealed that efforts to achieve uniform control over the commando forces were encountering difficulties, and requested Japanese side only to respond to requisition by forces designated by the KMT government.⁴⁶ The KMT government, which was on the verge of national unification, wanted to avoid at all costs knowledge spreading inside and outside the country about the lack of control over its own forces.

The tension on the part of the KMT government was fully conveyed to the Japanese side through the press conference and other means. The China Expeditionary Army headquarters, which sent a telegraph on the meeting to the Ministry of the Army, reported about the confrontation between the KMT and CCP as well as the disorder of the requisition operations with a recommendation that Japan should thereafter avoid all negotiations and propaganda that would expose the domestic

⁴¹ Xiao Huilin, *Xiao Yisu shangjiang yishi* [Anecdote of General Xiao Yisu], p. 157.

⁴² *Tezang shiliao, Zhongguo zhanqu zhongguo lujun zongsilingbu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Special Collections: “Report on the Surrender Acceptance by the General Headquarters of the Chinese Army in the China Theater”], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 134-010301-0115-001.

⁴³ Telegrams from the Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Army to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Headquarters (August 23 and 25, 1945), *Shusen shina kankei tsuzuri* [File on the end of the war in China], the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Archives No. Bunko - Yuzu - 418.

⁴⁴ The Japanese side’s request items are compiled in *Rengokoku to no sessho kankei jiko sore 4* [Items related to negotiations with the Allied Powers, Part 4], NIDS, Archives No.: Bunko - Yuzu - 10. However, it is not clear whether they were actually presented.

⁴⁵ *Jiang Jieshi riji* [The Diaries of Jiang Jieshi], August 22, 1945.

⁴⁶ Included in *Daiichiji kaidanji ni okeru saibu renraku jiko* [Detailed liaison items at the time of the first meeting] in *Shusen shina kankei tsuzuri* [File on the end of the second Sino-Japanese war], NIDS, Archives No.: Bunko - Yuzu - 201.

situation in China avoided in public by the other side, and aim to conduct appropriately confidential communication in the background.⁴⁷

In this way, the KMT government, as the legitimate government responsible for national unification after the war, had to show both at home and abroad that it was taking a strong stance in the war termination process. In this respect, the CCC, with its liaison system with the U.S. military and its powerful troops and their means of transportation, was considered the most suitable organization to oversee the restoration of authority.

4. The CCC's Posture for Restoration of Authority

After the August 21 press conference, the CCC began full-fledged operations for the disarmament of the Japanese forces and restoration of authority. In the Nanjing and other major cities, personnel were dispatched from Area Army and War Zone commands to receive the requisition troops and assist them in the work, and advance command posts were set up (General Leng Xin was assigned to Nanking). On August 27, a meeting of the Military Affairs Commission decided on the order of the areas to restore authority and the representatives to be assigned for disarmament of the Japanese and Wang regime's forces in major cities, such as Nanjing, Hankow, and Beiping.⁴⁸ On

**Table Major Areas for Accepting Surrender and Restoring Authority,
and Deployment of Main Control Units**

Main war area and force (commander)	Area and city of deployment
First Area Army (Lu Han)	Vietnam north of the 16th parallel north
Second Area Army (Zhang Fakui)	Guangxi and Guangdong area
Third Area Army (Tang Enbo)	Nanjing and Shanghai area
Fourth Area Army (Wang Yaowu)	Changsha and Hengyang area
I War Zone (Hu Zongnan)	Luoyang
II War Zone (Yan Xishan)	Shanxi Province
III War Zone (Gu Zhutong)	Hangzhou and Xiamen
V War Zone (Liu Zhi)	Zhengzhou and Kaifeng
VI War Zone (Sun Weiru)	Hankow and Yichang
VII War Zone (Yu Hanmou)	Around the border of Fujian and Guangdong provinces
IX War Zone (Xue Yue)	Nanchang
X War Zone (Li Pinxian)	Xuzhou
XI War Zone (Sun Lianzhong)	Beiping, Tianjin
XII War Zone (Fu Zuoyi)	Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan

Source: Compiled by the author based on a figure in He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng huiyilu – kangri zhanzheng (shang)* [Chen Cheng Memoirs: The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression vol.1] (Taipei, Academia Historica, 2005), 217.

⁴⁷ Telegram from the Chief of General Staff of the China Expeditionary Army to the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of War and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff Headquarters (General Staff telegram no. 631, August 25, 1945), in *Shusen shina kankei tsuzuri* [File on the end of the war in China].

⁴⁸ He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng huiyilu – kangri zhanzheng (shang)*, [Chen Cheng's Memoirs: The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression vol.1], (Taipei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2005), p. 221.

August 31, the draft for this measure was submitted to Jiang Jieshi.⁴⁹

The following figure shows the deployment of the each War Zone and Area Army that were responsible for accepting the surrender of Japanese soldiers and civilians and restoring authority.

From the above figure, it can be confirmed again that the military deployment for the operations to restore authority roughly followed the strategic posture of the KMT army prior to the end of the war. The deployment of the First to Fourth Area Army under the direct control of the CCC was in line with the counterattack plans RASHNESS and CARBONADO against Japan, and there was a smooth transition from the operation against Japan to the restoration of authority. For example, the Second Area Army in charge of the Guangdong area continued to fight against the Japanese forces that had withdraw from South China until two days before the ceasefire. The Army was also looking to advance into the Guangdong and Guangxi coastal areas.⁵⁰ Additionally, the Third Area Army, which had many prominent units under the direct control of the CCC such as the New Sixth Army with the highest sufficiency rate of U.S.-style equipment, headed to restore authority in Nanjing and Shanghai, the most important political and economic areas for the KMT government.

The continuity with the counterattack plan against Japan is evident in other examples as well. According to Chen Cheng, the order of the requisitioned areas decided by the Military Affairs Commission on August 28 started with mainland China first, followed by Vietnam, thirdly Taiwan, and fourthly Manchuria.⁵¹ The reason why Vietnam was put second here is thought to be because the counterattack plan included a support operation in the Vietnam area, and it was ready to advance.

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the most powerful group in North China, the I War Zone, was not in charge of the requisition of Beiping and Tianjin. The KMT government changed Hanzhong field headquarters to Beiping headquarters, and assigned it for requisition operations with the 11th War Zone. In contrast, the I War Zone only dispatched the 40th Army to the Beiping area while sending a large force to Shanxi Province. The implications of these actions will be discussed later. In any case, the CCC's operation was developed in the same manner as the counterattack plan against Japan. This appropriation of the counterattack posture against Japan was also a necessity from the perspective of gaining support from U.S. forces.

After Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Wedemeyer requested to MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the de facto counterattack against Japan be continued, including support for U.S. landing operations along the coast of China and large-scale military transport for the KMT army, saying that if the counterattack was terminated, the KMT army would be left deep in Southwest China, which would hinder future national unification. Wedemeyer's request was denied, but military assistance to China was continued.⁵² On August 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

⁴⁹ Telegram from Jiang Menglin, General Secretary of the Executive Yuan, to Jiang Jieshi (August 31, 1945), in the Academia Historica of Taiwan, *Guominzhengfu dangan* [Nationalist government archive] *Di wei zichan jieshou yu chulin* [Expropriation of enemy], Archives No. 001-110200-00008-005.

⁵⁰ Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, p. 343.

⁵¹ He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng huiyilu – kangri zhazheng (xia)*, [Chen Cheng Memoir: The War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression vol.2] (Taipei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2005), p. 665.

⁵² At this time, Wedemeyer claimed to MacArthur and others that China was the real powder keg in the Far East. Marc Gallicchio, *The Scramble for Asia: U.S. Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific* (London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 41.

instructed the U.S. forces headquarters in China to assist the KMT government in securing key bases on the Mainland China, and informed Pacific Theater Headquarters that it was preparing to secure key ports and liaison points in support of the Chinese theater.⁵³

In response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concern that U.S. forces might be drawn into China's civil war, Wedemeyer acknowledged the danger and stressed the need to support the KMT government's restoration of authority.⁵⁴ After the war, the United States, aiming for early demobilization, was in a hurry to remove the Japanese troops deployed in East Asia,⁵⁵ and in this regard, it can be said that the KMT government and Wedemeyer, who wanted to proceed with the restoration of authority as soon as possible, had the same interests. In the end, the U.S. Marines landed in the four cities of Yantai, Qingdao, Tianjin, and Dagu and effectively took charge of the disarmament of the Japanese troops.⁵⁶

While the KMT government requested U.S. assistance, it was also proceeding with the deployment of troops using its existing transportation capabilities. The U.S.-China Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed plans to transport central forces by air and sea to (1) the Nanking and Shanghai areas, (2) the Beiping and Tianjin areas, (3) Taiwan, (4) Manchuria, and (5) Qingdao, in that order from September to November. The troops for transport would be the most elite units under the direct control of the CCC, including the New Sixth Army, the 94th Army, the 74th Army, and the 13th Army, etc.⁵⁷ The KMT government began sending troops and equipment of the New Sixth Army to Nanking one after another from early September, and accelerated the advance of each unit, mainly in the Yangtze River basin.⁵⁸

The support of the U.S. military was essential for the deployment of forces to carry out the restoration of authority.⁵⁹ By utilizing the liaison system with the U.S. military that had been established in the course of getting ready for the counterattack, the CCC rapidly prepared to advance forces under its direct control to various locations.

⁵³ Joint Chief of Staff to Wedemeyer, August 10, 1945, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Far East, China*, vol. 7 [hereafter *FRUS, 1945*] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 527-528.

⁵⁴ Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 19, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, p. 532.

⁵⁵ Kato, "Haisha no kikan," 116-117. According to Kato, the United States, while concerned about involvement in the civil war, decided by November to support national unification by the KMT government and to assist in transporting the KMT army to Manchuria.

⁵⁶ Telegram from He Yingqin to Jiang Jieshi (September 21, 1945). *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu "Shengli shoujiang (san)"* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections "Victory and Surrender Acceptance (3)"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-090105-00014-104.

⁵⁷ Memorandum from the Chief of Staff Kaien to the China-U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting (September 6, 1945). *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu "Geming wenxian – riben touxiang"* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections "Revolutionary Literature – Japan's Surrender"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-020300-00027-073.

⁵⁸ Telegraph from He Ying-qin to Jiang Jieshi regarding the transportation of the New Sixth Army (September 14, 1945). *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu "Shengli shoujiang (er)"* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections "Victory and Surrender Acceptance (2)"], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-090105-00013-153.

⁵⁹ Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 362-363.

5. The Beginning of Restoration of Authority by the Military and the Accompanying Disorder

In the beginning of August 1945, the CCC's handling of the war termination process began smoothly with the support from the U.S. forces in China and the “cooperation” of the Japanese side.⁶⁰ However, the KMT army began to face problems not only with stationing and communication with the Japanese military, but also the requisition of uncontrolled areas and security measures.

The first and most urgent task for the time being was to maintain and manage the transportation network and communications. On August 22, He Ying-qin instructed all units under his command to restore transportation and communications while eliminating CCP forces as they advanced.⁶¹ However, since it would take some time for the requisition troops to arrive, Jiang Jieshi had instructed He YingQin to order the Japanese and Wang regime's forces to maintain transportation and communications.⁶² Based on this instruction, for example, the X War Zone, which had jurisdiction over the area east of the Beiping-Hankow railway, deployed Japanese railway troops to the Tianjin-Pukou railway to support and protect the operations.⁶³ For this reason, some railway troops remained in the area after the latter half of October, repairing and guarding railways and communication lines destroyed by the CCP forces.⁶⁴ In and around Xuzhou, it is said that military-related rail transport was stopped 300 times from August 15 to late October due to the destructive activities by the CCP forces.⁶⁵

In addition, the KMT government also focused on the requisition and operation of communication facilities to bring the post-war disorder under control. On August 25, the Ministry of Communications, which was in charge of the government's transportation administration, considered requisition of the wireless communication network in addition to transportation, and requested Jiang Jieshi for swift requisition of transportation and communication infrastructure developed by the Japanese and Wang regime.⁶⁶

However, due to the competition within the KMT government on the requisition of transportation and communication infrastructure, CCC could not managed it centrally. According to the CCC's official report on the requisition and disarmament, three communication facilities of Japan's China Expeditionary Army established in Nanjing were requisitioned by the Military Administration Department and Japanese engineers were retained for their maintenance and management. In addition, the communication facilities owned by the press department of the general headquarters of Japan's China Expeditionary Army were taken over by the General Staff,

⁶⁰ Momma, “Riyō sareta haisha,” p. 372.

⁶¹ Telegram from He Yingqin to Chiang Kai-shek and Yu Feipeng (August 22, 1945), *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu “Shengli shoujiang (er)”* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections: Victory and Surrender Acceptance (2)], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-090105-00013-244.

⁶² Telegram from Jiang Jieshi to He Yingqin and commanders who were under his command (August 12, 1945), *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu “Shengli shoujiang (san)”* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections “Victory and Surrender Acceptance (3)”), Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-090105-00014-104.

⁶³ *Di shi zhanqu shoujiang yaobao* [Surrender Acceptance Report in the 10th War Zone], *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuANJI* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan].

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ *Junzhengbu shoujiao rijun wuzhuang wuzi buchong banfa* [Supplementary Regulations for the Collection of Japanese Armed Supplies by the Military Administration Department], ibid.

⁶⁶ Telegram from Jiang Menglin, General Secretary of the Executive Yuan to Jiang Jieshi (August 25, 1945), *Guomin zhengfu dang'an “Shoufuqu fuyuan cuoshi”* [The Nationalist Government Archives: Demobilization Measures for Recovered Areas], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 001-076500-00001-006.

and the facilities of each communication unit were seized by the Ministry of Communication.⁶⁷ Regarding the Japanese embassy's powerful radio station equipment, a dispute between the BIS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had occurred, but Jiang Jieshi was able to finally resolve it.⁶⁸ The BIS also obtained all of the wireless communication devices and their transmissions that had been assigned to each unit by the special work headquarters, the intelligence service of the Wang regime.⁶⁹

The requisition of weapons, equipment, and military supplies also primarily fell under the jurisdiction of the CCC. However, the CCC directly requisitioned items received under its command, while other items were placed under the control of the Military Administration Department. After the occupation and securing of the Japanese controlled areas and the internment of the Japanese military and civilians were completed, the Military Administration Department established 10 new requisitioned areas and assigned a representative office to each area to work on the operations to restore authority.⁷⁰

Through the above procedures, weapons and supplies to be used in the field were distributed to each unit. For example, about 6,700 guns were reorganized into 111 artillery battalions, and added to each unit. In addition, some 17,200 vehicles were also requisitioned and distributed to various units and logistics headquarters.⁷¹

From the above, it seems that the KMT army's requisition efforts, which were marked by disorder, were at least somewhat successful in terms of equipment and other items. However, according to the report by the Military Administration Department, many of the requisitioned items were always in danger of theft and were poorly

preserved, with many damaged or unusable.⁷² In Guangzhou City, ammunition was left out in the open at all collection sites, and much of it was rendered unusable by rain.⁷³

6. The Intensifying Conflict between the KMT and the CCP, and the “Restoration of Authority” from the Wang Regime’s Forces

Another issue that the KMT army faced in the war termination process was the restoration of public order. Particular emphasis was placed on dealing with the Wang regime’s forces and the CCP. However, the treatment of the Wang regime’s forces was an issue that the KMT government had

⁶⁷ *Zhongguo zhanqu zhongguo lujun zongsilingbu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Report on the Surrender Acceptance by the General Headquarters of the Chinese Army in the China Theater].

⁶⁸ Telegram from the Ministry of Communications to Jiang Jieshi, *Waijiaobu dang'an "Jieshou riben dian tai"* [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives “Expropriation of a Japanese Radio Station”], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 020-150100-0010.

⁶⁹ Telegram from Dai Li to Chen Siyun (August 24, 1945), *Dai Li shiliao “Daigong yimo - dianxun lei” (di 1 juan)*, [Historical Materials of Dai Li: Dai Li’s Posthumous Literature – Telecommunications (vol.1)], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 144-010109-0001-062.

⁷⁰ *Junzhengbu shoujiao diwei wuzi baogaoshu (yijiusiliu nian shiyi yue)* [Report on the Collection of Adversarial Materials by the Military Administration Department (November, 1946)], *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuanji* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan].

⁷¹ *Junzhengbu shoujiao rijun wuzhuang wuzi buchong banfa yilanbiao* [List of Supplementary Regulations for the Collection of Japanese Armed Supplies by the Military Administration Department], ibid.

⁷² *Junzhengbu shoujiao diwei wuzi baogaoshu* [Report on the Collection of Adversarial Materials by the Military Administration Department], November, 1946, ibid.

⁷³ *Junzhengbu guangzhou qu tepaiyuan jieshou baogaoshu* [Report on Expropriation by the Special Commissioner of the Guangzhou District of the Military Administration Department], ibid.

to deal with carefully, as there were calls to punish them for being so-called “Hanjian” (Chinese traitors) while at the same time there were fears that they might join the CCP and cause rebellion.⁷⁴

From the instructions issued to each of the War Zone, it appears that the KMT government at the end of the war was thinking of disbanding and reorganizing the surrendered Wang regime’s forces in a unified manner under the leadership of the central government.⁷⁵ Sun Weiru (Commander of the VI War Zone Command) urged the central military leadership to pay attention to the local governments’ arbitrary “counter maneuvering” against the Wang regime’s forces, and advised them to set up controls and restrictions on operations involving the Wang regime’s forces.⁷⁶ In addition, Chen Cheng had long expressed his intention to strengthen the military through downsizing and reorganization after the war,⁷⁷ and he had been reluctant to introduce the Wang regime’s forces.⁷⁸

However, the KMT army’s idea of reorganizing or dismantling the requisitioned Wang regime’s forces was not necessarily shared in the entire government. On the contrary, as the threat of CCP forces increased, there appeared moves to incorporate and utilize the Wang regime’s forces more actively and to deploy them in security operations. On August 25, Dai Li, head of the BIS, advised Jiang Jieshi to dispatch the Wang regime’s forces as a garrison to counter the more than 100,000 CCP troops advancing around Nanjing.⁷⁹ In fact, the Wang regime’s forces in Jiangsu Province, including the Ren Yuandao troops that had been clearing the CCP forces and the Nanjing defense force, suppressed the CCP forces as a provisionally organized division under the aegis of the Third Area Army, which had moved into the Nanjing area.⁸⁰ In Guangdong as well, the Wang regime’s special forces and military police, for which the BIS had launched “counter maneuvering,” were assigned to the security forces under the name of “Guangzhou Advance Army Command.”⁸¹

The BIS was not alone in regarding “counter maneuvering” against the CCP as a security measure. The Political Department also referred to this issue in its August 1945 activity report, stating that “by achieving good results in counter-maneuvering against the enemy (the Wang regime’s forces), we will be able to demonstrate results in preventing the CCP from taking

⁷⁴ In his diary immediately after the end of the war, Jiang Jieshi that “the most important key is the requisition of the surrendering enemy (Japan and the Wang regime), and that if the KMT failed in this, the Communist rebels would link up with them and cause a major uprising” (Jiang Jieshi riji [The Diaries of Jiang Jieshi], August 12, 1945).

⁷⁵ *Di qi zhanqu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Report on the Surrender Acceptance in the 7th Theater], *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuanji* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan]

⁷⁶ Telegram from Sun Weiru to the Military Affairs Commission general office (August 12, 1945), A *Jiang Zhongzheng zongtong wenwu “Shengli shoujiang (si)”* [President Jiang Zhongzheng Collections “Victory and Surrender Acceptance (4)”, Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 002-090105-00015-113.

⁷⁷ He Zhilin ed., *Chen Cheng xiasheng congjun shiliao xuanji: zhengjun jiayao* [Selected Historical Materials of Mr. Chen Cheng’s Military Services: Summary of Military Reorganization], (Taibei: Guoshiguan [Academia Historica], 2010), pp. 168-169.

⁷⁸ Liu Ximing, *Weijun* [Collaborationist Chinese Army], p. 374.

⁷⁹ Telegram from Dai Li to Jiang Jieshi (August 25, 1945), *Dai Li shiliao “Daigong yimo – junshi lei (di san juan)*, [Historical Materials of Dai Li: Dai Li’s Posthumous Literature – Military (vol. 3)], Guoshiguan [Academia Historica] (Taiwan), Archives No. 144-010103-0003-012.

⁸⁰ Liu Ximing, *Weijun* [Collaborationist Chinese Army], p. 369.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 370.

advantage of this opportunity.”⁸² The headquarters in charge of requisition in various regions also seem to have viewed the seizure of the Wang regime’s forces as an extension of their wartime “counter-maneuvering” operations.⁸³

The essence of the “counter-maneuvering” against the Wang regime’s forces was a strategy to make the enemy forces change sides, which was fundamentally different from the reorganization of the military. However, it is difficult to say that the KMT government was aware of this difference as it was forced to deal with immediate security issues such as the CCP. In the end, the KMT government, while trying to proceed with the war termination process, had no choice but to maintain and restore public order by returning to its wartime strategy.

Along with the Wang regime's forces, the CCP became a focal point of the security issue. From the spring of 1945 onward, the KMT army's main concern in North China was shifting from the Japanese military to the CCP. After the war, the KMT government and the CCP engaged in a fierce tactical struggle over the disarmament of Japanese troops in North China. Refusing the KMT government's order, the CCP deployed a large force in the region from August 10 to occupy the main railway lines and cities along the lines, and by August 16 had expanded its influence to northern Jiangsu Province, forcing the Japanese troops to surrender and comply with requisitioning.⁸⁴

In response to the growing power of the CCP, Jiang Jieshi tried to suppress them immediately after Japanese surrender. Jiang's instructions on August 10 clearly included the control of "wicked people" in Henan, Shaanxi, and Hubei provinces as a response to the situation thereafter. The term "wicked people" generally means "scoundrels," but here it clearly refers to the CCP.⁸⁵ For example, in the mountainous areas around Funiu Mountains in Henan Province, where the CCP was said to be expanding its influence significantly, the V War Zone was instructed to dispatch one army to secure a base for defense and attack against "wicked people." In addition, in the northern part of Shaanxi Province, that is, in the direction of Yan'an, the I War Zone dispatched and the VIII War Zone three army and one army respectively.

In Hubei Province, the X War Zone had been instructed to secure a base for the eradication of “wicked people” in the Dabie Mountains. If the “wicked people” already occupied a key point, then the order was to assemble a strong force to expel or destroy them quickly. As mentioned above, the control of the CCP in North China was an issue that had been under consideration even before the end of the war. Although the CCC shifted its posture from counterattack against Japan to restoration of authority, the Central Army in North China continued to push for the control of the CCP.

However, military action in the northern part of Shaanxi Province was halted after the beginning of the U.S.-brokered talks between the KMT and the CCP over postwar politics. Jiang

⁸³ *Di qi zhanqu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Report on the Surrender Acceptance in the 7th Theater], *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuanji* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan].

⁸⁴ Momma, "Ryo sareta haisha," pp. 375-376.

⁸⁵ Telegram from the General Staff to the CCC and War Zone Commanders (signed no. 324, August 10, 1945), *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuanji* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan].

Jieshi had called on Mao Zedong immediately after the end of the war to come to Chongqing for talks on postwar stability, and this was probably a response to that call. The I War Zone dispatched three divisions that were to head for Yan'an to support Shanxi Province.⁸⁶ Shanxi was a region controlled by Yan Xishan, who was distant from the central government, and the expansion of the CCP forces had been anticipated since the beginning of the war. At least as of early September, the armed conflict between the two parties had already intensified.⁸⁷ The dispatch of troops of the I War Zone seems to have been an attempt to tighten control over an area that was seen as militarily and politically vulnerable rather than to support the restoration of authority.

While KMT government suspended the aggressive operations against the CCP, its army was frequently attacked by the CCP forces. In the V War Zone, the CCP forces blocked the area along the southern bank of the Yellow River and major cities such as Luoyang, Zhengzhou, and Kaifeng.⁸⁸

In areas other than North China, the CCP had expanded its power beyond the expectations of the KMT government. Around September 10, the III War Zone, which had jurisdiction over Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, discovered a large force of CCP troops commandeering 200-300 boats and attempting to move southward along the Yangtze River basin. It also reported a series of battles with CCP forces in the Hangzhou area since the end of September.⁸⁹ In addition, a KMT intelligence agent dispatched to Guangdong Province reported that the Guangdong People's Anti-Japanese Liberation Army under the command of the CCP was attempting to requisition the weapons and equipment of Japanese troops waiting in the area.⁹⁰

The CCP forces were clearly moving southward from the Yangtze River and expanding their area of operations to South China. The diversion of the Wang regime's forces to the security forces seems to have been a response to this. However, the KMT government eventually took control of the requisition in mainland China. When the CCP, which had failed to conduct requisition in North China, shifted its forces to Manchuria, the focus of the conflict turned toward that region.⁹¹

Conclusion

The war termination process in mainland China has been conventionally discussed by focusing on the postwar situation of the cooperation between China and Japan over requisition, the conflict between the KMT and CCP, and the United States' war termination process against Japan. While acknowledging the results of these previous studies, this paper aims to clarify the internal factors that enabled the KMT government to advance the relatively smooth war termination process in the early stage from the perspective of the KMT army, which was responsible for the operations.

For the war termination process, the KMT government centralized all operations to restore authority under the CCC which was a military organization for preparing for and carrying out

⁸⁶ Jiang Yongjing and Liu Weikai, *Jiang Jieshi yu guogong hezhan (1945-1949)* [Jiang Jieshi and the KMT-CCP Peace and War (1945 - 1949)], (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan [Commercial Press], 2011), p. 2.

⁸⁷ Ambassador Hurley to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, pp. 549-550.

⁸⁸ *Di wu zhanqu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Report on the Surrender Acceptance in the 5th War Zone], *Riben touxiang wenxian zhuanji* [Collection of Literature on the Surrender of Japan].

⁸⁹ *Di san zhanqu shoujiang baogaoshu* [Report on the Surrender Acceptance in the 3rd War Zone], *ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Huanan diwei ji gongdang zhuangkuang baogao* [Report on the Status of Adversaries and the Communist Party in Huanan], *Tezhong dang'an* [Special Archives], Guomindang Dangshihui [Party Historical Commission of the Guomindang], Archive No. Special 30/ 394.49

⁹¹ Momma, "Riyō sareta haisha," p. 375.

the counterattack against Japan, based on the close cooperation system with the U.S. military headquarters in China. The CCC deployed requisition forces throughout the country in line with the counterattack plan while receiving support from the U.S. military even after the war ended. In other words, the KMT army's posture at the end of the war was built around U.S. military support and the counterattack against Japan, and the CCC was consistently at its core. Immediately after the ceasefire, the KMT army shifted this military posture for the counterattack against Japan into a posture to restore authority, which enabled it to begin the war termination process relatively quickly.

However, problems arose that could not be handled by the CCC's centralized posture for restoration of authority. As the confrontation with the CCP intensified, the KMT army deployed the Wang regime's forces in addition to regular troops in security operations without requisition. The KMT army's relationship with the Wang regime's forces had been cultivated through wartime strategy. These examples show how difficult it was for the KMT army to shift from a wartime posture, and also illustrate the significant impact that the conflict with the CCP had on the development of the war termination process.

As described above, the KMT army, with the CCC at its core, played a major role in advancing the early war termination process. On the other hand, the KMT army's centralized posture for restoration of authority was not flawless, and as the conflict with the CCP intensified, the KMT army began to use the Wang regime's forces for security operations. In general, it can be said that the posture and actions of the KMT army had an important impact in shaping the course of transforming the situation in China from the Second Sino-Japanese War to the postwar conflict between the KMT and CCP.

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