

Notes

Introduction

1. See also Scott D. McDonald, “战略竞争? —Strategic Competition?” in *China’s Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations*, eds. Scott D. McDonald and Michael C. Burgoyne (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2019), 26.
2. Jimbo Ken, “Beikoku no taichu seisaku: senryakuteki kyoso e no shuren” [U.S. Policy toward China: Convergence to Strategic Competition], in *Chugoku wa “chikara” wo do tsukau no ka: shihai to hatten no jizoku to zodai suru pawa* [How China Uses Power: Continued Rule and Development, and Growing Power], ed. Kamo Tomoki (Tokyo: Ichigisha, 2023), 182-197.
3. Arakaki Hiromu, “The United States and Competition with China: America’s Entrenched Hardline Posturing,” Chapter 2 of this book, 48-49.
4. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (December 2017), 25, 27-28, 34-35. For the first time, the U.S. *National Security Strategy* openly defined China as a “revisionist power.” Susan L. Shirk, *Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023), 5.
5. [U.S.] Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge* (January 2018), 2, 4.
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9. “习近平同美国总统拜登通电话” [Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Biden on the Phone], *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], July 29, 2022.
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12. Masuda Masayuki, “China’s Major-power Diplomacy in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Chapter 1 of this book, 30-32.
13. Liu He, “加快构建以国内大循环为主体、国内国际双循环相互促进的新发展格局” [Accelerating the Establishment of a New Development Paradigm in Which Domestic Circulation is the Mainstay and Domestic and International Circulations Reinforce Each Other], *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], November 25, 2020.
14. Masuda Masayuki, “Tairitsu e no kiro ni tatsu Chugoku no taibei seisaku” [China’s Policy toward the United States at a Crossroads of Confrontation], in *Afuta korona jidai no beichu kankei to sekai chitsujo* [U.S.-China Relations and the World Order after COVID-19], eds. Kawashima Shin and Mori Satoru (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2020), 84.
15. Editorial Writer, “全面加强新时代我军人才工作: 认真学习贯彻习主席在中共中央政治局第四十一次集体学习时重要讲话” [Comprehensively Strengthening China’s Military Personnel in the New Era: Earnestly Study and Implement President Xi’s Important Speech at the 41st Group Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo], *Jiefangjun Bao* [PLA Daily], July 30, 2022; “解放军就最坏情况演练, 美国迅速改口” [The PLA Conducts Drills for Worst-case Scenario, the United States Changes its Stance], Ye Hua Guanchashi [Ye Hua’s Observation], January 10, 2023, video.
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 35. Shoji Tomotaka, “ASEAN’s Neutrality: A Survival Strategy amid U.S.-China Confrontation,” Chapter 4 of this book, 98-104.
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 37. According to Evelyn Goh, renewed great power competition in East Asia “means the end of US preponderance in East Asia—it is no longer the only credible great power in town.” Of course, while this does not mean that the United States will leave East Asia, “It does mean that the United States is no longer East Asia’s only pillar, shelter or policeman. It may not even be a pillar, shelter or policeman in some issue areas.” See Evelyn Goh, “The Asia-Pacific’s ‘Age of Uncertainty’: Great Power Competition, Globalisation and the Economic-Security Nexus,” in *From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Diplomacy in a Contested Region*, eds. Robert G. Patman, Patrick Köllner, and Balazs Kiglics (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 33.
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- Chapter 1**
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Chapter 2

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Chapter 6

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Chapter 7

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