

# **SALW and Micro-Disarmament: Norm-Building and the Roles of the United Nations**

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## Introduction

In the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* published in 1995, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that "Micro-Disarmament" would play an important role in addressing problems facing the international community.<sup>1</sup> The "micro-disarmament" advocated by Secretary-General Ghali targeted anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, which are used most frequently in post-Cold War conflicts and cause huge human and economic damage.<sup>2</sup> His successor, Kofi Annan, has reconfirmed the significance of the "micro-disarmament" as an international agenda and referred to the problems over small arms and light weapons as "Global Scourge."

In the post-Cold War era, there have been many cases that a civil war and/or communal violence, which involved various social and ethnic groups, have caused serious pain over the peace and security of the respective community.<sup>3</sup> The weapons with low sophistication were the choice of the violence in many of the cases. However, the conventional method of solving conflicts has limited applicability which focused on building multinational consultations among nations concerned through negotiations and creating new treaties. In a conflict-torn society, the enforcement of such agreement is doubtful and the result of which produced irrelevant outcomes.<sup>4</sup> What is worse, the members of the international community showed little concern about such conflicts because they felt the solution of the conflicts is beyond their national interests. Racial and tribal violent conflicts, which often broke

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60-S/1995/1. January 3, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> Though it is difficult to know the exact amount of damage, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in a keynote speech to the First Biennial Meeting of States on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Com

bat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects that small arms and light weapons were used as main weapons in forty-seven conflicts out of forty-nine witnessed in the 1990s and that 300,000 people were killed in military conflicts and another 200,000 in ethnic violence. United Nations, Press Release, DC/2871, July 3, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Peer, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

<sup>4</sup> Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Introduction," in Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp.26-32

out in the Third World, posed grave problems to the security of neighboring countries, but were not serious enough for the countries outside the region to be concerned. The "micro-disarmament" by Secretary-General Ghali worked out to fill the gap in the conflict-solution methods and that in the perception of threats among nations.

The approach outlined in the "micro-disarmament" is not to regard arms control and disarmament as an end to strategic stability but to make it a part of the process of peace building and enforcement in its broader sense. This is one of the great characteristics of the micro-disarmament<sup>5</sup> It is a comprehensive measure to reduce the conflict and reintegrate community into normal setting, where conflict and violence is remote and social welfare is maintained. It includes arms control and disarmament that will focus on control and limit the weapons circulated in the respective community, activities designed to make disarmament feasible, weapons management (including storage management), and demilitarization after conflicts but programs to reintegrate soldiers into society. The reform of the police forces is considered as one of the significant means to these ends. Moreover, each process forms part of the whole avenue to the establishment of peace and security. Entities in charge of promoting the processes will be not only nations and international organizations but also NGO, the mass media, intellectuals and all the people interested in the processes. This means to facilitate arms control and disarmament from the standpoint different than "military policy for nations in conflict to cooperate in pursuit of common interest" defined by Hedley Bull.<sup>6</sup> Of course, this does not mean that arms control and disarmament in the traditional sense of the word has disappeared. In dealing with challenges facing the post-Cold War international society, the "micro-disarmament" has gained increasing recognition and significance together with mounting awareness regarding new concepts on security, such as global governance and human security.

The "micro-disarmament" with the above-mentioned features has brought together various groups concerned with humanitarian problems, disarmament, religions, development, peace activists and feminism movement. In the Ottawa Convention of 1997 (the Convention for the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction), stockpiling, transfer and use of antipersonnel mines were prohibited. This landmark treaty, which has eliminated a specific weapon through negotiations for the first time in human history, added impetus to peace movement of various nations and NGO. After the Ottawa, NGO began to look at small arms and light weapons as next target and proposed initiatives to ban such weapons.<sup>7</sup> However, the groups concerned with small arms and light weapons came out from various backgrounds, so that

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<sup>5</sup> Fred Tanner and Keith Krause, "Introduction," in Keith Krause and Fred Tanner, eds., *Arms Control and Contemporary Conflicts: Challenges and Responses*, PSIS Special Studies no. 5, 2001, pp.2.

<sup>6</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p.xiv.

the focus of their activities was dispersed.<sup>8</sup> In spite of this situation, as more and more researchers, NGOs and international organizations raised problems over small arms and light weapons, the international community led by the United Nations took the initiative and accelerated dialogs with the quarters concerned in the late 1990s toward a success of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects) in 2001. During the several rounds of negotiation, measures to deal with the issue narrowed down and obstacles for successful implementation were pointed out. On the basis of the results of the negotiations, each member of the United Nations adopted the final report and action program at the conference. Then, the international community moved to the next step of specific activities.<sup>9</sup>

These initiatives contributed to the remarkable progress of the issues concerned. Points of contention were narrowed down, while awareness of the issue was deepened in the international community. Nevertheless, the ranges of issues deemed significant remain wide, except some instances where conventional measures have been introduced for the development of the arms control. Lying behind this situation are the lack of consensus as to why the small arms problem occur and what kind of measures are needed to address the problem when arms control and disarmament is considered a fundamental solution to conflicts. Furthermore, the success in banning antipersonnel mines send a wrong message to the international society about the model through which to deal with certain types of weapons. Essentially, antipersonnel landmine and small arms has different specifications and military utility, so that applicability of the success-model in one area was irrelevant. In fact, the approach of the international community to deal with the small arms issue required multi-dimensional and enmeshed arrangement different from monolithic but focused approach that has been taken in the issue of antipersonnel mines. For the moment, the international community is addressing the small arms problem based on the action program adopted at the U.N. conference on small arms and is in the process of sorting the points of contention. Part of its efforts is the first tentative meeting on the U.N. conference on small arms held in 2003, and the process is continuing. This article overlooks how the international community has been coping with the problem since the 2001 conference on small arms. It also makes a brief explanation of the discussions held at the conference and predicts the direction this issue develops. This article also shows how the international community defines the "micro-disarmament" and how the small arms issue should be dealt

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<sup>8</sup> Keith Krause classifies the framework of the problems over small arms and light weapons into seven categories-humanism and human rights, public welfare and crimes, economic development and good governance, violence in communities, intervention into regional conflict expansion, regional instability and international terrorism-and analyzes the nature of each problem and how small arms and light weapons exercise influence. Keith Krause, "The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons," paper presented at the 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies, "Networking the Security Community in the Information Age," May 17, 1998.

<sup>9</sup> *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Aspects*, UN Document A/CONF. 192/15, July 20, 2001: *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit*

with in that perspective.

## I. Development of the issue on small arms and "micro-disarmament"

The issue on the development of the small arms developed after the U.N. Secretary-General Ghali's proposal to the U.N. conference. Ever since, the United Nations has played a central role in provoking an interest in the issue as common agenda among various countries and in the international community.

In December 1994, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its resolution "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them."<sup>10</sup> The resolution was adopted after the Mali government had asked the United Nations to cooperate in collecting small arms circulating illicitly in the country after their civil war. The resolution expressed the international community's concern about illicit traffic of small arms particularly in Sub-Saharan countries. The resolution pointed out that small arms in conflicting areas hampered the restoration of peace and stressed the importance of local governments controlling the illicit trade of small arms. In December 1995, the United Nations also adopted the resolution entitled "Small Arms" (A/RES/50/70). It was designed to organize the main points of the small arms issue, analyze the nature and cause of the issue, and work out preventive measures to reduce the number of small arms. The resolution called on the U.N. secretary-general to prepare a report on the issue. Specifically, it asked the secretary-general to (a) classify the types of small arms and light weapons used in U.N.-defined conflicts; (b) explain how and why the excessive inflow of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade, leads to regional instability; and (c) work out measures to prevent accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, which cause and exacerbate conflicts and thereby bring about instability in the regions concerned.<sup>11</sup> Following the resolution, the secretary-general set up a panel consisting of government experts from sixteen countries. In August 1997, the panel completed the report and secretary-general submitted it describing the results of discussions at the panel to the General Assembly.<sup>12</sup> The report classified then-categorized small arms into small arms and

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<sup>10</sup> This was the first resolution whose title used the term "small arms." United Nations, General Assembly, "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them," A/RES/49/75, December 15, 1994.

<sup>11</sup> This resolution included respect for the spirit of self-defense based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and self-determination defined in the Vienna Declaration and action program adopted at the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights. It also mentioned that small arms acquired through illicit trade would most likely be used for violence and that small arms obtained directly and indirectly by terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and underground organizations would threaten regional and international security, and political stability of the regions concerned. United Nations, General Assembly, "General and complete disarmament, B. Small Arms," A/RES/50/75, December 15, 1995.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms," A/52/298, August 27, 1997.

<sup>13</sup> The antipersonnel mine ban convention classified landmines into antipersonnel mines and antitank mines, and focused only on antipersonnel mines at the Ottawa Convention. However, the international community expanded the scope, and began to discuss antitank mines at the Disarmament Committee.

light weapons. It was based on the consideration that if light weapons were included in small arms, light arms owned by regular armies of each country would be subject to control, and the reclassification was intended to avoid this mixture.<sup>13</sup> The report also proposed measures to reduce the number of arms concerned and prevent excessive accumulation and transfer of such arms, indirectly pointing to regions troubled with excessive accumulation and traffic of small arms and light weapons<sup>14</sup>

In order to put the proposals in the report into practice, the U.N. General Assembly called on the secretary-general to launch study on restrictive measures against ammunition and explosives considered effective in small arms control, and make audit to the U.N. member countries about the idea on having an international conference on illicit trade of arms. In addition, it asked the secretary-general to inaugurate anew a group of government experts for the purpose of studying the current situation of control on small arms in member countries and measures to substantiate the proposals included in A/52/298, and to submit the results to the U.N. General Assembly in 1999.<sup>15</sup> In December 1997, the secretary-general organized a group of government experts from 23 countries. The expert group, chaired by Japanese U.N. Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki, submitted a report compiling the views of member countries to the 1999 General Assembly. The report recommended twenty-four measures, which include: effective enforcement of control on export and import of small arms proposed by the United Nations Security Council; assistance to restoration efforts in post-conflict areas; self-restraint on transfer of small arms to regions in conflict; and marking of small arms at a time of manufacturing.<sup>16</sup> In December 1999, the U.N. General Assembly decided to hold a "conference on the illicit trade in small arms in all aspects (U.N. conference on small arms)" in July 2001.<sup>17</sup> The resolution confirmed the significance of a comprehensive approach by the international civil society including NGO, and regional and

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<sup>14</sup> As proposals to restrict excessive accumulation and transfer, the resolution presented the promotion of comprehensive approach to security and development (maintenance of social order in the wake of conflicts); the promotion of post-conflict disarmament and demilitarization programs (including a program to collect arms); assistance to disarming of soldiers in U.N. peace-keeping operations and addition of this task to peace-keeping operations; and deeper regional and international cooperative relationships, establishment of information sharing mechanisms, and destruction of small arms and light weapons owned by citizens other than those for national defense and public order, all with regard to activities for control of illicit trade-the police, information gathering, and customs and national boundary management. As future measures, the resolution proposed: the enforcement in each country of the international arms transfer guidelines in the U.N. resolution 46/36 H adopted on December 6, 1991; enactment of domestic laws and rules concerning possession and use of arms by citizens; confirmation of laws, rules and procedures regarding legal possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons; reintroduction of license requirements for ownership of small arms and light weapons by citizens in post-conflict society; restrictions on overseas transfer of surplus arms produced for police and military purposes; prevention of theft from storage facilities and black-market sale of arms; exchange of information on groups engaged in illicit transfer (cooperation among the United Nations, international organizations and regional bodies); promotion of regional moratorium; cooperation in the attempt of the OAU (Organization of American States) to establish the Pan-American treaty; organization of international conferences; establishment of a marking system by the United Nations in the arms production phase; establishment international database on manufacturers of legal weapons and ammunition; and study of initiatives on problems over ammunition and explosives. United Nations, A/52/298.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, 52/38 J, December 9, 1997.

international organizations.

On the basis of progress in proposals included in the 1997 report, the 1999 report said that a reduction in small arms and light weapons is closely related to prevention of proliferation of such arms in future and that it is necessary for the international community to get involved in the reduction and prevention continuously and harmoniously because both will potentially reinforce each other. The report also pointed out that it is important for some regions to learn lessons from success stories in other areas. Thus, it was commonly perceived that the focal points of the small arms issue were initiatives to manage export and control illicit trade on the arms supply side, and a reduction in existing small arms where excessive accumulation and transfer of small arms cause problems.

In the wake of the publication of the report, the small arms issue was addressed at three levels-international organizations centering on the United Nations, regional organizations, and each country.<sup>18</sup> It was emphasized that the international civil society led by NGOs would play a significant role in providing comprehensive assistance to activities of these organizations and member countries.

In October 1998, the U.N. Security Council adopted the resolution 1209, which criticized the accumulation and illicit transfer of small arms for threatening the security of nations (particularly African nations), regions and the world, and for hampering humanitarian development. It also recommended that African countries consider measures to increase transparency of arms transfer, calling for control on export, import, and re-export of arms through export management systems and expansion of regional arms registration systems now in operation in western African countries. The resolution proposed that measures taken by the organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) be set up in other countries. In July 1999, the Security Council Chairman announced in the statement on "maintenance of freedom and safety, and establishment of peace in the wake of conflicts" that arms control, demilitarization and return of soldiers to society should be regarded as a series of processes toward peace, stability and development.<sup>19</sup> In September the same year, the Security Council chairman ordered the Secretary-General to prepare a handbook describing methods to dispose of collected

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<sup>16</sup> The 1999 report confirmed that "excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons" were at issue and emphasized the damage of such arms, especially to children. It also pointed out that various conflicts have brought about circulation of small arms and that it was important to eliminate the root cause of such conflicts. The report, above all, said the existence of small arms affected development, post-conflict restoration efforts, disarmament, demilitarization and return of soldiers to society. It should be noted that the illicit trade in small arms not only threatened security but hampered international and national social and economic development. The report referred to flow of small arms from legal channels to illicit ones, existence of arms brokers, problems over storage of small arms in member countries and inadequate export control systems. United Nations, General Assembly, "Small Arms," A/54/258, August 19, 1999

<sup>17</sup> United Nations, 54/54 V, December 15, 1999.

<sup>18</sup> This three-level approach to the small arms issue was confirmed both in the 1997 and 1999 reports and was presented in the action program of the 2001 world conference on small arms.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations, S/PRST/1999/21. This initiative led to DDR (Disarmament, Demilitarization and Reintegration).

weapons without damaging environment.<sup>20</sup>

In parallel with efforts of the United Nations, the European Union (EU) adopted the "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking on Conventional Arms" in 1997, setting forth the initiative to information exchange among member countries and to assist the Third World countries engaged in elimination of illicit trade.<sup>21</sup> In May 1998, the EU announced the "EU Code of Conduct on Arms Embargo" to set standards for arms export. In December the same year, it adopted the "Joint Action" on small arms.<sup>22</sup> The Joint Action had as three objectives: to contribute to ending the accumulation and proliferation of small arms which destroy safety; to help reduce the accumulation of existing arms to the level which meets demand in terms of legal security of each country and to assist in solving problems caused by the accumulation; and asked for the member countries to strengthen export management systems for small weapons. It included a variety of specific programs, such as a plan to eradicate "violent cultures." In the U. S.-EU joint declaration (U.S.-EU Statement of Common Principles on Small Arms and Light Weapons) in December 1999, the United States expressed its support for the "Joint Action." In November 2000, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted action criteria in four areas-preservation of manufacturing records for small weapons, common export criteria and export management, disposal and destruction of surplus weapons, and early warning, prevention of conflicts, crisis management and post-conflict restoration.

Simultaneously with initiatives in the countries exporting arms, arms recipient countries are actively carrying out initiatives through regional organizations. In November 1997, the thirty-three members of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed the "Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials." The convention provided for concerted action through guidelines of each country on small arms transfer management, marking of manufacturing numbers by small arms manufacturers, and establishment of license systems for export and import, and temporary passage.<sup>23</sup> In October 1998, ECOWAS announced a three-year expansion of moratorium on export and import of small arms and on manufacturing. This attempt was materialized through cooperation from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on the assumption that intra-region safety is essential for promotion of development. In order to extend a

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<sup>20</sup> United Nations, S/2000/101.

<sup>21</sup> The official name is the European Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.

<sup>22</sup> The official name of the Code of Conduct is the "European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, and the Joint Action is the "Joint Action of 17 December 1998 Adopted by the Council of European Union on the Basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of the European Union on the European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilizing Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

<sup>23</sup> The following year, a "model regulation" draft was prepared for this convention. The official name is the "Model Regulation for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and

moratorium, the Program for Co-ordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was adopted in March 1999 and the Code of Conduct was extended in December of same year. In October 2001, it was again agreed to extend a moratorium by three years. In Africa, the "Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa" was held in March 2000. Adopted at the conference was the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.<sup>24</sup> On the basis of the declaration, the Nairobi Secretariat announced the concerted action program in November the same year, calling for the establishment of laws for effective control of possession and transfer of small arms and light weapons in each country.<sup>25</sup>

The U.N. conference on small arms was held in July 2001. At the conference, the proposed initiatives and various attempts already made were summarized, and the course to take in the future was indicated. The official name of the conference was "Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects." As this name indicates, the conference, while recognizing humanitarian and socio-economic problems caused by small arms and light weapons, confirmed the individual and collective self-defense in the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the right of self-determination and manufacturing small arms, import and possession of small arms and light weapons based on each nation's sovereignty. Indeed, the focal point of the action program was limited to how to prevent illicit trade.<sup>26</sup> In other words, what was discussed was the reinforcement of the existing framework for small arms control, such as economic sanctions by the United Nations and the protocol against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.<sup>27</sup> The conference dealt with the trade in and unnecessary accumulation of uncontrolled weapons in order to ensure safety necessary for the implementation of development programs and peace-keeping operations.

The final report of the conference described measures at the national, regional and global levels designed to prevent the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and at the same time explained how to implement them, pointing to the need for international cooperation and assistance. It made twenty-two proposals at the national level. Among them were: more strict control systems against export and import, and manufacturing of small arms and light weapons (including establishment of license systems); identification of individuals and groups engaged in illicit trade and manufacturing; marking of small

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<sup>24</sup> The official name is "the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

<sup>25</sup> Nairobi Secretariat, Implementing the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, July 2001.

<sup>26</sup> In many regional arrangements, the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is considered a fundamental condition, making it difficult to deny or restrict it.

<sup>27</sup> The official name is the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. This was adopted in the resolution 55/255 at the 55th United Nations General Assembly on May 31, 2001.

arms and light weapons to be manufactured legally: implementation of control on re-export; restrictions on brokering; disposal of unnecessary small arms and light weapons collected; and thorough control on stored small arms and light weapons. The report also proposed measures to help restore post-conflict society. Among the eight regional-level measures were recommendation of a weapons moratorium, promotion of regional cooperation in border management and improvement in regional transparency. Regarding the ten international-level measures, emphasis was placed on beefing up of the Interpol, introduction of control on brokering, and cooperation with NGOs with a view to raising international awareness about the small arms issue. The report also made eighteen proposals for international cooperation in implementing the three-level measures.<sup>28</sup> The action program for small weapons and light weapons specified an outline of what the international community should do to address the problem.<sup>29</sup>

## II. Small Arms Issue and International Community

The approach of the international community to the issue of small arms and light weapons is different from conventional approaches toward arms control and disarmament, and solution of conflicts.

It was not the 1990s that the world witnessed and recognized disasters triggered by the spread of small arms and light weapons for the first time. It goes without saying that small arms had a long history of causing heavy damage before the 1990s. However, it was in the 1990s that the small arms issue was considered an international agenda requiring international action. After the Cold War ended, many criminal activities took place in complicated regional conflicts and over national boundaries, while personnel engaged in U.N. peace-keeping operations were increasingly exposed to dangers, leading to common understanding that a realistic approach was necessary. The "micro-disarmament" advocated by Secretary-General Ghali was the first of its kind to identify political measures to address the above problems. The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), which played an important role in defining the concept of the "micro-disarmament," classifies steps toward the micro-disarmament into national and multinational level approaches, and proposes specific measures at both levels. Measures at the national level include improvement in police activities, management of export and import, and manufacturing, and collection of weapons. Among those at the multinational level are: specific conditions

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<sup>28</sup> United Nations, A/Conf. 192/15.

<sup>29</sup> The United Nations decided to hold a conference in 2006 for the review of the 2001 conference with interim meetings scheduled for 2003 and 2005 to study the progress in the action program.

<sup>30</sup> BICC, *The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, brief 7, September, 1996.

for assistance to administrative competence, higher transparency, sanctions, exercise of military force, and elimination of certain weapons; demilitarization and disarmament; and establishment of multinational mechanisms for information exchange.<sup>30</sup>

Under the concept of "micro-disarmament" advocated by Secretary-General Ghali, it was assumed that after the identification of political measures, particular problems facing conflicting nations and society are addressed in accordance with the political framework classified into preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping operations and post-conflict peace building. This process is not limited to international conflicts. It can be applied to domestic conflicts.<sup>31</sup> In the "micro-disarmament," however, political objectives deduced from political measures and framework reflects gaps in security interests among nations, producing confusion in conceptual definitions for the nature of the small arms issue. A report published in 2003 by the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) said that the small arms issue is complex and multi-faceted and has various overriding focal points, posing a new challenge to the United Nations in promoting arms control and disarmament in this area. The report then pointed out that "it is necessary to work out new international codes, standards and programs."<sup>32</sup>

One of possible causes for complex conceptual definition for the small arms issue is where to set the "micro-disarmament" in the conventional political framework. As Hedley Bull defines, the ultimate goal of disarmament is to reduce and eliminate weapons, whereas the elimination of small arms and light weapons is not pursued in the small arms issue.<sup>33</sup> Small arms and light weapons do not necessarily influence military balance among nations, and therefore give little impact to security of nations when they are discussed in the category of arms control at structural and operational levels.<sup>34</sup> Problems over small arms and light weapons are often related to a nation's internal affairs, and though their spread has international implications, their direct influence rarely exceeds regional levels.

Of course, developed nations are often responsible for the spread of small arms and light weapons, thus it is vitally important to define this as a global security problem and call for their participation in the comprehensive solution of the problem. On the other

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<sup>31</sup> Brown and Oudraat cite as policy measures humanitarian aid, factual surveys, arbitration, reliability-enhancing measures, traditional peace-keeping operations, multi-functional peace-keeping operations, military and economic assistance, arms embargo and economic sanctions, law enforcement and exercise of military force, and as policy tasks conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution. Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "Internal conflict and International Action: An Overview," in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, rev. ed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 163.

<sup>32</sup> International Action Network on Small Arms: IANSA, *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society*, p. 18.

<sup>33</sup> Some groups inheriting the peace movement aim at the total elimination of small arms and light weapons in developed countries. However, it was clarified at the United Nations that only the excessive accumulation and transfer leads to instability, and the existence of small arms and light weapons is not defined as causing disasters. Regarding Bull's definition of arms control and light weapons, refer to "The Control of the Arms Race," Bull.

<sup>34</sup> John Baylis, "Arms Control and Disarmament," in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, and Colin S. Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 185.

hand, it is also true that difficulty arises in defining the problem with differences in severity, influence and responsibility as what Garret Hardin calls "tragedy of the commons." It was internationally agreed that human rights were abused in nations engaged in conflicts and human tragedies were caused due to disasters resulting from small arms and light weapons, while it was mainly developing countries concerned that would benefit from the solution of conflicts. Countries in the "North," which manufacture and transfer small arms and light weapons and are therefore required to play an important role in this issue, had to use their political and economic resources for the welfare of other countries, not necessarily for their own national interest. In other words, the small arms issue was too indirect and remote for each country to become an urgent international problem, whereas it related to several countries in that the buildup of the police and administrative management in one country alone could not solve the problem.

In this context, it is only natural that identification of policy measures was given priority over the discussion about policy goals. Another factor lying behind this process is that opinions were divided on how small arms and light weapons caused disasters, making it necessary to take urgent and practical action to deal with disasters resulting from small arms. For example, in the United States and Switzerland, people have a right to possess small arms but do not use them often as means of violence or criminal activities. On the other hand, in some countries where possession of small arms is regulated, people resort to violence using small weapons. Considering what causes this difference, it proves difficult to substantiate the correlation between the spread of small arms and outbreak of violent activities using small arms. Therefore, in order to utilize scarce resources of the international community effectively, it was considered more practical to specify desirable policy measures and leave their implementation to the quarters concerned than to continue discussions on social characteristics of the small arms issue.

In the mid-90s, international consensus was reached to tackle with the small arms issue in respective countries in terms of phenomena occurring in those countries instead of discussing possible correlations between conflicts and the spread of small arms and light weapons.<sup>35</sup> This is one of indirect reasons why the small arms issue has become diverse.

Two views have come to coexist with each other as to the nature of the small arms issue. One is that the "existence of conflicts" invites the influx of small arms and light weapons and gives violent influence to civil society. The other is that the "inflow and existence of small arms and light weapons" triggers and prolongs conflicts, and exposes civil society to danger.<sup>36</sup> The two views largely define the solution of conflicts and the nature of the

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<sup>35</sup> For that matter, it is also true that the small arms issue began with the movements to raise moral consciousness of the international civil society. Human Rights Watch, BASIC, Center for Defense Information (CDI), World Watch Institute, Saferworld, ICRC, Oxfam, and other NGOs which have long been engaged in disarmament play a leading role in problems over small arms and antipersonnel mines. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, eds., *Light Weapons and Civil Conflicts: Controlling the Tools of Violence* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).

"micro-disarmament" to be carried out subsequently. Policy measures necessary to maintain the effects of arms control and disarmament differ according to how conflicts end. For example, when conflicts are brought to an end with the division of power among the parties concerned, it is important to retain the military balance of power as it is and manage the rivalry among the parties. The "micro-disarmament" in this situation is designed to curb the parties who seek to benefit from the continuation of conflicts, and to eliminate military force in a phased manner. On the other hand, if an agreement is reached on the integration of civil society and sharing of political power among the conflicting parties concerned when conflicts end, the biggest objective is to manage and promote the restoration process of countries. In this case, maintenance and development are difficult unless incentives for regulation of military force are provided from the outside. It is for this reason that the goal of the "micro-disarmament" is to reduce opportunities for the parties engaged in conflicts to acquire military force (including small arms and light weapons).<sup>37</sup>

There may be no definite answer to the questions as to whether the will to acquire small arms exists in advance or the availability of small arms matters. The action program adopted in the 2001 U.N. conference on small arms and light weapons only said the questions must be dealt with simultaneously. The conference also failed to produce an agreement on the identification of standardized management procedures and the dividing lines between legal and illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons. In this context, criticism was leveled against the conference, saying it only listed policy measures. Given the fact that the international community is in the process of establishing codes on the small arms issue, a list of multi-dimensional problems might be a necessary step toward providing added momentum in raising awareness regarding the small arms issue as an international agenda.

As mentioned earlier, the approach of the "micro-disarmament" is premised on the application of individual action programs to each nation concerned for measures to solve social problems of the nations in conflict. However, it was necessary to prepare several parameters in order to define the universality of the small arms issue and promote operational ability as policies. In other words, whatever caused the small arms issue, it was necessary for the international community to present common interim goals against

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<sup>36</sup> In particular, researchers in international relations usually studied the small arms issue in terms of the former approach. Michael Brown compiled research on internal conflicts and cited as potential factors for such conflicts structural factors (weak government, internal instability and racial distribution), political factors (discriminatory political system, exclusive nationalist ideology, elitist government), socio-economic factors (economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development and modernization), and cultural and perceptive factors (cultural discrimination and groups' recognition of history). Direct causes of conflicts are classified into elite-led conflicts and civil society-led conflicts, and internal and environmental factors are introduced in both cases. Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview," in Brown, Cote, Jr., Lynn-Jones, and Miller, eds., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, rev. ed. Pp. 4-17. For studies on ethnic conflicts by researchers in international relations, refer to Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>37</sup> Tanner, *Arms Control and Contemporary Conflicts: Challenges and Responses*, p. 8; John Sislin and Frederic S. Pearson, *Arms and Ethnic Conflict* (Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 2001), chap.1.

this problem. The U.N. conference agreed to prepare parameters of small arms and light weapons, such as "dangerous use," "accumulation causing instability" and "illicit trade." It was possible to make the parameters compatible with the afore-mentioned policy framework. Still, even when these parameters were used, the direction and degree of interest of the quarters concerned produced differences in contents of policies of each nation.

Take "illicit trade" for example. It is well known that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons exacerbated conflicts in Africa throughout the 1990s. If the control on the illicit trade could prevent the deterioration of conflicts, the international community should focus on the "opportunities to acquire small arms" and solve the problem in an attempt to manage import and shipment routes. There could be other potential reasons for the deterioration of conflicts. For instance, a weaker internal governing organization, possession of weapons as a means of self-defense against social instability resulting from poverty, and the existence of "gun culture" and "militarized culture." It is persuasive to some degree to give priority to measures such as escape from poverty (development), cultural conversion (religion and education) and stronger governing systems (internal reform) rather than exclusively focusing on export management on the supply side and distribution management. This could be applied to such parameters of small arms as "dangerous use" and "accumulation causing instability."

There is no denying that the cause of a dilemma seen in the small arms issue lies in the fact that not only such public actors as nations, and international and regional organizations but various actors interested in development and religious problems showed great interest in the small arms issue and could easily identify their cases with the issue. In a sense, the small arms issue has become disperse due to deliberate action to arouse concern and make the actors more involved in the issue. It is often pointed out that the small arms issue is like a Christmas tree in that many people can find areas of interest as if they could find places to hang ornaments in a Christmas tree.<sup>38</sup> Then, it can be concluded that the objective of the United Nations was to show an outline of the problem and make many actors concerned more involved in the small arms issue. For the United Nations, which provides moral legitimacy of the international community, the "micro-disarmament" approach might have been desirable in avoiding direct intervention in internal affairs while fulfilling its responsibility for peace and stability of the international community. In fact, through globally-conducted wars on terror in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United Nations succeeded in getting the United States to participate in the fight against the small arms issue,

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<sup>39</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September, 2001).

though it had been reluctant to address the issue and tackle poverty, one of potential causes. In the wars on terror, the United States insisted that the eradication of environment where terrorism is born and nurtured should be an international common objective.<sup>39</sup> This policy objective led to an increase in the amount of assistance and more emphasis on development, and was consistent with the development approach to the small arms issue advocated by some groups. In this context, toward the policy objective in wars on terror, the United States hung one ornament in a Christmas tree called the small arms issue.<sup>40</sup>

In this context, the objectives of the policy for the "micro-disarmament" have become a serious problem. The United Nations termed the nature of the small arms issue changeable and fluid, and concluded measures should be comprehensive and situational, ensuring the maximum flexibility in addressing the issue. In the meantime, policy objectives were made open to discussions, leaving room for arbitrary interpretation of the nature of the small arms issue among nations and various organizations seeking to benefit from participation. This means if policy objectives are decided by groups trying to benefit from participation, the objectives would be at random and particular cases would be accumulated. In other words, if it is a challenge in working out policies to explain causal relations between policy objectives and measures, the "micro-disarmament" could not present consistent keynote policies because it cannot clarify such causal relations. Indeed, the documents adopted by the United Nations detailed explanations on the policy framework and specific measures. But it is still unclear whether they can substitute policy objectives or whether higher policy objectives exist or not.

Thus, the United Nations refrained from spelling out initiatives and limited only to showing an outline of the direction to take, allowing each nation to reflect political opinions in carrying out specific measures. As expected, after the 2001 conference, the international community was to take various approaches to address the small arms issue.

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<sup>40</sup> It is necessary to add both optimistic and pessimistic views on the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the small arms issue. In the "Symposium on Terrorism and Disarmament" sponsored by the U.N. Disarmament Bureau in October 2001, multinational treaties and organizations used for disarmament were termed effective against terrorism. Thus, the 9/11 attacks had delicate influence on the small arms issue. The incident took place immediately after the U.N. conference on small arms, shifting the focus of the international community from small arms and light weapons to terrorism. On the other hand, the awareness was growing that control on small arms would be effective against terrorism and its promotion should form part of efforts against terrorism. This was desirable from the standpoint of facilitating the solution of the small arms issue. It was also understood that both soldiers in civil wars and those engaged in violent crimes choose small arms and light weapons, which would be effective in promoting restrictions on trade in small arms. However, transfer of weapons to anti-government force like the transfer of small arms and light weapons to anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan was made an exception to transfer of small arms and light weapons, as the United States argued. In the wake of the 9/11 incident, the trend was growing toward more emphasis on threat of weapons of mass destruction, making it likely that the small arms issue might be turned into a peripheral agenda in international security. There was some concern that that developed nations would change how to use resources for the small arms issue after the 9/11 attacks. David Beal, "Re-assembling Small Arms."

### III. Approaches to Supply and Demand Sides, and New International System

The approaches of the international community to the small arms issue, pointed out in the previous chapter, will be reviewed from different angles—the supply and demand sides. According to Lora Lumpe, this approach is a policy framework worked out by the international community for convenience in simplifying the complex small arms issue.<sup>41</sup>

In the small arms issue, many of the terms used in arguing the issue is drawn from research on arms trade. The demand-side and the supply-side approaches have often been used in this research field.<sup>42</sup> However, the United Nations uses this classification only when it is convenient to sort out problems facing nations involved in conflicts and those supplying arms. It should be noted that the usage is different from conventional research on arms trade.

The demand side approach of the United Nations comprehensively defines measures that should be implemented by countries in conflicts, including arms development both at home and abroad. This is different from research on arms trade, where the approach is limited to addressing factors promoting the use and accumulation of arms. In the supply side approach, the United Nations refers not only to management of exports and manufacturing of arms in arms exporting countries but development of a sense of responsibility in such countries so that small arms and light weapons will not be transferred to nations involved in conflicts. In the meantime, BICC, saying it is the responsibility of arms exporting countries not to exacerbate instability of nations involved in conflicts, defines the supply side approach as measures for arms exporting countries to fulfill their responsibility. It also defines the demand side approach as disposing of weapons already accumulated and making citizens and criminal groups abandon their weapons.<sup>43</sup> This classification is also broader in concept than the conventional research on arms trade.

As arms trade research shows, it is next to impossible to determine where the responsibility lies for arms trade. As Robert E. Harkavy explains, pressures for arms on the demand side and those on the supply side complement each other, and structural factors work in dynamism of arms exports and imports. Various researchers propose that further study be carried out on structural factors leading to internal conflicts and influx of small arms and light weapons into the nations concerned. However, it takes time and energy to analyze internal conflicts with various complicated factors intertwined with each other, and it is unrealistic to wait for the results of such analysis, considering changeability of the international community and the nature of international opinion calling for quick results. On the premise of comprehensive interactions between the demand side approach and the

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<sup>42</sup> Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare and the Third World* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

<sup>43</sup> BICC, *The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, p. 26.

<sup>44</sup> Clare Jefferson and Angus Urquhart, *The Impact of Small Arms in Tanzania: Results of a Country Survey*, ISS Monograph, no. 70 (March 2002).

supply side approach, nations and international organizations concerned with this problem are working out measures in accordance with benefit and interest of each side, and seeking solutions to this problem. Saferworld, an NGO based in London, calls this "Holistic Approach" and Krause at Small Arms Survey, another NGO based in Geneva, names it as "Integrated Approach."<sup>44</sup>

The international community's interest in the supply side approach remains unabated in the wake of the U.N. conference on small arms. OSCE plans to compile "Best Practice Handbook" for publication in 2003. The handbook is to describe desirable measures to be implemented by member countries in eight fields—control and manufacture, marking and record keeping, controls over export, controls over brokering activities, stockpile management and security, definitions and indicators of a surplus, destruction techniques, small arms measures as part of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.<sup>45</sup> As field missions, OSCE is carrying out projects assisting collection and destruction of arms after conflicts, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR) in such countries as Albania and Kosovo.<sup>46</sup> In December 2002, the Wassenaar Arrangement added a category of small arms and light weapons to a conventional military list and launched projects designed to increase transparency of small arms transfer among member countries.<sup>47</sup> Each country has conducted its own initiatives, and numerous seminars have been held to raise awareness regarding the small arms issue at the same time. Problems have been pointed out over each country's policies on export management and arms exports.<sup>48</sup> In October 2002, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Small Arms Survey jointly published "The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms and Light Weapons," proposing an increase in transparency of arms transfer by marking small arms and light weapons in the manufacturing and distribution phases.<sup>49</sup> The United Nations Group of Government Experts, set up in the wake of the 2001 U.N. conference on small arms, is addressing the problems over analysis of transfer routes and marking of small arms and light weapons. It completed its study on feasibility by the time an interim meeting was held in 2003. At the interim meeting, some countries insisted that measures with international binding power should be introduced.<sup>50</sup>

Regarding the demand side approach, two projects are drawing attention — one by

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<sup>45</sup> It was decided that Best Practice Handbook would be prepared at the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation on July 10, 2002. Then, member countries interested in the problem voluntarily worked out model plans for each section, which would be compiled by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center. OSCE, "Decision No. 11/02, Preparation of Best Practice Guides on Small Arms and Light Weapons," July 20, 2002.

<sup>46</sup> OSCE, Conflict Prevention Centre, *Report to the First Biennial Meeting of States on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, July 1, 2003.

<sup>47</sup> Public Statement, 2002 Plenary of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Vienna, December 12, 2002.

<sup>48</sup> In May 2003, the OSCE economic forum discussed economic aspects of small arms and light weapons.

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Small Arms Survey, *The Scope and Implications of a Tracing Mechanism for Small Arms and Light Weapons* (Geneva: United Nations, 2002).

UNIDIR and the other by Saferworld. In 2002, UNIDIR launched the "Human Security and Small Arms in West Africa: Enhancing the Role of Civil Society" project to address the problem through the "participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) approach. Under this approach, researchers and businessmen who are interested in humanitarian problems and disarmament jointly evaluate the small arms issue. Conducted under the project are activities to inspire consciousness in the society concerned, improvement in administrative capability of relevant regional organizations through disarmament and PKO, development of capability of regional research organizations to address the small arms issue, publication of policy papers and proposals, and publicity campaigns throughout west Africa through regional seminars.<sup>51</sup> The project, usually called "Weapons for Development Program," is designed to raise awareness regarding small arms and light weapons in local civil society, improve capability of administrative organizations, link collection of small arms and light weapons to development aid, and thereby to reduce the number of small arms and light weapons in distribution.

Saferworld is implementing a model program for small arms in Tanzania through its sister body SaferAfrica, based in South Africa. Under the program, mapping exercise is carried out to identify problems facing each internal section in terms of small arms and light weapons in order to analyze problems (arms registration system, lack of training for the police, exodus of refugees, etc.), capability of the government, gap between problems and the capability of the government, and the current stage in overcoming that gap. Then, the differences are identified in consciousness about safety between civil society (churches, etc.) and the governments, and measures to bridge the differences is shown to national focal points of each country. In the next phase, a national action plan to carry out such measures is devised jointly with national focal points. A mechanism is installed for local task force to implement a national action plan and report on the progress in implementation to national focal points. This project is a pilot case. . SaferAfrica aims to carry out similar projects in other countries. For the moment, Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, Mali and Namibia are said to show interest in such projects.<sup>52</sup>

The report provided by IANSA before the interim meeting in 2003 shows that various attempts have been made by nations, international organizations, regional organizations and NGOs to varying degrees.<sup>53</sup> It is true that combining projects on the demand and supply sides makes a comprehensive approach to the small arms issue feasible, but at same time it is necessary to point out that some problems remain. On the supply side, if arms supplying countries ignore the international code of conduct and continue transfer of small

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<sup>51</sup> "Applying Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) approaches in Weapons for Development," A Report of an International Conference held at Palais de Nations C-3, Geneva, December 9, 2002.

<sup>52</sup> Clare Jefferson and Angus Urquhart, *The Impact of Small Arms in Tanzania: Results of a Country Survey*, ISS Monograph Series, no. 70, March 2002.

<sup>53</sup> IANSA, *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003*.

<sup>54</sup> Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

arms and light weapons, no realistic measures are available to prevent the transfer. The action program adopted at the U.N. conference on small arms does not refer to compulsory measures, nor specify legal steps to countries, which do not comply with arms export management. In this situation, the United Nations once deliberated on how to address the problem over export management of late starters. It only reached an agreement to improve awareness of member countries through continued dialogs among them.<sup>54</sup> The 2001 conference put on the back burner a task to incorporate countries lacking in the will and ability to accept encouragement and advice for law development into the supply side approach. This was discussed at the interim meeting in 2003, but to no avail.

In larger context, this problem was deliberately left unattended. The United States and Japan, which are noted for good performance and experience in export management for security during the Cold War, and former east European countries participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement had already developed export management systems for small arms and light weapons by the time when the U.N. conference on small arms was held. All these countries but Japan, which virtually exports no arms, showed interest in improving management capability of conflicts by installing regulations on arms trade except their own legitimate arms exports. Illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons is classified into the "black market" with no government intervention and the "gray market" with certain government intervention. The above-mentioned countries aimed at a ban on arms transfer from the black market and late starters, while retaining their interest in the gray market. In other words, their main objective was to control legal and illegal transfer of surplus small arms and light weapons in a country concerned after a conflict is subdued to another country in conflict.

In the U.N. conference on small arms in 2001, the United States claimed that arms transfer to non-state actors (NSA) is a means to national security. Donald McConnell, Assistant State Secretary of the Department of States, said the heart of the small arms issue is controls over "illicit transfer" and that a total ban on small arms trade and transfer is not realistic in terms of feasibility. He also said that what matters is small arms transfer to end users with no sense of responsibility, adding that "regulations on non-state actors will not work as intended because terrorist groups, rebels and drug traffickers obtain arms not through legal transfer but through illegal diversion, robbery and contraband." He further asserted that a ban on arms trade and transfer will rob minority races of means to fight against a possible massacre under an oppressive government.<sup>55</sup>

The problem on the demand side approach is that the promotion of holistic approach

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<sup>55</sup> Donald J. McConnell, "Combating the Spread of Small Arms: The U. S. Approach," in U. S. Foreign Policy Agenda, *Small Arms and Light Weapons: U. S. Policy and Views*, An Electronic Journal of the U. S. Department of State, vol. 6, no. 2, June 2001, p.7.

by developed countries and the United Nations does not always guarantee political willingness on the recipient side to address the small arms issue. In order to ensure political willingness in arms recipient countries, it is necessary to provide political, economic and social incentives. People in countries, which provide incentives ask for moral responsibility for assistance or legitimate ground that it will contribute to national interest. In cases where provision of incentives is defined as international moral justice, some recipient countries interpret this only within the framework of the north-south problem and stress the responsibility on the supply or "north" side for its neo-colonialism or stewardship. In this context, a new logic is needed to bridge the perception gap. If supply countries implement a holistic approach in accordance with their national interest, they tend to cite as a reason the reinforcement of the historical partnership continued since the colonial days or to define the small arms issue as a means to pursue economic and military interests. In this case, recipient countries take this as a duty of former suzerains, generating no tension.

In implementing the "micro-disarmament," the United Nations has left nations and regional organizations to work out policy objectives. As a result, the issues of small arms and light weapons are creating new north-south relations. As the policy framework is strengthened on the supply side, the small arms issue tends to take on the implication of technology and arms control by "countries in the north" over "countries in the south." However, the reinforcement of the policy framework on the supply side can damage political and strategic interests of developed countries, barring too much expectation. A view is prevailing in some quarters as follows: with the demand side approach, "countries in the north" choose to get involved in the small arms issue in accordance with their national interest, and a new dynamism depending on the degree of historical relationships is emerging. There is no ignoring this view.

#### IV. "Micro-Disarmament" and International Security

No one can deny that the "micro-disarmament" advocated by U.N. Secretary-General Ghali is producing a new standard for arms control and disarmament in the international community through problems over antipersonnel mines, and small arms and light weapons. It may also be true that nations, regional organizations and civil society centering on NGOs are using this standard being refined through the "micro-disarmament" and are promoting changes in the international community.

In November 2002, UNDP issued a report. The report explained that the U.N. conference on small arms in 2001 and the subsequent approaches by regions and the international community to the small arms issue led to the following common understanding: sections in charge of law and order must be reformed in each country in order to address the indiscriminate spread of small arms and light weapons; DDR is vitally important to stabilize society in the wake of conflicts; "violent culture" must be eradicated in order to pursue non-violent solutions to conflicts; it is fundamentally important to improve transparency for arms trade, possession and manufacturing and to reduce the amount of

arms in putting an end to the use of arms; and collection, safe management and destruction of small arms and light weapons are the only means to prevent further transfer of such arms and weapons.<sup>56</sup>

Needless to say, these steps does represents current international consensus. However, four items out of the above-mentioned five are related to problems facing nations involved in conflicts, testifying to the fact that UNDP attaches importance to the demand side. This is quite natural, considering that UNDP is an organization to provide assistance. In fact, numerous organizations stress the supply side approach in the small arms issue. For example, the report on small arms in the Horn of Africa published by BICC in 1994 explained overwhelmingly the supply side.<sup>57</sup> A similar trend is seen in occasional papers of Small Arms Survey, and the international community centering on NGOs addresses the small arms issue in the context of development aid.<sup>58</sup>

This is in stark contrast with the action program adopted at the U.N. conference on small arms in 2001, where the supply side problem was subject to heated discussions. Considering the fact that developed countries criticized the conference for making little reference to the supply side problem, a great change was seen in the agenda of the small arms issue. Contributory to that change were the failure of policy objectives to support autonomous development, growing awareness among developed countries, particularly European nations, regarding threat to security caused by the influx of refugees resulting from conflicts, and animated activities of international civil society centering on NGOs.

The failure of the conventional policy objectives has something to do with "assistance fatigue" on the supply side. The frequent outbreak of regional conflicts in the 1990s testified to the fact that assistance from developed countries during the Cold War days failed to achieve adjustment of internal social and political systems. For example, in Rwanda, where it was regarded that the development went smoothly during the Cold War, racial conflicts led to massive massacres in the mid-1990s and, consequently, many development programs failed. This tragedy made developed countries review their assistance plans and philosophy. Developed countries, which lost legitimate ideological rationale for assistance after the end of the Cold War, shifted their focus to the removal of root cause of frequent conflicts in order to ensure efficient assistance rather than the continuation of conventional assistance. During this period, the small arms issue drew attention with reference made to "root cause."

Problems over development and disarmament were unique in that changes were imposed by external forces on the social government system and culture causing internal conflicts.

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<sup>56</sup> UNDP, "Small Arms and Light Weapons," *Essentials*, no. 9, November 2002.

<sup>57</sup> BICC, *Small Arms in the Horn of Africa: Challenge, Issues and Perspectives*, Brief 23, December 1994.

<sup>58</sup> William Godnick with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink, *Stray Bullets: The Impact of Small Arms Misuse in Central America*, Small Army Survey, Occasional Paper no. 5, October 2002; Spyros Demetriou, *Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Republic of Georgia, 1989-2001*, Small Army Survey, Occasional Paper no. 6, November 2002; Spyros Demetriou, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle, *Small Army Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo*, Small Army Survey, Special Report, April 2002.

In international law, it is common sense to respect national sovereignty and maintain the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, and nations incapable of ensuring responsible governing systems were considered equal sovereign states. Questions were raised in terms of maintenance of order in the international community. The governance theory advocated by UNDP and theory of "human security" had their origins in this principle. It became legitimate to restrict part of national sovereignty as moral justice of the international community. In the small arms issue, more importance was attached to the demand side than the supply side, and the focus was placed on who would exercise policy under what kind of validity.

The implications of the small arms issue on regional security were particularly serious in Europe. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, it was thought that military conflicts were unlikely to take place in Europe. Nevertheless, racial conflicts occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo after the collapse of Yugoslavia, giving great impact to European nations. In the former Soviet Union, regional conflicts broke out in Azerbaijan and Georgia, arousing consciousness that Europe is not outside historical confrontational relations. What mattered in these conflicts was not the spread of the conflicts but the outflow of refugees resulting from conflicts posed serious threat to security in neighboring areas. The objective of European nations was how to ensure peace and stability after the conflicts. Therefore, methods had to be worked out to establish peace, not to maintain the situation after the end of the conflicts.

When considering how to ensure the establishment of peace, it is said that the most likely method possible is to return to the pre-conflict situation. This is only maintenance of the status quo and not the restoration of peace and stability. Under this condition, European nations utilized the multinational framework, including OSCE, prepared a comprehensive framework entailing nations involved in conflicts and formulate measures to address small arms on both the supply and demand sides. The supply side, which had already export control systems in operation, could concentrate on multinational policy adjustment, and specialize in problems on the demand side in considering new issues.

It may be necessary to point out that NGOs are faced with ironical reality when it comes to revitalization of the international civil society centering on NGOs. Most NGOs are based in developed countries. This means that financial resources of NGOs lie in developed countries and they compete with each other for finance. With progress in globalization, NGOs are increasingly exposed to harsh competition for funds and agenda. NGOs must constantly announce new initiatives to raise money, gain good reputation by achieving good results from such new initiatives and collect new funds with publicity for such results. In particular, problems drawing attention of the United Nations also draw attention of NGOs. Various NGOs get involved in the small arms issue because they can play an active role in the problem. The government of each nation and international organizations rely heavily on NGOs for collection of arms and reintegration of soldiers.

From the perspective of NGOs, it is easier to carry out activities in society where social order collapses and contribute to development than to pursue changes in policy under complex social systems in order to produce tangible results. In developed countries,

complicated political and economic dynamism works, and necessary legal systems are often already in operation. In this respect, factors other than those related to the small arms issue are important in policy changes, causing delay in such changes. The government plays a leading role in this field, and roles of NGOs are difficult to identify. In this situation, it is only natural that NGOs have concentrated on problems on the demand side.

As priority has shifted to the demand side in the small arms issue, however, it has become increasingly clear that developed countries have tried to impose international order on the Third World, which is an inherent aspect in this problem. In other words, developing nations, which cannot implement policies in accordance with desirable international and social order, are subject to control by developed countries. Under the approach attaching importance to the prescription of the small arms issue with no clear-cut policy objectives, agenda considered important by developed countries are given priority in accordance with their interests. In some cases, this can apply to a single developed country. In either case, the north-south problem has shifted from emphasis on internal development to assistance and development of capability of maintaining order from the outside in terms of the small arms issue. Moreover, each nation is faced with the issue of sovereignty in the era of globalization through the "micro-disarmament."

## Conclusion

At the interim meeting in 2003, progress in the action program was reported. According to the summary by the chairman, progress was seen in the following fields. Regarding manufacturing and transfer of small arms and light weapons, more than 90 countries decided to ban illicit manufacturing, possession and trade of small arms and light weapons through internal laws. As for regulations on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, each region addressed this problem and progress was witnessed in sharing information on controls over brokering activities. In the field of collection and destruction of surplus arms, more than four million weapons were destroyed for the past 10 years. At the same time, the report called for international assistance for controls over stockpiling facilities and exchange of information on stockpiling of arms and weapons.<sup>59</sup>

Considering how much each government has addressed the small arms issue and how much interest NGOs and the United Nations have shown in this problem, thought is necessarily given to roles of standards in multinational diplomacy on the international

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<sup>59</sup> United Nations, Press Release, DC/2877.

<sup>60</sup> Keith Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of Small Arms and Light Weapons," *Global Governance*, vol. 8, no. 2 (April/June, 2002), pp. 247-263.

scene. It goes without saying that nations are leading actors in multinational diplomacy, and that national interest is greatly significant in formulating policies and a decisive factor in defining the direction of policies. In addressing the small arms issue, each nation took "rational" activities in the light of its national interest. When considering how the small arms issue influences national interest of each country in terms of multinational diplomacy, it is often difficult to identify layers of national interest. It is also true that national interest is "constructed" through multinational forums and dialogs with NGOs, and agenda setting at international and regional organizations.<sup>60</sup>

Given the fact that national interest is constructed through the standards of the international community, it should be taken into consideration that the small arms issue has become disperse because many international organizations and NGOs got involved and carried out their own initiatives. It is notable that this phenomenon can damage the authority and roles of the United Nations in the small arms issue. The fact that the United Nations legitimized the implementation of a variety of measures without clarifying policy objectives is considered a negative aspect of the short process from the recognition of the problem by the international community to the formulation of the action program. This lack of uniformity in the small arms issue leads to debates on the roles of the United Nations.

It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that there are mixed views on the roles of the United Nations. On the positive side, the United Nations is in principle a multinational forum and it is enough to legitimize benefit and interest of each country and organization. The United Nations does not need to intervene in the issue if initiatives of each country result in mitigation of the small arms issue. It follows from this view that the more comprehensive the action program of the United Nations becomes, the more actors get involved in a problem, and as a result, the less danger citizens suffer in conflicts or will suffer.

On the negative side, it is necessary to present clear policy objectives regarding the small arms issue, define concept on policy measures and give priority to such measures. Nevertheless, if the United Nations does not play a leading role, organizations involved in the small arms issue carry out initiatives at random. It follows from this view that the United Nations abandons its role, though it is vitally important in order to draw attention from the whole international community to the "micro-disarmament," which is not necessarily related to direct security of developed countries. Amid the move to re-definition of the north-south problem and changes in concept on sovereignty, if a leading actor does not present the whole picture of the problem and show the direction to take, international order will likely be restructured in an arbitrary manner. This may lead to future instability of the international community.

When considering rational selection of national policies and discussions about organization of standards in international relations, it is quite significant in global politics how a nation formulates policies in interactions between national interest and multinational diplomacy. National interests against social phenomena, such as damage resulting from small arms, development and security interact with international standards, increasingly complicated by interests of the international civil society, including NGOs. In this situation,