

China's "Japan Neutralization" Policy and its Perception of Japan's Circumstances: the Case of the Divide and Rule Policy toward the LDP in "the Age of Discontinuity" in Japan-China Relation*

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Abstract

Following the Nagasaki Flag Incident of May 1958, China completely suspended all exchange with Japan. However, it recognized the importance of Japan in its strategy vis-à-vis the U.S., and, in light of the intensifying power struggles within the LDP, China launched a divide and rule policy toward the LDP so as to isolate the Kishi administration. At this time, China chose to target Ishibashi Tanzan, Matsumura Kenzo, and Miki Takeo, who were influential politicians and leaders of anti-mainstream factions of the LDP, and attempted to link their visits to China with the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi campaigns within Japan, symbolized by the movement against the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (hereinafter referred to as the Security Treaty).

A series of manipulations toward Japan (対日工作 *Duiri Gongzuo*) were carried out under the orders of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly Mao Zedong. As the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out and progress was made in revising the Security Treaty, CCP leaders judged that the necessity of China's "Japan neutralization" policy remained unchanged, and that it was now going to be even more an urgent issue. Meanwhile, the "Japan Hands" in CCP presented a broad interpretation of Japan's political and social situation, including the internal power struggles of the LDP and the movement against revising the Security Treaty, and frequently produced reports coinciding with CCP leadership's policies and perceptions. Thus, intelligences from the "Japan Hands" offered "feasibility" to the Japan neutralization policy advanced by Chinese leadership, but it became the pitfall of China's Japan neutralization policy.

Introduction

The Nagasaki Flag Incident, in which a Chinese national flag (the Five-starred Red Flag) was pulled down at a Chinese stamp and paper cut exhibition in Nagasaki, occurred in May 1958. At this time, China announced that it would suspend all private-sector exchange between China and Japan. This represented the first major difficulty for the movement to improve relations between China and Japan, which had developed using an incremental approach focused on economic and cultural exchange, since the signing of the first Sino-Japanese private trade agreement in 1952. Therefore, due to the Nagasaki Flag Incident, postwar Sino-Japanese relations are regarded as

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entering a period of discontinuity.¹

However, these Chinese measures did not necessarily mean a total cessation of exchange between Japan and China. China's aim was to keep a close eye on the general election of the House of Representatives in May 1958, to encourage the activities of pro-Chinese forces, and to put pressure on Kishi Nobusuke's administration. Even after the victory of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the general election, China did not change this approach toward Japan. With regard to future interchange between Japan and China, on June 25, 1958, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided the new policy that was called as “斷而不絕 *duan er bu jue* [To break off but not discontinued]. Under this new policy, China forbade contact with anyone who followed Kishi and stopped correspondence and travel. On the other hand, it also stated that left-wing forces, as well as people who would be useful to a friendship between Japan and China or to defeating the Kishi administration, were to be the subjects of proactive invitations.²

Moreover, during this period, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, was spearheading the Great Leap Forward within China. In this context, the Japanese appeasement policy led by Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council, was criticized³—but China hadn't changed the importance of Japan in China's strategy toward the U.S. The relationship between the U.S. and China was worsening, symbolized by the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis,⁴ and Mao Zedong was aware of how important the U.S. military bases in Japan were to the U.S.'s Asian strategy. On June 28, 1958, at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission, he stated, “If, in the future, the U.S. wages war in the East, it must depend upon Japan. For this reason, we must thoroughly investigate the situation in Japan.”⁵

In fact, during this period of discontinuity, China expanded its active manipulation toward politicians from both the government and opposition parties.⁶ Notably, China succeeded in ensuring visits from Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzo in the fall of 1959. China had already invited

¹ Furukawa Mantaro, *Nitchu Sengo Kankei Shi* [A History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1981), pp. 153-157; Tian Huan ed., Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoxian comps., *Zhanhou zhongri guanxi shi* [Chronology of Post-War Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1995], (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe (China Social Science Press, 2002), pp. 160-163.

² Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter, the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) *Wo dui Zhongguo, Riben minjian jiaoliu de fangzhen* [Chinese Approach to Private Exchange between China and Japan], June 25, 1958 (105-00899-08).

³ Sugiura Yasuyuki, “Chugoku no ‘Nihon Churitsuka’ Seisaku to Tainichi Joseininshiki - Daiyonji Nitchu Minkan Boeki Kyotei Kosho Katei to Nagasaki Kokki Jikan wo Chushin ni” [China's “Japan Neutralization” Policy and its Perception of Japan's Circumstances: With a Focus on the Negotiating Process for the Fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki Flag Incident], *Asian Studies* 54, no. 4 (October 2008): p. 70.

⁴ For information about China's responses to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, see Fukuda Madoka, *Chugoku Gaiko to Taiwan ‘Hitotsu no Chogoku’ Gensoku no Kigen* [Chinese Diplomacy and Taiwan: The Birth of the ‘One China’ Principle] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013), pp. 133-201. For information about the relationship between the U.S. and China, see Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 175-202.

⁵ CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, *Mao Zedong nianpu di 3 juan* [Chronicle of Mao Zedong vol.3], (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [Central Party Literature Press], 2014), p. 379.

⁶ For information about China's contemporary maneuvering of the Japanese Socialist Party, see Sugiura Yasuyuki, “Chugoku no ‘Nihon Churitsuka’ Seisaku to Tainichi Joseininshiki - Nippon Shakaito no Hochu to Nihon Kokunai no Hanbei/Hankishi Toso no Sogorensa (1956 nen 6 gatsu – 1959 nen 6 gatsu)” [China's “Japan Neutralization” Policy and its Perception of Japan's Circumstances: The Mutual Connections Between the Japanese Socialist Party's Visit to China and the Anti-U.S./Anti-Kishi Movement within Japan (June 1956 to June 1959)] *Chikaki ni Arite* 56 (November 2009, hereinafter Sugiura Paper (1)): pp. 51-67.

conservative party politicians in the past, but Ishibashi and Matsumura were important politicians and the leaders of factions in the LDP; when the China-Japan relationship was "discontinued," their visits to China attracted a great deal of attention. The aim of this paper is to focus on the divide and rule policy toward the LDP, including both Ishibashi and Matsumura's visits to China and the plan for Miki Takeo, also a political opponent of Kishi, to visit China, and, at the same time, to explicate the processes through which China accomplished such a policy, based on various political measures, China's perception of the situation, and its intelligences.

The previous works in this theme are broadly split into three types: (1) research on the history of the postwar relationship between Japan and China, based on the perspective of China-Japan friendship; (2) research on the history of postwar Japanese politics and diplomacy; and (3) research on (the history of) modern Chinese diplomacy. (1) includes the research of Furukawa Mantaro,⁷ Lin Daizhao,⁸ Luo Pinghan,⁹ and Tian Heng;¹⁰ this research assumes that the cause of the "discontinuity" was the Kishi cabinet hostile policy against China, and holds the actions of the people who were committed to a friendship between China and Japan under such circumstances in high regard. The research of Matsuo Takayoshi,¹¹ Hara Yoshihisa,¹² Jiang Keshi,¹³ Zhai Xin,¹⁴ Inoue Masaya,¹⁵ and Lu Xueying,¹⁶ which focuses on Ishibashi and Matsumura's visits to China, is included in (2). On the other hand, neither (1) nor (2) offer entirely satisfying explications of China's policy toward Japan.

Research by Okabe Tatsumi,¹⁷ Li Enmin,¹⁸ Aoyama Rumi,¹⁹ Okazaki Hisahiko,²⁰

⁷ Furukawa, *Nitchu Sengo Kankei Shi*.

⁸ Lin Daizhao, *Sengo Chunichi Kankei Shi* [A History of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations], trans. Watanabe Hideo (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo, 1997).

⁹ Luo Pinghan, *Zhongguo dui ri zhengce yu zhongri bangjiao zhengchanghua* [The Road to Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], (Beijing: *Shishi Chubanshe* [Current Affairs Press], 2000).

¹⁰ Tian Huan, "Zhanhou zhongri guanxi shi 1945-1995" [Chronology of Post-War Sino-Japanese Relations 1945-1995].

¹¹ Matsuo Takayoshi, "Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku to Ishibashi Tanzan" [The Restoration of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and Ishibashi Tanzan], *The Ritsumeikan Bungaku*, no. 509 (Dec. 1988): pp. 1467-1485.

¹² Hara Yoshihisa, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji Anpo Kaitei no Seijirikigaku* [Postwar Japan and International Politics: The Security Treaty Revision and Political Dynamics] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 1988).

¹³ Jiang Keshi, *Bannen no Ishibashi Tanzan to Heiwa Shugi* [The Last Years of Ishibashi Tanzan and Pacifism] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006).

¹⁴ Di Xin, *Songcun Qiansan ji tuan he zhong guo 1959-1972* [Kenzo Matsumura Group : Japan's diplomatic pipe to China 1959-1972], (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe [Social Sciences Academic Press], 2007).

¹⁵ Inoue Masaya, *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Shi* [The Political History of the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations], (Nagoya: The University of Nagoya Press, 2010).

¹⁶ Lu Xueying, *Furui Yoshimi to Chugoku Nitchu Kokko Seijoka e no Michi* [Furui Yoshimi and China: The Road to the Normalization of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Co., Ltd., 2001).

¹⁷ Eto Shinkichi and Okabe Tatsumi, *Chukyo Tainichi Hatsugen no Naiyo Bunseki* [Analysis of the Content of Chinese Communist Statements Toward Japan] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asian Affairs Bureau China Division, 1966); Okabe Tatsumi, *Gendai Chugoku no Taigai Seisaku* [Modern China's Foreign Policies] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971). See also Okabe, *Chugoku no Taigai Senryaku* [Chinese Foreign Strategy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2002).

¹⁸ Li Enmin, *Zhongri minjian jingji waijiao (1945-1972)* [China - Japan Foreign Economic Diplomacy (1945-1972)], (Beijing: *Renmin Chubanshe* [People's Publishing House], 1997).

¹⁹ Aoyama Rumi, "1950 Nendai Kohan no Chugoku no Taigai Seisaku - 'Kyoko Seisaku' no Naka no 'Junan Rosen'" [Chinese Foreign Policy in the Second Half of the 1950s: A 'Flexible Approach' Within A 'Hard-line Policy'], *Journal of Law and Political Studies*, no. 43 (Dec. 1999): pp. 43-79.

²⁰ Okazaki Hisahiko, "Chugoku no Tainichi Seisaku Kettei ni okeru Doyo - Dai Yakushin kara Keizai Chosei e no Tenkanki ni okeru Shu Onrai no Tainichi Kosaku" [Turbulence in the Formation of China's Policy Toward

Osawa Takeshi,²¹ and Qi Jianmin²² is included in (3). Okabe's research points out that the Chinese policy aim was to put pressure on the Japanese government by escalating the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements in Japan, and takes a similar research angle to this paper in that it also considers the interactions between China's policy toward Japan/its perception toward Japan and the political and social conditions within Japan. Be that as it may, it contains very little investigation of Chinese manipulations toward LDP due to documentary constraints. It also lacks discussion about what intelligences and policy recommendations were used to form the CCP leadership's policy measures and perception of the Japanese situation. Osawa's research makes use of historical documents from the Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify CCP's reflections on the gradual “以民促官 *yi min cu guan* [to encircle the government through the people]” policy, which had yielded no results. It shows that the return to the original “人民外交 *ren min wai jiao* [People's Diplomacy],” which strictly applied a so-called two-part theory centered on the three political principles,²³ was found in the policy toward Japan during this period based on the “断而不绝 *duan er bu jue* [To break off but not discontinued]” policy, and in this respect is a vital prior study. However, Osawa does not discuss the interrelationship between China's policy toward Japan and the political and social conditions within Japan in detail, nor does he adequately investigate the CCP manipulation toward the LDP. Qi Jianmin's research uses documents from the Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to analyze China's divide and rule policy toward the LDP during this period, making it a key piece of past research. Despite this, Qi doesn't carry out a detailed examination of the political processes that led to the divide and rule policy toward the LDP, or of Chinese influence during Matsumura and Ishibashi's visits to China; the research also lacks an adequate discussion of the interrelationship between China's policy toward Japan and the political and social conditions within Japan.

This paper sets out to analyze this topic from the following two analytical viewpoints. The first viewpoint is China's political policy toward Japan: “Japan neutralization.” On March 1, 1955, at a meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, attendees formed an outline of China's policy toward Japan—the first since the state was founded—titled “The CCP Central Committee's Measures and Plans for Policy and Activities Concerning Japan.” It denoted policies such as ensuring Japanese independence from the influence of the U.S. through direct and indirect encouragement of pro-China forces and the anti-U.S. movement, and the normalization

Japan: Zhou Enlai's Maneuvering of Japan During the Transitional Period from the Great Leap Forward to Economic Adjustment], *Toyo Kenkyu*, no. 134 (Dec. 1999): pp. 45-65.

²¹ Osawa Takeshi, “Sengo Shoki Nitchu Kankei ni okeru ‘Danzetsu’ no Saikento (1958-1962) - ‘Toso Shien’ to ‘Keizai Gaiko’ no Kyoso wo megutte” [Reexamining ‘Discontinuity’ in Sino-Japanese Relations in the Early Postwar Period (1958-1962): A Combination of ‘Conflict Support’ and ‘Economic Diplomacy’], in *Gendai Chugoku Gaiko no Rokujuunen* [Sixty Years of Modern Chinese Diplomacy], ed. Soeya Yoshihide (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2011), pp. 93-114.

²² Qi Jianmin, *Zhou Enlai yu changqi guoqi Shijian hou de dui ri waijiao* [Zhou Enlai and Diplomacy with Japan after Nagasaki National Flag Event], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu* [Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies], vol.9, 2014 (September, 2014), pp. 42-55.

²³ The three political principles were presented by China as conditions for the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, and consisted of (1) the renunciation of the hostile policy against China, (2) the renunciation of the “Two Chinas,” and (3) the improvement of policies that hindered the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. They were first presented in a meeting between Liao Chengzhi and Chairman Miyazaki Seimin of the Japan-China Friendship Association in July 1958, and were suggested again to Sata Tadataka, Director of the JSP's former International Bureau, when he visited China in August 1958. Sugiura Paper (1), pp. 52-53.

of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, to be accomplished in the context of a united front against the U.S. The Japanese government regarded China's policy toward Japan, which aimed for Japan-U.S. estrangement, as "Japan neutralization."²⁴ Moreover, the U.S. was uneasy about the neutralization of Japan due to the peace offensive by China and the Soviet Union, and considered adjustments to its Japan policies, including revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as a response to this.²⁵

The second analytical viewpoint is China's perception toward Japan at the time. When referring to China's perception, this paper includes discourse from the *People's Daily* and statements by CCP leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, as well as intelligences from China's "Japan Hands", such as Liao Chengzhi, which exerted influence when this perception was formed. Here, the "Japan Hands" is a general term for interested parties engaged in manipulation toward Japan, who were brought together across organizations under Liao Chengzhi, then Deputy Leader of the CCP's the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group and Deputy Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council.²⁶ Consequently, this paper will also make use of sources such as the Xinhua News Agency's *Internal Reference* (内部参考 *Neibu Cankao*) and *Reference News* (参考消息 *Cankao Xiaoxi*), in addition to historical papers stored in the Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁷

1. The Political Process Leading up to the Start of the Divide and Rule Policy toward the LDP

(1) Forbidding Contact via Diplomatic Missions and Reconsidering the Manipulation toward the LDP
Following the Nagasaki Flag Incident, China was strongly interested in the faction rivalry and diverging opinions on the issue of China within the LDP.²⁸ On July 27, 1958, Katsumata Seiichi of

²⁴ Sugiura Yasuyuki, "Chugoku no 'Nihon Churitsuka' Seisaku to Tainichi Joseininshiki - Kishi Nobusuke Naikaku no Seiritsu kara 'Kishi Hihan' made" [China's "Japan Neutralization" Policy and its Perception of Japan's Circumstances: From the Formation of Kishi Nobusuke's Cabinet to the Development of "Kishi Criticism"], *Journal of Law and Political Studies*, no. 70 (Sept. 2006; hereinafter Sugiura Paper (2)): p. 100.

²⁵ Michael Schaller, "*Nichibei Kankei*" to wa Nan datta no ka Senryoku kara Reisen Shuketsu made [Altered States: the United States and Japan Since the Occupation], trans. Ichikawa Yoichi (Tokyo: Soshisha Publishing Company Ltd., 2004), p. 200 and p. 233. Nakajima Shingo, *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku "Yoshida Rosen" wo meguru Seiji, Gaiko, Gunji* [Postwar Japan's Defense Policy: Politics, Diplomacy, Military Affairs Connected to the "Yoshida Line"] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2006), pp. 126-133. Sakamoto Kazuya, *Nichibei Domei no Kizuna Anpo Joyaku to Sogosei no Mosaku Zohoban* [The Bonds of the Japan-American Alliance: Exploring the Security Treaty and Reciprocity Expanded Edition] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing Co., Ltd., 2020), pp. 191-200.

²⁶ For information about the "Japan Hands" see Wang Xueping ed., *Sengo Nitchu Kankei to Ryo Shoshi: Chugoku no Chinichiha to Tainichi Seisaku* [Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations and Liao Chengzhi: China's "Japan Hands" and Policy Toward Japan] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2014). Additionally, see Osawa Takeshi, "'Yi Min Cu Guan' 'Ban Guan Ban Min' no Butaiura: Gendai Chugoku no Tainichi Seisaku Kiko no Genkei" [The "Yi Min Cu Guan" and "Ban Guan Ban Min": The Models for the Organization of Modern China's Policy Toward Japan], *Modern China*, no. 88 (Sept. 2014): pp. 27-41, for information about contemporary China's organizational structure regarding its policy toward Japan.

²⁷ Ding Min, who was responsible for Japan within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, testifies that the records of the current Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs contain not just documents under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also historical materials transferred during the Cultural Revolution among the documents under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council. Wang, *Sengo Nitchu Kankei to Ryo Shoshi: Chugoku no Chinichiha to Tainichi Seisaku*, p. 317 and p. 328. In light of Ding Min's words, despite the as-yet limited public access, it is conceivable that one can use the records of the Archives of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify, to a degree, the actions of the "Japan Hands" who carried out manipulations toward Japan across organizations under Liao Chengzhi.

²⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], May 28 and

the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) wrote a letter to Liao Chengzhi, saying that the situation inside the LDP was extremely complex, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama Aiichiro, Minister of International Trade and Industry Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency Miki Takeo, Chairperson of the General Council Kono Ichiro, Minister of Finance Sato Eisaku, Minister of State Ikeda Hayato, and Secretary-General Kawashima Shojiro all held their own expectations.²⁹ Tazaki Suematsu was a JSP fixer of Chinese issues, and had ensured that Sata Tadataka, former Director of the international bureau of the JSP, visited China. Tazaki stated, “I contacted Kono Ichiro, Akagi Munenori, and Tasaki Tatsunosuke before the visit to China, and they are prepared to accept any kind of condition from China. Kono has already drafted a plan that will skillfully settle the relationship between Japan and China, and is making preparations to submit this once the time comes.”³⁰

On September 28, 1958, the *Movements of Foreign Affairs*,³¹ a situation report created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on various pieces of intelligences, made the following analysis concerning the circumstances within Japan following Sata’s report upon returning to the country: (1) there were widening divergences within the LDP, and as Matsumura Kenzo had expressed dissent, any statement of opposition was still only informal. (2) Kono Ichiro had sent secret instructions to Kitamura Tokutaro, Sonoda Sunao, and others in his own faction and demanded that Kishi undertake some “frank reflection.” (3) Kishi, fearing being isolated within the Party, had clearly told the JSP through the Chief Cabinet Secretary Akagi Munenori, a member of his own faction, that he was not involved in the “Two Chinas” scheme or with any military organization that regarded China as hostile, and that although he had no intention of apologizing for the Nagasaki Flag Incident, he would respect the Chinese national flag in the future. (4) Unlike Kishi, who had a firm wait-and-see approach, Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama was fairly flexible in his assertions.³² Moreover, in relation to Sata’s report, the October 15 edition of *Movements of Foreign Affairs* introduced news from Japan indicating that Kishi may have a wait-and-see approach, but Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama was willing to negotiate based on conditions suggested by China, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Akagi and Matsumura Kenzo thought the same way as Fujiyama.³³

The Japanese government at the time were searching for a way to establish contact with

May 31, 1958 ; *Riben fangmian shitan wo dui riben taidushi* [The Japanese Side Tries to Explore Our Attitude toward Japan], May 31, 1958 (105-00899-05).

²⁹ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Shengjiantian Qingyi, Gangqi Wenxun, Nanxiang Sanlang zhi Liao Chengzhi xin* [Letters from Katsuma Seiichi, Okazaki Bunkun and Nango Saburo to Liao Chengzhi], from July 26 to July 27, 1958 (105-00600-02).

³⁰ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben shehuidang shitan wo dui riben taidushi* [The Social Democratic Party of Japan Tries to Explore Our Attitude toward Japan], July 18 to August 16 (105-00899-11).

³¹ Ding Min testifies that the main work of the people responsible for Japan in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which did not have any diplomatic relations with Japan at the time, was reading newspapers and undertaking investigative research to sort out relevant materials. Wang, *Sengo Nitchu Kankei to Ryo Shoshi: Chugoku no Chinichiha to Tainichi Seisaku*, p. 308.

³² The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben guonei dui shehuidang zuoduo zhonglong fang hua de fanying* [Reactions from inside Japan to the Visit to China by Sata Tadataka of the Social Democratic Party of Japan], August 27, 1958 (105-00899-14).

³³ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *An Xinjie jiaoxiao zhanzheng de yitu* [Kishi Nobusuke’s Intention behind his Clamor for War], October 15 to November 7, 1958 (105-00899-16).

China through its diplomatic missions,³⁴ but the Chinese embassies informed these approaches from Japanese side to their own country. On May 24, 1958, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed its missions that they must decline contact with Japanese diplomats, stating, "As the Kishi administration's approach toward China is extremely unfriendly, you must respond by saying you are unable to receive them."³⁵ On August 7, 1958, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reissued its instructions to its overseas missions, saying that they were to refuse all contact with Japanese diplomats.³⁶

China also started reconsidering its manipulation toward the LDP so far. On May 3, 1958, Ikeda Masanosuke,³⁷ a central figure on the Japanese side from the second Sino-Japanese private trade agreement to the fourth Sino-Japanese private trade agreement, sent a letter to Zhou Enlai explaining the Japanese government's thoughts on the fourth Sino-Japanese private trade agreement, but China did not reply.³⁸ On October 1, 1958, during Ikeda's visit to Bulgaria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent instructions to the resident Chinese embassy not to contact him.³⁹

Tsuji Masanobu,⁴⁰ who had previously conversed with Zhou Enlai immediately after the establishment of Kishi's cabinet, spoke with Indonesian President Sukarno on August 22, 1958, and stated that he wanted to visit China and meet with Zhou Enlai to improve the relationship between China and Japan. This message was delivered to Beijing on August 26, having traveled from the Indonesian government via the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. However, on September 6, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected this proposal, stating that although it acknowledged that Tsuji was a Diet member who was part of the Ishibashi faction, that opposed Kishi, and he

³⁴ Kimura Takakazu, "Kishi Naikaku no 'Chugoku Tekishi Seisaku' no Jitsuzo" [The Real Picture of the Kishi Cabinet's 'hostile policy against China'], *Nippon Rekishi*, no. 741 (Feb. 2010): p. 77.

³⁵ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Wo zhuwai shiguan renyuan yu riben fangmian renyuan jiechushi* [The Contact between Personnel in Our Embassies Abroad and Personnel on the Japanese Side], April 3 to October 3, 1958 (105-00895-01).

³⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhishi zhuwai shilingguan jujue tong riben fangmian jiechushi* [Our Embassies and Consulates Abroad Instructed to Refuse Contact with Personnel on the Japanese Side], August 16, 1958 (105-00899-12).

³⁷ For information about Ikeda's role in China-Japan exchange, see for example Okazaki Yuji, "Shoki Nitchu Boeki Senkusha Ikeda Masanosuke: Hatashita Yakuwari to Genkai, Sono Jitsuzo wo Ou" [Ikeda Masanosuke, Pioneer in Early Sino-Japanese Trade: His Role and Limitations, Pursuing the Real Picture], *Monthly Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 55, no. 5 (May 2001): pp. 39-51. Okazaki Yuji, "Ikeda Masanosuke to Sengo Shoki Nitchu Boeki (Jo): Minkan Boeki Kyotei ni Honso – Shonai Shusshin Seijika no Ashiato" [Ikeda Masanosuke and Early Postwar Sino-Japanese Trade (Part 1): The Hard Work Toward a Private Trade Agreement – The Footsteps of a Politician from Shonai], *Tohoku University of Community Service and Science Comprehensive Research and Essays: Forum 21*, no. 3 (May 2002): pp. 85-105. Okazaki Yuji, "Ikeda Masanosuke to Sengo Shoki Nitchu Boeki (Ge) – Minkan Boeki Kyotei ni Honso – Shonai Shusshin Seijika no Ashiato" [Ikeda Masanosuke and Early Postwar Sino-Japanese Trade (Part 2): The Hard Work Toward a Private Trade Agreement – The Footsteps of a Politician from Shonai], *Tohoku University of Community Service and Science Comprehensive Research and Essays: Forum 21*, no. 4 (Dec. 2002): pp. 117-138.

³⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "*Riben guohui yiyuan cujin ri zhong maoyi lianmeng*" *Huizhang Chitian Zhengzhifu zhi Zhou Enlai zongli han* ["Japanese Diet Members Promoting Japan-China Trade Alliance" Letter to Premier Zhou Enlai from Chairman Ikeda Masanosuke], May 3 to May 13, 1958 (105-00598-01).

³⁹ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben fangmian shitan yu wo jiechu ji wo duice* [The Japanese Side Trying to Contact Us and Our Countermeasures], October 1, 1958 (105-00598-04).

⁴⁰ For information about the meetings between Tsuji and Zhou Enlai, see Sugiura paper (2), p. 102. The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "*Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian riben pengyou Shi Zhengxin tanhua jilu* [Record of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and His Japanese Friend Tsuji Masanobu," February 27, 1957 (105-00540-03).

had recognized China at an early stage, it would be inappropriate to invite him while there was an intensifying movement against Japan; “Above all, to invite him after the Japanese government has rejected our nation’s six conditions⁴¹ for a relationship between China and Japan would provoke dissatisfaction among the Japanese people.” On August 24, Tsuji sent a letter to Zhou Enlai via some old Chinese expatriate friends in Hong Kong, but on September 29 the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council assessed this letter as “giving cunning excuses for Kishi Nobusuke’s hostile policy against China, and frivolously discrediting the Japan policy of Chairman Mao and China.”⁴²

(2) The Intensification of LDP Faction Rivalry and the Emergence of the Issue of the Revision of the Security Treaty

On October 8, 1958, the Kishi cabinet submitted its proposal to revise the Police Duties Execution Act (hereinafter referred to as the Police Duties Act) to the National Diet. The JSP opposed this, in addition, since the submission was abrupt, and on November 4 the Kishi administration had suddenly forced an extension of the Diet session without building the consensus with the opposition parties, there was also criticism from inside the LDP. Furthermore, Kishi did not implement an adequate press policy, and so on October 15, there was even a report that Kishi hinted at revising Article 9 of the Constitution toward an American NBC reporter on the grounds of Chinese aggression,⁴³ as a result the Japanese media also criticized Kishi’s approach. On November 5, four million people from around the country participated in protests against the revisions to the Police Duties Act, which were organized by a number of organizations, including the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), the All-Japan Trade Union Congress (Zenro), and the Federation of Independent Unions of Japan (Churitsu-roren). With such strong opposition from inside the country, Kishi discussed the issue with the JSP Committee Chairman Suzuki Mosaburo on November 22, and obtained his agreement by shelving the Police Duties Act and having the House of Representatives enter a spontaneous recess.⁴⁴

China was also watching the situation in Japan very closely.⁴⁵ It was attentive to the fact that Kishi’s statement on October 15 was criticized not just by the Japanese Communist Party and the JSP, but also by the general public, and set out a policy that would take this opportunity to

⁴¹ The “six conditions” referred to the three political principles, plus three more conditions that China demanded when Sata visited: (1) With regard to the Nagasaki Flag Incident, the Kishi administration should (i) guarantee that it would send a government representative to the location and put up a Chinese national flag, (ii) punish the perpetrator(s) and (iii) send an official delegation to clearly express its apology to China; (2) in order to abolish the “Two Chinas” scheme, Japan should state, verbatim, that “Japan earnestly desires to restore normal relations with the People’s Republic of China, and will strive to do so”; and (3) once the above were completely fulfilled, the Japanese government could send a delegation to Beijing to talk. Sugiura Paper (1), pp. 52-53.

⁴² The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben guohui yiyuan Shi Zhengxin laihua shi* [Tsuji Masanobu, a member of the Japanese Diet, came to China], August 26 to September 29, 1958 (105-00895-03); Tsuji Masanobu, *Doran no me Ajia, Arabu no Shidosha to Kataru* [The Eye of the Storm: As Told by Asian and Arabic Leaders] (Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers Co., 1958), pp. 228-232.

⁴³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, October 15, 1958 evening edition.

⁴⁴ Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji Anpo Kaitei no Seijirikigaku*, pp. 195-212. Ohinata Ichiro, *Kishi Seiken 1241 Nichi* [The Kishi Administration: 1241 Days] (Tokyo: Gyosei Mondai Kenkyujo, 1985), pp. 163-171.

⁴⁵ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], November 13 and December 11, 1958. Relevant reports were printed in the *People’s Daily* on October 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, and 29, and in November daily articles connected to the issue of the Police Duties Act appeared up until November 27.

strike more blows against the Kishi government through conflict inside and outside the House.⁴⁶ The observers' article in the October 24 edition of the *People's Daily* pointed out that when it came to the issue of revising the Police Duties Act, the fight against Kishi wasn't limited to the regular working class; it had expanded to the intellectuals and the world of academia, and even within the LDP no small number of knowledgeable people were professing their discontent with Kishi's reactionary policies.⁴⁷ The November 4 edition of *Movements of Foreign Affairs* offered an analysis noting that there was a cautious approach to the proposal to revise the Police Duties Act even within the LDP, the momentum of the civil strife was intensifying the contradictions within the country, and that opinions within the governing ranks had also diverged further.⁴⁸ The November 11 edition of the *People's Daily* also reported opposition in the LDP with regard to the issue of revising the Police Duties Act.⁴⁹

At the same time, there was also encouragement from the Soviet Union,⁵⁰ and China began considering its response to the negotiations for revising the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty⁵¹. During this period, China and the Soviet Union shared information regarding their policies toward Japan. On April 15, 1958, Zhou Enlai responded to a request by Pavel Fyodorovich Yudin, the Soviet Ambassador to China, and explained that China had stopped implementing the fourth Sino-Japanese private trade agreement and had launched criticism against the Kishi administration; the reason for this was to determine whether it was possible to put pressure on the Kishi administration and use the differences between Japan, Chiang Kai-shek's group, and the U.S. At the same time, Zhou Enlai indicated that the Kishi administration was planning to realize the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere through economic expansion into Southeast Asia, and to resurrect Japanese militarism. Zhou Enlai also stated that he would practice the flexible tactic of pressurizing the Japanese people on the one hand, and winning them over to his side on the other, and insisted that his goal would be achieved through this conflict.⁵²

On May 9, 1958, Zhang Wentian, Executive Vice Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign

⁴⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *An Xinjie jiaoxiao zhanzheng de yitu* [Kishi Nobusuke's Intention behind his Clamor for War], October 15 to November 7, 1958 (105-00899-16).

⁴⁷ *Women zhichi riben renmin de zhengyi douzheng* [We Support the Righteous Struggle of the Japanese People], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], October 24, 1958.

⁴⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *An Xinjie jiaoxiao zhanzheng de yitu* [Kishi Nobusuke's Intention behind his Clamor for War], October 15 to November 7, 1958 (105-00899-16).

⁴⁹ *Jianjue yaoqiu jiesan zhongyiyuan dadao an zhengfu Riben shehuidang juejing jiaqiang guohui wai de douzheng Ziyouminzhudang neibu fenqi jiashen An Xinjie xianyu simian chuge* [Resolute Demand to Dissolve the House of Representatives to Defeat the Kishi Administration; The Socialist Party of Japan Determined to Strengthen the Battle outside the Diet; Internal Divisions Deepen in the Liberal Democratic Party; Kishi Nobusuke Is under Fire from All Quarters], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 11, 1958.

⁵⁰ For information about the Soviet response to the Security Treaty revision, see Saito Motohide, *Roshia no Tainichi Seisaku Jo Teisei Roshia kara Soren Hokai made* [Russia's Policy Toward Japan Part 1: From Imperial Russia to the Collapse of the Soviet Union] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2018), pp. 226-229.

⁵¹ For information about the negotiations to revise the Security Treaty, see Sakamoto, *Nichibei Domei no Kizuna: Anpo Joyaku to Sogosei no Mosaku Zohoban*, pp. 182-212.

⁵² *Youjin yu Zhou Enlai huitan jiyao: nangong wenti, dui ri zhengce deng (1958. 4. 15)*-[Summary of the Meeting between Pavel Yudin and Zhou Enlai: Issues around the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Policy toward Japan, etc. (April 15, 1958)], *Shen Zhihua ed., Eluosi jiemi jiemi dang'an xuanbian zhongsu guanxi di 8 juan* [Selection of Declassified Russia Archives: Sino-Soviet Relations vol.8], (*Zhongguo Chuban Jituan Dongfang Chuban Zhongxin* [Orient Publishing Centre, China Publishing Group], 2015, hereinafter referred to as *Zhongsu guanxi* [Sino-Soviet Relations]), pp. 30-32.

Affairs spoke with Sergei F. Antonov, Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim in China. During the conversation, Zhang Wentian informed Antonov that China was taking the opportunity presented by the Nagasaki Flag Incident to put pressure on the Kishi administration and support the JSP and the Japanese Communist Party, and that PRC had made a decision to launch a counterattack against Japan, which intend to block the LDP from obtaining two thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives general election. Furthermore, he indicated the concrete measures that China deployed criticism of Kishi in Chinese newspapers and suspended exchange with Japan on all fronts. At the same time, Zhang Wentian clearly stated that these measures were tactical diversions, and that China's policy toward Japan still aimed to ensure the estrangement of Japan and the U.S.⁵³ On the other hand, a report from the Embassy of the Soviet Union in China to their home analyzed that China's policy toward Japan would be effective, and that while they did acknowledge that the policy was still maturing, it included extreme elements and drawbacks, and noted it should be pointed out that when China shifted its policy toward Japan, there were no prior consultations with the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

On August 2, 1958, Mao Zedong spoke with Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who visited China in absolute secrecy. During the conversation, Mao Zedong told Khrushchev that the CCP's conditions to restore relations between China and Japan were (1) an apology for the Nagasaki Flag Incident, (2) the abandonment of hostile policy against China and of the Two Chinas policy, and (3) no hinderance to the normalization of the China-Japan relationship. In addition, Zhou Enlai stated that, even if Japan responded to the three conditions, China would not establish any diplomatic mechanisms in Japan to prevent the Two Chinas situation from arising. In response to this, Khrushchev and Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Fedorenko, who was later appointed as the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, proposed sending Chinese people, who pretended to be from the Soviet Union to the Soviet Embassy in Japan and had them work as counselors. However, the Chinese side implicitly rejected this offer.⁵⁵

Against this backdrop, on September 9, 1958, the Soviet Embassy in China informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that negotiations, which revised the Security Treaty, had taken place during a conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the U.S. on September 3.⁵⁶ At this point, the Soviet Embassy in China provided the analysis from the Soviet Embassy in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which included information such as: (1) under the spirit of retaining the overall principles of the various military treaties between Japan and the U.S., the Japanese government was planning to have the U.S. carry out ex-ante coordination with Japan regarding the activities and its movement plans by the U.S.

⁵³ *Andongnuofu yu Zhang Wentian huitan jiyao: Tongbao zhongguo dui ri zhengce de tiaozheng (1958. 5. 9)* [Summary of the Meeting between Sergei F. Antonov and Zhang Wentian: Briefing on the Adjustment of China's Policy towards Japan (May 9, 1958)], *Zhongsu guanxi* [Sino-Soviet Relations], pp. 41-43.

⁵⁴ *Andongnuofu guanyu zhongguo zhengzhi jingji xingshi de baogao (yijiuwuba nian qi yue ershiwu ri)* [Sergei F. Antonov 's Report on the Political and Economic Situation in China], *Zhongsu guanxi* [Sino-Soviet Relations], pp. 113-116.

⁵⁵ *Heluxiaofu yu Mao Zedong huitan jilu: Mantan guoji xingshi (1958. 8. 2)* [The Records of the Meeting between Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: An Informal Discussion on the International Situation], *Zhongsu guanxi* [Sino-Soviet Relations], p. 164, and pp. 176-177.

⁵⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Li Hui fusizhang jiejian su zhuhua shiguan canzan Sudalikefu tanhua jilu* [The Records of the Meeting between Li Hui, Deputy Director, and Sudalikov, Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in China], September 13, 1958 (105-00596-02).

military in Japan, (2) however, the Japanese government also did not believe that this attempt would succeed, and, perhaps their aim would influence the U.S. policy, or fool the general public within Japan, who demanded the implementation of more independent policies. On September 15, the Soviet Embassy in China communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Soviet Embassy in Japan had warned Japan about the participation of the U.S. forces in Japan in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.⁵⁷ On October 2, Antonov met with Zhou Enlai, and told him that the Soviet Union had decided to deter Japan's pro-American policy through economic means.⁵⁸

On November 3, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi spoke with Antonov. Antonov handed over a memorandum, which contained intelligences on secret talks between Japan and the U.S. about revising the Security Treaty in Tokyo. The memorandum offered the following analysis of the Security Treaty revisions: (1) the aim of the talks was to confirm U.S. rights regarding U.S. forces in Japan and to strengthen Japanese militarism, and possibly to suggest that such an action would lead to the deployment of Japanese troops overseas and enable nuclearization; (2) as a result of the treaty, Japan would likely be able to join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and even the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, through the U.S.; (3) within Japan, unease about the involvement in a war, especially a nuclear war, was increasing day by day, and every day there were more and more voices from the general Japanese population calling for a policy of neutrality; (4) Japan's ruling group were divided in the opinions regarding the current negotiations to revise the Security Treaty; (5) Kishi was using revising the Security Treaty to eliminate any clauses in the current treaty, which were unfavorable to Japan, and was trying to give the impression that Japan had become an equal party in the Japan-U.S. alliance. Then, Antonov made a suggestion to Chen Yi: that China and the Soviet Union could make a joint statement opposing the revision of the Security Treaty, and propose a trilateral treaty of peace and friendship between Japan, China and the Soviet Union. Although Chen Yi replied that he would report this to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and give an answer after researching the issue, he responded with his personal opinion that a joint statement would be too much.⁵⁹

The November 7 edition of the observer's article in the *People's Daily* pointed out that after the revisions, the Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. would become a bilateral military treaty with the characteristics of a joint defense pact, and that it was apprehensive that the treaty could be connected to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.

⁵⁷ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sulian zhuhua shiguan canzan Sudalikefu huijian Zhang Hanfu fubuzhang dijiao zhuri shiguan jiu meiguo zai dongya diqu zhizao jinzhang jushi zhi riben waiwusheng zhaohui chaojian deng shi* [Sudalikov, Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in China Met with Deputy Minister Zhang Hanfu to Discuss the Copies of Notes Submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Japan Addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Regarding the Tensions Created by the United States in East Asia, etc.], September 15, 1958 (109-00829-11).

⁵⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sulian zhunbei shijia yali, daji riben qinmei zhengce* [The Soviet Union Preparing to Apply Pressure to Combat Japan's Pro-U.S. Policy], October 8, 1958 (105-00899-15).

⁵⁹ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sulian zhuhua linshi daiban xiang ChenYi fuzongli shou dijiao guanyu riben meiguo mimi huitan deng wenti de beiwanglu* [The Chargé d'affaires of the Soviet Union in China Handed Over to Vice Premier Chen Yi a Memorandum on Secret Talks between Japan and the United States and Other Issues], November 3, 1958 (105-00378-01).

It also asserted that China would support the Japanese patriots' movement demanding the abolition of the Security Treaty, which included the Japanese Communist Party, the JSP and discerning members of the government and the LDP.⁶⁰

The November 7 edition of the *Movements of Foreign Affairs* also offered an analysis of the Security Treaty revisions: (1) as the situation in the Taiwan Strait became fraught, Kishi feared the involvement in a war, but proactively kept in step with the U.S.. Kishi was colluding all the more with the U.S. during this time to discuss revising the Security Treaty; as well as making U.S. obligations to defend Japan, he was considering Japanese obligations toward American war policy, such as providing bases, defending American-occupied Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, strengthening the anti-communist military groups of Northeast Asia, and deploying troops overseas; (2) Kishi's hostile policy against China was widening the cracks within Japan, and these situations developed the actions by a variety of democratic party factions and groups; the JSP had declared they would overthrow Kishi's cabinet; (3) the Japanese government and the LDP were disunited, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama, Matsumura Kenzo, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kishi held divergent opinions. Moreover, this document suggested policy that launched a concentrated attack on Kishi and increasingly isolated him while supporting all the people who were friendly toward China, especially the JSP, to promote the anti-Kishi movement among the Japanese people.⁶¹ The November 15 edition of the *Movements of Foreign Affairs* presented an analysis that the Japanese people opposed to revising the Security Treaty, and that there had been increased calls to abolish it since the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, but that Kishi's cabinet disagreed with these opinions, and intended to revise the treaty. It also reported a policy to advertise the dangers of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, expose Kishi's intentions, and support the fight of the Japanese people.⁶²

In this context, a meeting was held at 3 pm on November 7 to consider the Soviet Union's proposal regarding the revision of the Security Treaty. On the morning of that day, Zhou Enlai called Liao Chengzhi and instructed him to convene the Japan Group⁶³ under his jurisdiction, carry

⁶⁰ *Jingti rimei xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" de pianju!* [Beware of Japan-US Scam to Revise the "Security Treaty"!], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 7, 1958.

⁶¹ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *An Xinjie jiaoxiao zhanzheng de yitu* [Kishi Nobusuke's Intention behind his Clamor for War], October 15 to November 7, 1958 (105-00899-16).

⁶² The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Guanyu xiugai rimei "anquan tiaoyue" de dongxiang* [Movement on the Revision of the Japan-U.S. "Security Treaty"], November 15, 1958 (105-00899-17).

⁶³ This Japan Group is thought to refer to the so-called "Great Japan Group" organized by Liao Chengzhi, in which those responsible for practical work connected to Japan participated, including people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the National Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, the CCP Communist Youth League, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the *People's Daily*, and the Xinhua News Agency. The Great Japan Group undertook communications, debates, research, and studying relating to China's political direction toward Japan and its perception of Japanese circumstances, and conveyed information gathered by each organization and proposals to the CCP leadership, chiefly Zhou Enlai, while receiving policy directions and instructions from the CCP leadership through Liao Chengzhi. In fact, the members of the Japan Group convened at this time included names such as Zhao Anbo (International Department, Central Committee of CPC), Yang Zheng, Wang Xiaoyun (Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council), and Yang Chunsong (National Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee); even Zhuang Tao (International Department, Central Committee of CPC), and Chen Kang (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were called. The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waijiao buzhang Chen Yi jiu riben meiguo xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" fabiao shengming de youguan qingshi ji shengming gao* [Foreign Minister Chen Yi's Statement on the

out research in advance, and then prepare any necessary documents and opinions for the meeting that afternoon. On this occasion, Zhou Enlai instructed Liao Chengzhi to research two points for consideration that he had discussed with Chen Yi the previous day: (1) Kishi was making use of the Japanese people's wish, which abolished the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and achieved equal status, to sign a treaty of alliance with the U.S., and Kishi was planning to revive Japanese militarism through this new treaty. What rallying cries and policies should China use to support and encourage the fight of the Japanese people? (2) There were some good points about making a joint statement with the Soviet Union, but while the Soviet Union was engaged in diplomatic relations with Japan, China was not, and the Taiwan issue also lay between them. Consequently, there could be no allowances in the phrasing of the joint statement. Would it therefore be better to release their own statements, or a joint statement? Zhou Enlai also ordered him to research the issue of the revision of the Police Duties Act with regard to the circumstances within Japan.⁶⁴

On the afternoon of November 7, based on the opinions of Liao Chengzhi and his group, Zhou Enlai gathered Chen Yi, Liao Chengzhi, Deputy Director Li Chuli of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee, Vice Minister Zhang Hanfu of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant parties from the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Internal Liaison Department, and held a discussion on the response to the revision of the Security Treaty. Then, on November 15, Zhou Enlai submitted the following report to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee.⁶⁵

First, the report gave the following analysis with regard to the revision of the Security Treaty: (1) Kishi was using the wishes of the Japanese people to recover Okinawa and the Bonin Islands and reform the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty into an equal pact so Japan would be pulled into the U.S.'s Northeast Asian alliance group, and was trying to rearm Japan and resurrect its militarism through new treaty; (2) the aims of the U.S. were to tie Japan to the U.S. tank through this military treaty and make Japan obliged to defend U.S. military bases, then to expand this area of defense into the western Pacific, and in so doing push Japan to the front lines and have it take risks for the U.S. in an emergency. The U.S. had felt the sting of engagement on the front lines in the recent Lebanon crisis and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, and was consequently exploring plans that would enable it to escape from such predicaments. As a result, this revealed U.S. weakness; (3) once Japan rearmed, it was extremely doubtful that Japan would obey the American plan. The report also pointed out that the Japanese people were already engaged in widespread protests, but

Revision of the "Security Treaty" by Japan and the United States and Requests for Instructions in Relation to the Statement], November 7 to November 30, 1958 (105-00378-02).

The Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council had also set up a Japan Group, with several members of staff deployed under the leader of the group (initially this was Yang Zheng; after this it was Wang Xiaoyun), but because it played an administrative role, such as documenting the proposals of the "Great Japan Group" and convening meetings of the "Great Japan Group," it was known as the "Small Japan Group." For more details concerning the Japan Groups mentioned above, see Wu Xuewen, *Fengyu yangqing – wo suo jingli de zhongri guanxi* [Rain or Shine - Sino-Japanese Relations as I Experienced Them], (Beijing: *Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe* [World Affairs Press], 2002), pp. 55-56 ; Wang, *Sengo Nitcho Kankei to Ryo Shoshi: Chugoku no Chinichihua to Tainichi Seisaku*, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁴ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waijiao buzhang Chen Yi jiu riben meiguo xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" fabiao shengming de youguan qingshi ji shengming gao* [Foreign Minister Chen Yi's Statement on the Revision of the "Security Treaty" by Japan and the United States and Requests for Instructions in Relation to the Statement], November 7 to November 30, 1958 (105-00378-02).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

that the sources and future development of these problems were not clear.

Moreover, based on these points, the report proposed that China should make a statement regarding the revision of the Security Treaty. Two reasons were given: (1) it was necessary to declare China's stance of resolute opposition to any new military collusion between Japan and the U.S.; (2) China must adopt a mindset to explain its rationale, separate the Japanese people's mentality which desired independence, peace, and equality, from the current conspiracy to tie Japan to the American tank, and divorce the legitimate demand, which Japanese wanted to maintain armaments for the self-defense, from Japanese and U.S. collusion to invade and expand. On the other hand, the report saw the revisions to the Security Treaty as unblockable. Nevertheless, it pointed out that a statement by China could strengthen the progressively powerful fight in Japan, and help the Japanese people to see their prospects more clearly.

Second, with regard to the Soviet Union's proposal, the report suggested that although there were advantages to making a joint statement with the Soviet Union, it would be more desirable to make an independent statement. The reasons given were: (1) the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with Japan and the U.S., but China did not, and Japan and U.S. were involved in the Taiwan problem; (2) a joint statement with the Soviet Union would highlight the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance e—and give Kishi an excuse to advocate for the signing of a military pact between Japan and the U.S. and deceive the Japanese people. Additionally, it noted that although the suggestion of a trilateral peace treaty between China, Japan and the Soviet Union in the Soviet Union's proposal offered the advantage of not allowing Kishi to use the excuse of a China-Soviet alliance, implementing such a proposal at the moment would indicate Chinese and Soviet weakness to Japan and the U.S., and so should be brought up after seeing the situation in the future.

Third, after acknowledging the above opinions, the report put forward measures to be taken: (1) a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; (2) an editorial in the *People's Daily*; (3) a joint statement by the different public organizations that had connections with Japan to date, which would express support for the Japanese people's opposition to the resurrection of militarism and their fight to gain democracy and freedom; (4) notifying the Soviet Union of the Chinese opinions and measures. This report attached a draft of the statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The draft statement for the Minister of Foreign Affairs was created based on the content of this report. The report's proposals received the approval of the leadership of the CCP, including Mao Zedong, by November 18. After this, Zhou Enlai applied the final revisions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs' statement, and the statement was to be issued on November 19.

On November 18, the day before the statement was to be issued, Zhou Enlai instructed Chen Yi to meet with Yudin and inform him of China's opinions and measures. Yudin was not in good health, so Chen Yi spoke with Antonov and informed him that there would be an independent statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chen Yi offered the reasons that although a joint statement would be important, it was not yet the time for it, and that although the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with Japan, China did not, and so it would be inconvenient to phrase and express such a statement. He then noted that in this statement, China had decided to attack the Kishi cabinet and support the anti-Kishi movement of the Japanese people.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Ibid.

The statement, which was made in the name of Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi, took the position that "The 'Security' Treaty between Japan and the United States of America is a one-sided, unequal treaty ensuring that American imperialism controls the Japanese people," asserting that the Japanese people were demanding the abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and that the Treaty "completely contravenes the wishes of the Japanese people." Then, the statement noted that "the Chinese people have consistently supported the Japanese people's fight for independence, peace, and democracy, and wholeheartedly expect Japan to become a peaceful and neutral state," and put forward a message with a "Japan neutralization" policy in mind. Moreover, it pointed out that an extremely powerful mass movement was taking place among the Japanese people on an unprecedented scale toward Kishi's hostile policy against China, and that even within the LDP, educated people were expressing great dissatisfaction with Kishi's reactionary policies.⁶⁷ An editorial in the following day's *People's Daily* also criticized Kishi's approach toward the U.S. and China, calling for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to be abolished, and characterizing the current anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements as unprecedented in the history of postwar Japan.⁶⁸

The Kishi cabinet immediately rebutted China's approach.⁶⁹ Even Japanese public opinion criticized China's approach as meddling with internal affairs.⁷⁰ China understood this reaction from Japan,⁷¹ but focused its attention on inflaming the Anpo protests within Japan, and so ignored it.⁷²

On November 28, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Soviet Embassy in China that their proposal to sign a trilateral peace treaty between China, Japan and the Soviet Union, which was included in the draft for an independent statement by the Soviet Union, was inappropriate, and demanded it be cut. Chinese side pointed out one reason that, following China's announcement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi's statement, there was a remarkable reaction in Japan, and the Japanese people opposed the Kishi administration's Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; the proposal would cause part of the Japanese populace to misunderstand that China was hurrying to improve its relations with Kishi's administration, and shake the determination of the anti-Kishi

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ "Heping duli minzhu shi riben renmin wei yi guangming de qiantu" [Peace, Independence and Democracy are the Only Path to Bright Future for the Japanese People], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 20, 1958.

⁶⁹ "Chin Ki Seimei ni kansuru Gaimusho Joho Bunkakyokucho Danwa" [Conversations about Chen Yi's Statement with the Director-General of the Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (November 20, 1958), in *Sengo Shiryo Nitchu Kankei* [Postwar Documents: Sino-Japanese Relations] ed. Ishikawa Tadao, Nakajima Mineo, and Ikei Masaru (Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron sha co., Ltd., 1970; hereinafter, *Sengo Shiryo*), p. 106.

⁷⁰ "Shasetsu Chin Ki Bucho no Kyokkai wo Haisu" [Editorial: Overcoming Minister Chen Yi's Misconstructions] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 22, 1958.

⁷¹ Cankao Xiaoxi [Reference News], November 21, 1958; The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhongguo sulian dui ri zhengce wenti* [On China and the Soviet Union's Policy toward Japan], November 21 to December 17, 1958 (105-00899-18).

⁷² The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zhongguo sulian dui ri zhengce wenti* [On China and the Soviet Union's Policy toward Japan], November 21 to December 17, 1958 (105-00899-18); Liu Chu, *Mei ri fandongpai yao ba riben tuoshang huimie de daolu - jielu ri mei xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" de yinmou* [U.S. and Japanese Reactionaries Want to Drag Japan down the Road to Destruction - Exposing the Conspiracy behind Japan and the United States Revising the "Security Treaty"] *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], December 5, 1958; Meng Jing, *Ri mei xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" de yinmou* [Conspiracy behind Japan and the United States Revising the "Security Treaty"], *Shijie Zhishi* [World Affairs], 1958, vol.23 (December, 1958), pp. 27-28.

movement.⁷³ During this period, the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union reported that Soviet news and propaganda, which aimed at the Japanese government, were comparatively mild for the diplomatic consideration, and this would influence the later behavior of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴

As stated above, by maintaining an unyielding attitude toward Japan, China intended to link the revision of the Security Treaty to the inflammation of the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements. In this context, China emphasized the information about Japan provided from the Soviet Union. However, during this same period, China feared that falling into step with the Soviet Union in terms of its policy toward Japan would drag China into its approach of appeasement, and thought it should refuse the Soviet proposal regarding the revision of the Security Treaty.

(3) The Beginning of the Divide and Rule Policy toward the LDP

From November 1958, the incumbent LDP ministers sought to improve Sino-Japanese relations through the Soviet Union. On November 29, 1958, Chief Cabinet Secretary Akagi requested the cooperation of Fedorenko, Soviet Ambassador to Japan, to improve relations between China and Japan. Akagi stated that (1) Kishi had not sent a letter apologizing for the Nagasaki Flag Incident, but had expressed his feelings of regret when responding to questions in the Diet, and (2) the statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi went too far, seeming to add to the pressure on the Japanese government, and had alienated a huge number of Japanese people from China. Moreover, he noted that it had been a mistake for the Japanese government to make a statement acknowledging the “Two Chinas” in the past, and “the Japanese government cannot ignore the current circumstances, although there are great difficulties.” This message was passed to Beijing via the Soviet Embassy in China.⁷⁵

In December 1958, Minister of International Trade and Industry Takasaki also met with Fedorenko and expressed that the suspension of trade between China and Japan was a heavy blow for Japanese industry, and so Japan wanted to undertake trilateral trade with China via the Soviet Union. Takasaki pointed out the importance of improving the relationship between Japan and China, and proposed that (1) if China were to invite Takasaki, he would immediately raise the invitation before the government, and once he had permission, would travel to China in his position as Minister of International Trade and Industry, or (2) if the government did not give permission, he would resign, and then visit China in his capacity as a private citizen. He requested that this was conveyed to China, and that he be informed of the result. This proposal was passed to China via the Soviet Embassy in China.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, the factional rivalry in the LDP had intensified even more. On December 22,

⁷³ op.cit. Another reason was the lack of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and the legal state of war accompanying this.

⁷⁴ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Zuijin sulian baokan dui riben wenti de baodao* [Recent Soviet Press Coverage of Japanese Issues], November 27, 1958 (109-01814-16).

⁷⁵ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben guangfang zhangguan Chicheng tanzhongri guanxi wenti* [Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Akagi Talks about China-Japan Relations], December 10, 1958 (105-00378-04).

⁷⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Sulian zhuhua shiguan canzan Andongnuofu huijian Zeng Yongquan fubuzhang dijiao riben tongshang chanye xiang yaoqiu sulian bangzhu tong zhongguo maoyi de beiwanglu* [Antonov, Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in China, Met with Vice Minister Zeng Yongquan and Handed Over the Memorandum of the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry Requesting the Soviet Union to Support Trade with China], January 7, 1959 (109-00829-22).

82 members of the anti-mainstream factions of the LDP organized a rally opposing the situation that Kishi moved the LDP presidential election forward and demanding the revocation of the expulsion of Tsuji Masanobu and of the cull that recommended the resignation of Kawasaki Hideji. Moreover, on December 25, Minister of State Ikeda Hayato, Minister of Education Nadao Hirokichi, and Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency Miki Takeo submitted letters of resignation.⁷⁷ China observed these movements closely,⁷⁸ and the January 6 and January 18 (1959) editions of the *People's Daily* referred to the intensification of internal LDP strife caused by moving the presidential election forward.⁷⁹ Although Matsumura Kenzo, who ran as a rival candidate to Kishi in the LDP presidential election held on January 24, 1959, was defeated, he received the support of 166 votes—around one third of the votes within the LDP⁸⁰—and China also paid attention to this result.⁸¹

On February 13, 1959, Mao Zedong gave new instructions concerning the policy toward Japan. He added a revised proposal—"Exchange with some persons involved in government will be permitted at appropriate times"—to the "Basic Evaluation of the Foreign Affairs Work by the CCP's the Central Foreign Affairs Small Group in 1958 and the 1959 Political Policy and Plan Concerning Foreign Affairs Work" submitted by Chen Yi on January 26.⁸² These instructions were the catalyst for China launching its divide and rule policy toward the LDP.

It is thought that Mao Zedong's instructions were influenced by the *Foreign Affairs Briefings* created by the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council on January 17 and 22, 1959, as well as by the perception of Japanese circumstances to date. These *Foreign Affairs Briefings* reported intelligences about Japan from Tazaki Suematsu, who had visited China in January, and included the following details: (1) among the LDP and the Japanese government, Secretary-General Fukuda Takeo, Chief Cabinet Secretary Akagi, and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yamada Hisanari had spoken with Sata Tadataka in the hope of gaining the cooperation of the JSP with the issue of China, and the JSP had proposed a meeting of both countries' foreign ministers. After this was suggested, the LDP had supported it, and sought to use it to break the stalemate in Sino-Japanese relations; (2) even within the LDP, Akagi, Matsumura, Miki, Takasaki, and Kitamura were proactive vis-à-vis the issue of China. Furthermore, Kono was also interested in the issue of China, but did not want to risk himself, and so had not yet raised this in public; (3) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau Itagaki Osamu and Director of Chinese Affairs Okada Akira intended to approve the three political principles, but asked that China did not demand this to be done publicly and in writing. Additionally, both said

⁷⁷ Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji Anpo Kaitei no Seijirikigaku*, pp. 215-218.

⁷⁸ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], December 27 and December 31, 1959.

⁷⁹ *Riben ziyouminzhudang de neihong* [Internal discord in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], January 6, 1959 ; *An Xinjie jituan qitu qiangying tiqian chongxuan zongcai Riben ziyouminzhudang neidouzheng reng lie* [Kishi Nobusuke's Group Tries to Forcefully Re-Elect the President Early; the Internal Struggle in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Is Still Intense], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], January 18, 1959.

⁸⁰ Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji Anpo Kaitei no Seijirikigaku*, p. 221.

⁸¹ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], January 15 and January 27, 1959; *An Xinjie chongxin dangxuan ri ziyouminzhudang zongcai* [Kishi Nobusuke Re-Elected as President of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], January 29, 1959.

⁸² CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, *Mao Zedong nianpu di 3 juan* [Chronicle of Mao Zedong vol.3], p. 588.

that they could not send a delegation to China for an apology, but wanted to convey their message that this measure was the utmost they could do with the LDP's current relationship between China and Japan. This was also reported to Mao Zedong.⁸³

On the other hand, these *Foreign Affairs Briefings* left doubts as to whether Tazaki's intelligences had been passed on correctly. The reason for this was that according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' records of the details of the meetings with Tazaki, Tazaki said that (1) even if Kishi's cabinet lost power due to the internal rivalries of the LDP, this would not change the reign of the conservative parties that followed the U.S., and there was no hope that an LDP government would pursue a policy of friendship with China; and (2) left-wing members of the LDP such as Matsumura and Kitamura were interested in trade between Japan and China, but lacked power and their perceptions were unclear, so they were being used by Kishi and Kono.⁸⁴

The leadership of the CCP met with Miyamoto Kenji, Chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, when he visited China, and told him their desire to implement a divide and rule policy toward the LDP. On February 24, 1959, Miyamoto spoke with Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi, and stated that the movement against revising the Security Treaty was escalating in Japan, and the internal disagreements in the LDP were also intensifying. Zhou Enlai pointed out that China's policy toward Japan lay in the accomplishments of the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements, and aimed to isolate Kishi by supporting the JSP and the anti-mainstream factions of the LDP, and exposing the disagreements within the LDP, based on the principle of inseparability between political and economic affairs. Zhou Enlai also stated that Kono Ichiro was considering a ministerial level meeting between Japan and China.⁸⁵

On March 3, Mao Zedong met with Miyamoto, and on this occasion Mao Zedong asked, "Ikeda is a member of the far right and Kishi is central, so isn't Kono better, in comparison? Is there any possibility that Kono could replace Kishi?" He also questioned whether the 166 votes, which Matsumura gained in the LDP presidential election, could become a long-term opposition faction, and whether it would be a good idea for Matsumura to visit China. Miyamoto responded that (1) Ikeda and Kono were both members of factions that opposed Kishi, but would be treasonists just like Kishi, and (2) Matsumura and his allies were relatively attuned to the anti-U.S. movement, but the opinions of the people who supported Matsumura were inconsistent, and it would not be possible to unite them over time.⁸⁶

⁸³ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben shehuidang Tianqi Mosong fanghua qingkuang fanying*, [Responses to a Visit to China by Tazaki Suematsu of the Socialist Party of Japan], January 17 to January 22, 1959 (105-00672-01).

⁸⁴ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Guanyu shehuidang shijietuan fanghua wenti riben shehuidang Tianqi Mosong tong wofang tanhua jilu* [The Transcript of the Conversation between Tazaki Suematsu of the Socialist Party of Japan and China on the Visit of the Socialist Party Delegation to China], January 21, 1959 (10500672-06). Incidentally, Tazaki answered later in life that he didn't have very many acquaintances among LDP politicians (interview with Mr. Tazaki Suematsu, October 2004). Meanwhile, Okada Akira responded that there was a possibility that he had facilitated travel documents, but he was not acquainted with Tazaki (interview with Mr. Okada Akira, February 2008). Considering these points, it is unclear how much truth was contained in the series of statements by Tazaki.

⁸⁵ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai deng zhongguo gongchandang lingdaoren yu riben gongchandang zongshuji Gongben Xianzhi huitanlu ji qi zhaiyao* [The Meeting between Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Other Leaders of the Communist Party of China and Miyamoto Kenji, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Japan, and its Summary], February 24 to March 2, 1959 (105-00667-02).

⁸⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian riben gongchandang*

In March 1959, China accepted a JSP group visit led by Asanuma Inejiro; the aim of the visit was to strengthen the unity of the forces for reform among the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements, based on a request from the Japanese Communist Party, and it also gave a sense of their limited role in breaking the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations.⁸⁷ It was in this context that China seriously considered a divide and rule policy toward the LDP. After the visiting JSP group had returned to Japan, Chen Yi met with Antonov and told him that China had ruled out the possibility that the JSP would gain political power, and that the anti-mainstream factions of the LDP, Matsumura, and Ishibashi held one third of the votes within the LDP; "Our method lies in grasping the anti-mainstream factions of the LDP and isolating the right by gaining a hold of the left," he stated, and expressed China's intention to pursue a divide and rule policy toward the LDP.⁸⁸

During the first half of 1959, Liao Chengzhi met with Saionji Kinkazu, who was staying in Beijing, and the two discussed improving the relationship between China and Japan and whether Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzo would be inclined to visit China. Saionji responded that Ishibashi and Matsumura were the most appropriate politicians who wanted to improve Sino-Japanese relations. Liao Chengzhi took this opinion seriously and reported the details to Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, and China made the decision to invite Ishibashi and Matsumura to China.⁸⁹

2. Developing the Divide and Rule Policy toward the LDP through Visits to China

(1) Ishibashi Tanzan's Visit to China

On June 4, 1959, Ishibashi Tanzan, having been encouraged by Kazami Akira, advisor to the JSP, and Suzuki Kazuo, the executive director of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association,⁹⁰ expressed his intent to visit China via a letter to Zhou Enlai. However, Ishibashi guarded against falling for China's divide and rule policy toward the LDP, and set the following condition for his visit: "Both countries will mutually respect each other's relationship with the Soviet Union, the United States of America, or any other existing relationships, and not suddenly seek to change them."⁹¹ Although China passed on its intent to welcome Ishibashi's visit to China by a letter in the name of Liao Chengzhi, dated June 21, it did not give a clear response to Ishibashi's proposal.⁹²

After his victory in the House of Councilors election, on June 18, 1959, Kishi reformed his cabinet and appointed party executives. Kono Ichiro, who had hoped to be appointed Secretary-General of LDP, denied entry to the cabinet, and broke away from Kishi.⁹³ China

zongshuji Gongben Xianzhi de tanhua jilu [The Record of Talks between Chairman Mao Zedong and Miyamoto Kenji, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Japan], March 3, 1959 (105-00667-01).

⁸⁷ Sugiura Paper (1), pp. 60-62.

⁸⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Chen Yi fuzongli jian waizhang huijian sulian zhuhua shiguan canzan Andongnuofu tongbao riben shehuidang fanghua qingkuang* [Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi Meets with Antonov, Counsellor of the Embassy of the Soviet Union in China to Brief on the Visit of the Socialist Party of Japan to China], March 24, 1959 (109-00871-08).

⁸⁹ Wu Xuewen, *Fengyu yangqing - wo suo jingli de zhongri guanxi* [Rain or Shine - Sino-Japanese Relations as I Experienced Them], p. 64.

⁹⁰ Furukawa, *Nitchu Sengo Kankei Shi*, p. 174; Jiang Keshi, *Bannen no Ishibashi Tanzan to Heiwa Shugi*, p. 21

⁹¹ Ishibashi Tanzan, *Ishibashi Tanzan Zenshu Dai 14 Kan* [The Complete Works of Ishibashi Tanzan Vol. 14] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Inc., 1970), p. 425.

⁹² "Ryo Shoshi kara Ishibashi-shi ate Shokan (1959.6.21)" [Letters from Liao Chengzhi to Mr. Ishibashi (1959.6.21)], in *Sengo Shiryo*, 129; Inoue, *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Shi*, pp. 226-227.

⁹³ Hara, *Sengo Nihon to Kokusai Seiji Anpo Kaitei no Seijirikigaku*, pp. 258-270.

paid close attention to this political situation and the strife within the LDP concerning the revision of the Security Treaty.⁹⁴

In light of the escalating power struggle in the LDP, China expected Ishibashi's visit to China to play an active role in dividing the ruling group in Japan, and uniting the anti-Kishi forces. Furthermore, should Ishibashi visit China while maintaining his anti-Kishi stance, this could also be advantageous in garnering support from the masses who stood on the middle ground.⁹⁵ On the other hand, China paid attention to the fact that Ishibashi had stated that this visit to China was to resolve the Chinese understanding of Kishi's policy toward China at a press conference in Hong Kong.⁹⁶ In this context, the *People's Daily* from the day after Ishibashi's arrival in Beijing welcomed his visit, criticized American imperialism, the Kishi cabinet and the revision of the Security Treaty, and pointed out that, "Unlike Kishi's faction, Mr. Ishibashi Tanzan and other discerning people within the LDP hope that Japan will not suffer another great disaster." This editorial focus on inflaming the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements relating to the issue of the revision of the Security Treaty by clearly linking Ishibashi's visit to China with the divide and rule approach toward the LDP as early as possible.⁹⁷

From September 12, 1959, Ishibashi first met with Liao Chengzhi three times. Liao Chengzhi stated that China's concerns were (1) to make Kishi Nobusuke renounce his hostile policy against China, (2) an inability to approve of any relationship between Japan and Taiwan that was connected to the "Two Chinas," and (3) the abolition of the U.S. military bases in Japan, and repeatedly emphasized the third of these. Ishibashi defended Kishi's attitude toward China, saying that it was not necessarily hostile, and replied that they could not immediately abolish the U.S. military bases in Japan.⁹⁸

Zhou Enlai and Ishibashi met on September 16 and 17, but due to a gentleman's agreement between the two of them, the full details of their meeting are unclear even today.⁹⁹ According to Chinese documents, Zhou Enlai proposed the creation of a joint communique on the first meeting, and, when they met the following day, declared, "Our wish is to see a lasting peaceful and friendly relationship between China and a truly independent, peaceful, neutral, and democratic Japan," and asserted that Japan must become independent.¹⁰⁰

After this, Ishibashi and Liao Chengzhi spoke about the proposed joint communique, but they held conflicting opinions about three areas brought up by the Chinese side: (1) points relating to the Kishi cabinet's "hostile policy against China" and "scheme to create two Chinas," (2) points relating to the principle of inseparability between political and economic affairs, and (3) points relating to Zhou Enlai's wish for Japanese democracy, freedom, and neutralization. In the end,

⁹⁴ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], June 21 and July 3, 1959.

⁹⁵ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben qian shouxiang Shiqiao Zhanshan xi fanghua shi* [Former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan hoping to Visit China], June 25, 1959 (105-00955-07)

⁹⁶ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], September 9, 1959.

⁹⁷ "Jinmin Nippo Ronpyo: Ishibashi Tanzan Sensei no Chugoku Homon wo Kangei suru (1959.9.10)" [*People's Daily* Commentary: Welcoming Ishibashi Tanzan's Visit to China (1959.9.10)], in *Sengo Shiryo*, pp. 129-130.

⁹⁸ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Liao Chengzhi yu Shiqiao Zhanshan de tanhua jilu (sanci)* [The Record of Conversations between Liao Chengzhi and Ishibashi Tanzan (Three Times)], June 4, 1959 (105-00669-02).

⁹⁹ Jiang, *Bannen no Ishibashi Tanzan to Heiwa Shugi*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁰ CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, *Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-1976, zhongjuan* [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1949-1976 vol.2] (Beijing: *Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe* [Central Party Literature Press], 1997), p. 254.

they wrote down both sides' conflicting points for (1), Ishibashi compromised on (2) and accepted the principle of inseparability between political and economic affairs, and once the expression in (3) was changed, Ishibashi accepted China's hopes, clearly written as: "The Chinese people will offer considerable support to the efforts of the Japanese people to realize this goal, that is the improvement of the relationship between both countries, and offer their heartfelt sympathy with the Japanese people's wish for independence, freedom, democracy, peace, and neutrality." On September 20, 1959, both sides signed the joint communique.¹⁰¹ Moreover, this communique clearly stated that, "The Chinese government and the Chinese people welcome the visits of Japanese politicians and people from different fields who sincerely desire a friendship between China and Japan."¹⁰² The *People's Daily* editorial praising the joint communique referenced the increased opposition to the revision of the Security Treaty within Japan, and linked Ishibashi's visit to China with the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movement, as well as noting, "Mr. Ishibashi will work together with discerning Japanese elites and hopes to remove the expected difficulties, one after another."¹⁰³

China closely observed the reaction to the joint communique within Japan. In Japan, Secretary-General of the LDP Kawashima Shojiro presented a critical opinion of the joint communique.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, *Reference News* paid close attention to these news as below (1) the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that the communique would not change China's policy toward Japan, and that China would use this as a tool for tactical aggression; (2) Secretary-General Kawashima Shojiro and Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiina Etsusaburo were uncomfortable with the communique, but their intention was to minimize the influence of the communique on Japan; (3) the JSP welcomed the communique, and Okada Haruo of the JSP stated that it may divide the LDP; (4) it strengthened the unity of the anti-Kishi forces such as the LDP's anti-mainstream faction and the JSP.¹⁰⁵

After returning to Japan, Ishibashi pointed out that as revising the Security Treaty posed an obstacle to breaking the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, it was not desirable to hurry it.¹⁰⁶ On September 30, Ishibashi advised Kishi to break the deadlock in relations between China and Japan, but Kishi refused. In these circumstances, the October 12 edition of the *People's Daily* commented that since the announcement of the communique between Ishibashi and Zhou Enlai, criticism of the Kishi administration was increasing within the LDP, especially from the factions of Ishibashi, Matsumura, and Kono, and that Kishi was becoming all the more isolated.¹⁰⁷ Then, on October 28, Ishibashi came to the point of declaring that Kishi standing down would be a good measure

¹⁰¹ Jiang, *Bannen no Ishibashi Tanzan to Heiwa Shugi*, pp. 35-36, pp. 46-64.

¹⁰² "Shu Onrai Souri to Ishibashi Tanzan no Kaidan Komyunike (1958 nen 9 gatsu 20 ka)" [The Communique Discussed by Premier Zhou Enlai and Mr. Ishibashi Tanzan (Sept. 20, 1959)], in *Sengo Shiryo*, p. 130.

¹⁰³ Zhou Enlai zongli he Shiqiao Zhanshan xiansheng de huitan de zhongda yiyi [Significance of the Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], September 23, 1959.

¹⁰⁴ "Ishibashi/Shu Kyodo Seimei ni kansuru Kawashima Jiminto Kanjicho Danwa (1959.9.20)" [Conversations with LDP Secretary-General Kawashima about the Ishibashi/Zhou Joint Statement (1959.9.20)], in *Sengo Shiryo*, p. 130.

¹⁰⁵ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], September 22, and September 23, 1959.

¹⁰⁶ Ishibashi, *Ishibashi Tanzan Zenshu Dai 14 Kan*, p. 437.

¹⁰⁷ Zhou Enlai, *Shiqiao huitan gongbao fabiao hou An Xinjie chujing gengjia guli* [Kishi Nobusuke Became More Isolated after the Publication of the Press Release of the Meeting between Zhou Enlai and Ishibashi], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], October 12, 1959.

to break the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁰⁸ China paid close attention to Ishibashi's argument for Kishi to stand down,¹⁰⁹ and it was reported in the *People's Daily*.¹¹⁰ On October 18, during a meeting with a mission from the Japanese Communist Party, led by Nosaka Sanzo, Mao Zedong expressed that Ishibashi had also stated his agreement with the three political principles, and that he had been satisfied with this.¹¹¹

(2) Matsumura Kenzo's Visit to China

Matsumura's behavior was more cautious than Ishibashi's. Matsumura focused on the political situation in near future, and intended to prioritize rebuilding a working relationship—for example, agricultural cooperation—over a political relationship.¹¹² China also understood that when Matsumura visited China, he had no intention of announcing any “joint statements” or “agreements.”¹¹³ However, China paid attention to reports in Japan saying that Matsumura's visit to China would greatly influence Kishi's cabinet and the LDP,¹¹⁴ and anticipated its political effects. The day Matsumura arrived in Beijing, the *People's Daily* touched on the escalating Security Treaty protests (known as the “Anpo Protests”) in Japan, and reported that even within the LDP, Kono Ichiro, Ishibashi Tanzan, Miki Takeo, Matsumura Kenzo and their allies in the anti-mainstream factions had clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the way Kishi did things.¹¹⁵

Matsumura's visit to China lasted for around a month and a half; first, on October 21, he met with Liao Chengzhi. Matsumura asserted that the idea of the inseparability of political and economic affairs was obvious, and that even if Japan could not be neutralized, that did not necessarily mean that there couldn't be exchanges between China and Japan. He also pointed out that the Kishi cabinet was temporary and would not last for a long time, and passed on that Ikeda Hayato had desired Matsumura's visit to China, and that he believed Fujiyama Aiichiro also hoped to visit China after the revision of the Security Treaty had finished. He then explained that the aim of revising the Security Treaty was to change an unequal treaty into an equal one.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁸ Matsuo, “Nitchu Kokko Kaifuku to Ishibashi Tanzan,” p. 1479.

¹⁰⁹ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], October 29 and November 4.

¹¹⁰ *Shiqiao Zhanshan zai daban fabiao tanhua Yaoqiu An Xinjie cizhi jie jue zhongri guanxi wenti* [Ishibashi Tanzan Spoke in Osaka, Requesting the Resignation of Kishi Nobusuke to Solve the Problems of China-Japan relations], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], October 29, 1959; *Poshi An Xinjie zhengfu gaibian dui zhongguo de zhengce Shiqiao zhunbei xianqi cujin rizhong youhao yundong Pianshan Zhe qiangdiao ying huifu dui hua zhengchang guanxi* [Forcing the Kishi Nobusuke Administration to Change its Policy toward China; Ishibashi Prepares to Launch a Campaign to Promote Friendship between Japan and China; Katayama Tetsu Stresses that Japan's Relations with China Should Be Normalized], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 5, 1959.

¹¹¹ CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, *Mao Zedong nianpu di 4 juan* [Chronicle of Mao Zedong vol.4], (Beijing: *Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe* [Central Party Literature Press], 2014), p. 216.

¹¹² Inoue, *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Shi*, p. 231.

¹¹³ Deyou Liu, *Toki wa Nagarete Nitchu Kankei Hishi 50 nen (Jo)* [Time Passes: A Hidden History of Sino-Japanese Relations Across 50 Years (Part 1)], trans. Yadan Wang (Tokyo: Fujiwara-Shoten, 2002), p. 390.

¹¹⁴ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], October 20, 1959.

¹¹⁵ *Fandui rimei “anquan tiaoyue” de yundong jinru xin jieduan Riben renmin jiaqiang tuanjie fenyong douzheng Duiwu riyi kuoda nongmin fenqi canjia zhizhengdang neibu maodung jiashen* [Campaign against Japan-U.S. “Security Treaty” Enters a New Phase; Japanese People Strengthen Their Solidarity and Struggle; Growing Ranks of Peasants Rise Up to Participate in the Campaign, amid Deepening Conflicts within the Ruling Party], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], October 20, 1959.

¹¹⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Liao Chengzhi huijian riben youren Songcun Qiansan de tanhua jilu* [The Transcript of the Conversation between Liao Chengzhi and His Japanese Friend Matsumura Kenzo], October 21, 1959 (105-00667-03).

On October 23, Matsumura met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi. While Chen Yi said the deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China was not the main hinderance to the development of Sino-Japanese relations, he did repeatedly insist on the removal of the U.S. military bases in Japan, stated that China supported the Japanese people's movement opposing the Security Treaty, and criticized Kishi's hostile policy against China. Matsumura acknowledged that the U.S. military bases in Japan were an obstacle to a friendship between Japan and China, but refuted that they would resurrect Japanese militarism and pose a danger to China. Matsumura asserted that Kishi's approach toward China was not a hostile policy against China, defending Kishi, his political opponent within Japan.¹¹⁷

From October 25, Matsumura met with Zhou Enlai a total of four times. Zhou Enlai criticized the revision of the Security Treaty and Kishi's hostile policy against China. Matsumura refuted this, saying that the aim of revising the Security Treaty was to establish equality in the relationship between Japan and the U.S., and that Kishi did not see China as hostile.¹¹⁸ The *Internal Reference* from October 25, when Zhou Enlai met with Matsumura, carried a special article titled "The Current Situation in Japan," which reported that Japan's economic situation was deteriorating, and that as the Japanese people's movement against revising the Security Treaty developed, the anti-Kishi forces within the LDP were also actively overthrowing Kishi—Japanese power was destabilizing.¹¹⁹

China was determined to connect Matsumura's visit to China with the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements by any means necessary. On November 11, at the farewell party for Matsumura's group, Zhou Enlai stated, "Due to the opposition to the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the fight of the Japanese people, who insist on its abolition, is escalating even more every day; the Chinese people sympathize with this fight, and support it."¹²⁰ On November 13, a paper by a commentator in the *People's Daily* noted, "We believe that Mr. Matsumura has used this visit to demand freedom from the shackles of America, and that he holds a greater understanding of why the Chinese people have such deep sympathy and support for the widespread fight of the Japanese people, who oppose the revision of the Security Treaty and insist on its abolition."¹²¹ On November 11, Zhou Enlai met with a Japanese reporter who had accompanied Matsumura to China, and raised the following criticisms: (1) China had associated with the Japanese government, as shown by Ishibashi and Matsumura's visits to China, but the Japanese government would not associate with the Chinese government, and (2) because the Kishi cabinet follows the idea of separating

¹¹⁷ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Chen Yi fuzongli huijian riben youren Songcun Qiansan de tanhua jilu* [The Transcript of the Conversation between Vice President Chen Yi and His Japanese friend Matsumura Kenzo], October 23, 1959 (105-00667-04).

¹¹⁸ Tagawa Seiichi, *Nitchu Kosho Hiroku Tagawa Nikki – 14 nen no Shogen* [Secret Record of Sino-Japanese Negotiations: The Diary of Tagawa – 14 Years of Testimony] (Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers Co., 1973), 16; Liu, *Toki wa Nagarete Nitchu Kankei Hishi 50 nen (Jo)*, pp. 392-394.

¹¹⁹ *Neibu Cankao* [Internal Reference], October 25, 1959.

¹²⁰ *Zhou zongli zai huansong Songcun de yanhui shang shuo xiwang zhongri youhao hu bu qinfan zhubu hui fu liangguo zhengchang guanxi Songcun Qiansan xiansheng biao shi wanquan zancheng Zhou zongli de jianghua* [At the Banquet to Welcome Mr. Matsumura, Premier Zhou Said He Hoped that China and Japan would be Friendly and Non-Aggressive, and that Relations between the Two Countries Should Be Normalized Gradually; Mr. Matsuura Kenzo Expressed His Full Support for Premier Zhou's Speech], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 12, 1959.

¹²¹ *Zhongri liangguo ying heping gongchu huxiang youhao* [China and Japan Should Maintain Peaceful Coexistence and Mutual Friendship], *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], November 13, 1959.

politics and economics, they could not talk about political issues.¹²² China was also interested in the news coverage of Matsumura's visit to China within Japan,¹²³ and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs distributed translations of Japanese editorials praising the outcomes of Matsumura's visit to China on November 23.¹²⁴

(3) Miki Takeo's Planned Visit to China

During this period, China was also interested in the possibility of Miki Takeo's visit to China. On June 4, 1959, the Chinese Embassy in Poland sent a report to Beijing saying that the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed it that Miki was touring countries in Europe from July until September and would be visiting Poland in September, and was looking for a way to contact China at that time. The report noted that Miki was the leader of an important faction of the LDP—a faction opposed to Kishi, which represented freedom and democratic tendencies—and opposed the government's excessive dependence on the U.S. He was one of the four expected to succeed Kishi once he stepped down.¹²⁵

On June 17, the Chinese Embassy in Poland reported to Beijing that the first secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Poland hoped for an unofficial telephone meeting, but that the aim might be Miki's matter. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially Zhang Hanfu, debated how to deal with this, and concluded that the first secretary was the previous Director of Chinese Affairs Okada Akira. On May 30, the Central Investigation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China provided intelligence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that Okada had also held a position at the Japanese Embassy in the Soviet Union, and that when he had taken his leave of Kitamura Tokutaro in Tokyo, he had clearly wanted to explore the possibility of Chinese invitation for a Kitamura's visit. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs guessed that Okada was searching for a route that would break the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations based on the principle of separating politics and economics, and that he had obtained information about the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw. They then discussed the following counterplans: (1) to refuse contact regardless of whether it was Okada or not, and (2) if Miki or Kitamura wanted contact, they should not go through Okada or the Japanese Embassy in Poland. On June 20, Zhang Hanfu informed Liao Chengzhi of these details, and asked for his instructions.¹²⁶

On June 23, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a reply to the Chinese Embassy in Poland, pointing out that the first secretary was Okada Akira, and that his aim was to sound out China with regard to Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, it instructed the Embassy to be careful of his actions, because, as a former student of the Tung Wen College in Shanghai, Okada was fluent in Chinese,

¹²² "Nihonjin Kishadan e no Shu Onrai Danwa" [Zhou Enlai's Conversations with a Group of Japanese Reporters] November 11, 1959, in *Sengo Shiryō*, p. 138.

¹²³ *Cankao Xiaoxi* [Reference News], November 13 and November 15, 1959.

¹²⁴ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben qingkuang huibao* [Japan Situation Report], November 23, 1959 (105-00670-02).

¹²⁵ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben daibiaotuan fang dongou geguo shi tan zhongri guanxi* [Japanese Delegation Visits Eastern European Countries and Discusses China-Japan Relations], June 17 to August 20, 1959 (105-00668-08).

¹²⁶ The Bureau of Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Riben zhu bolan shiguan yaoqiu yu wo zhu bolan shiguan jiechu ji wofang duice* [Request by the Japanese Embassy in Poland to Contact Our Embassy in Poland and Our Countermeasures], June 13 to October 13, 1959 (105-00668-01).

and ordered that, if Okada did make contact, any exchanges through the Japanese Embassy in Poland were to be refused, but that if Miki wished to visit China, he could be given a travel visa. On June 24, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an official cable jointly signed by the Central Investigation Department and passed on Okada's personal information, pointing out that his aim was to clarify what, specifically, counted as "politics" within China's principle of inseparability between political and economic affairs.¹²⁷

On September 16, the Chinese Embassy in Poland reported that they had received a telephone call from Okada, who stated that Hirasawa Kazushige, a journalist accompanying Miki, hoped to meet Ambassador Wang Bingnan. On September 23, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed that if Hirasawa came, he should be received by a normal member of staff. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to avoid giving the impression that Japan and China were holding talks in Warsaw by having him meet with Wang Bingnan. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered that if Miki hoped to visit China, it would be acceptable to issue both Miki and the people accompanying him with travel visas, but Okada and those accompanying the Japanese Embassy in Poland must not be added to this. In the end, Miki's visit to China never materialized; Okada Akira tried to make contact with China after this, but did not succeed.¹²⁸

Conclusion

After the Nagasaki Flag Incident, China was strongly interested in the power struggle within the LDP. As the movement against Kishi within Japan escalated, triggered by the protests opposing the revision of the Police Duties Act, China paid close attention to the intensifying power struggles within the LDP. Then, when the Kishi administration started revising the Security Treaty, China intended to support the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements within Japan and isolate the Kishi administration through scathing criticism of the revision. At this time, China emphasized the intelligences from the Soviet Union, but held its attitude of appeasement toward Japan at arm's length.

In light of the good fight by the anti-mainstream factions, including Matsumura Kenzo and his allies, in the LDP's presidential election in January 1959, Mao Zedong gave instructions to embark on a policy of divide and rule toward the LDP, and succeeded in having Ishibashi Tanzan and Matsumura Kenzo visit China. Moreover, although it never occurred, China also planned for Miki Takeo to visit China. These visits to China, when compared to past invitations for conservative politicians to visit China, were ground-breaking in two ways. First, as China's opposition to Kishi's administration became more profound, it was able to invite influential politicians who were the leaders of LDP factions in conflict with Kishi. Second, as the factional strife within the LDP became more acute, China attempted to directly affect the political situation within the LDP by connecting these LDP Diet members' visits to China with the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi struggle. Since the negotiations for the first Sino-Japanese private trade agreement in 1952, China had been in direct contact with politicians from both the conservative and reformist sides, planning to expand its influence. However, until this point its main targets among the conservative forces were Diet members involved in private exchanges between China and Japan, such as Ikeda Masanosuke and Tsuji Masanobu; it had not directly participated in the political situation within the ruling

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid. Okada testified that Minister for Foreign Affairs Fujiyama was favorably disposed toward his behavior, but that he carried out these actions based on his own decisions (Interview with Mr. Okada Akira, February 2008).

Party. In this sense, this divide and rule policy toward the LDP was a step away from its past maneuvering of Japan.

It could be said that these manipulations toward Japan achieved a certain degree of success, in that after returning to Japan, Ishibashi progressed to arguing for Kishi to stand down. Ishibashi's visit to China, and his words and actions upon his return became an issue for Kishi ("his hinderance is troubling"), who wanted revising the Security Treaty to proceed smoothly.¹²⁹ Moreover, Matsumura's return to Japan saw the successive founding of the Society for Research on the Issue of China, chiefly driven by the Ikeda faction and the Miki/Matsumura faction, especially Matsumura and Ide Ichitaro, and the "Society for Research to Improve Sino-Japanese Relations," centered around Utsunomiya Tokuma of Ishibashi's faction. The formation of these pro-China factions among the anti-mainstream factions of the LDP signified that the issue of China was becoming an anti-Kishi symbol.¹³⁰ Furthermore, China's connections with Matsumura Kenzo played a key role in China's later policy toward Japan, such as contributing to the establishment of the LT Trade system in November 1962.¹³¹

On the other hand, China did not consider it possible to prevent the revision of the Security Treaty and to immediately realize "Japanese neutralization." On October 18, 1959, Mao Zedong told the mission from the Japanese Communist Party visiting China, "Should the opposition to the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty fail, and the treaty is revised, this treaty will surely appear before the Japanese people in ten years' time, but that will educate the Japanese people, and even bring them one step closer to unity, and the fight will surely continue."¹³²

However, immediately following Matsumura's return to Japan, a situation occurred beyond Chinese expectations. On November 27, during the Eighth Joint Action Protest of the People's Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, the main faction of the National Federation of Students' Self-Governing Associations (Zengakuren), which was controlled by the Communist League (The Bund), broke into the National Diet, sending the Anpo Protests into overdrive.¹³³ China paid close attention to this move, and an editorial in the *People's Daily*, ratified by Zhou Enlai,¹³⁴ declared its support and sympathy for the struggle opposing revising the Security Treaty.¹³⁵ Following this, Chinese interest in the Anpo Protests became even stronger, and in addition to supporting the anti-U.S. and anti-Kishi movements in *People's Daily* newspapers, China broadened its involvement through a mass rally in support of the Anpo Protests, which

¹²⁹ Hara Yoshihisa, *Kishi Nobusuke Shogenroku* [Record of Testimony of Kishi Nobusuke] (Tokyo: The Mainichi Newspapers Co., 2003), pp. 218-219.

¹³⁰ Inoue, *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Shi*, p. 223.

¹³¹ For information about Matsumura Kenzo's role in establishing the LT Trade system, see Inoue, *Nitchu Kokko Seijoka no Seiji Shi*, pp. 248-258.

¹³² CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Zhengqu bijiao chang de heping shijian shi keneng de (1959. 10. 18)* [Winning a Relatively Long Period of Peace Time Is Possible (October 18, 1959)], *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* [Mao Zedong on Diplomacy], (Beijing: *Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe* [Central Party Literature Press] and *Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe* [World Affairs Press], 1994), p. 386.

¹³³ Otake Hideo, *Shinsayoku no Isan Nyuu Refuto kara Posuto Modan e* [The Legacy of the New Left: From the New Left to the Postmodern] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2007), pp. 69-78.

¹³⁴ CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, *Zhou Enlai nianpu yijiusijiu-yijiuqiliu, zhongjuan* [Chronicle of Zhou Enlai 1949-1976 vol.2], p. 270.

¹³⁵ "Jinmin Nippo Shasetsu: Gunkokushugi Fukatsu no Michi wo Susumu Nihon" [*People's Daily* Editorial: Japan Following the Path to Resurrect Militarism], in *Sengo Shiryo*, pp. 139-141.

mobilized the masses within China on a huge scale.¹³⁶

China's series of manipulations toward Japan were accomplished under the orders of the leadership of the CCP, especially Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, as is shown by the process to determine the statement given by Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi regarding revising the Security Treaty in November 1958, and Mao Zedong's orders in February 1959. As Mao Zedong's words before the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrate, with the occurrence of this crisis and the progress of the Security Treaty revision, it was necessary for CCP to keep Japan neutralization policy without any changes; rather, it was more urgent. In addition, the leadership of the CCP perceived that they had increased room to carry out the divide and rule policy toward the LDP due to the escalating power struggles within the LDP, which was caused by the movement against the Police Duties Act revisions and the revision of the Security Treaty.

As Okabe has pointed out, China's perception of Japan's circumstances was attuned to the political and social situation in Japan, but it should be noted that these perception was constructed through the intelligences from the "Japan Hands." The "Japan Hands" sometimes took an arbitrarily broad understanding of Japan's political and social situation when it came to the power struggles within the LDP and the movement opposing the Security Treaty, and often created and provided reports and opinions agreeing with CCP leadership's policies and perceptions of the situation. If one considers that the "Japan Hands" felt their most important duty was "learning" about political policies toward Japan through the CCP leadership's words with important people on the Japan side and relevant documents, then it was inevitable that their reports characteristically flattered the intentions of the CCP leadership.¹³⁷ Moreover, such intelligences from the "Japan Hands" ended up offering "feasibility" to the Japan neutralization policy by Chinese leadership. In one sense, it could be said that it was here that the pitfall of China's Japan neutralization policy lay.

Thus, although there is no doubt that the leadership of the CCP were the main actors in China's policy toward Japan, the fact that the "Japan Hands" influenced the policy toward Japan through intelligences should not be overlooked. The interactions between CCP leadership and the "Japan Hands" had not previously been considered due to documentary limitations, but as this paper has explored, it is possible to clarify the processes through which China achieved its policy toward Japan by paying attention to this aspect. The elucidation of this interrelationship between CCP leadership and the bureaucracy could provide important angles for analysis—not merely of policy toward Japan, but also to understand China's political decision-making process.

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¹³⁶ For information on China's policy toward Japan regarding the Anpo Protests, see Sugiura Yasuyuki, "Tainichi Seisaku toshite no Taishu Doin no Genten – 60 nen Anpo Toso to Chogoku" [The Origins of Mass Mobilization as a Policy Toward Japan: The 1960 Anpo Protests and China] in *Gendai Chugoku Seiji Gaiko no Genten* [The Origins of Modern Chinese Politics and Diplomacy], ed. Kokubun Ryosei and Kojima Kazuko (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2013), pp. 293-317.

¹³⁷ Wu Xuewen, *Fengyu yangqing – wo suo jingli de zhongri guanxi* [Rain or Shine - Sino-Japanese Relations as I Experienced Them], pp. 56-57. Wu Xuewen recollected that he was able to gain a systematic understanding of the Central Committee's policy toward Japan from conversations between Zhou Enlai and Ishibashi Tanzan from 1959 to 1963.

