The First War Plan Orange and the First Imperial Japanese Defense Policy: An Interpretation from the Geopolitical Strategic Perspective

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Introduction

In 1973, Shimanuki Takeji, the then Director of the War History Office, discovered and published much of the "First Imperial National Defense Policy" of 1907 (hereinafter used as a general term for the "Imperial Japanese National Defense Policy," the "Required Forces for National Defense" and the "General Principles on the Employment of the Imperial Army and Navy"). Rapid progress has since been seen in the studies on that policy with chief attention paid to the national-level government-military relationships. Most of the preceding studies have placed the emphasis on the image of the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers who were responsible not for military command but for military administration. Consequently, those studies have interpreted the "First Imperial National Defense Policy" as the inconsistency between the military policy and diplomacy, or as the "dual" national defense policies formulated by the two services, and have also stressed "the Imperial Japanese Navy officially regarded the U. S. as the hypothetical enemy for the first time in that policy only in order to boost the naval expansion budget" without any discussion on

In this article, Japanese names are given in the Japanese order with surname first.


a "reality" at that time. There must have been, however, a "reality" meeting the eyes of the military and naval officers who were responsible for military command. In fact, Lt. Col. Tanaka Giichi, who led the work to lay down the "First Imperial National Defense Policy," was a member of the Army General Staff, and his counter partners of Captain Kawashima Reijirō and Commander Takarabe Takeshi were also the members of the Naval General Staff.

Although the recent studies on the "First Imperial National Defense Policy" have been taken the changes in security environment and thoughts of the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers into consideration, no study has been made on relations between that policy and war plans of foreign countries which should be considered a threat or on connections between that policy and the contemporary thoughts on a geopolitical strategy. For instance, Kobayashi Michihiko, who took changes in the national defense environment after the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Japanese Military Arrangements into consideration, said, "At a time when the friendly atmosphere between Japan and the United States reached its peak toward the closing days of the Russo-Japanese War, naval powers which could be potential threats to the Imperial Japanese Navy are limited to European powers (Germany and France)" and "The Imperial Japanese Navy worked out an 8-8 fleet plan with the U. S. Navy as a standard for armaments, but immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese-American confrontation was not recognized with realistic urgency but only a remote possibility." Thus, he did not refer to connections between the War Plan Orange (a war plan against Japan) of the U. S. Navy and that policy. Even Kurono Taeru, who used the term "geopolitics" in his study, said, "On the whole of strategy, it is formally consistent to regard Russia and the United States as hypothetical enemies under geopolitical conditions, but...it is also necessary to determine hypothetical enemies in the light of the international situation [that is, Germany or the United States as a main enemy, followed by Russia]. So, I cannot help thinking the method for concluding hypothetical enemies [namely, on the basis of geopolitical conditions, Russia as a main enemy, followed by the United States] as the deliberate coherency to justify the increase of armaments." Thus, he touched on the geopolitical strategic environment conditions and a geopolitical strategic perspective only in a negative way.

This paper approaches the working hypothesis from two analytical points of view: a geopolitical strategic perspective and the operational thinking on blockade, and examines the working hypothesis that "the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers' geopolitical strategic perspective allowed them to interpret the substance of the first War Plan Orange of

1906 which fundamentally represented the idea of the U. S. Navy to blockade the whole of Japanese Archipelago strategically, and to position the U. S. as the hypothetical enemy in the 'First Imperial National Defense Policy'."

The first reason why a geopolitical strategic perspective is regarded as analytical point of view is that it seems that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers conducting military command perceived the "reality" with a geopolitical strategic perspective. It is true that the term geopolitics did not exist in Japan until it was introduced in 1925, and that neither Captain Alfred T. Mahan of the U. S. Navy, who first introduced the geopolitical perspective in the Meiji Period, nor Halford J. Mackinder of Britain used the term geopolitics. But as "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" published in 1890 by Mahan is considered the introductory guide of geopolitics, the contemporary Japanese should have possessed a strategic perspective equivalent to geopolitics, whether it was extrinsic or intrinsic.

In fact, the Imperial Japanese Navy attached importance to a geopolitical strategic perspective supported by the historical approach like Mahan. For example, in 1897, when Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō was the President of the Higher Naval College, the monthly pay for Ogawa Ginjirō, a part-time instructor in history, was 40 yen, while that for Ariga Nagao, a part-time instructor in international law, was 30 yen.6 Samejima Kazunori, who became the President of the Higher Naval College the following year, said that would-be naval officers should be educated in good judgment based on a historical perspective, and that they could not (1) work out a national defense planning, (2) have deep insight into subtleties of policies of the great powers' armed forces, or (3) understand the recent naval tactics and strategies based on a historical approach, unless efforts were made to identify factors behind the diplomacy of great powers featuring the recent gradual movement to the east, future trends and causes of wars in the light of relations between military and diplomacy.7

Like naval officers of Europe and the United States, the Imperial Japanese Naval officers had the capability of applying the geopolitical conditions in other areas to the geopolitical strategic environment in Japan and its neighboring districts. For example, in 1899, some Imperial Japanese Naval officers were assigned the work of identifying fleet deployment, and ports and harbors to be occupied immediately before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. In the process, they recognized as the "strategically essential and fundamental principle" the securesness of the command of the seas through the decisive fleet engagement advocated by such great naval strategists as Mahan and Column, and reported that Tsushima Island or Geoje-Do Island should be occupied in order to control the decisive strategic point

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6 "Daigaku-Hi-Dai-12-Gō, Shokutaku Kyōjuu Keizoku itasitaki Gi nituki Gushin (Classified Document No. 12 of the Higher Naval College, Request for Retaining a Part-Time Instructor, submitted from Togō Heihachirō, President of the Higher Naval College to the Minister of the Navy, Count Saigō Tsugumichi, dated March 13, 1897)," in the Ministry of the Navy, ed., "Meiji 31 Nen Kōbunzasshō (1) (Miscellaneous Documents File of the Ministry of the Navy in 1898, Vol. 1)." Possession of the MAL of NIDS.

7 "Daigaku-Hi-Dai-1-Gō, Shigaku Kyōjuu no tame Bungakusi Kyōkan 1 Mei Shokutaku ainaritaki Gi nituki Gushin (Classified Document No. 1 of the Higher Naval College, Request for Hiring a Part-Time Instructor in History, submitted from Samejima Kazunori, President of the Higher Naval College to the Minister of the Navy, Count Saigō Tsugumichi, dated January 6, 1898)" in Ibid.
of the Korean Strait, while comparing the Japan Sea to the Mediterranean, the Yellow Sea to the Atlantic and the Korean Strait to the Strait of Gibraltar.  

The second reason is that the geopolitical ways of thinking are now required more than ever before in the light of reality in Japan, which is quite different from other countries. The Japanese people were forced to renounce the word geopolitics in the occupation policy by the Allies. However, in as early as 1986, Takeuchi Keiichi, who carried out critical studies on the post- and pre-war trends both at home and abroad over geopolitics, said: "Geographical study and education in Japan after World War II ... produced the intellectual backwardness of not trying to explore deep meanings that the politics and culture have in shaping space composition ... It is an intellectual laziness to avoid studying wars like it is an allergy. Geopolitics should be proposed not only for the purpose of waging wars but preventing wars and minimizing damage suffered by ordinary people in wars." In 1993, when the meeting of the commission on world political maps of the International Geographical Union was held in Tokyo, which was the first of its kind in the Asia and Pacific region, Takagi Akihiko, an organizer of the meeting, was faced with the discrepancy between Japan and foreign countries where the geopolitics and political geography have been modified as disciplinary fields. All he could say was that "It is certain that the study meeting in 1993 and the book compiling its results will have great significance if they trigger efforts in Japan to carry out studies in these fields." It is now or never for us Japanese people to learn the geopolitical ways of thinking.

The first reason why the operational thinking on blockade is regarded as an analytical point of view is that the operational thinking on blockade, one of the two most traditional operational thinking of the navy together with the decisive naval fleet engagement, had much to do with a geopolitical strategic perspective. In the afore-mentioned assigned work in 1899, the Imperial Japanese Naval officers concluded that the occupation of the Tsugaru and Korean Straits was tantamount to blockading the Russian fleets based at Vladivostok and Port Arthur in the Japan Sea.
The second reason is that it seems that the operational thinking on blockade evolved from that of a tactical level blockade to a strategic level blockade through the Russo-Japanese War, and into the "Containment Policy" during the Cold War. Takano Yōichi, Assistant at the Imperial University of Tokyo, indicated this evolution in his 1944 paper, saying "Ports or at most coastal areas of an enemy country were considered as targets for blockade by force at a time of the First Armed Neutrality and the Paris Declaration [of 1856], but then, as naval strength increased, the London Declaration [of 1909] predicted the blockade of all the coastal areas of an enemy country."13 Maurice Farr Pamelee recognized the sign of the "theory of strategic areas" in the operation to blockade Port Arthur by the Imperial Japanese Navy.14 Associate Professor Thomas Joseph Lawrence, an instructor in international law at the Royal Navy, said, "A blockade operation will be significant in cases where the Baltic Fleet defeats the Imperial Japanese navy and cuts off supply from the high seas by blockading all the ports in Japan," adding "Japan....tried to maintain a 1,000-nautical mile zone [as an area for capturing ships which was a bone of contention in the London Naval Conference of 1908-09]."15

The third reason is that the operational thinking on blockade originates in the tack of a "siege" in the land warfare. If the operational thinking on blockade, a notion deriving from a land warfare as named "besiege at sea,"16 is regarded as an analytical point of view, it can be consistent with the future studies on a geopolitical strategic perspective of the Imperial Japanese Army officers. For example, the term blockade itself is a term of the navy which blockades ports, whereas it is the "coast defense" from the standpoint of the army which fights against a blockading fleet and it was the "garrison artillery" that carried out the task. In this context, it is possible that officers of both the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy shared a geopolitical strategic perspective as a common concept.

I. Prototype of the War Plan Orange

The first task is to clarify the substance of the 1906 scenario, the prototype of the War Plan Orange. The reason why the 1906 scenario is the prototype is that, as Edward S. Miller pointed out, strategic principles of the War Plan Orange were determined between

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1906 and 1941, and it seemed as if the principles were incorporated into the genes of
the U. S. Naval officers through subsequent research, war games and materials in public
documents.\textsuperscript{17}

On the other hand, the Japanese translation of the \textit{War Plan Orange} revealed that it
was the General Board that finally conceptualized the \textit{War Plan Orange} on the basis of a
Naval War College draft in 1906,\textsuperscript{18} but the translation made no mention of the substance.
Notes carried in the English original showed that "GB 1906 PLAN" was prepared in
September 1906 at the General Board and that "GB 1906 PLAN" was quoted in 12
sites.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, to extract and compile descriptions on "GB 1906 PLAN" will give a
whole picture of "GB 1906 PLAN," the prototype of the War Plan Orange.

Following are the substance of the "prototype of the War Plan Orange" by sorting
out the descriptions on "GB 1906 PLAN" in the \textit{War Plan Orange} (original in English).

Prototype of the War Plan Orange

Phase-1
The Philippines is occupied by the Imperial Japanese armed forces. Feeble Asiatic
Squadron retreats quickly at the first shoot by the Imperial Japanese armed forces.

Phase-2
Reinforcing Fleet and troops are sent immediately from the Atlantic, and the
Philippines are recaptured before the Imperial Japanese armed forces are poised for
defense.

Phase-3
Relentless blockade and destruction of ports, harbors and ships throws Japan into
"final and complete commercial isolation," and drives it into "eventual impoverishment
and exhaustion" and defeat.

Urgent Problem-1
Construction of bases for supplies (especially coaling stations) and repairs from

\textsuperscript{17} Edward S. Miller, \textit{Orenji Keikaku (War Plan Orange: the U. S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945)}, trans.,
Sawada Hiroshi, Shinchô-sha, 1993, pp. 5-6 and p. 12; Asada Sadao, \textit{Ryô-Taisen-Kan no Nichi-Bei Kankei
(Japanese-American Relations Between the Wars)}, University of Tokyo Press, 1993, p. 18; Michael Vlahos, "The
and the War Plan Orange)," trans., Asada Sadao in Hosoya Chihiro and Saitô Makoto, eds., \textit{Washington Taisei to
Nichi-Bei Kankei (Washington Treaty System and the Japanese-American Relations)}, University of Tokyo Press,

\textsuperscript{19} Edward S. Miller, \textit{War Plan Orange: The U. S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945} (U. S. Naval Institute
Press, 1991), p. 389, fn. 8; p. 390, fn. 40; p. 395, fn. 12; p. 389, fn. 14; p. 401, fn. 1; p. 402, fn. 10, fn. 18, fn. 35;
p. 403, fn. 45; p. 410, fn. 2; p. 413, fn. 8; p. 414, fn. 43, fn. 56.
the Pacific coast to the Philippines, and chartering of foreign ships necessary for massive transport of the U. S. armed forces

Urgent Problem-2
To turn Subic Bay (the Philippines) into a fortress so that it can last until the reinforcing fleet from the Atlantic crosses the Pacific and arrives at the Philippines

II. Ideas of the Caribbean Maneuvers by the U. S. Navy — Origin of War Planning against Japan and Germany

The second task is to identify the information with which the Imperial Japanese Navy could learn the substance of the prototype of the War Plan Orange before 1906 and clarify the contents that could be obtained from this information source. Notable information sources were the four articles on Caribbean Maneuvers by the U. S. Navy in 1902-03 compiled by the Third Bureau of the Imperial Japanese Naval General Staff. They are "Beikoku Kaigun no Tōki Enshō (U. S. Naval Maneuvers in This Winter)," "Beikoku Riku-Kaigun Rengō Enshō ni tuite (Joint Exercise of the U. S. Army and Navy)," in "Kaigun Isan (Tsune) Dai-4-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Ordinary Edition, Vol. 4.)" compiled in November 1902 and "Kyaribian-kai no Beikoku Kaigun Enshū (U. S. Naval Maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea)," "Kyaribian-kai ni okeru Beikoku Kaigun Enshū no Mokuteki (Purpose of the U. S. Naval Maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea)," in "Kaigun Isan (Tsune) Dai-5-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Ordinary Edition, Vol. 5.)" compiled in March 1903.20

The first reason to pay attention to the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean is that the maneuvers were the touchstone of the War Plan Black (war plan against Germany) to be completed later. Kenneth Hagan, who was in charge of strategy education at the U. S. Naval War College, pointed out that the maneuvers in the Caribbean served as a


22 Ibid., p. 237
touchstone of the subsequent War Plan Black. According to Hagan, the difference between the maneuvers in the Caribbean and the War Plan Black lied only in the strategy to occupy Puerto Rico Island and Culebra Island ahead of the Imperial German Navy, and the operation for the U. S. Navy to defeat the Imperial Germany Navy through reconnaissance by light vessels and attack by main warships had been tested the maneuvers in the Caribbean.

The second reason is that it is highly likely that the War Plan Black and the War Plan Orange were of the same nature; for Admiral George Dewey, who planned and directed the maneuvers in the Caribbean in 1902, chaired the General Board from 1903, when the General Board was inaugurated, to 1917, and under this General Board, concepts took shape on the prototype of the War Plan Orange in 1906, and the War Plan Black and the War Plan Orange in the 1910s. Of course, it can be easily imagined that planners changed every few years, but at the same time it is greatly possible that a fundamental idea about the plans prepared under the same chairman in the same organization remained the same. Moreover, it was Theodore Roosevelt who, when he was an assistant secretary of the Navy, recommended Admiral Dewey to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron in preparation for the outbreak of the war with Spain. When Roosevelt was the President of the United States from 1901 to 1909, about half of the period when Admiral Dewey served as chairman of the General Board, Roosevelt consistently promoted the U. S. diplomacy against the background of naval expansion policy and military strength out of respect for Captain Mahan. In this context, it seems that the U. S. policy against Japan, not only in terms of naval affairs but also diplomacy, remained unchanged as will be mentioned in the fourth section.

The third reason is that, as a logical conclusion of the first and second reasons, it is considered possible to analyze closely the substance of the prototype of the War Plan Orange from the maneuvers in the Caribbean, the touchstone of the War Plan Black. According to Hogan, "the War Plan Black" is said to have been "a curiously prescient mirror of the secretly evolving German Operationplan III (war planning against the United States)." According to Herwig and Trask, the objectives of a war under the Operationplan III by Germany were to solidify Germany's presence in the West Indies, to secure a free hand in South America and to defeat the Monroe Doctrine, and in order to achieve these objectives, the Imperial German Navy is said to have planned to occupy Puerto Rico Island and Culebra Island, about thirty kilometers east of Puerto Rico, as bases for its fleets. It was also pointed out that the Imperial German Navy (1) considered  

21 Ibid.
23 Hogan, This People's Navy, p. 237.
that the two islands separated the Atlantic from the Caribbean and was conveniently located to control the eastern exit of the Panama Canal when it was completed; (2) thought it possible to attack the east coastal cities in the United States from the two islands; (3) expected the U. S. Navy to wage the decisive fleet engagement after Germany occupied the two islands with geopolitical significance; and (4) believed it essential for its victory to defeat the U. S. Navy in the decisive fleet engagement because a blockade strategy could not lead to surrender the United States rich in natural resources.  

However, the essential parts of war planning against the United States in 1899, a basis of the Operation plan III, are said to have been revealed to the U. S. side after the publication of a book compiled by an officer who worked for the Imperial German Army General Staff. Furthermore, Germany is said to have tried to obtain information on the U. S. war planning against Germany from her military and naval attaches stationed in the United States. In this respect, it is really worth studying a hypothesis that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers practiced the logical conclusion that the substance of the prototype of the War Plan Orange of 1906 could be analyzed closely from the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean, a test of the War Plan Black.

The fourth reason is that the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean were included in "Saitō Makoto Bunsho (Saitō Makoto Documents)" which were the historical documents left by Saitō Makoto, who was the Director for General Affairs of the Navy Department in 1902 and the Minister of the Navy in 1907, and in "Chiyoda Shiryō (Chiyoda Collection)" consisting mainly of documents submitted to the Meiji Emperor. Even if the logic and ideas presented in the first through third reasons were correct, they would be meaningless unless officers in top positions of the Imperial Japanese Navy paid attention to the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean. The fact that the articles were included in the "Saitō Makoto Bunsho (Saitō Makoto Documents)" and the "Chiyoda Shiryō (Chiyoda Collection)" shows that those in important posts of the Imperial Japanese Navy harbored not a small interest in the articles. Lying behind this great interest were the fact that Admiral Dewey, the director of the maneuvers in the Caribbean and chairman of the U. S. General Board, was Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Asiatic Squadron, which defeated the Spanish Squadron in Manila Bay and started the Spanish-American War, and that Admiral Dewey drew much attention from the Imperial Japanese Naval officers, including Saitō Makoto, who was sent to Manila Bay as the commanding officer of the H. I. J. M. S. Akitsushima at

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27 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
28 Ibid., p. 54.
29 See foot-note 20.
30 "Beikoku Kaigun Sanbō Honbu Shinsetsu Mondai ni tuite (Question about the Establishment of the new Naval General Staff)" translated from Army and Navy Journal, Whole No. 2065(Mar 21, 1903) into Japanese in the Third Bureau of the Naval General Staff, ed., "Kaigun Isan (Tsume) Dai-6-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Ordinary Edition, Vol. 6.)" compiled in July 1903, pp. 203-205, Possession of the MAL of NIDS as the Chiyoda Collection, No. 65 and of the MJPFRM as Saitō Makoto Documents, No. 24-
a time of the Spanish-American War. Another fact is that the Naval General Staff knew that Admiral Dewey served as the chairman of the U. S. General Board (described as "General Staff Conference" by the Imperial Japanese Navy at that time), which played a significant role in planning the U. S. Naval operations.30

The fifth reason is that officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy understood the feature of the strategic conditions of the Caribbean. Even if they obtained the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean and knew that the maneuvers were formulated by the General Board, which functioned as a planning body for the U. S. Naval operations, they could not understand the essential meanings of the maneuvers unless they were familiar with the feature of the strategic conditions in the Caribbean. It seems that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers perceived the feature of the strategic conditions through two sources.

The first source is the strategic perspective of Captain Mahan, U. S. Navy. In 1899, a book of his papers was translated into Japanese under the title of Taiheiyô Kai-ken Ron (The Interest of America in Sea Power). Chapter 8 of the book carried his paper "Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea" with maps attached. In this paper, Captain Mahan said "the Mediterranean and the Caribbean [were] ... similar conditions, regarded as quantities of interest in the sphere of international relations." As reasons, he enumerated that "[(1)] Both are land-girt seas; both are links in a chain of communication between the East and the West; [(2)] in both the chain is broken by an isthmus; [(3)] both are of contracted extent when compared with great oceans, and, in consequence of these common features, both present in an intensified form the advantages and the limitations, political and military, which condition the influence of sea power." In comparison with the Mediterranean, Captain Mahan said, "It is even more forcible truth of the Caribbean, partly because the contour of its shores does not, as in Mediterranean peninsulas, thrust the power of land so far and so sustainedly into the sea, .... there does not exist in the Caribbean or in the Gulf of Mexico — apart from the United States — any land power at all comparable with those great Continental states of Europe whose strength lies in their armies far from than in their navies." He also cited "In the Gulf [of Mexico] the mouth of the Mississippi ... [as] the [decisive strategic] point where meet all the exports and imports, by water, of the Mississippi Valley" and "In the Caribbean ... the isthmus ... [as] an important link in the communications from East to West," and advocated "Communications are probably the most vital and determining


element in strategy, military or naval .... communication exists between these two centers and outside world .... It is from their potential effect upon these lines of communication that all positions in the Gulf or the Caribbean derive their military value.\textsuperscript{31}

Then, Captain Mahan referred to the geographical strategic values of individual islands and sea routes. As for the strategic value of Cuba, (1) it was regarded as a base for naval operations; (2) it lay horizontally to the North-American continent as a geographical feature; (3) there was little possibility of "total blockade"; and (4) it was considered possible to control from Cuba the Florida Strait to the north, the Yucatan Channel to the west and the Windward Passage to the east. Regarding the strategic values of Jamaica, which Mahan said were inferior to those of Cuba, if Britain occupied Jamaica, various weaknesses could be overcome thanks to the greatest naval strength of Britain. Moreover, Captain Mahan pointed out that St. Thomas Island and Samna Bay, east of Haiti Island, were the most important positions in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean in the light of the possibility that the Anegada Passage and the Mona Passage, both of which lay in the most important route between Europe and the isthmus, would be controlled.\textsuperscript{32}

After explaining the strategic conditions in the Caribbean this way, Captain Mahan concluded that if Jamaica was to survive a possible war between Spain and Britain, it would be essential to secure the communication lines as a supply channel by maintaining mobile forces and controlling the Windward Passage during the war.\textsuperscript{33}

If Mahan's hypothesis is changed from a war between Britain and Spain to a war between Japan and the U. S., an interesting similarity will be witnessed; for a map of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea is quite close to a map of the western Pacific area. For example, the North American continent is compared to the Asian Mainland, Florida Peninsula to Korean Peninsula, Cuba to Japan, Jamaica to Luzon Island, the Mississippi River to the Yangtze River and the Windward Passage to the Bashi Channel. In this case, a logical conclusion is that if the U. S. Asiatic Fleet based in Manila, Luzon Island (Jamaica), is to survive the attack from Japan (Cuba), it is essential to secure command of the Bashi Channel (Windward Passage) and a supply route from the U. S. mainland.

In this context, it is only natural to consider that not a few officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy paid attention to this similarity in strategic conditions between the Caribbean Sea and the western Pacific area. For example, who could be instanced is Captain Kawashima Reijirō, Director of the First Section of the Naval General Staff, who took part in the preparation of the "First Imperial National Defense Policy." The Library of

\textsuperscript{32} Taihei'yō Kai-ken Ron, pp. 207-222.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, pp. 223-224.
the National Institute for Defense Studies has the English original of *The Interests of America in Sea Power* published in 1897. Written on the title page is "Book Donated by Vice Admiral Kawashima Reijiro" with his signature "R. Kawashima, Dec. 1897 Southsea." In a blank space on the pages referring to Cuba and Jamaica, he wrote "values of Cuba and Jamaica against Britain," "Theory on values of Cuba" and "Cuba and Jamaica." Vice Admiral Kawashima undoubtedly had paid attention to Jamaica, though it has to be proved with handwriting analysis. In 1897, the U. S. Navy regarded the Imperial Japanese Navy as a hypothetical enemy for the first time in waging a war against Spain in the Philippines. The same year, 1,174 Japanese people were expelled from Hawaii by the Honolulu Government, immediately after they arrived there, and the Japanese government sent the H. I. J. S. *Naniwa* with a special envoy on board and protested that the action represented a serious violation of Japan's rights under treaties with the U. S. In 1893, when some Americans established the Honolulu Government as a revolution by the whites, Lieutenant Kawashima studied the guideline for war games. Therefore, it is considered natural that Kawashima noticed the afore-mentioned similarity in strategic conditions in 1897.

The second source is the articles carried in the *Army and Navy Journal*. Two articles entitled "Denmâku-ryō Nishi Indo Shotô (Danish West Indies)" and "Nishi Indo Shotô ni okeru Beikoku no Shin Senryaku Chiten (New Strategic Points of the U. S. in the West Indies)," which were translated into Japanese from the No. 2008 (February 15, 1902) and the No. 2010 (March 1, 1902), respectively, were carried in the "Kaigun Isan (Tsune) Dai-3-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Ordinary Edition, Vol. 3.)." compiled by the Third Bureau of the Naval General Staff. The article entitled "Denmâku-ryō Nishi Indo Shotô (Danish West Indies)" referred to the U. S.’s treaty with Denmark to buy three Danish islands-St. Thomas, Santa Cruz and St. John-for 4.5 million dollars and described the joy for "the fruit of many years of planning and efforts." The article also said the need for the U. S. to purchase the islands lay in the "U. S. national policy of Monroe Doctrine." St. Thomas was referred to as Gibraltar in the West Indies because it was situated to control the Anegata Passage, the easternmost part of a sea route connecting the Caribbean and the Atlantic.

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The article "Nishi Indo Shotō ni okeru Beikoku no Shin Senryaku Chiten (New Strategic Points of the U. S. in the West Indies)" said the three islands were strategically and geopolitically important in order to control the Windward Passage. In particular, St. Thomas, which was compared to Gibraltar in terms of strategic significance, could ensure peace in the Caribbean and national interest of the U. S. if it was equipped with a fortress to become the strongest foothold in the world. Therefore, through the two articles, it is quite possible that officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy learned the geopolitical and strategic conditions of the Caribbean Sea.

The possible "Plan of Operations" imagined from the above two articles compiled by the Third Bureau of the Japanese Naval General Staff in 1902 are described under the headings of "Hypothetical Situation," "Objective of War," "Goal of Operations" and "Courses of Action" as follows:

Plan of Operations

Hypothetical Situation
(1) A war against Germany to be triggered by the Venezuelan crisis

Objective of War
(2) Protection of the Monroe Doctrine, the policy of the nation

Goal of Operations
(3) Recapture of Puerto Rico Island and Culebra Island

Courses of Action
(4) Quick organization of Combined Fleet
(5) Recapture of the two islands by Combined Fleet
(6) Early detection of enemy fleets by means of thorough search
(7) Concentrated fire from Combined Fleet
(8) Breakthrough of the enemy patrol line
(9) Protection of transport convoy, and attack and destruction of enemy transport convoy

III. True Value of Naval Strategist Satō Tetsutarō — Close Analysis of substance of

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Prototype of the War Plan Orange

The third task is to study whether it is feasible to analyze closely a prototype of the War Plan Orange from the main points of the maneuvers of the U. S. Navy in the Caribbean, which must have drawn much attention from officers in the top posts of the Japanese Navy.

First, as to the "hypothetical Situation," "a war against Germany to be triggered by the Venezuelan crisis" is changed to "a war against Japan to be triggered by a certain crisis." Second, "expansion of American interest" is added to the "Objective of War." These changes are based on the outline of the paper by Commander Bradley A. Fiske carried in the *Army and Navy Journal* (April 1, 1905) immediately before the Battle of Tsushima. The Japanese Naval General Staff also included this paper in the "Kaigun Isan (Tsune) Dai-10-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Ordinary Edition, Vol. 10.)" compiled in September 1905. In his paper, Commander Fiske wrote that the protection of the Monroe Doctrine was the most important duty of the U. S. Navy, and that the objective of the U. S. Navy lay in the implementation of U.S. policies as the will of the U. S. government, namely the expansion of national interest of the U. S. on the assumption that U. S. citizens would suffer great damage even if the U. S. was partially blockaded.40

Third, a new condition "the occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy thanks to geographical advantages" is added as "Initial Situation" and the "Goal of Operations" are changed from "recapture of Puerto Rico Island and Culebra Island" to "recapture of the Philippines." Rear Admiral George W. Melville, Director of the Engineering Bureau, Navy Department, said that the Philippines would be a place for a decisive battle and that Japan would likely win the battle thanks to geographical advantages. The Third Bureau of the Japanese Naval General Staff carried this view under the title of "Gasshikoku Kaigun-shō Kikan Kyokucō George W. Melville Jyutu Kongo Jyūnen-kan niokeru Kaigun no Hattatsu (Development of the U. S. Navy for the Next Decade by George W. Melville, Director of the Engineering Bureau of the U. S. Navy Department)" in the "Kaigun Isan (Toku) Dai-3-Gō (Compilation of the Information Materials on the Foreign Navy, Separate Edition, Vol. 3.)" compiled in July 1902.

In this paper, Rear Admiral Melville cited financial adjustment, progress in industry, acquisition of the Philippines and rapid development of the navy as the four largest

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achievements of the U. S. for the past four decades, and was proud that the U. S. became a powerful naval country with control over the waters surrounding the North American continent. Expressing anxiety that this kind of success might make other countries jealous of the U. S., he pointed to the need for building up naval strength to protect rights and privileges in commerce with a view to retaining the four biggest achievements. Presenting his recognition that brave action was required in that era, he said the U. S. had to develop naval strength capable not only of defending its coast but of attacking coastal areas of an enemy country in an emergency, though the U. S. was geographically suitable for defense. Then, he addressed that the U. S. launched to increase its naval preparation in order to become the largest naval power in the world, regarding Japan, who began to advocate the Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine, as a possible enemy country against the U.S., and insisted on a decisive naval engagement in the Philippines and its protection. In terms of the protection of the Philippines, Rear Admiral Melville pointed out the strategic main object of the Panama Canal lay in quick combination of naval strength in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In other words, it was possible for officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy to imagine that the U. S. Navy would send the reinforcing fleet in the Atlantic to the Pacific, combine the reinforcing fleet with the feeble Asiatic Fleet escaped from the Philippines and strike the Imperial Japanese Navy if Japan carried out operations against the Philippines.

However, it is difficult to conclude definitely that the U. S. would counterattack a possible Japanese invasion of the Philippines from the papers by Commander Fiske and Rear Admiral Melville alone. The experience during the Russo-Japanese War applies in this respect. The above-mentioned scenario — for the U. S. Navy to retreat its feeble Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines and combine it with the reinforcing fleet sent from the Atlantic, and to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy by a decisive naval engagement — was a logical conclusion for officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy immediately after the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, the "Kaibō -shi Ronkō Dai-5-Kan (A Study on Coast Defense History, Vol. 5, October 1907)" written by Satō Tetsutarō and with a recommendation of "Coastal defense should be learned from this work" by Sakamoto Toshiatsu, the President of the Higher Naval College, hypothesized the worst scenario for Japan that a hypothetical enemy retreats her inferior fleet based in the Oriental water, combines it with reinforcing fleet from her home water, and fights her superior combined fleet against the Imperial Japanese fleet as follows:

The precedent of Admiral Rozhestvensky added to naval strategy one principle that it is not impossible to send reinforcing fleet to an enemy home water, however remote it

42 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
43 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
is...If Russia had had small-scale fleets in the Orient, withdrawn them to places in
the west of Singapore in the light of a possible confrontation with Japan, combined
them with reinforcing fleets, and fought her superior combined fleet against the
Imperial Japanese fleets, how could Japan have destroyed such Russian combined
fleet?....It is not reasonable to think that no country could resort to this strategy.....If
a country withdrew its fleets in the Oriental water to a certain place, waited for
reinforcing fleets from her home water to join them, and attacked the Imperial
Japanese fleets, without a doubt we would have no choice but to fight against
superior combined fleet.44

On the premise of a war against the U. S., the Imperial Japanese Naval officers
could easily imagine that the U. S. would temporarily renounce the Philippines and
retreat its feeble Asiatic Fleet based in the Philippines to Guam or Hawaii, organize the
Combined Fleet there and fight against the Imperial Japanese Naval Force to recapture
the Philippines.

On the basis of the afore-mentioned "Hypothetical Situation," "Objective of War"
and "Initial Situation," "Courses of Action" to achieve "Goal of Operations" can be
determined in accordance with "Plan of Operations" of the maneuvers in the Caribbean.
And a draft of "War Planning of the U. S. Navy against Japan over the Acquisition of the
Philippines" can be formulated as follows:

War Planning of the U. S. Navy against Japan over the Acquisition of the Philippines

Hypothetical Situation
a. A war against Japan to be triggered by a certain crisis (1)

Initial Situation
Occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy thanks to
geographical advantages

Objective of war
b. Protection of the Monroe Doctrine, the policy of the nation, and expansion of
   national interest (2)

44 Satō Tetutarō, Instructor at the Higher Naval College, "Kaibō-shi Ronkō Dai-5-Kan (A Study on Coast
   Defense History, Vol. 5)" October 1907, pp. 118-120, Possession of the MAL of NIDS.
Goal of Operations
   c. Recapture of the Philippines (3)

Courses of Action
   d. Escape of the feeble Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines from a patrol line of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet (8)
   e. Quick organization of the Combined Fleet (reinforcing fleet and Asiatic Fleet) (4)
   f. Early detection of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet through large-scale search (6)
   g. Destruction of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet through concentrated fire in a decisive naval engagement (7)
   h. Recapture of the Philippines by the Combined Fleet (5)
   i. Attack on the Japanese transport vessels (9)

* Numbers in parentheses are relevant numbers to the main points of the maneuvers in the Caribbean.

Comparison of this draft with the main points of a model of the War Plan Orange clearly shows that the draft is equivalent to the Phase-1 and Phase-2 in the prototype of the War Plan Orange.

However, with the analysis of the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean alone, it is impossible to interpret the Phase-3: the relentless blockade and destruction of ports, harbors and ships throw Japan into "final and complete commercial isolation" and drive it into "eventual impoverishment and exhaustion" for its defeat. Here, on the assumption that a hypothetical enemy combines its fleets in the Orient with the reinforcing fleet to organize the superior Combined Fleet, a study will be made on how the Imperial Japanese Navy will fight against the superior Combined Fleet. The appearance of this kind of Combined Fleet represents nothing but a failure of the concept advocated by Satō that an enemy would be defeated on the "first line" of national defense — at sea. Even in this case, on the basis of Satō's concept, defense was possible to crush an enemy on the "second line" — along coastal areas, and to destroy an enemy on the "third line" — inland. 45

Nevertheless, Satō said, "Armed forces on the second and third line are not capable of waging offensive attacks and therefore cannot drive an enemy from coastal areas. Finally, enemy fleets secure a route for transport of massive armed forces, occupy neighboring islands and cut off traffic," 46 pointing out that Japan would be virtually subject to blockade if

46 Satō Tetutarō Instructor at the Higher Naval College, "Kaibō-shi Ronkō Dai-4-Kan (A Study on Coast Defense History, Vol. 4)" September 1907, p. 311, Possession of the MAL of NIDS.
47 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
the first line was destroyed. Satō went on to say that London would last less than five weeks if Britain, which depended on foreign countries for food, was blockaded, while Japan would hold only two months if Tokyo Bay, a route for food supply by the sea, was blockaded. He concluded that Japan had no choice but to surrender in starvation to an enemy. In other words, the emergence of superior Combined Fleet of an enemy country meant not only the collapse of an important premise of superior Imperial Japanese Fleet protecting the "first line" of national defense but surrender with the Japanese people almost starving to death.

Now, let us pay attention to reasons why the U. S. Navy and Satō harbored the idea that blockade by Combined Fleet was not limited to a tactical level blockade against ports and harbors but led to a strategic level blockade against the entire area of Japan. During the Spanish-American War of 1898, the U. S. Navy blockaded Santiago Bay and Manila Bay, while the Imperial Japanese Navy blockaded Port Arthur during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. Both are regarded as a tactical level blockade. It was not until World War I that vast oceans were designated as a blockade area.

The first reason why the U. S. Navy could invent an idea of a strategic level blockade against the entire area of Japan is probably the memory of the Civil War. This refers to the "Anaconda Plan," designed to blockade long coastal lines of the Southern Confederate States by the Northern Union. The U. S. Navy's predecessor was the navy of the Northern Union which blockaded the long shorelines of the Southern Confederate States during the Civil War prior to about forty years. Moreover, only ten years passed since the official book on the Civil War was published in 1896. The U. S. Navy around 1906 should have learned the lessons of the Civil War.

The second reason is probably treatment and application of the Operationplan III. As mentioned earlier, in the process of devising the Operation plan III, intended to fight against the U. S. Navy in the Caribbean after crossing the Atlantic, the Imperial German Navy considered creating an opportunity for a decisive fleet engagement against the U. S. Navy. Meanwhile, the U. S. Navy closely analyzed the Operationplan III and invented a touchstone of the War Plan Black. In this context, it seems that the U. S. Navy devised a prototype of the War Plan Orange designed to cross the Pacific, fight against the Imperial Japanese Navy in a decisive fleet engagement and blockade the entire nation on the basis of the Operationplan III. In 1898 when the Spanish-American War was ongoing, a U. S. Senator proposed making "the Pacific an American lake." In his study on the strategic values of Caribbean in 1897, Mahan pointed out that Cuba would unlikely be subject to "total blockade". Though Cuba is about half the size of Japan's mainland Honshū, if the U. S. Navy crossed the Pacific and waged a war against Japan on the basis of the Operationplan III, the idea of total blockade of Cuba led to the concept of a strategic level blockade against

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48 Miller, Orenji Keikaku, p. 32
50 Mahan, Taiheiyō Kai-ken Ron, pp. 207-222.
the entire area of Japan.

On the other hand, the reason why the Imperial Japanese Navy harbored the idea of a strategic level blockade against the entire area of Japan is the result of soul-searching of the Russo-Japanese War. In late January 1906, the Japanese Navy set up the "research council for provisions of capture at sea" within the Higher Naval College mainly to review the provisions of capture at sea during the Russo-Japanese War and to obtain the qualifications to take part in the 2nd Peace Conference. Participants in the council included Counselor Yamakawa Shizuho and Endō Genroku as well as Commander Akiyama Saneyuki from the Navy; Counselor and doctor of laws Akiyama Masanosuke from the Army; Takahashi Sakuye, Ryū Sakutarō, Matsunami Jinichirō and Matsuo Tōru, all professors at the Imperial University of Tokyo as well as doctor of laws Ariga Nagao and Nakamura Shingo, Professor at the present Hitotsubashi University from the academic community. At the fourth meeting on February 21, the problem was raised whether it was possible to blockade the Japanese territories — the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Sōya Straits by herself — in order to blockade Primorsky Kray of Russia. This means that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers and international law experts gave thought to a strategic level blockade against vast areas of the Japanese archipelago and the entire Sea of Japan, while studying the possibility of blockading Primorsky Kray of Russia by blockading its own territories of the three straits.

Would an enemy country, which broke through the "first line" of national defense and carried out a strategic level blockade against Japan, launch landing operations? To this question, Satō cited an example of assaults on eastern countries regarded as half-civilized country by the Europeans and Americans, though the number was relatively low because landing forces usually suffered great damage. One of the examples was the landing on Chōshū (now Yamaguchi Prefecture) in the so-called "Shimonoseki Bombardment (Allied Naval Expedition of September, 1864 against Chōshū Han by Britain, France, the Netherlands and the U. S.)" In the U. S., "war scare" was raging through in the wake of the anti-Japanese movement in California in 1906. Thus, officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy should have assumed that the U. S. Army and Naval Brigade would venture to land on Japan, which seemed to the Americans to be half-civilized country. In fact, Satō said "Japan is a long and narrow archipelago with many cities abutting on coastal areas. Therefore, clearly it does not take an enemy many days to reach its targets after a landing without invading deep into the country," pointing out that an enemy could easily achieve objectives of its landing.

In the case where landing operations were conducted under a strategic level blockade, what kind of peace could officers of the Japanese Navy imagine? Satō said, "The Japanese

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51 Ministrial Secretariat of the Navy Department, ed., "Kaijyō Hokaku Jiken Chōsa-kai Shorui (Papers of the Research Committee on the Cases of the Capture at Sea [during the Russo-Japanese War])" August 1908, Section of Explanatory Notes, pp. 1-2 and Section of Outline of Agenda, p. 3, pp. 22-23, Possession of the MAL of NIDS.
53 Ibid., pp. 295-296.
54 Ibid., pp. 311-312.
people under the Emperor have made efforts to build the nation and enjoyed prosperity, but would fall under the control of an enemy country, swallowing bitter feelings,\textsuperscript{54} showing the view that Japan would definitely surrender and fall into the bottomless pit from the first-rate country. Moreover, officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy might have been able to recollect that in February 1862 when the Civil War was ongoing, Ulysses S. Grant recommended unconditional surrender in response to the offer of surrender from Fort Donelson through the Japanese translation of Grant's autobiography. For Grant had visited Japan and tried to act as a peacemaker over the Taiwan issue, and wrote his autobiography, saying "These volumes are dedicated to the American soldiers and sailors." So, they must have read the following description on the fall of Fort Donelson:

\begin{quote}
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY IN THE FIELD,
CAMP NEAR DONELSON,
February 16, 1862.

GEN. S. B. BUCKNER,
Confederate Army.

SIR: Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. Grant,\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

Grant also revealed in his autobiography that he practiced a strategy of cutting off food supply to the Confederate army as follows:

When Confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville, and on to the Atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest .... Protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without


bloodshed, and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war .... But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. This policy, I believe, exercised a material influence in hastening the end.

Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a war with the U. S. would lead to nothing but unconditional surrender in starvation.

As a result of the review in accordance with the ways of thinking of the Imperial Japanese Naval officers, "Goal of Operations" is revised into "unconditional surrender in starvation," and the "U. S. Navy's War Planning against Japan over the Acquisition of the Philippines" is modified to the "U. S. Navy's War Planning against Japan" as follows:

U. S. Navy's War Planning against Japan

Hypothetical Situation
   a. A war against Japan to be triggered by a certain crisis (1)

Initial Situation
   Occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy thanks to geographical advantages

Objective of War
   b. Protection of the Monroe Doctrine, the policy of the nation, and expansion of national interest (2)

Goal of Operations
   c. Unconditional surrender in starvation

Courses of Action
   d. Escape of the feeble Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines from a patrol line of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet (8)
   e. Quick organization of the Combined Fleet (reinforcing fleet and Asiatic Fleet) (4)
   f. Early detection of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet through large-scale search (6)
   g. Destruction of the Imperial Japanese Naval Fleet through concentrated fire in a decisive naval engagement (7)
   h. Total blockade of Japan by the Combined Fleet (5)
   i. Attack on the Japanese transport vessels (9)

* Numbers in parentheses are relevant numbers to the main points of the maneuvers in the Caribbean.
This "War Planning against Japan" is the same as the main points of a prototype of the War Plan Orange from the Phase-1 through the Phase-3. In other words, officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy can analyze the essential points of a prototype of the War Plan Orange reasonably and easily from the articles on the maneuvers in the Caribbean.

IV. Advice from President Roosevelt — "Second Tripartite Intervention" and "Balance of Antagonism"

The fourth task is to study what caused officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy to conclude that a war with the U. S. would be unavoidable. In the previous passage, it was made clear that officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy had the ability to analyze the main points of a prototype of the War Plan Orange from the maneuvers of the U. S. Navy in the Caribbean. Considering the fact that information is processed and becomes useful only when it is given a chance to be used, it is necessary to identify a reason why the maneuvers in the Caribbean captured the spotlight. Accordingly, it is necessary to survey (1) the expansion of naval preparation and the diplomatic commitment to the isthmus on the side of the U. S. after the Spanish-American War, (2) the naval and diplomatic confrontations between Japan and the U. S. on the Asian Mainland and in the Pacific, on the basis of historical documents compiled by the Naval General Staff and included in the "Saitō Makoto Bunsho (Saitō Makoto Documents)," and (3) to pay attention to two events toward the closing days of the Russo-Japanese War.

In 1899, the U. S. worked out a shipbuilding program to boost the number of ships from 81 (230,000 tons) to 144 (440,000 tons). Of the total increase, 51 battleships (110,000 tons) were already under construction, while the remaining 12 (90,000 tons) would be newly-constructed. Since the end of the Spanish-American War, the nation's fervor for the Navy reached its peak, while the government and the public agreed on the construction of a powerful navy. In this situation, the shipbuilding program would certainly be completed during the next Congress, if not the current session.57

In 1900, a new Anglo-American treaty on the Nicaragua Canal (so-called "Hay-Pauncefote Treaty") was signed, which could free the U. S. from fetters imposed by the

58 "Nikaragua Unga ni kansuru Ei-Bei Shin-Kyōtei (New Anglo-American Treaty on the Nicaragua Canal)" reported by the Minister in the U. S. on February 10, 1900 in Ibid., pp. 559-566.
59 Iriye Keisirō and Ōhata Tokusirō, Jyūtei Gaikō -shi Teiyō (Basic Text for Modern Diplomatic History, third ed.), Seibundō, 1988, p. 188.
so-called "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty" ratified in 1850. Though this new Anglo-American treaty was rejected at the Senate, the American public understood the canal construction was urgent because it was considered necessary to dispatch U. S. Naval forces between the Pacific and the Atlantic against the background of the Spanish-American War. In other words, under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, (1) neither the U. S. nor Britain would have exclusive rights for the canal and construct fortresses, and (2) the U. S. could take the initiative in construction and control of the canal without being bound by the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stipulating the observance of a neutrality principle for the canal.

Two years after the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was resigned and ratified in 1901, the Panama Revolution took place in November 1903 with support from President Roosevelt, and the U. S.-Panama Treaty was concluded two weeks later. As a result, the U. S. obtained the exclusive right for the Panama Canal and a permanent lease on the canal area. It looks as if the situation over the Panama Canal served as a model of the control over the Manchurian Railway after the Russo-Japanese War.

With favorable winds blowing for the U. S. Navy, bases were built on islands off San Francisco and the Philippines one after another. Submarine cables were laid within the Philippine islands. By 1899, Cavite in the Philippines was a coaling station for the Asiatic Fleet, while a dock capable of accommodating new battleships based in Pearl Harbor was being built and construction work got underway to set up coaling stations on Pago Pago Island of the Samoan Islands and on Guam. In 1900, it was decided to establish coaling stations on the Galapagos Islands and Basilan Island of the Philippines. Work was launched to build a submarine cable network linking Manila to various islands. In 1902, a budget appropriation was requested for construction of a large-scale dry dock on Guam, while construction of a naval station was planned on Tutuila of the Samoan Islands. In 1906, the

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60 Idid., pp. 188-189, Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 18.
U.S. submarine cable network was completed to link the U. S. to Guam, Manila, Shanghai and Yokohama.\(^{64}\)

During this period, Japan waged a fierce competition over the "Amoy Incident" and the "Marcus Island Incident" with the U. S. who steadily laid a foundation for its footholds in the Pacific. In the Amoy Incident, Japan landed her naval brigade on the city in Fukien to occupy Amoy Port on the pretext that the Boxer Uprising spread to Fukien Province in 1900 and the missionary house of the Honganji Buddhist temple was burnt down. The U. S. sent battleships and landed her naval brigade there in protest. Under this pressure from the U. S., the Japanese government accepted the recommendation from Ito Hirobumi and abandoned the occupation of the port.\(^{65}\) Later that year, however, the U. S. was to give up the idea of building a coaling station. The Secretary of State, John M. Hay sounded out Japan on its plan to set up a coaling station of the navy in Samsah Wan, Fukien province, though he was aware that Japan and the Ch'ing dynasty had concluded a non-cession treaty on Fukien. He had no choice but to abandon the plan when Japan pointed out that it would violate the Open Door Note on territorial integrity of the Ch'ing dynasty submitted by Hay himself.\(^{66}\)

The Marcus Island Incident took place in late July 1902, three months before the article on the Caribbean maneuvers by the U. S. Navy. The Incident was triggered by the correspondence from Takahira Kōgorō, the Japanese Minister to the U. S. to the effect that several Americans, including Rosehill, would head for Marcus Island to gather guano there. Upon receiving the news, the Japanese government dispatched the H. I. J. M. S. Kasagi to claim sovereignty over the island. Ishii Kikujiro, who was on board that warship, presented a document claiming Japan's sovereignty and prevented the Americans from landing on the island. Giving up the landing, the Americans arrived at Hawaii in the middle of September and called for the dispatch of the U. S. Naval warship to obtain damages from the Japanese government and permission to pick guano on the island. In response to this demand, the Secretary of the Army in Hawaii went to Washington for consultations.\(^{67}\)

The Marcus Island Incident must have reminded the U. S. Navy that the Imperial Japanese Naval warships had been dispatched on such occasions as the Hawaii Revolution of 1893 and the Hawaii Annexation of 1898. The Incident must have represented a gleeful chuckle for the Japanese government, which was forced to submit a written promise twice in 1901 not to come close to the Midway Islands in connection with the landing by Japanese hunters on the islands in the summer of 1900.\(^{68}\)

The Imperial Japanese Navy, which learned about the contents of the article on the

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\(^{64}\) Kitaoka Shinichi, Gotō Shinpei, Chuō-Kōron-sha, 1978, pp. 63-68.


\(^{66}\) Hōka Daigaku Kokusai Kōhō Kenkyū Siti (Research Office of International Law, Law College of the Tokyo Imperial University), "Hōka Daigaku Kokusai Kōhō Enshū Hōkoku: Minami Tori-Shima Jiken (Report of the Seminar of the International Law on the Case of the Marcus Island Incident)," October-November 1902, Possession of the MJPHMR as Saitō Makoto Documents, No. 61-3.

\(^{67}\) Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 128.
Caribbean maneuvers three months later, could probably not surmise the outline of the prototype of the War Plan Orange. In the "Kaigun Kakuchō ni kansuru Gi Teishutsu Riyū (Reasons of the Proposal for Naval Expansion)," submitted in 1902 by Saitō Makoto, the Chief of the General Affairs, equivalent to Vice-Minister of the Navy, it was pointed out that Japan, who ranked fourth (120,000 tons) with the U. S. ranking sixth (110,000 tons), would be placed seventh (140,000 tons), far below the U. S. (300,000 tons) in 1908. Saitō only stated that naval preparation should be built up to compete with the possible size of fleet Russia could dispatch to the Far East and that Japan should make efforts to improve its economic strength without waging wars for several years. Although he was concerned that the Imperial Japanese Navy would be surpassed by the U. S. if it remained idle, it might be nothing compared with threats from Russia. Even if the Imperial Japanese Navy perceived the prototype of the War Plan Orange, it was barely conscious of it due to a sense of security arising from the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

It was rather the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Russo-Japanese Peace Conference between June and August 1905 that made Japanese statesmen and officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy thoroughly cautious of the U. S. In the negotiations on the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement launched before the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the British side conveyed its intention to "leave cruisers in the Far Eastern station in Hong Kong but to recall all the five battleships." In response, on June 2, 1905, the Minister of the Navy, Yamamoto Gonbeye replied that "though it is understood as a stopgap measure to recall all the five battleships, it should be the immovable principle for Japan and Britain to maintain naval superiority over the Navy of another country in the Far East," indicating his caution over the presence of the U. S. Navy in the Philippines. However, as Britain expressed a view that "the U. S. is an unspoken ally in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement," the revised Anglo-Japanese Agreement was signed on August 12. As a result, the navy of Britain and other European nations withdrew their battleships from the Far East, leaving one-on-one confrontation between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the U. S. Navy in the region. The Panama Canal was already under construction, making it easy to send all the U. S. war vessels to the Far East upon completion. This meant the Imperial Japanese Navy was required to build up its armaments within a limited time framework.

It was the Katsura-Taft agreement concluded on July 29, 1905, that temporarily eased this strategic environment. For the U. S., the agreement brought security to the Philippines. For Japan, it not only ensured the Japanese presence on the Korean Peninsula and offered expectations for further support from the U. S. for the ongoing Peace Conference with
Russia but symbolized the status of the U. S. as an unspoken ally in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement.⁷² In other words, Japan and the U. S. was locked in the naval and diplomatic competitions but established a relationship of trust.

A main factor behind the U. S. Navy's formulation of the prototype of the War Plan Orange of 1906 was a growing sentiment in favor of a war with Japan against the background of stepped-up campaigns for the expulsion of the Japanese: anti-Japanese movements in San Francisco 1906, and abuse of the Orientals in the San Francisco Earthquake and enactment of an ordinance to segregate Japanese schoolchildren in 1906.⁷³ It is considered possible that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers analyzed closely the prototype of the War Plan Orange with the break of the anti-Japanese movements and arguments for the outbreak of a war with Japan. On the other hand, at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan had returned the Liaotung Peninsula to the Ch'ing dynasty by accepting the so-called "Tripartite Intervention," the advices from Russia, France, Germany. Ten years later, Japan returned a blow to Russia who was the leading nation in the "Tripartite Intervention" by winning the Russo-Japanese War. In concluding the Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, the Meiji Emperor in his imperial edict, again, referred to "acceptance of the advice from the U. S. President." So, the similar pattern of accepting advice weighs on my mind. In his paper thirty years earlier, Iriye Akira pointed out: "The Japanese expectation that President Theodore Roosevelt would be an instrument in procuring a peace treaty favoring Japan was not totally justified, but there is no evidence that Japanese officials were disillusioned with American policy during the Portsmouth Peace Conference." ⁷⁴ It is true that the "Kimitsu Dai Nikki (Document Files of the Ministry of the Army)" in the Military Archival Library lacks the only one volume for August 1905 when advice was provided. It is not known from the diaries or memoirs on and by Japanese statesmen what kind of advice was extended and how they reacted to the advice. But this seems to hold the key to the consciousness on the Japanese side that a war with the U. S. should be probable.

Claude M. MacDonald, British Ambassador to Japan, left valuable documents providing clues to the above-mentioned questions. Ambassador MacDonald, who tried to learn about reactions of the Japanese government to the advice from President Roosevelt, talked with Prime Minister Katsura Tarō for two hours on August 27. He reported on the results of the talk to British Foreign Minister, Marquess of Lansdown, dated the same day. Following are the contents of the advice, the reactions of the Japanese government and the impressions of Ambassador MacDonald.

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The main purpose of President Roosevelt's advice to Japan was to make Japan abandon her request for indemnity. "The President said that [(1)] the amount asked for Japan....was altogether too extravagant, and one which the Russians could not be expected to pay. [(2)] If Japan persisted in this demand, she would certainly alienate the sympathy of America and of 'other states,' for it would then be seen that she had gone to war for the purpose of extorting money from Russia," and "The President also dwelt upon [(3)] the magnanimous behavior of the American nation after the Spanish war, on which occasion it was the victor that paid the indemnity, not the vanquished." 75

Upon receiving the advice from President Roosevelt, the Japanese government held a cabinet meeting with Itō Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo and some members of the General Staffs. In the light of the advice, the cabinet meeting decided to reduce the amount of indemnity to a reasonable extent. The instruction to that effect was issued to Komura Jutarō in Portsmouth. Through Kaneko Kentarō, Komura was also instructed to express Japan's appreciation to the President for his "tremendous efforts for peace" and tell the president "that Japan had embarked on the war in order to preserve her existence as a nation, and most certainly not to make money." 76

After listening to the above explanations directly from Prime Minister Katsura or from Ishii Kikujirō, an interpreter, Ambassador MacDonald reported to Lansdown on his impressions. First, President's advice to Japan "was couched in language which left nothing to be desired in the matter of direct frankness, and was certainly not conciliatory in tone" and "seemed to lay greater stress on the largeness of the sum claimed by Japan." Ambassador MacDonald, who had learned in advance about the outline of the advice through Mortimer Durand in Washington, got that impression partly from the English translation by Ishii of the advice sent from Komura. Pointing out that the advice told repeatedly by Prime Minister Katsura from the memory during the talk was exactly the same as what he had learned from Durand, he reported that the advice "dwelt more upon the large amount claimed than on the principle of claiming an indemnity." He also stated that "All the points made in Sir Mortimer Durand's version were brought out with directness which, to the Japanese nature, must have been very jarring." 77 Barring some gap between Ishii's translation and the original, the President's advice to Japan was in general unpalatable, far from welcome advice to the Japanese government.

Second, Ambassador MacDonald continued to report his impressions on Japanese reaction to the President's advice that stressed "magnanimous behavior of the American nation after the Spanish war, on which occasion it was the victor that paid money the

76 Ibid., pp. 305-306
77 Ibid., p. 305.
78 Ibid., p. 306.
indemnity, not the vanquished [Spain]. Ambassador MacDonald sensed that "The idea of Japan paying Russia an indemnity after having severely defeated her both by land and sea seemed to strike both the Prime Minister and Mr. Ishii as being not altogether devoid of humour." In his report, he also referred to the view of Prime Minister Katsura that the proposed concessions in the advice might be the same as those conveyed to the president by the Russian plenipotentiary. Therefore, the Japanese government seems to have felt indignation beyond disgust toward the President's advice.

The third impression is on the disappointment of the Japanese government, particularly Prime Minister Katsura. Ambassador MacDonald said that "Count Katsura again repeated what he had said on previous occasions with regard to the earnest desire on the part of Japan to make every possible concession so that an honorable and lasting peace might be brought about" and gained the impression that "It seemed to the Japanese Government that every effort had been made on their part to refrain from hurting the feeling of their adversary, and to smooth the way for a peaceful conclusion of the Conference." Ambassador MacDonald went on to introduce Prime Minister Katsura's view that "the results of the Conference held at Portsmouth on the previous day, details of which had not yet reached the Government, would not be very satisfactory," describing that Prime Minister Katsura presented a telegram "which had arrived from Baron Komura that morning, giving what was believed to be the Czar's answer to the President's appeal. It was to the effect that sooner than consent to the Japanese compromise he could appeal to the nation, mobilize the rest of his army, and lead it against enemy." Although Japan suppressed its resentment, made more concessions and agreed to accept the U. S. President's advice, Russia replied with no concessions whatsoever. In this context, it is possible that the Japanese government sank into deep despondency, or harbored intense hatred against the president, rather than disappointment.

It may not be too much to conclude from the above-mentioned three impressions of Ambassador MacDonald that Prime Minister and the officers of the General Staffs at a cabinet meeting witnessed the "Second Tripartite Intervention" in the President's advice. After the Sino-Japanese War, Japan tried to comply with international law and behave as a member of the western civilized nation at all costs, but went through unspeakable hardships and privations due to power politics of Western powers in trying to work out postwar reparations with the Ch'ing dynasty alone. Ten years later, Japan tried to repay Russia for power politics and settled the postwar matters through the intermediation of the U. S. and European nations. Nevertheless, the U. S. advised Japan not to seek

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79 Ibid., p. 306.
80 Miwa Kimitada, Nichi-Bei Kankei no Ishiki to Kôzô (Mutual Image and Basic Structure of Japanese-American Relations), Nansô-sha, 1974, pp. 35-40.
82 Ibid., p. 104.
indemnity indispensable to the restoration after the war and even suggested that Japan, the winner of the war, pay it. It was the U. S. that Japan depended on for assistance. In fact, Japan mounted an armed attack on Port Arthur after obtaining the guarantee of neutrality in Japan's favor from the U. S. on January 12, 1904, one month before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Soon after the war was launched, the U. S. discouraged Germany and France from pursuing such as "Tripartite Intervention," saying the U. S. would support Japan if they did so. In this context, the U. S. president's advice looked as if it reversed its position toward Japan. It seems that Japanese government leaders and officers of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy were deeply disappointed and began to harbor a grudge of a "Second Tripartite Intervention" against the U. S.

Some members, who took part in the cabinet meeting to contrive how to handle the President's advice, sealed the idea of the "Second Tripartite Intervention" in their mind and remained cool enough not to provoke hostile feelings among the Japanese people toward the U. S. Japan underwent unspoken hardships and privations for 10 years after the end of Sino-Japanese War with a huge amount of reparations, and came very close to being defeated before going on to win the Russo-Japanese War. It also relied on foreign bonds from Britain and the U. S. for war expenditure, seven times the annual government spending. Ambassador MacDonald pointed out that "other and weightier reasons exist which have induced the Japanese Government to take this step [to give up the demand for indemnity in exchange for Sakhalin Island], and that those reasons are altogether connected with finance." In other words, Japanese statesmen and officers calmly formed the judgment that it would take a long time for Japan to rebuild itself without reparations.

In his classified report No. 233 dated August 30, Ambassador MacDonald suggested another important thing. He stated that "Prime Minister [Katsura] and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs [Chinda], with both of whom I have discussed the point, are, as yet, entirely at a loss to explain how, on the 21st and 25th, the President telegraphed to the Czar, urging him to accept the Japanese compromise, while on the 22nd he told Baron Kaneko to convey to Baron Komura his strong disapproval of the money clause of the said compromise." They received a telegram dated August 28 from Ambassador plenipotentiary Komura showing the second advice of President Roosevelt to the Russian Emperor dated August 25. The word "as yet" displayed feelings close to irritation on the side of Ambassador MacDonald over the failure of Prime Minister Katsura and Vice Foreign Minister Chinda to understand how they could explain the two pieces of advice from President Roosevelt to the Russian Emperor (to accept concessions from Japan) and the advice to Japan dated 22 (to abandon the demand

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for indemnity in exchange for concessions), though he discussed the main points of the first advice to the Russian Emperor on August 21 with Prime Minister Katsura and Vice Foreign Minister Chinda.

Then, Ambassador MacDonald asked Ishii Kikujirō, who visited him on behalf of Prime Minister Katsura, "whether he could tell me, for the private information of my Government, what had been the results of the meeting at the Palace on the previous day." Ishii declined. The Ambassador summoned Vice Foreign Minister Chinda and extracted the information on the results of the conference that "it has been decided 'in the interests of humanity, and in accordance with the expressed desire of the President of the United States,' to withdraw all claim for indemnity in whatever form expressed, but to retain the entire Island of Sakhalien." On this decision, Ambassador MacDonald said, "That the Japanese Government should take this step I must say came as a great surprise to me. I did not make any comment beyond asking Mr. Chinda how he thought the news would be received by the Japanese people." 

Didn't Ambassador MacDonald make any comment at all? After extracting the information on the results of the meeting at the Palace, he probably reconfirmed the main points of the first advice to the Russian Emperor dated August 21 with Prime Minister Katsura and Vice Foreign Minister Chinda, which he had discussed with both of them, and disclosed the "the private information" available only within the British government showing the meanings of the two pieces of advice to the Russian Emperor and the advice to Japan dated August 22. This can be inferred from the irritation Ambassador MacDonald had that the Japanese government seemed "as yet" not to understand the meanings of the three pieces of advice from President Roosevelt. He also expressed his readiness to reveal the "the private information" available only within the British government." Moreover, it appeared unnatural that he stressed that he had told nothing at the time of the decision of the Japanese government. This seemed to show his intention to change the issue from his advice to the decision of the Japanese government's own.

The reason why I stick to what Ambassador MacDonald's use of words is that the "the private information" available only within the British government he offered in exchange for the results of the meeting at Palace was certainly the "balanced antagonism" policy, the core of the three pieces of advice from President Roosevelt which puzzled Japanese government leaders. According to Zabriskie, President Roosevelt had three objectives at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. The first was "to give Japan a free hand in Korea." The second was to render her assistance, both morally and

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83 Ibid., p. 306.
financially in her fight to loose the clutch of Russia in Manchuria, with its menace to American commercial and industrial interests to prolong the war for a sufficient length of time to exhaust both Russia and Japan. The third was to leave weak Russia and strong Japan in hostile relations at the end of the war so that the balance of power might be maintained in Manchuria. The U. S. forecast that Japan would not be hostile to Germany in Kiachow Bay and the U. S. in the Philippines, while Russia would pay attention only to the Far East away from the front of Western Europe.

President Roosevelt also showed considerable favor to Japan so that Japan would drive Russia from Manchuria on behalf of the U. S. and ensure interests of the U. S. in Manchuria open to foreign countries. This was disclosed in a letter President Roosevelt sent to Theodore Roosevelt Jr. dated February 10, 1904, two days after the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Russian fleet stationed in Port Arthur as follows:

It has certainly opened most disastrously for Russians and their supine carelessness is well-nigh incredible. For several years Russia has behaved very badly in the Far East, her attitude toward all nations, including us, but especially toward Japan, being grossly overbearing. We had no sufficient cause for war with her. Yet, I was apprehensive lest if she at the outset whipped Japan on the sea she might assume a position well-nigh intolerable toward us. I thought Japan would probably whip her on the sea, but I could not be certain; and between ourselves—for you must not breathe it to anybody—I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our games (underline by Takahashi).

In any case, it seems that Japanese government leaders became aware of President Roosevelt's "balanced antagonism" policy either from Ambassador MacDonald at the end of the Portsmouth Peace Conference or by racking their brains over the meaning of the three pieces of advice by the middle of 1906 at the latest. The first reason for this speculation is the following remark by Professor Tansill:

President Roosevelt was immediately aware that his "balanced antagonism" policy in the Far East collapsed. Japanese politicians were wise enough to leave diplomatic problems with Russia unattended. Furthermore, the British Foreign Ministry accepted cooperation between Japan and Russia favorably. Britain has been bracing itself for a likely conflict with Germany. For Britain, it would work to its great advantage to have a powerful ally

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87 Ibid., p. 104.
from which it would obtain support in exchange for territories in China. On July 30, 1907, Japan and Russia concluded a significant treaty consisting of official and classified documents to demarcate respective spheres of influence.  

Contrary to the intention of President Roosevelt to maintain "balanced antagonism" between Japan and Russia even after the end of Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese government wisely embarked on the establishment of friendly diplomatic relations with Russia by concluding a bilateral agreement as if it had perceived the "balanced antagonism" policy.

Second, in 1907, Japan proceeded with the diplomacy to guarantee its interests in Manchuria in such a way as to exclude the U. S. and acquire approvals from European powers. Given the revised Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Katsura-Taft agreement of 1905, and Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese ententes of 1907, it is clear that the U. S. was kept outside Japan's framework to secure its interests in Manchuria. Under the revised Anglo-Japanese Agreement, Japan was allowed to place Korea under Japanese control, and respective special interests were recognized in the East Asia. The Franco-Japanese entente recognized Japan's special interests in Ch'ing's territory of Manchuria bordering Korea. Under the classified article of the Russo-Japanese entente, it was agreed to divide Manchuria into two and to make the southern Manchuria Japan's sphere of influence. By contrast, under the Katsura-Taft agreement, Korea alone was recognized as Japan's sphere of influence.  

Third, the supreme proposition of Japan's diplomatic policy to prevent the U. S. from making a foothold in Manchuria and secure Japan's interests there coincided with its military strategy. Komura annulled the Katsura-Harriman memorandum, saying that it "will make Japan renounce its military and economic interests in Manchuria, where Japan acquired after hundreds of thousands of our people had lost their lives and the hundreds of millions of yen were spent there," and "render the Portsmouth Treaty toothless." As if to respond to this, in the "first Imperial National Defense Policy," maintenance of Japan's interests in Manchuria was listed first, and it was laid down as the ultimate objective to "support and expand Japan's interests in Manchuria and Korea as well as our national strength spreading to the South and South-East Asia and to the other side of the Pacific." 

Now, it can be said that the Imperial Japanese Navy closely analyzed the essence of the prototype of the War Plan Orange from the Caribbean maneuvers and began to  

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study its operations against the U. S. in the summer of 1906 at the latest by looking back on the military and diplomatic aspects so far: (1) troubles with the U. S. before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War worked as jabs, (2) President Roosevelt's advice to Japan at the last stage of the Portsmouth Peace Conference reminded Japan of the "Second Tripartite Intervention," (3) the three pieces of advice made Japan aware of the "balanced antagonism" policy.

It can be also summarized that the Imperial Japanese Navy placed the U. S. as the hypothetical enemy through the following four waves. Firstly, in negotiating the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement on June 2, 1905, the Minister of the Navy, Yamamoto Gonbeye replied, "though it is understood as a stopgap measure to recall all the five battleships, it should be the immovable principle for Japan and Britain to maintain naval superiority over the Navy of another country in the Far East," indicating caution over the presence of the U. S. Navy in the Philippines.

Secondly, it can be said that members of the General Staffs shared the image of the "Second Tripartite Intervention" and the understanding of President Roosevelt's "balanced antagonism," both of which Prime Minister Katsura must have had. As a result, their animosity against the U. S. was certainly amplified. It is because that as shown in the report by Ambassador MacDonald to the Marquess of Lansdown, a cabinet meeting was held whenever a telegram was sent to Japan from the plenipotentiary delegation during the Portsmouth peace conference. Particularly, a cabinet meeting to discuss Roosevelt's advice to Japan brought together members of the General Staffs. It is possible, however, that a sense of security arising from the signing of the revised Anglo-Japanese Agreement on August 12 mitigated the enmity to the U. S. temporarily.

Thirdly, the hostility toward the U. S. which might have been alleviated surfaced again over the problem related to the Anglo-Japanese Military and Naval Arrangements. In February 1906, Lt. Col. Tanaka Giichi of the Army General Staff exchanged views with Commander Takarabe Takeshi of the Naval General Staff, and as a result, formulated the "Meiji 39 Nen Nippon Teikoku Rikugun Sakusen Keikaku (Imperial Japanese Army Operation Guideline for 1906)" designed to shift its basic scheme from defensive operation to offensive one on the Asian Mainland against the background of powerful naval strength. In other words, the Imperial Japanese Navy assured the Imperial Japanese Army that it would maintain its naval supremacy as a premise for offensive operation on the continent. In July, however, the Imperial Japanese Navy proposed to Commander Frank Marble, the U. S. Naval attache in Japan, that it would like to exchange information with the U.

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93 Kobayashi, Nippon no Tairiku Seisaku, p. 131.
94 Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, p. 185, p. 186, fn. 120.
95 Kobayashi, Nippon no Tairiku Seisaku, p. 144.
96 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
S. Navy as with Britain, Japan's ally. This clearly showed that the Imperial Japanese Navy reviewed the draft of naval arrangement for Anglo-Japanese Military and Naval Arrangements which had already been prepared because Britain urged Japan in the middle of April to conclude the bilateral Military and Naval Arrangements at an early date. As the result, the U. S. came into the limelight as a hypothetical enemy. It may be also considered that Field Marshal Yamagata and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Chinda, who took part in the meeting held to discuss the demand from Britain to conclude the Anglo-Japanese Military and Naval Arrangements, made remarks to the Chiefs of the General Staffs on the position of the U. S. leading to the "Second Tripartite Intervention" and "balanced antagonism."

Last but not least important was that the Imperial Japanese Navy's proposal for cooperation with the U. S. Navy was turned down by the Chief of the Office of the Naval Intelligence in the middle of January 1907 on the grounds of cooled-down relations between the two countries due to the immigration issue. The Minister of the Navy, Saitō Makoto had in hand the "Kaigai Jyōhō (Overseas Information)" edited by the Army General Staff (December 1906), which contained information on the U. S. Navy in the Philippines. As shown by this fact, the Imperial Army and Naval officers worked hard on the formulation of the "First Imperial National Defense Policy." It was just in the middle of January that a "conference on national defense policy" was held jointly by the General Staffs, including Lt. Col. Tanaka, Captain Kawashima, who had paid attention to Jamaica, and Commander Takarabe, with a view to the formulation of the "First Imperial National Defense Policy," while the denial of the cooperation between the U. S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy reached the latter. Because Britain told Japan that the U. S. was an unspoken ally, Japan proposed to establish cooperative relations with the U. S. But the U. S. rejected the proposal, which made the Japanese Army and Navy regard the U. S. as a hypothetical enemy. The "First Imperial National Defense Policy" enacted in April 1907 listed the U. S. as a probable enemy following Russia on the ground that "though the U. S. should be maintained as a friendly ally, there looms a grave armed conflict between Japan and the U. S. in view of the bilateral geographical, economic, racial and religious relations." In other words, the "First Imperial National Defense Policy" reflected the premise that the naval superiority is indispensable to secure the Japan's interests on the Asian Mainland, and the understanding common to the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers that the Navy of the U. S. with great interests in Manchuria will stand in the path of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Akiyama Saneyuki, who

98 Rikugun Sanbō Honbu (Army General Staff), ed., "Kaigai Jyōhō (Foreign Affairs)" December 1906, Possession of the MJPHMR as Saitō Makoto Documents, No. 38-16.
99 "Meiji 40 Nen Nippon Teikoku no Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial Japanese National Defense Policy of 1907)."
100 Sakurai Masakiyo, Akiyama Saneyuki (Biography of Akiyama Saneyuki), Akiyama Saneyuki Kai, 1933, p 237.
101 "Meiji 40 Nen Nippon Teikoku no Kokubō Hōshin (Imperial Japanese National Defense Policy of 1907)."
studied in the U. S. during the Spanish-American War and apprenticed himself individually to Mahan, was absorbed in plans for operations against the U. S. at the Higher Naval College after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, and those around him were concerned that he would go out of his mind. Though armed conflict with the U. S. was not likely to take place soon, compared with Russia who intended to get war of revenge and "has assigned more military force to the Far East since the end of the Russo-Japanese War ... and has been strenuously rebuilding her Navy," the focal point for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy was just the matter of time to prepare for the coming armed conflict with the U. S.

Conclusion

In contrast to preceding studies on the "First Imperial National Defense Policy" which focused on the image of the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers who were in charge of military administration, this report is an attempt to pay attention to the another image of those officers who take charge of military command with their geopolitical strategic perspective, and to bring to light "reality" reflected in their eyes in enacting the "First Imperial National Defense Policy." Used as viewpoints for analyses in this attempt are a geopolitical strategic perspective of the Imperial Japanese Naval officers who could, like their European and U. S. counterparts, apply the geopolitical strategic conditions in other areas to those in Japan and its neighboring areas, and the operational thinking on blockade evolving from that of a tactical level blockade to a strategic level blockade through the Russo-Japanese War.

Consequently, it has been made clear that the Imperial Japanese Naval officers could draw the substance of the first War Plan Orange of 1906 by applying the geopolitical strategic conditions in the Caribbean displayed in Mahan's study and by interpreting the idea of a strategic level blockade by the Combined Fleet of the U. S. Navy against Japan proper and surrounding area from the articles on the maneuvers in Caribbean with their own geopolitical strategic perspective. Immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, this was considered fully possible for the Imperial Japanese Naval officers like Satō Tetsutarō and Kawashima Reijirō. It was also revealed that Satō even predicted the process up to the surrender of Japan 38 years later. In this regard, it can be safely said that this study has proved that "the Imperial Japanese Naval Officers' geopolitical strategic perspective allowed them to interpret the substance of the first War Plan Orange of 1906 which fundamentally
represented the idea of the U. S. Navy to blockade the whole of Japanese Archipelago strategically, and to position the U. S. as the hypothetical enemy in the 'First Imperial National Defense Policy'."

Also discovered are the reports by British Ambassador to Japan Claude MacDonald, considered as new historical materials regarding the Portsmouth Peace Conference. From these documents, it could be speculated that Japanese government leaders and members of the General Staffs interpreted the President Roosevelt's advice to Japan as the "Second Tripartite Intervention" and they could possibly learn Roosevelt's "balanced antagonism" policy from Ambassador MacDonald. Despite the above-mentioned interpretation and possibility, Japan proposed to establish cooperative relations with the U. S. Navy. Nevertheless, the U. S. Navy in turn rejected the proposal, which led Japan to regard the U. S. as a hypothetical enemy. In this context, the attempt to bring to light "reality" reflected in the eyes of the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers in charge of military command can be termed a success.

In May 15, 1907, Luke E. Wright, the U. S. Ambassador to Japan, took notice of a local press which welcomed the progress in the negotiations of the Franco-Japanese agreement as complete understanding among Japan, Britain, France and Russian, then, he expounded that "her financial and industrial resources ... are the points of her greatest weakness as a world power." Today, Japan is the world's second economic superpower in terms of GNP, but it stands on the threshold between the East and the West with the vital weakness of vulnerability to a strategic level blockade, that is, "containment" as well as the weakness pointed out by Ambassador Wright. This geopolitical strategic condition is considered a constant independent variable. If attention is paid to Japan's geopolitical strategic condition, it is possible to review the Imperial Japanese Army and Naval officers' perspective on national security challenging these restrictions continuously from the time when the term geopolitics was not available to the period from 1925 on. It is only from this kind of study that the implications of contemporary significance can be found.

102 "Wright to Root, May 15, 1907," in the State Department Numerical File No. 6351, General Records of the Department of State, 1756-1979 (U. S. . National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59) and