

Japan's Security in the Changing Eurasian Strategic Environment

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Introduction

There are two ways for states to ensure national security in military terms. The first is to build up military forces in order to deter military attacks by enemies, followed by active defense if deterrence fails. In addition, when deterrence cannot be achieved independently, states rely on foreign assistance. We are familiar with this view of national security as the traditional perspective. However, at the same time, this method exacerbates the arms race between states with increasing mutual distrust and financial burdens, and consequently increases the danger of wars, as has been seen in the past. Conversely, the second way is to ensure enemies' safety against attack. This way is called reassurance,¹ which has a particularly high likelihood of success when the states involved in the hostile relationship are not able to afford to strengthen their military forces, and when they share concerns about the results of a military arms race. This choice, which takes a form of military détente, namely arms control and disarmament,² plays an important role not only in correcting military weakness and vulnerability in a realistic sense, but also in promoting humanity in an idealistic perspective.

In both the views of deterrence (and defense) and reassurance, it is apparent that the strategic link among the key Eurasian powers, namely Europe (backed by the U.S.), the Soviet Union (Russia of today), and China, has changed drastically in nature following the end of the Cold War evolving around Russia.

In 1966, as the monolithic unity of communism began to crumble, the Soviet political leader Leonid I. Brezhnev addressed himself to reviewing his country's military posture toward China. In parallel with preparing for a possible full-scale war against the U.S., in order to deter Chinese military adventurism, the Soviet Union set about reviewing its military posture with the aim of acquiring limited war options, including the use of nuclear weapons, against China. On the other hand, at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in March 1966, Brezhnev advocated the creation of a European Security Conference. In light of this, the Warsaw Pact adopted the Bucharest Declaration in

¹ Reassurance is also used to mean providing a sense of security to an ally. However, to avoid confusion, this paper will only use the term in the context of providing assurances of security to a hostile state.

² The concept of arms control, with some exceptions, includes arms reductions. However, this paper will use "arms control" to refer to arms stabilization measures that do not include arms reduction, in order to avoid complications related to terminology.

July, making clear its stance on promoting military détente with NATO. The Bucharest Declaration reiterated measures aimed at alienating the U.S. from Western Europe that were unacceptable to NATO. The declaration contained clauses calling for the simultaneous dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe, and establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. However, the overtones of an intention to alienate Western Europe from the U.S. gradually faded out. In this way, the Soviet Union, which was compelled to build-up its military forces against China, indicated its intention to avoid military operations on two fronts. Then NATO, which adopted the Harmel Report³ in December 1967, acted in concert with Eastern proposals to strengthen military détente in Europe. This created the atmosphere to start the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was to commence in mid-1973, and talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, respectively. As a result, in the context of a succession of meetings on military détente, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was concluded between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in November 1990. Moreover, after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was reached in November 1999. The danger of surprise and large-scale attacks in the European theater has virtually vanished. In contrast to this, by virtue of China's concern about military antagonism with the Soviet Union, which manifested itself in an actual border clash in March 1969, the U.S. reached a political reconciliation with China that came as a great surprise to Japan.

Today, it cannot be ignored that both Europe and Russia are enjoying the fruits of military détente. Russian President Vladimir V. Putin calmly watched the developments of the NATO Summit held in Prague in November 2002, at which the Baltic States were invited to become new members. Though the President himself had never actually given consent for the enlargement of NATO, Russia did not shift its military posture in ways such as deploying tactical nuclear weapons that did not contravene existing treaties, and never violated the CFE Treaty. But that did not mean that the Russian military or State Duma was fully persuaded by the President, who was searching for a way to compromise with NATO, or that they were disengaged from the mindset of the Cold War era. In view of this, while there is little possibility that Russia will re-ignite a new antagonism with NATO, it is inconceivable that it will relax its vigilance.

In contrast to the concern over deterioration between Europe and Russia, Russia and China have made noticeable progress toward eliminating their former antagonism. China shares Russia's misgivings over the uni-polar control of the U.S., which has emerged as the sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union. China fears the U.S., which might cast China as a source of a future threat. Russia is concerned about NATO's enlargement to the East. Although there is little possibility that both states will return to

³ The official name of the report that NATO adopted was "The Future Tasks of the Alliance." It is commonly known as the Harmel Report, named after then Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who

their former honeymoon period, a disengagement of troops from border areas (7,300 kilometers long and 100 kilometers deep) was agreed upon in April 1997 within the so-called Shanghai Five security cooperation framework, which consisted of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and military transparency of the region has been increased. Inviting Uzbekistan as a new member in June 2001, the Shanghai Five was reorganized as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and stepped up its relations. In conjunction with the progress in military détente in the region, the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China was concluded in July 2001 to replace the Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which had expired in 1980. Upon the signing of the treaty, both states stressed that it would not constitute a new military alliance. However, there were some words added in the joint statement to support compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the creation of a multi-polar world, which would deprecate U.S. unilateralism. Through the strengthening of mutual ties to avoid military operations on two fronts, both states have made progress in military technology transfer. Military exports to China provide an easy way for Russia to acquire foreign currency, and military imports from Russia are not only a counteraction to U.S. military sales to Taiwan, but also an easy way to military modernization, including the creation of a blue water navy for China.

This paper will focus on the changing Eurasian strategic environment using two variables, deterrence and reassurance, and examine its impact on the future course of Japan's security.

I. Strategic Link among Europe, the Soviet Union and China in the Cold War Era

A. Deterioration in Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-Soviet relations, which saw a honeymoon period with the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in February 1950, began to deteriorate in the mid-1950s. The "de-Stalinization" line hammered out by Nikita S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 aggravated an ideological dispute with China. In other words, détente, prevention of global conflict, and the establishment of a cooperative relationship with the West, as well as the renunciation of support for world revolution, gave rise to the harsh criticism of "revisionism" from China.⁴ The Sino-Soviet

played a key role in its production. The report identified NATO strategy for the 1970s in the triad of deterrence, defense and détente.

⁴ B. Kurik, "Sovetsko-Kitaiskiy Konflikt v Kontekste Mirovoi Politiki (Soviet-Chinese Conflict in the Context of World Politics)," *Sovetskaya Vneshnyaya Politika v Gody Kholodnoi Voiny: 1945 – 1985*,

struggle for leadership within the socialist bloc from the end of the 1950s to the early 1960s sharpened into an ideological confrontation. Seeking to expand China's influence within the socialist bloc, Chinese leaders, headed by Mao Zedong, considered the Soviet change of course as a betrayal of the international socialist movement. At the same time, they asserted that China, which remained loyal to communist ideals, was the true successor to Vladimir I. Lenin, and tried to strengthen their influence within the socialist bloc.⁵ Meanwhile, Soviet leaders believed that China should adhere strictly to the course determined by the Soviet Union.⁶ Intervening strongly in China's internal affairs, the Soviet Union openly criticized the domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party determined at the 2nd Convention of the 8th National People's Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1958.⁷ Moreover, in 1959, the Soviet Union further stepped up its criticism of China's foreign policy, and disputed with China over some points, including Taiwan, Tibet and the Sino-Indian border problem. And the ideological conflict between the two countries also led to a deterioration in their military and economic relationship. The Soviet Union had already cancelled technical assistance to China in 1957. In addition, Khrushchev, who had refused China's request to supply nuclear weapons manufacturing technology, forced China to abandon its plan to develop nuclear weapons by taking it under the Soviet nuclear umbrella in an attempt to control China militarily.

In response, Mao, asserting that China would not be controlled by any power, refused the Soviet demands and chose to independently develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, in July 1960, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union had withdrawn its engineers from China, and, as a result, China was forced to stop a large number of major construction projects.

In the 1960s, Sino-Soviet ideological antagonism became entangled with confrontation over territorial issues, and escalated to military confrontation. In September 1963, China openly raised the issue of revising the "unequal treaties" relating to the Sino-Soviet border.⁸ When Sino-Soviet border negotiation broke down the following year in 1964, China subsequently made a demand for territory totaling 1.5 million square kilometers from the Soviet Union.⁹ Moreover, Mao, who refused to send a delegation to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1966, accelerated the Cultural Revolution during the same year and made an "anti-Soviet" line a principle of Chinese foreign policy.¹⁰ This was a crucial period in Sino-Soviet antagonism. Acts of provocation by troops of both

(Soviet Foreign Policy during the Years of the Cold War: 1945 – 1985), (Moscow: International Relations, 1995), p. 376.

⁵ V.A. Zolotarev, *Rossiia (SSSR) v Lokal'nykh Voinakh i Voennykh Konfliktakh Vtoroi Poloviny 20 Veka*, (Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Military Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Century), (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2000), p. 126.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ The "theory of continuous revolution," which stressed class warfare during the socialism stage, was developed at this meeting.

⁸ Kurik, p. 377.

⁹ Zolotarev, p. 126.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

countries on the Sino-Soviet border area rose sharply from this period onward. There were about 1,000 total incidents of provocation between 1960, when the Sino-Soviet relationship began to deteriorate, and October 1964. This figure rose appreciably to 4,189 incidents in the period between October 1964 and March 1969, when the Sino-Soviet border clash occurred.¹¹

With the rising military tension on the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviet Union became strongly aware of the Chinese threat. It became very important for the Soviet leadership to avoid the worst scenario of being forced into difficult operations on two fronts in both the European and Far Eastern theaters.¹² Brezhnev, who replaced Khrushchev in October 1964, conducted a comprehensive review of the foreign policy employed under Khrushchev, but he did not completely rule out the “peaceful coexistence” advocated by the previous administration. He announced that the Soviet Union would continue to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence with nations that had different social systems.¹³ In this context, Brezhnev proposed to the West the holding of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union in March 1966, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization adopted the Bucharest Declaration on strengthening peace and security in Europe in July of that year.¹⁴

The Soviet proposals for military détente in Europe were linked to the development of a strategic review in the Soviet Union. In December 1966, after work that had lasted for six months, the Soviet Union completed its review of the strategic doctrine adopted in 1959. The first essential point of the revised doctrine was a change of the previous assumption that a world war would inevitably escalate into a nuclear war, to the view that it was possible to avoid a strategic nuclear exchange even in the event of a world war.¹⁵ The Soviet Union had tried to build up its nuclear capabilities throughout the 1960s, so that it achieved parity of nuclear capability with the U.S. This situation formed the background to this review.¹⁶ In addition, this situation also led to increased opportunities for nuclear arms control with the U.S. The second essential point of the strategy review was the major change in Soviet military strategy toward China. In October 1964, China succeeded in its first nuclear tests. Before the review, the Soviet Union had assumed that China would support the Soviet Union in the event of a nuclear exchange with the West. However, the deep antagonism with China

¹¹ Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” *Cold War History*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 2000), pp. 22-23 and 50. According to accounts from Russian sources, there were over 6,000 incidents of provocation by Chinese soldiers in the Krasnoznamenny Tikhookeansky Border District area of jurisdiction between 1964 and 1968, and a total of approximately 26,000 soldiers participated in these incidents. Zolotarev, p. 126.

¹² Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 163-165.

¹³ R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917 – 1991*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 247.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ MccGwire, pp. 28-29.

¹⁶ Nation, pp. 236-237.

forced the Soviet leadership to reverse this assumption. In other words, the Soviet Union began to fear that in the event of it being engaged in the European theater, the People's Liberation Army, with its vast numbers, would take advantage of the situation to attack the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The Soviet Union decided to stop Chinese territorial ambitions by keeping a nuclear option against China to block China's own use of nuclear weapons, while at the same time building up its conventional military capabilities. It became most important for the Soviet leadership to build up military force in the Far Eastern theater to deter China from taking advantage of hostilities in Europe and initiating military action against the Soviet Union.¹⁸ With the intensifying Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Soviet leadership transferred troops from the western and the central regions to the Transbaikal and the Far Eastern regions, took measures to boost the firepower of its units deployed on the border area with China, and built up anti-tank missile supplies.¹⁹ In 1965 the Soviet Union had deployed 20 divisions in the Far East, and the number of divisions deployed there had been increased to 25 in 1969 and to 45 in 1973.²⁰

Meanwhile, as China's internal power struggle intensified during the Cultural Revolution, which began in the autumn of 1965, it was caught in a diplomatic isolation. In this situation, China's external concerns were focused on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and, in particular, on the danger that the two superpowers would conspire to dominate China. However, this did not mean that the Chinese leadership felt a real Soviet military threat. Luo Ruiqing, Chief of the General Staff, who was aware of the danger of a limited land offensive in 1965, asserted the need to substitute a forward defense strategy for "the people's liberation war strategy" and to modernize weapons and military equipment. But the main threat that Luo perceived was the U.S., which was escalating its intervention in Vietnam, rather than the Soviet Union.²¹

However, the event that changed China's perception of the Soviet Union took place in Europe. This was the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 as an exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty." With the suppression of the democratization movement in Czechoslovakia, the so called "Prague Spring," the Chinese leadership criticized the Soviet Union's action as "socialist imperialism." Having perceived

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

¹⁸ McGwire, p. 163.

¹⁹ Zolotarev, p. 127.

²⁰ McGwire, p. 164, and "Zhong guo yin su dui su lian zhi ding dui mei an guan zheng ce de ying xiang (Chinese factors which have influence on Soviet decision-making of its national security policy)," *Mei zhong su 3 jiao guang xi (Relations among the U. S., China and the Soviet Union)*, (People's Publisher, August 1993), p. 88.

²¹ However, Mao Zedong and Lin Bao did not believe that the U.S. intervention was aimed at China. Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army after Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 40, and Jonathan D. Pollack, *The Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Chinese Security Debate* (Rand Corporation, October 1982), p. 10. Moreover, it could be inferred that military modernization that led to a negation of the people's war of liberation theory was not an option from the perspective of the promotion of the Cultural Revolution in domestic politics.

the Soviet military threat to be real, the Chinese leadership feared that a punitive Soviet military action could be directed at China.²² China was thus forced into confrontation with two enemies: the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet border clash, which broke out in March 1969, confirmed China's perception of the Soviet threat.²³ Therefore, in the early 1970s, China deployed two thirds of its infantry divisions in the Shenyang military district and the Beijing military district, i.e. the locales opposite the regions where Soviet forces were concentrated. In addition, nearly half of its 5,000 fighter aircraft were committed to air defense operations against Soviet forces.²⁴ China also began to strengthen its nuclear capability. By 1971, in addition to the deployment of 20 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with a range of about 600 miles, it had also begun production of Chinese-made Tu-16 middle-range bombers (known as Hong Zha 6 (H6)) capable of carrying nuclear warheads, despite the perceived difficulty in penetrating Soviet air defense systems.²⁵

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, China perceived the Soviet threat as being more serious than the U.S. threat. China became aware of the danger of the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia following a U.S. withdrawal from Asia because U.S. President Richard M. Nixon, who had announced the Guam Doctrine in July 1969 and began withdrawing troops from Vietnam, abandoned the 2½ Strategy and adopted the 1½ Strategy in February 1970. Given these moves by the U.S., China, perceiving the Soviet Union to be a more serious threat than the U.S., decided to change its isolated position and began to seek rapprochement with the U.S. China changed its military posture against the two superpowers simultaneously and decided to oppose the Soviet threat only. China recognized that Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation would ensure its own security.²⁶ China thought that the U.S. perceived China in the following way. Although the U.S. continued to regard China as a potential enemy, China was not then a threat to the U.S. because of domestic chaos as the result of the Cultural Revolution and of the Soviet military pressure on China. Rather the U.S. could seek to tackle the increasing Soviet influence by bringing China closer to itself. In fact, as China had calculated, the U.S., which gave priority to stopping Soviet expansion, had been seeking to improve its relations with China.

For the Soviet Union, Sino-U.S. rapprochement meant a consolidating anti-Soviet encirclement not only in the European theater, but also in the Far Eastern theater. The Soviet Union was pushed by the need to break out of this encirclement. Brezhnev had advocated détente in Europe since immediately after his appointment, but initially, his ulterior motive

²² Pollack, p. 12, points out the fear of a surprise Soviet attack against nuclear facilities in China, which had recently succeeded in atomic tests.

²³ N. Vert, *Istoriya Sovetskogo Gosudarstva 1900 – 1991, (The History of the Soviet State 1900 – 1991)* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2000), p. 476.

²⁴ Jonathan D. Pollack, "Sino-Soviet Relations," in Grayson Kirk and Nils H. Wessell (ed.), *The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities*, (Praeger Publishers, 1978), p. 38.

²⁵ Joffe, p. 39

²⁶ Yang, pp. 21-52.

had been to alienate the U.S. from Europe by excluding it from the framework, thus weakening NATO. However, the Soviet leadership was forced to make comprehensive efforts for military détente with the West as a result of the Sino-Soviet military clash and Sino-U.S. rapprochement. First, there was the issue of improving relations with the U.S., which was seeking rapprochement with China. Fearing the strengthening of the Sino-U.S. security relationship, the Soviet Union began to pursue détente with the U.S. that would lead to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).²⁷ Second, there was the issue of ensuring stability in the European theater. The Soviet interest coincided with that of Western European NATO countries, and their coincidence led to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks that began in the 1970s.

In contrast to its promotion of détente in the European theater, in the Far Eastern theater the Soviet Union took the policy of deterring China from taking military action against the Soviet Union. U.S. President Nixon visited China in February 1972, and Japan and China normalized diplomatic relations in September of the same year. As a result, the U.S., China and Japan began to cooperate in containing the Soviet Union in North East Asia. In order to counter this development, the Soviet Union continued to strengthen its conventional forces and nuclear capability in the Far East after 1972.²⁸ Its military strength in the Far East increased in terms of the number of divisions – 45 in 1973 to 55 in the mid-1980s, of which two divisions were deployed in Mongolia. The Soviet Union had upgraded the equipment of its ground and air forces in the Far East between 1972 and 1977, constantly updating old fighter aircraft and armored combat vehicles and replacing them with advanced ones. In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (INFs) and *Backfire* intermediate-range bombers in the Far East.²⁹ In addition, it also expanded its influence in nations bordering China, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, in an attempt to contain China.

In response, China strengthened its cooperation with the U.S. and tried to improve its ties with Japan, which also perceived the Soviet military threat. In August 1978, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China was concluded. It included a clause opposing (Soviet) hegemony. In this situation, in April 1979, China announced to the Soviet Union its intention not to renew the Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance concluded in February 1950 and due to expire in April 1980.

However, the Sino-Soviet relationship began to change at this time. As U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated again due to the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the start of Ronald Reagan's administration in the U.S. in January 1981, the main Soviet objective of its military build-up in the Far East changed from deterring China's

²⁷ Vert, pp. 467-468, and Nation, p. 258.

²⁸ The main factor promoting the build up in Soviet military capabilities in the Far East throughout the 1970s was the Chinese threat. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Ajia ni okeru Gunbi Kanri (Arms Control in Asia)," Hiroshi Kimura (ed.), *Kiro ni tatsu Gorbachev (Gorbachev at the crossroads)*, (Keisoshobo, 1990), p. 113.

²⁹ "zhong guo yin su dui su lian zhi ding dui mei an guan zheng ce de ying xiang," p. 91.

adventurous military action to strategic confrontation with the U.S.³⁰ In this “New Cold War” atmosphere, Brezhnev proposed Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the Far East at the same time,³¹ seeking to improve relations with China. This was because Sino-U.S. relations began to deteriorate due the Reagan administration’s tough anti-Communist line. Relations between the two countries were strained because of U.S. arms exports to Taiwan. Taking advantage of this timing, Brezhnev made a speech in Tashkent in March 1982 proposing to China the opening of talks to improve Sino-Soviet relations. In response, China, which had been comparing its interest in Sino-U.S. cooperation with its interest in Sino-Soviet relations, decided to limitedly improve its relations with the Soviet Union. China began to seek a limited rapprochement with the Soviet Union without damaging its relations with the West.³² However, none of the “three conditions”³³ that China put forward for improving Sino-Soviet relations were fulfilled, and their relations only improved completely after Mikhail S. Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union.

B. Progress of Détente between Europe and the Soviet Union

The origins of arms control and disarmament in Europe after World War II extend back to the mid-1950s.

After the death of Stalin in March 1953, as the division of Germany gradually consolidated, the Soviet Union, who found it impossible to create a unified and neutralized Germany as a buffer, proposed a Draft European Treaty among Britain, the U.S., France and the Soviet Union at the Berlin Conference of foreign ministers in January 1954. That draft could be seen as a prototype of the later CSCE. The idea of creating a collective security framework in Europe, which was called the Molotov Proposal, advocated refraining from the threat or use of force among member states, and considering an armed attack against one or more of them as an attack against them all. The proposal, contrary to its peaceful explanation, concealed the Soviet’s intention of promoting the dismantling of NATO, which would conflict with its spirit, and expelling the U.S. from European soil while guiding the German issue to its own advantage. Moreover, at the first post-war summit held in Geneva in July 1955, Soviet representative Nikolai A. Bulganin proposed to freeze Eastern and Western armaments as a temporary measure until the establishment of a European collective security system, and then to dismantle both NATO and Warsaw Pact simultaneously.

Additionally, it was also proposed to limit the number of military personnel of participating countries which were not permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to

³⁰ Hasegawa, p. 115.

³¹ A speech by Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. *XXVI's ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Coyuza (26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union)*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), p. 252.

³² Hasegawa, p. 116

³³ The three conditions were Soviet military reductions in the Far East, the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of the (Soviet-backed) Vietnamese military from Cambodia.

150,000 – 200,000. The West, which had already decided to assign a 500,000-strong military to the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), could not accept the proposal. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower made an “Open Skies” proposal (mutual observation using unarmed aircraft) against the closed Eastern bloc. Another proposal was from Anthony Eden of Britain, in which he put forward a general election for the unification of Germany. A unified Germany would belong to the Western camp. He added the elements of mutual observation through the installation of observation radar and military disengagement in the region adjoining the unified Germany, in order to prevent surprise attacks.

Aimed at reducing the military strength of the opposing side, arms control and disarmament proposals prevailed. In October 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki insisted on establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, as well as recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland's western border, and recognizing East Germany at the U.N. General Assembly. This proposal concealed the aim of neutralizing NATO's efforts since 1954 to deploy nuclear weapons to make up for its inferiority in conventional forces, as well as of avoiding the danger that West Germany would develop its own nuclear forces. While Britain and Scandinavian countries reacted positively to the proposal, it was unacceptable to the U.S. and West Germany, which feared the consolidation of eastern military superiority in the region. Looking at those proposals, it is no exaggeration to argue that the basic framework of arms control and disarmament in Europe was in place then. However, the atmosphere for dialog between the East and West did not exist during this period when persistent and serious East-West military antagonism continued.

Both sides gradually changed their attitudes toward arms control and disarmament in the 1960s. Their proposals changed the nature of the discussion, which turned to redressing the internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities of both camps.

East-West tensions caused by the declaration of Khrushchev in November 1958 to make West Berlin a “Free City,” and the construction of the Berlin Wall by East Germany in August 1961, reached a climax during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. However, since the U.S. and the Soviet Union settled the nuclear nightmare peacefully, East-West relations entered into a new stage. A hot line was set up between them, and the direct talks continued into the beginning of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

In contrast to the development of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union faced a difficult military problem with China. In this situation, the Soviet Union chose to promote military détente in the European theater in order to avoid military operations on two fronts at once.

At the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in March 1966, Brezhnev proposed the creation of a security conference to the West. In light of this, the Warsaw Pact adopted the Bucharest Declaration in July, making clear its stance on promoting military détente with NATO. The Pact proposed the establishment of good neighborly relations based on respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence, and the promotion of scientific and technological

exchange. As well as the simultaneous dismantling of both alliances, it also put forward the withdrawal of foreign troops from European soil and the establishment of a denuclearized zone in order to promote military détente in the region. The proposal still seemed to come between the U.S. and Western Europe because of its timing, when European NATO members were exerting themselves to create their own nuclear forces, namely the Multilateral Force (MLF), and when France withdrew from the military organization of NATO. However, after the Czech Incident of August 1968, known as an exercise of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the overtones of an intention to alienate Europe from the U.S. disappeared from the Eastern proposals.

Though the Soviet Union accelerated its military build-up against China around the time of the Sino-Soviet clash over the Ussuri River in March 1969, it still had an overwhelming advantage in conventional forces in the European theater. Therefore it did not want arms reduction but arms control, especially CBMs on the Western front for the purpose of maintaining the stability and status quo there. This was because the military balance at this point was firmly in favor of the East, and as far as NATO accepted it as truth, the Soviet Union did not need to begin arms reduction talks with NATO until the time when the East faced difficulties in maintaining its superiority. In response to the proposals from the East, NATO adopted the Harmel Report in December 1967. This meant that NATO put the idea of “détente” formally into its security policy, in addition to the previous concepts of “deterrence” and “defense.” Then, in June 1968, NATO announced the so-called “Reykjavik Signal,” in which NATO addressed an appeal for arms reduction in Central Europe that became the foundation of the later MBFR talks.

While the Soviet Union desired military détente in Europe in order to prepare for a threat from China, NATO also needed détente in Europe for different reasons. From around 1966, NATO faced a number of difficult problems. An inflation spiral was also complicating weapons procurement costs then. To make matters worse, a growing anti-Vietnam War mood spreading in Europe made it difficult for member states to raise defense expenditures. In addition, the issue of burden sharing among the allies began to prevail in the U.S. due to surging Vietnam War expenditures. It just so happened that U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield, who had witnessed not only wasted money spent on relocating NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels due to French secession from NATO's military organization, but also reluctance of European allies to increase the burden during his European tour, submitted a resolution for the unilateral reduction of U.S. forces deployed in Europe (the so-called Mansfield Resolution) to the Senate in August 1968.³⁴ The resolution reflected the U.S. irritation and dissatisfaction with the defense efforts of its European allies. But, if the U.S. decreased the force level unilaterally, it would diminish U.S. military power in Europe, the

³⁴ On a series of proposals known as the Mansfield Resolution, see Charles R. Gellner, *The Mansfield Proposals: To Reduce U.S. Troops in Western Europe, 1967 – 1974* (The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Revised, December 1, 1982). It cannot be ignored that the June 1966 suggestion by Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, as to the possibility of the Soviets' response to a unilateral reduction of U.S. troops in Europe became a hint for the Senator to submit the resolution.

core factor of European defense, and aggravate the imbalance of power between the two camps. Therefore, the MBFR proposal made by NATO was not just about achieving the lofty ideal of arms reduction, but also was an attempt to switch the U.S. unilateral force reduction proposal onto the reciprocal process of East-West arms reduction talks. For European allies, if East-West arms reductions proceeded in line with the MBFR talks, it could alleviate the pressure of strengthening conventional forces, and if the Soviet Union rejected the talks, it could avoid the U.S. unilateral force reduction.

In order to build up a favorable strategic environment, it was necessary for both parties to give consideration to the proposals of the other. Thus, when East-West compromise was reached, the CSCE and the MBFR talks were started simultaneously.

The CSCE, officially inaugurated in Helsinki in July 1973, was a conference of all European countries with the exception of Albania, the U.S. and Canada. Until April 1973, the preparatory talks agreed that the Conference should cover four categories (baskets) of topics. The first category was related to security in Europe, which contained the settlement of the post-war borders between participating states claimed by the East, and the promotion of CBMs demanded by the West. The second was on cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology. The third basket was on cultural exchange and freedom of movement, information and thought. However, as the closed nature of Eastern society indicated, it was clear that the third basket would become a major point of contention between the camps. The fourth was on a follow-up to the Conference so that participating states could get further fruits of cooperation.

The plenary meeting started, and when a compromise solution was reached on the controversial third basket requiring that both East and West gave only a general statement on the issue, the discussion centered on the first basket.

Based on the ten principles of CSCE, such as respecting each other's sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force, respecting the inviolability of frontiers, and so on, the participating states agreed, leaving place for peaceful adjustment, on the de facto consolidation of the post-war borders, which was touted as a victory for Soviet diplomacy at a later time. As CBMs, the Conference agreed that prior notification would be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the military maneuvers (or in the case of maneuvers arranged at shorter notice, at the earliest possible opportunity prior to their starting dates through regular diplomatic channels) in Europe which exceeded a total of 25,000 troops, independently combined with any possible air or naval components, and also agreed to apply the same measures to Soviet maneuvers that would be conducted in areas within 250 kilometers from its frontiers facing or shared with other European participating states. It also agreed to measures to exchange information on the designation, general purpose and states involved in the maneuvers, on the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and on the areas and estimated timeframe of the conduct. Regarding the exchange of military observers, the participating states agreed to apply the principle of reciprocity and to decide the numbers of observers and procedures on a case-by-case basis. Though those provisions

were not very tight, the historic Helsinki Agreement (Accord)³⁵ was concluded on August 1, 1975 as the first fruits of CBMs after World War II.

On the other hand, the MBFR talks, for which NATO had attached “Four Conditions”³⁶ in May 1970, started in late October 1973 in Vienna in order to achieve a balance of forces between East and West deployed in Central Europe (East and West Germany, the three Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia).³⁷ However, the talks faced difficulty in the formal name of the talks from the outset. This was because the Soviet Union stubbornly opposed the term “balanced,” which NATO had proposed for the purpose of reducing both forces to the same number. By compromise, the talks became officially called negotiations on “Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MRFA).” The parties agreed to drop the term “balanced,” acceded to an Eastern proposal, and to add the term “associated measures,” instead, which implied strict verification procedures, in line with the Western assertion. But no one believed that the East would accept the on-site inspections that were indispensable to strict verification procedure. In fact, the talks, which continued without provisions of verification, could not find a common ground for counting the forces. In addition, as opposed to the proposals of the West to look for a balance of forces, the East adhered to “same rate of reductions” in many stages. In this sense, there was little possibility for the success of the talks. The limited coverage of the area subject to arms reduction created another problem for the talks. France, which had withdrawn from the NATO military organization, did not participate in the talks. This meant that even though the parties reached some agreements, they could have little significance militarily due to the mobility brought about by advanced military technology. Both sides had different views on the forces subject to the talks. While the East advocated the reduction of combat aircraft and nuclear forces that comprised the core of NATO’s military strength, NATO, which was afraid of massive conventional attack from the East, insisted on the balanced reduction of conventional land forces. At the end of 1975, the West proposed an Option III in which NATO made a concession to the East to add nuclear forces to the talks, but the talks made no progress. It complicated the negotiations when the East proposed to reduce forces “based on the combat unit.”³⁸

³⁵ Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Final Act*, August 1, 1975.

³⁶ The four conditions set by NATO were as follows. The talks should take account of the geographical asymmetry that benefits the East. The term “balanced” should mean that the East reduces more forces than the West. Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapon systems in the area concerned. There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

³⁷ The participating states in the talks were divided into two groups: direct participants and observers. The former group consisted of eleven states whose military forces deployed in the region were covered by the talks, and the latter group included eight states that did not deploy forces in the region. However, the negotiations continued without a definition of the status of Hungary, which the West had demanded to include in the region subject to reductions.

³⁸ An example of the “combat unit” reduction is as follows. The U.S. battalion had 54 battle tanks, while the Soviet Union had 31. If both states agreed to cut 300, the U.S. actually had to cut 324 (6 battalions),

Thus, MBFR talks failed to bridge the gulf between the two sides and made no progress. In addition to the reasons described above, it was decisive that the East, which was in a stronger position militarily, did not need to concede to the demands of the West, which could not afford the military build-up due to the financial difficulty. What the East had to do was to carry on the talks in order not to block the progress of the CSCE.

So, why did the CSCE succeed? It was simply because the European NATO members, the non-allied and neutral states that took part in the Conference, as well as the Eastern states, had shared a desire for the easing of tension in Europe. Viewed from a rational perspective, in the absence of alternative options, it was no more than a confirmation of the status quo that the East demanded in establishing the post-war borders in Europe. In this sense, the *Ostpolitik*, which West German Chancellor Willy Brandt promoted starting in October 1969, played an important role. The *Realpolitik*, in which West Germany gave up on unification, brought peace and stability in Europe, and eventually actualized a birth of a unified Germany. The second reason was that since CBMs did not call for significant changes in military posture in Europe, the parties were not forced to increase the fiscal burden that accompanied arms reduction.

In order to further develop the achievements made in Helsinki, follow-up meetings were held in Belgrade from October 1977, and in Madrid from November 1980. However, in addition to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) issue, they were unable to achieve their anticipated results in the atmosphere of the “New Cold War” caused by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, steady efforts continued to be made in the background even during this period. In May 1978, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing proposed the holding of an arms reduction conference to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament to cover the whole of Europe “from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.” This proposal, which covered the area later known as the ATTU zone, aimed to strengthen CBMs and further promote arms control in the first stage. In addition, in the second stage, it aimed to achieve a reduction of offensive conventional weapons, including battle tanks and combat aircraft in particular. At the time, France had withdrawn from the military organization of NATO and was not participating in the MBFR talks. France did not think that the CSCE would proceed in facing the third basket. Then France seized the opportunity for initiating arms control and disarmament issues in Europe from outside the existing framework. The East responded to the French proposal in May 1979, by advocating the Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament in Europe (CMDD), based on a Polish plan. As with the French plan, this proposal also envisaged two-stage negotiations. However, the latter included the nuclear

while the Soviet Union had to cut 310 (10 battalions). Though the number of battalions cut by the Soviet Union was bigger than that of the U.S., the total number of battle tanks cut by the Soviet Union was smaller than that of the U.S. by 14. Due to the differences of battle formations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was difficult to assess how the measures affect the power balance between them precisely. But so far as the two sides stuck to the difference, it was difficult to reach agreement on this counting rule. This is sometimes called “bean counting,” and becomes a major obstacle to promoting disarmament.

forces, the essence of deterrence for NATO, and the naval forces, the indispensable element for U.S.-European military ties, as subjects for discussion.

Despite those differences in opinion, both sides shared the objectives of stability and safety in Europe. Thus, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)³⁹ opened in Stockholm in January 1984. The participants were the 35 member states of the CSCE, and the subject was confined to the first stage of arms control. The conference did not proceed for a while, as it was hindered by NATO's INF deployment, which started at the end of 1983.

The stalemated negotiation was improved remarkably by the appearance of new Soviet Chief Secretary Gorbachev in March 1985. The Soviet economy had virtually stagnated at the beginning of the 1980s. If the Soviet Union wished to achieve economic recovery within the socialist framework, the promotion of arms control and disarmament with the West would not only reduce the heavy burden of military expenditures, but also get around the anticipated military inferiority caused by the technological gap with the West. Thus, the Soviet Union developed "new thinking" diplomacy, and followed by the remarks of President Reagan at the U.S.-Soviet Summit in November pushing for an early agreement on talks, the negotiations were given a strong impetus.

During this time, the Soviet Union had shown a willingness to compromise to confine the targets of arms control to ground forces in line with the Western proposal. On the other hand, the West did not raise the issue of human rights that the East deeply disliked. At the end, in September 1986, with some political agreements such as refraining from the threat or use of force, the meeting agreed on a more detailed implementation of CSBMs⁴⁰ than that of the Helsinki Accord. In regard to the notification of military activities, which included both military maneuvers and military movements, participating states agreed to give notification 42 days or more in advance of notifiable military activities involving at least 13,000 troops or at least 300 battle tanks, and involving at least 3,000 amphibious landing troops or at least 3,000 parachute drop troops. As for the observation of military activities, the parties agreed to invite observers from all other participating states to military activities when the number of troops of land forces engaged met or exceeded 17,000 troops, and when the number of troops of airborne forces engaged met or exceeded 5,000 troops. It was also agreed that each party should exchange an annual calendar of its military activities subject to prior

³⁹ The official name of the conference was the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. As the name of the Conference indicated, the parties agreed to bring forward the talks in two stages.

⁴⁰ The term Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) became established during the Helsinki process. Though the Conference was composed of 35 states, as the main issue was focused on alleviating military tensions between the East and the West, only 23 states that belonged to the alliances, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union in particular, took central roles in the Conference. At the second CSCE follow-up meeting held in Madrid, Yugoslavia, representing non-allied and neutral states, argued that the meeting should discuss the "security" of these states. As a result, the parties agreed to adopt "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)" in March 1981. Keeping CSBMs in view, this paper will use CBMs in general discussion.

notification no later than November 15 of the previous year, and should apply more strict provisions to the activity plans in which engaged forces met or exceeded 40,000 troops and 75,000 troops, respectively.

Military transparency in Europe was further improved through these provisions. Among other items, the most significant outcome of the Conference was the Soviet Union's acceptance of the provisions of on-site inspection for the first time; which it previously refused to accommodate for a long time. This was because through the detailed ground and air inspection procedures, both sides could get information about each other's "fixed military unit", which was essential for the arms reduction talks scheduled for the second stage. It should be added that neither the INF negotiations nor START I could have succeeded without agreement of these provisions.

Building on the fruits of the Conference within the framework of CSCE, an informal meeting started in February 1987 to promote arms reduction in the ATTU Zone among 23 member states of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The official talks opened in Vienna in March 1989 when the parties had reached broad agreements on the procedure for talks, the division of regions, and the ranges of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE). Despite the slight differences of opinion about the talks, it was clear that the talks would reach a conclusion within a short period of time. Gorbachev himself had acknowledged the fact that heavy military expenditure was impeding economic development in the East. Similarly, the West faced difficulties in raising defense expenditures and maintaining conscription with the decrease in the size of its youth populations. In addition, it was necessary for NATO to break the imbalance of conventional forces as quickly as possible, which was brought about by the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty of December 1987. The MBFR talks finished their role in early February just before the new talks started.

The CFE Treaty, composed of 23 articles with eight protocols and three declarations, was signed in November 1990.⁴¹ Five categories of offensive weapons, namely, battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters were defined as TLEs, and the ceilings in the ATTU Zone were set at 40,000, 60,000, 40,000, 13,600, and 4000, respectively. The parties also agreed that the force reduction of each TLE was to be carried out in three stages during forty months after the treaty came into force, and that the treaty divided the ATTU area into four smaller zones (three overlapping zones and one separate flank zone) and set ceilings of TLEs for each zone in order to avoid the danger of surprise attacks and large-scale assaults caused by the concentration of forces. In order to avoid the complexity of the treaty, the parties also agreed that the allocation of TLEs for each zone would be left to internal adjustment within the blocks, and that no special conditions were set other than the provision which the ceiling of the TLEs for one state should not exceed more than one third of the whole. The treaty did not touch on military personnel, assuming that it would naturally decrease in number with the reduction of armaments. However, an exceptional provision was applied to Germany, which had

⁴¹ The official name is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

achieved unification in October 1990, in the form of a declaration by the German government,"⁴² that Germany would undertake to reduce its personnel strength to 370,000, with an overall ceiling of 345,000 for its ground and air forces.

The second feature of the treaty was that the parties agreed to exchange information on the existing military forces that possessed TLEs for the first time. Information exchange of military activities had been conducted among the parties, but information exchange covering the whole military forces that was indispensable for arms reduction had never been carried out because of the attitude of some parties to insist on the secrecy of forces and because of the difficulty of strict verification. Therefore, the mandatory information exchange of military forces under the CFE Treaty played a decisive role in avoiding war in Europe. They agreed to set procedures for the review meetings, and also agreed to establish the Secretariat Office in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, and the Office for Free Elections in Warsaw to observe the fruits of the Treaty with the spirit of democracy. Thus, the CFE Treaty went into force provisionally on July 17, 1992, and formally into force on November 9 of the same year. During this period of time, the parties agreed to limit the strength of military personnel, and reached the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A) on July 10.

As a result, together with the declaration on the end of the Cold War by the political leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in December 1989, the fruits of military détente decreased tension between the East and the West drastically and the danger of surprise attacks and large-scale assaults became remote in Europe. Europe began to go beyond the age of "détente," and to enter into the age of "cooperation" without "enemies."

II. Strategic Link among Europe, Russia and China in the Post-Cold War Era

A. Changing Relations between Europe and Russia

Not long after the signing of the CFE Treaty that brought strategic stability in Europe, Europeans faced an age of great transition. In July 1991, the Warsaw Pact, a party to the CFE Treaty, officially ceased activities. At the same time, former Eastern allies increasingly distanced themselves from the Soviet Union. Then, the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, and the former republics of the Soviet Union became independent. These new states held a meeting with Russia in May 1992 in order to reallocate the TLE ceilings given to the Soviet Union under the CFE Treaty.⁴³ As a result, the ceilings for Russia were reduced to about half of those in the Soviet era. The CFE Treaty became unacceptable for Russia.

⁴² Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Personnel Strength of the German Armed Forces.

⁴³ The ceilings on battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters for the Soviet Union were 13,150, 20,000, 13,175, 5,150, and 1,500 respectively. Based on an

In November 1995, just before the completion deadline of forty months after commencement of the Treaty, Russia notified the parties that it faced difficulty implementing arms reductions in the flank zone (an area combining the Leningrad Military District and the North Caucasus Military District). The problem was caused by the fact that out of the ceilings applied to the zone (1,300 battle tanks, 1,380 armored combat vehicles, and 1,680 artillery pieces), the reduction of armored combat vehicles, in particular, which greatly exceeded the ceiling, made slow progress. Russia's mechanized infantry divisions at the time allegedly had 637 armored combat vehicles, and their tank divisions had 402. The Russian military, as well as Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev, had made an appeal for early revisions to the treaty on the grounds that effective operations could not be conducted within the framework.⁴⁴ A new factor unforeseen by the Treaty was then added. The Chechen conflict broke out at the end of 1994, and it complicated the situation.

In this situation, it was not wise for parties to accuse Russia of violating the Treaty. This was because if Russia were to renounce the Treaty with 150 days notice on the basis of Article 19 of the Treaty, it would nullify the military stability that had prevailed at long last and inevitably stir up military antagonism in Europe again. Moreover, Russian non-compliance in the flank zone did not harm the security of NATO members, and concession on this issue could be used as a potential bargaining chip for NATO for its enlargement eastward. In any case, some 2,500 inspections had been carried out and 58,000 TLE items had been destroyed under the Treaty. In particular, Russia had reduced their numbers of TLEs by nearly 20 percent through destruction of items.⁴⁵ The parties had no cause to nullify this outcome.

Therefore, in order to find a way out of the situation, the parties agreed to prepare the Flank Document outside the framework of the CFE Treaty just before the expiration of the deadline. At the end of May 1996, at the first Review Conference on the CFE Treaty held in Vienna, the parties decided to apply new provisions to the Russian Flank. Details of the provision were as follows. First, they established a new flank zone, where Pskov Oblast in the Leningrad Military District, Volgograd Oblast, Astrachan Oblast, the eastern part of Rostov Oblast, and a part of the Krasnodar Kray in the North Caucasus Military District were excluded from the original Flank Zone. Then they agreed to apply the original ceilings for the Flank Zone (1,300 battle tanks, 1,380 armored combat vehicles, and 1,680 artillery pieces), that had been established based on the May 1992 Tashkent Agreement, to the new flank zone from the end of May 1997. In sum, the zone of application became smaller without changing the ceilings. Second, the parties agreed to apply provisional ceilings

agreement at a meeting of the republics of the former Soviet Union held in Tashkent in May 1992, the ceilings for Russia were revised to 6,400, 11,480, 6,415, 3,450, and 890 respectively.

⁴⁴ Sergey Oznobistchev, "Developments of CFE treaty and Future Reductions in Conventional Weapons," *Proceedings of the USPID-VII International Castiglione Conference* <<http://twilight.dsi.unimi.it/usp/ID/Cast97/Atti/oznob.html>>.

⁴⁵ Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland, "Endgame: CFE Adaptation and the OSCE Summit," *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 29, No. 6 (September/October 1999), p. 15.

(1,897 battle tanks, 4,397 armored combat vehicles, and 2,422 artillery pieces) to the original Flank Zone, and to decrease the number of ceilings (1,800, 3,700, and 2,400 respectively) by the end of May 1999. Thus, the parties succeeded in avoiding a break down of the Treaty by responding flexibly without stigmatizing Russia with charges of treaty violations, and Russia reciprocated by accepting the new framework.

At the same time, it was indispensable for the parties to review the CFE Treaty itself, which no longer applied to the new situation in Europe. At the Vienna Conference mentioned above, the parties accepted the notion that Russia raised. At the Lisbon Summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in December 1996, they agreed to assign the task to the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), established on the basis of Article 16 of the Treaty. Both NATO and Russia submitted review proposals to the JCG that had commenced at the beginning of 1997. In late July, they consented to the core principles of revision of the Treaty.

The first principle was to set a national ceiling in addition to the zonal one of the present Treaty, and also to apply both ceilings to all types of TLEs. As the wording indicates, the national ceiling was the ceiling on the TLEs that each party state could possess, and the zonal ceiling was the ceiling on the TLEs that both party states and the stationed forces could possess in the appropriate zone. The word “all types” meant that the new provision would set both national and zonal ceilings for combat aircraft and attack helicopters, for which zonal ceilings had not been applied in the present Treaty. The second principle was to set national ceilings less than those allocated in the framework of the CFE Treaty on the own judgment of the party states. This principle was important in order to preserve the spirit of the Treaty as well as to promote further arms reduction. The third principle was, in addition to reviewing both national and zonal ceilings every five years, to put some exceptional provisions for flexibility and effectiveness of the new treaty. In the provisions, the parties took crisis management operations and emergencies into consideration under which the ceilings could be temporarily exceeded. They also prepared for the expansion of U.N. and OSCE activities with the aim of responding to regional and ethnic conflicts.

Talks on the revision of the CFE Treaty reached political agreement on a final draft at the end of March 1999. The OSCE Summit held in Istanbul in November 1999 adopted the Charter for European Security, in which the states deemed frequent conflicts within states as new risks and challenges to the security of all OSCE participating states. At the same time, the thirty member states of the CFE Treaty signed the new agreement.⁴⁶ The total numerical ceilings for battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters became 35,574, 56, 570, 36,312, 13,203 and 3,994, respectively, and, except for attack helicopters, the other types of TLEs reduced their numbers by 11%, 5.7%, 10% and 3%, respectively compared to the original ceilings set by the CFE Treaty. The possibility of surprise and large-scale attacks then receded further in Europe. Among others,

⁴⁶ The official title of the document is the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

it was most interesting to see the U.S. and Russia’s attitudes regarding the revision talks. (See Table 1)

Table 1 U.S. and Russian TLE quotas

Top line: National ceiling in 1999 Agreement
 Middle line: National ceiling in 1990 Treaty
 Bottom line: Current holdings (as of January 1, 2000)

	Battle tanks	Armored combat vehicles	Artillery pieces	Combat aircraft	Attack helicopters
U.S.	1,812	3,037	1,553	784	396
	4,006	5,152	2,742	784	404
	793	1,572	345	233	136
Russia	6,350	11,280	6,315	3,416	855
	6,400	11,480	6,415	3,450	890
	5,375	9,956	6,306	2,733	741

Following the new agreement, the U.S. accepted reductions in the ceilings of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery pieces by 55%, 41% and 43%, respectively. It was true that the U.S. made slight reductions in the ceilings for combat aircraft and attack helicopters, which NATO regarded as key to strategic mobility. It was also true that the numbers of U.S. TLEs deployed in Europe then were far fewer than the ceilings set by the new agreement allowed. However, the acceptance of new ceilings could have been a means for the U.S. to transmit its intentions to Russia, which was then anxious about NATO enlargement, that the U.S. would observe the legal framework to never cause military antagonism in Europe.

In contrast, Russia made slight reductions in all types of TLEs because of its military inferiority due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the eastward enlargement of NATO. In addition, in exchange for arms reduction in Georgia and complete withdrawal of troops from Moldova by Russia, the Flank Document of May 1996 was amended by Russian request in order to increase the ceiling of armored combat vehicles in the new flank zone up to 2,140. Above all things, it was the heart of the issue that Russia attended the JCG meeting at the end of March 1999. At that time, Russia took a hard diplomatic line in opposition to NATO bombing in Kosovo that had begun on March 24, and stopped attending the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) established in May 1997 as a consultative body with NATO. It was also of considerable importance that Russia had notified the parties in October 1999 that it would exceed the TLE ceilings in its flank zone as a result of the resumption of the Chechen conflict after August 1999. It was not negligible for Russia as well as for NATO allies to observe the Treaty.

Keeping step with the progress of military détente in Europe, NATO, a winner of the Cold War, had tried to redefine its *raison d'être* from an early stage. This was nothing but a struggle for NATO, a military alliance, to survive in an era of cooperation without enemies.

Around the time of the Malta Summit between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in December 1989, at which both states announced the end of the Cold War, NATO changed its *raison d'être* from the previous "framework for a military alliance," to a "political framework for an international alliance."⁴⁷ Then, at the July 1990 NATO summit in London, NATO declared its intention to strengthen the political elements specified in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that reflected a new security environment in which the Soviet Union could not be categorized as "the enemy."⁴⁸

Keeping the bottom line of collective self-defense against future uncertainties in an unthreatening manner, NATO tried to develop its capabilities as a security organization for all of Europe by modifying elements of its superstructure, such as the joint military organization and the common strategy.⁴⁹ At the summit, NATO announced its plans to invite representatives of former adversaries to NATO headquarters, and also to establish a permanent diplomatic liaison system with them. Furthermore, the NATO summit of November 1991 adopted "the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," and agreed to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in order to promote cooperative diplomatic and political relations with their former adversaries.

In parallel with this, NATO began to reorganize the military posture and the strategy that it had constructed in the Cold War era. The forward defense, in which NATO had deployed main defense forces along the West German border with East Germany and Czechoslovakia, lost its role with the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in the region led by the collapse of the Eastern block, with the reunification of Germany in October 1990, and with the signing of the CFE Treaty in November of that same year. Then in May 1991, NATO defense ministers agreed to streamline their previous headquarters, and announced a reorganization of their military structures. Each army corps, each formed by an individual ally, deployed on the West German eastern border area under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was reorganized into a multinational corps, and each new corps was dispersed from its previous area. As for the multinational corps, it was noteworthy that the U.S., which had deployed two army corps (5th Corps and 7th Corps) with more than

⁴⁷ Compare North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures* (NATO Information Service, 1984), p. 22, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Facts and Figures* (NATO Information Service, 1989), p. 13, on the change in the character of NATO.

⁴⁸ London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, July 5 – 6, 1990.

⁴⁹ Michael Howard, "The Remaking of Europe," *Survival*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (March/April 1990), p. 104, divides the elements that make up NATO into the bottom line, which is essential to maintaining its appearance as an alliance, including Article 3 (development of resistive force to military attack), Article 4 (cooperation based on recognized threats) and Article 5 (common defense against military attack), and the superstructure, which needs to change with the times, including the integrated military organization and its command and control system, as well as force deployment and strategy.

300,000 military personnel during the Cold War, reduced their manpower levels to 100,000 following the dispatch of the 7th Corps to the Gulf War and its subsequent disbanding, and reorganized its individual corps, which the U.S. Army had classified as a basic combat unit, into two multinational corps with Germany. This was because, combined with the outcome of the CFE Treaty, the change of the U.S. military posture in Europe became an effective means of communicating to Russia that the U.S. would not prepare to fight in Europe. In addition to this, the NATO defense ministers meeting agreed to establish two types of reaction forces to respond to emergencies such as regional and ethnic conflicts that arose frequently in the post-Cold War era outside NATO's defense area (out-of-area). Thus, NATO conferred upon itself a new crisis management mission without revising the North Atlantic Treaty, and began to engage in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the name of CSCE "responsibility" and UN "authority," using the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) that the former Eastern allies joined.

At the Rome Summit of November 1991, NATO also adopted a new strategic concept. It was interesting in some senses that NATO indicated its intention to modify the flexible response strategy that had formed the basis of Western European defense since its official adoption in January 1968. First, NATO actually stopped relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella under this decision. As a result, Western Europe, which until then had been dependant on U.S. nuclear deterrence, began to seek its own security policies through the creation of the European Union (EU) and the revival of the Western European Union (WEU). Second, the announcement of reorganizing military structures preceded the adoption of the strategic concept. This reversal in the order of events reflected NATO's haste to respond to the rapidly changing strategic environment. Third, NATO disclosed its strategic concept that had been kept confidential during the Cold War era for the first time.⁵⁰ This was also an effective means of removing Russian concerns. NATO began to adapt to a new era without revealing the nature of the "military alliance" that was concealed within.

However, from the start, the issue of NATO enlargement to the East contained inherent contradictions that Russia felt as an expansion of the "military alliance."

⁵⁰ NATO adopted a strategic concept four times during the Cold War. The first was "the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" (DC1/6), adopted in December 1949 after the North Atlantic Treaty went into effect. The second was "the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area"(MC3/5), amended in December 1952 with the aim of adjusting to new strategic conditions that included the outbreak of the Korean War and the NATO membership of Turkey and Greece. The third was "the Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area" (MC14/2) of April 1957, which clearly spelled out a dependence on nuclear weapons, in line with the massive retaliation strategy espoused by the U.S.'s Eisenhower administration. However, going into the 1960s with the birth of the Kennedy administration in the U.S., which strongly criticized the massive retaliation strategy, citing excessive dependence on the nuclear deterrent, NATO was forced to revise MC14/2. In January 1968, it adopted "the Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area" (MC14/3), which committed to a shift to the flexible response strategy that would form the core of subsequent strategy. The strategic concept documents remained confidential for a long time, but have all now been declassified. Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.), *NATO Strategy Documents: 1949 – 1969* (NATO, 1997).

In post-Cold War Europe, former East European states that had been emancipated from the Soviet's harsh control began to expect admission not only to the European Community (EC) to overcome their economic difficulties, but also to NATO as a "military alliance" in anticipation of Russia's recovery. Although NATO had fully realized the necessity to fill the power vacuum generated in the former East European states, it seemed difficult for NATO, which was seeking a new form as a "political alliance," to accept the requests from these states that so antagonized Russia. Although NATO, and particularly Germany, had fully realized the necessity to fill the power vacuum generated in the former East European states, there was appreciation that such actions by NATO would cause Russia to defy it as a new containment measure, which might provide another excuse to the nationalists in Russia and trigger new confrontation. NATO believed that it should not jeopardize the efforts of President Boris N. Yeltsin to seek a constructive relationship with NATO.

Meanwhile, it was reported in late August 1993 in the press that during talks with the Polish President Lech Walesa, Russian President Yeltsin gave an "implicit approval" to Poland's participation in NATO, which the Polish government had been expecting. Such external conditions touched off the sudden surfacing of NATO's enlargement arguments that had not been the topic of official discussions. As a result, an meeting of NATO defense ministers convened in Travemuende, where the ministers approved the reserved statement that the immediate goal was the structuring of cooperative relations in peacekeeping activities through the framework of the PfP that NATO expected to make one of its new activities, and they announced that it would invite Russia to join the PfP. The meeting shelved the topic of enlargement for the time being.⁵¹

The arguments on the enlargement of NATO appeared to have reached a certain settlement. They did not, however, resolve the dissatisfaction of the former East European states. In October, incidentally, the instability of the Russian domestic situation became apparent by the forceful suppressive actions against the Russian White House by President Yeltsin. There was appreciation that such a firm attitude on the part of Yeltsin might drive Russia to take hard-line foreign policies again. There was also a risk that the reactionaries in Russia that had started to rise with the slogan of the resurrection of a strong Russia might cause the Yeltsin Administration to be disturbed. Neither PfP nor NACC satisfied the expectations of these former East European states.

At the same time, the United States government showed new movement to accelerate the enlargement of NATO. President Clinton announced that the issue of enlargement of NATO was a matter of "when and how to execute" during his visit to the Czech Republic in January 1994, which communicated subtle changes in the U.S. government's posture. In

⁵¹ NATO announced PfP the following year in January 1994. The document left room for the future enlargement of NATO. At the same time, however, from an immediate and realistic perspective, NATO itself set the concrete objective for the time being as cooperation in the peacekeeping operations that it expected to be a new field of activity. Meanwhile, while leaving open the possibility of NATO military action in the event that a crisis in the territorial integrity of a participating nation should arise, this was limited to a statement to the effect of holding case-by-case consultations, in an effort to postpone the issue.

July 1994, President Clinton visited Poland and announced that Poland was the first candidate to become a new member of NATO and that Russia, which had opposed to the enlargement of NATO, had no authority to refuse it. Although the U.K. and France had been still frowning upon the United States' attempt to accelerate the enlargement movement, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl officially supported enlargement in November by placing priority on stability in neighboring states. In December, less than a year after the adoption of PfP, NATO allies agreed to the enlargement policy in keeping with the intention of the United States. Thus, the issue had transformed itself from the early stage of debating the pros and cons of enlargement to the specific decision-making stage of "who and when."⁵²

In late September 1995, when conflict in the former Yugoslavia seemed to cease following NATO's heavy bombing in Bosnia, all but brushing off Russian opposition, NATO sent a document on its enlargement policy to PfP member states. This document stipulated that the objective of NATO's enlargement was to provide increased stability and security for all the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. It also stipulated the rights and duties for the members of NATO, and urged further efforts for the states that sought new participation in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty to satisfy those conditions.⁵³

The gap between NATO and Russia was not filled in 1996 mainly because both the United States and Russia were obsessed with their own domestic affairs and Yeltsin's ailment was serious. Even at the summit held in March 1997, Clinton and Yeltsin could not fill the gap. In the midst of this sequence of events, in order to oppose NATO's enlargement, Russia suggested that it should strengthen the unity of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), bolster solidarity with the Middle East, and block NATO membership for the Baltic states. Russia began to be strongly aware of the need for a new strategy to counter the military threat coming from the West. Yet Russia did not have enough power to stop the already turning wheels of NATO's enlargement. Thus, in late May, both sides signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and agreed to establish the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The measure reflected NATO's expectation that, in return for Russia's tolerance of enlargement, NATO would consult closely with Russia before NATO puts its own policies into force. As a result, at the Summit held in Madrid in July 1997, following the U.S. open door policy (a policy permitting any country that applies for membership and meets the requirements to join the

⁵² Yuzuru Kaneko, "NATO kakudai wo meguru seijigaku, (NATO Enlargement and the U.S. Administration)" *Journal of National Defense*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (December 1996), pp. 83-98, and "Shinsei NATO no yukue - Toho eno kakudai kara misshon no kakudai e (The Birth of a New NATO: A Triumphant Alliance in Jeopardy)," *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol 2., No. 1 (June 1996), pp. 52-71, argues that NATO's eastward enlargement was underpinned by the logic of U.S. domestic politics.

⁵³ In addition to "the Fact Sheet on NATO Enlargement," "the Study on NATO Enlargement issues by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council" was also sent. It comprised six chapters in which Chapter One stated the objectives and principles for enlargement.

alliance), NATO decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to become new members.

In contrast to the U.S. open-door policy, France had recommended Romania, putting stress on the security of southern Europe and the Mediterranean, and Italy had requested the addition of its neighbor Slovenia. Voices from northern Europe made references to possible membership for the Baltic states. The main reason Europeans had tried to invite more states was that since they had feared a future military backlash from Russia and worried about an increase of their own commitments, they hoped to make an enlargement to the East a one-time exception. Therefore, when the U.S. announced its desire to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to become new members just before the start of the Heads of State and Government meeting, they did not hide their displeasure. A new NATO made up of 19 states came into being in March 1999 on the eve of NATO's 50th anniversary.

Striving to remove the image of a military alliance, NATO mentioned in December 1995 a "cooperative security" architecture in Europe that stipulated new relations with Russia for the first time and sought understanding of the Russians. Russians, however, were unlikely to accept this announcement of NATO that stipulated structuring of a security system where assurance of the security of one party would not damage the security of another party.

There was a fear that new problems would be added to unresolved ones of the first stage at the next stage of enlargement when the Baltic states would be nominated. If Lithuania joins NATO, Kaliningrad Oblast, which does not share a border with mainland Russia, would be severed from Russia, and it would make Russia face a difficult situation similar to the one experienced by the West with the former West Berlin. In this case, there is no doubt that the creation of a corridor via Belarus and Poland would become a problem. If Estonia and Latvia join the Alliance, even though NATO troops are not to be stationed in these states, it would create a situation in which NATO's defense line directly contacts Russia. In this sense, the Charter concluded by the U.S. with the Baltic states in January 1998 included a certain delicate clause.⁵⁴ This clause mentioned, "The U.S. warmly welcomes the membership in NATO of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and supports their efforts," and could be interpreted as a commitment from the Clinton government to early membership for these states in advance of deliberations at NATO.⁵⁵

There were other problems that happened in the U.S. Congress. In the United States, in late February 1998, just before the start of the ratification proceeding at the Senate, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright explained the significance of the enlargement of

⁵⁴ The official title of the document is a Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania.

⁵⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," *National Interest*, No. 53 (Fall 1998), pp. 13-17. The former presidential security adviser, who supported the Clinton government's policy on expanding NATO behind the scenes, advocated limiting the enlargement to Lithuania for the time being, as well as delaying the schedule for enlargement in order to give Russia time to come to terms with the new reality.

NATO at the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee as follows and sought understanding.⁵⁶ First, she said that “a larger NATO will make the U.S. safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars do not happen, second, a larger NATO has given the states of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems, and third, the new member states will add strategic depth to the alliance, not to mention well over 200,000 troops, and we will make NATO itself stronger and more cohesive.” She further mentioned in her testimony that “NATO is a military alliance, not a social club.” In contradiction to its external explanation, the U.S. administration saw NATO as a military alliance.

This tone found its way into the Senate discussions that began in mid-March 1998. Before the discussions, many senators had expressed their approval of the enlargement because it would extend the range of market democracy in the whole of Europe, and they had seldom thought of the issue in light of the complex European security context. Thus, at the end of April, the Senate passed this bill with approval of the remarkable majority of 80 to 19. As a result, however, Congress added several conditions on enlargement that included, “NATO is first and foremost a military alliance,” “a strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects the United States’ vital national security interests,” “the United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of U.S. combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of U.S. nuclear forces on the territory of Europe,” and other traditional “military alliance” characters to NATO.⁵⁷

In January 2001, the Republican administration of George W. Bush replaced the Democratic Bill Clinton government in the U.S. Six months after his inauguration, U.S. President Bush in June attended his first NATO Heads of State and Government meeting amidst a focus on the future for the second round of enlargement that had been left by the Clinton administration. He stressed that no states were excluded on the basis of their past history or geography, and, although his wording was indirect, that Russia had no right to object to enlargement.⁵⁸ In response, Russian President Putin who had indicated maximum cooperation with the U.S. by not only permitting the use of bases in Central Asia and assisting with military intelligence in Afghanistan in connection with the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., but also by not putting the military on alert during the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, stressed that NATO enlargement had no significance in a new era when the security focus had shifted to counter-terrorism.

⁵⁶ See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Administration Views on the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 105th Cong. 2nd Session, February 24, 1998, pp. 7-13, for the statements of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

⁵⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic*, 105th Cong., 2nd Session, Executive Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 144, April 30, 1998: S3756-S3782.

⁵⁸ U.S. President George W. Bush, “Excerpted Remarks at the North Atlantic Council,” NATO HQ, Brussels, June 13, 2001.

However, Russia could not prompt the U.S. to change its mind. The fact that the joint statement issued at the U.S.-Russian leaders' meeting in mid-November advocated the strengthening of ties between NATO and Russia through the establishment of a new mechanism endorsed this.⁵⁹ Two days later, it was reported that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had sent a note describing the intention to establish the Russia-North Atlantic Council to Russian President Putin, the governments of NATO member states and the NATO Secretary General. The objective was to strengthen ties between Russia and NATO in addition to making sure that Russia was not cut off from the framework of discussion in the event of a security emergency.⁶⁰ The note suggested inviting Russia to join and giving it voting rights in a new council to run parallel to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's highest decision making body, for the deliberation of specific issues where cooperation was essential, such as international terrorism, crisis management and arms control. After meetings between NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, who visited Russia in late-November, and President Putin, it was agreed in December to try to inaugurate the new council by May 2002.⁶¹

Thus, when the leaders of NATO member states and President Putin met in Rome on May 28, they agreed to establish a new joint decision making body officially called the NATO-Russia Council, based on the Reykjavik Agreement of mid-May.⁶² As a result, NATO and Russia dissolved the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which had been established on the basis of the cooperation agreement of May 1997. At the same time, twenty states, including Russia, that had been given the status of an "equal partner" with the 19 NATO members, agreed to build a new framework for cooperation. The framework would seek to deliberate specific issues of common interest in the security field⁶³ under the direction of the NATO Secretary General after the model of the North Atlantic Council, and make decisions based on "consensus rule."

However, the heart of the problem was not that cooperation between NATO and Russia was advocated over such a broad area, giving the impression that Russia had succeeded in joining NATO. Rather, it was that Russia could not participate in deliberations on issues that had been skillfully left out of the cooperation structure, including the formation of the

⁵⁹ Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship between the United States and Russia, November 14, 2001.

⁶⁰ "Blair plans wider role for Russia with NATO," *The Times*, November 17, 2001.

⁶¹ NATO-Russia Joint Statement issued on the Occasion of the Meeting of the Permanent Joint Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers in Brussels on December 7, 2001.

⁶² NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation. This document became known as the Rome Declaration.

⁶³ Nine specific areas were listed for cooperation between NATO and Russia in the Council. They were counter terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, salvage and lifesaving operations, mutual cooperation and organizational reform in the military, response to civil emergencies, and response to new forms of emergencies.

strategic concept and joint defense posture that NATO regarded as the bottom line of the “alliance.”

On November 21, the NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in Prague agreed to invite Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as the pending Baltic states, to become new members. As in the first round of enlargement, there was no scope for Russia to intervene in the decision, which strongly reflected U.S. government intentions.

However, at the same time, the Prague Summit agreed to the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) to respond to out-of-area issues such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As part of the reform of headquarter functions, it also agreed to establish a new headquarters at strategic level to supervise crisis management strategy, along with territorial defense, and another headquarters to be responsible for strengthening its functional aspect, such as joint operations. In addition to this, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), establishing targets for strengthening the crisis management capabilities of member states, was also agreed upon. Thus NATO aimed to strengthen its posture on crisis management, and began a comprehensive military reorganization.⁶⁴

These changes in NATO’s military posture should have made a significant contribution to removing Russian distrust, which was based on a fear of enlargement as the extension of a military alliance, because the conversion to a crisis management military model will inevitably lead to a reduction in territorial defense capabilities based on the fiscal circumstances of NATO members. Moreover, further reductions in the territorial defense capabilities specified under the CFE Treaty can also be expected.

However, from the Russian perspective, as President Putin himself has not dropped his opposition to the eastward enlargement of NATO, it has been no easy task to remove the image of the advance in the NATO defensive line ultimately implied by the membership of the Baltic states. Conservatives in the military and parliament who oppose the enlargement of NATO have not been satisfied with the government stance of watching events. In particular, it has not been easy to remove the Cold War mindset of antagonism, which was shared by NATO during the first round of enlargement, from Russians, who have been forced into passivity.⁶⁵

Therefore, there is still a danger that conflict between NATO and Russia may recur depending on future political circumstances. Even if events do not come to conflict, Russia is unlikely to relax its vigilance toward the West. As a result, Russia is expected to improve its relations with the Islamic states to the south where domestic ethnic problems are spreading and maintain its ties with India. In addition, it is likely to work for military

⁶⁴ NATO Press Release, Prague Summit Declaration issued by Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002, Press Release (2002) 127, 21 (November 2002).

⁶⁵ Stephen Hadley, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, “Challenge and Change for NATO: A U.S. Perspective.” *NATO/GMFUS Conference*, Brussels, October 3, 2002, recalls that NATO stuck to Cold War logic during the process of the first stage enlargement.

security in the East where it finds its greatest concern in terms of avoiding military operations on two fronts, and, ultimately, improve its relationship with China.

B. The Progress of Sino-Russian Détente

The starting of the Gorbachev administration in the Soviet Union in March 1985 improved Sino-Soviet relations. Gorbachev carried out “new thinking” diplomacy. The key idea of “new thinking” was to ensure security by reducing military power and preventing war. The urgent subject for Gorbachev was the renovation of the Soviet economy by reducing excessive military expenditure. Thus, Gorbachev aimed to end East-West confrontation in Europe, promoting disarmament with the U.S. and NATO. In the Far East he tried to ease military tension in the Sino-Soviet border area for improving its relations with China. Gorbachev tried to make China break away from the containment of the Soviet Union that had been formed in the 1970s.⁶⁶ In a speech in Vladivostok in July 1986, Gorbachev expressed his intention to resolve two of the “three conditions” that China demanded for improving Sino-Soviet relations. He stated that in addition to the partial withdrawal of Soviet military forces deployed in Mongolia, six divisions would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 1986. As to regional security, he proposed a reduction in armed forces to the level of “reasonable adequacy.”⁶⁷ Gorbachev actually began to withdraw military forces from Mongolia in 1987, and the withdrawal was completed in 1992, i.e. after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1988 he began to withdraw the Soviet military from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal was completed in 1989, the following year.

China also welcomed détente with the Soviet Union, since the Soviet military build up in the border area with China since the 1970s was a major threat to China from the north, against which it had to be constantly prepared. If reductions in military power in the Sino-Soviet border area went ahead and the military threat from the north lowered, it would be possible for China to direct resources from the security field into economic reform. Moreover, improving its relations with the Soviet Union was important for China, which had been exposed to severe criticism from the West on the Tiananmen incident in June 1989, to improve its deepening isolation.⁶⁸

At first both China and the Soviet Union tried to resolve the border problem which had been the main cause of the military clashes on the Ussuri River in 1969. The Sino-Soviet border was composed of two parts, the eastern part and the western part. In the eastern part, the two states had to demarcate the border line in the rivers which flow between them, and in the western part, they had to demarcate the border line on land. When Jiang Zemin visited

⁶⁶ Hasegawa, pp. 117-122.

⁶⁷ M.S. Gorbachev, *Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, Vol. 4, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), pp. 29-30. For example, Gorbachev made a unilateral disarmament proposal to cut Soviet military personnel by 500,000 (including a reduction of 200,000 in the Asian region) at the UN General Assembly in December 1988.

⁶⁸ Rajan Menon, “The Strategic Convergence between Russia and China,” *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 101-102.

the Soviet Union in May 1991, the two states signed the Agreement between China and the Soviet Union on the Sino-Soviet Eastern Border. After the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and the negotiating party on the Soviet side changed to Russia, Sino-Russian border talks continued, and the Russian and Chinese parliaments both ratified the earlier agreement on the eastern border in February 1992. When Jiang Zemin visited Russia in September 1994, the two states signed the Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Russia on the Sino-Russian Western Border, which came into effect in October 1995 after ratification by the parliaments of both states (December 1994 in China and June 1995 in Russia). Furthermore, when Yeltsin visited China in November 1997, both states agreed to demarcate the eastern border (about 4,280 kilometers long) while leaving the issue of the jurisdiction of Hei Xia Zi (Bolshoy Ussuriskii) Island, Yin (Tarabarov) Island and A ba gai tu Zhou Zhu (Bolshoy Island) unsettled. In April 1999, Russia and China announced that the demarcation of their eastern and western borders, including about 55 kilometers of the western border, had been completed. Therefore, the Sino-Russian border problem had been nearly resolved, except for the issue of the jurisdiction of the three islands on the eastern border.

This process of resolving the border problem gave rise to a framework of multinational confidence-building measures between China and the four former Soviet republics that shared borders with China. When Yeltsin visited China in April 1996, China and the four former Soviet republics of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Agreement to Strengthen Confidence in the Military Field in the Border Area. This agreement included the following points: not using military force in the border area for acts of aggression, not conducting military activities against the other signatories, limitations on the size, scope and frequency of military maneuvers, mutual notification about the main military maneuvers in a 100-kilometer deep border area, not conducting dangerous military activities, and friendly exchanges between units deployed in the border area.⁶⁹ The main purpose of this agreement was to promote peace and stability in the border area between China and the four former Soviet republics. The meeting of heads of these five nations, the so-called Shanghai Five, came into operation. When Jiang Zemin visited Russia the next year in April 1997, the five nations signed the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Area. This agreement included ceilings on tanks (3,900 for Russia and the other three former Soviet republics, 3,810 for Russia alone, and 3,900 for China) as well as armored combat vehicles (4,500 each) and maximum military personnel (130,400 each) in the border area (100 kilometers deep and 7,300 kilometers long).⁷⁰ Although the five nations have been working on the resolution of some unsettled problems and the refinement of the

⁶⁹ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, April 25, 27, 1996, Robert Karniol, "China to host border talks," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, April 17, 1996, p. 32, and "China concludes border pact," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 15, 1997, p. 12.

⁷⁰ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 25, 1997, *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, April 25, 1997, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, April 25, 1997.

agreement,⁷¹ the outcome of this military disengagement has made a significant contribution to stability in the border area of China and the former Soviet Union.

The progress in the relations between China and the Soviet Union (later Russia) since the last period of the Soviet era gave rise to a Sino-Russian “strategic partnership.” The Sino-Russian strategic partnership is based on their strategic thinking of obtaining a bargaining card in their own relations with the U.S., which has become the only superpower in the world, rather than on trust and good faith.⁷² China and Russia shared a common interest in building a multi-polar world order, as opposed to the uni-polar world order with the only superpower, the U.S. Although Russia and China both recognized that no state can compete with U.S. in military strength in the post-Cold War era, U.S. policies in Europe and the Far East caused a reaction from China and Russia. The two nations realized a connection between the eastward enlargement of NATO in Europe and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security relationship in the Far East.⁷³ In other words, they perceived that the military alliances led by the U.S. were being strengthened both in the west and the east of Eurasia.⁷⁴ The eastward enlargement of NATO was becoming a serious threat for Russia during this period. In particular, when the three Baltic states would become candidates for NATO membership in the second round of enlargement, there was a possibility that the Russian military may have been inclined toward hard countermeasures, even though President Putin may tacitly have approved this enlargement. This was because, following the three Baltic states’ NATO membership, NATO and Russia would share a defense line and the very sensitive problem of whether Russia could get a land corridor from the Russian homeland to the Kaliningrad region, which would become an enclave surrounded by NATO members. It was natural for Russia to seek military stability in the East in order to relieve the pressure from the West due to the enlargement of NATO.⁷⁵ In the Far East, Taiwan could be included in the missile defense plan that the U.S. has been promoting. China anticipated that Russia and China could oppose it together. It could be argued that China and Russia both considered it very important to cooperate with Central Asian nations in opposing the U.S. hegemony and for creating a multi-polar world order because neither of them could oppose

⁷¹ An example of an issue that was left out of the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Area is the problem of increasing the depth of the 100-kilometer border area.

⁷² Rajan Menon characterizes Sino-Russian relations as strategic convergence, Menon, p. 101.

⁷³ Andrew C. Kuchins and Alexei V. Zagorsky, *When Realism and Liberalism Coincide: Russian Views of U.S. Alliances in Asia*, (The Asia/Pacific Research Center, July 1999), from <<http://www.stanford.edu/group/APARC>>.

⁷⁴ “Reisengo no Taikoku Kankei ni Tsuite (The Relationship of the World Powers in the Post-Cold War Era),” *Beijing Review* (No. 9-10, 1999), p. 9.

⁷⁵ “Kongo 10 nen no sekai josei no hatten hoko oyobi chugoku no taisaku (The Development of the World Situation in ten years from now and China),” *Beijing Review*, (No. 29, 2000), p. 14, “Konnenkamihannki no kokusai josei no tokucho (The Characteristics of the World Situation in the First Half of This Year),” *Beijing Review*, (No. 34, 1999), p. 10, and Viktor Gobarev, Kosovo Aftermath: Russia-NATO Relations after the Kosovo Crisis: Strategic Implications, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 1999), p. 14.

the U.S. alone. In June 2001, the Shanghai Five agreed to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, including new member Uzbekistan. The strategic thinking of Russia and China was to create a framework for multi-lateral cooperation in central Eurasia that did not include the U.S. and to use this framework for opposing the U.S. hegemony. The consultative mechanisms of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization include regular meetings of heads of government, of foreign ministers and of defense ministers, in addition to meetings of heads of state. For example, the joint communiqué of the first meeting of defense ministers referred to strengthening military cooperation. Furthermore, it referred to the following two points in order to contain the U.S. First, they thought that the ABM Treaty was the foundation of global strategic stability and it was indispensable to maintain it. Second, they opposed the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan for Taiwan. These two points reflected Chinese demands.⁷⁶

In July 2001, the leaders of China and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.⁷⁷ The new Sino-Russian treaty did not include the clause for military alliance that had been included in the former 1950 treaty, which had expired in 1980. Nevertheless, it could be considered as searching for a new system for cooperation between the two states. At the signing of the new treaty, Jiang Zemin stressed the importance of strengthening strategic cooperation between China and Russia, and of joint efforts to build the multi-polar world order. Article 12 in the new treaty stipulates that both China and Russia will cooperate in preserving a global strategic balance and stability, observe a basic agreement to maintain strategic stability, and cooperate in their policies toward the U.S. The new treaty also included provisions that were desirable for China which was forced to modernize its military. Article 7 provided for the strengthening of military technological cooperation. In addition, Article 16 stipulated the necessity of cooperation in a wide range of fields, including science and technology, energy, nuclear power, aviation and space, and information technology. These articles showed the possibility that Russia would speed up the modernization of the Chinese military.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Russia has a number of cooperation frameworks in addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in its relations with Central Asian nations. These include the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the Eurasian Economic Union. China has no frameworks other than the Shanghai Treaty organization. In this situation, it is possible to take the view that China is more strongly conscious of using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a focus for opposing U.S. hegemony than Russia. The underlying reason for Russia's strengthening of cooperation with Central Asian nations through the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the intent to guard against the spread of NATO into Central Asia and to strengthen its bond with Central Asian nations in view of the visit by NATO Secretary General George Robertson to Central Asian nations, and deliberation on cooperation between NATO and Central Asian nations.

⁷⁷ See <<http://president.kremlin.ru/events/260.html>> for the text of the new treaty.

⁷⁸ Article 8 of the Treaty stipulates "Treaty nations must not participate in any alliances or bloc. Further, they must not be party to the activities of any alliances or bloc." This indicates that the treaty implied a mutual guarantee that Russia would not damage China's national interest by joining NATO or cooperating

China and Russia had been expanding military exchanges before the signing of the new treaty. Russia had exported to China advanced weapons and military equipment, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter-aircraft and *Sovremenny*-class destroyers, and had begun to transfer many kinds of military technology to China. China had tried to improve its air defense capabilities by introducing Russian surface-to-air missile systems. In addition to this, as some experts pointed out, Russia had cooperated with China in areas such as its operational command system, indicating that military ties between Russia and China had been strengthened.⁷⁹

The strengthening of Sino-Russian cooperation was very important for Russia. It was possible for Russia to reduce its military forces in the Sino-Russian border area as the result of the progress of confidence-building measures in this area. This was very significant for Russia, which was forced to cut military expenditures from a fiscal perspective. The military stability in the Sino-Russian border area was a matter of vital importance for Russia because it faced serious threats in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, i.e. the eastward enlargement of NATO and the expansion of Islamic extremism.⁸⁰ In relation to this point, Russia's export of weapons and military equipment to China were not only easy and efficient means for Russia to get hard currency, but also allowed Russia to easily assess China's military capabilities by increasing China's dependence on Russia and incorporating Russian weapons systems within the Chinese military. We could not deny that Russia intended to reduce the Chinese military threat to Russia by exporting naval weapons and leading China in the direction of expanding its naval capabilities.

Conclusion

How will the transition of the strategic link in Eurasia among Europe, Russia and China affect the future course of Japan's security? By way of conclusion, this section takes a look at the issue through the use of two variables, deterrence and reassurance.

The first point we should consider as a factor that will have a major impact on the East Asian regional security environment is the future of Sino-Russian relations. As was the case of the MBFR talks in Europe, it would be difficult to argue that the agreement on military disengagement by five states in April 1997 made certain military sense for China or Russia due to the small area covered. However, it would be fully expected that the agreement, which marked the first step in preventing the danger of possible military clashes, will lead to

with the U.S. from the Chinese perspective, and that China would not damage Russia's national interests by strengthening its relationship with the U.S. as seen in Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the past from the Russian perspective.

⁷⁹ Ariel Cohen, *The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in Eurasia?* (The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1459), July 18, 2001, pp. 4-6.

⁸⁰ Vladimir Mukhin, "Military prepares to make cutbacks abroad: The move signals a policy better tailored to meet the state's needs," *The Russia Journal*, August 31 – September 6, 2001.

full-scale military détente later. Moreover, though it is unlikely that the July 2001 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between Russia and China develops into a new military alliance, it might bolster the image of a delineation between Japan and the U.S. on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other if China and Russia present a united front on the creation of a multi-polar world and keep the attitude to oppose the U.S. that was seen at the Sino-Russian Summit in December 2002.

It is much more likely that Russia, facing the U.S.-led NATO enlargement and the difficulties in economic recovery, takes a moderate stance militarily to Japan and the U.S. in East Asia, and advocates creating a framework for regional cooperation in order to increase military transparency based on the concept of reassurance or creating a regional collective security framework as Russia used to do in the Cold War era.⁸¹ Similarly, China, which has joined the World Trade Organization and made a successful bid for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, cannot adopt a hard line in East Asia so long as it gives priority to the development of its inherently contradictory socialist market economy, and acknowledges its limited military capabilities.

However, the situation will grow worse when the Taiwan issue, which China regards as a matter of domestic policy, or the Korean issue, is put into the widening psychological gulf between the Japan-U.S. and Sino-Russian blocks. The promotion of Sino-Russian reassurance has led them to a boosting of the transfer of Russian weapon systems to China. For Russia, military exports to China are a quick and practical means of acquiring foreign currency necessary for economic revival. Russia may also believe that it contains China's future military adventures within predictable levels by promoting the conversion of China's weapon systems to those of Russia. On the other hand, for China, the military imports from Russia are not only a means of modernizing its outdated systems quickly, but also a counter-measure against the U.S. military exports to Taiwan. Thus, if both China and Taiwan continue military buildup, this would increase regional tension involving the U.S., which has engaged in the issue. Furthermore, in the long term, China, which has acquired stability and security in its northern border area in both strategic and fiscal terms, might focus its energies on building a blue-water navy. In addition, the arms sales from Russia to North Korea, with the February 2000 signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation as a turning point, might fan tensions between North and South Korea, rather than work as pressure from Russia to curb North Korean military adventurism. In these circumstances, if North Korea, opposing the U.S. with its principle of reciprocity which makes a sharp contrast to South Korea's sunshine policy, comes closer to China and Russia in exchange for economic and military aid, and if China and Russia meet its requests aside

⁸¹ In fact, when Gen Nakatani, the Director General of Japan's Defense Agency, proposed the establishment of a multi-lateral security framework in the Asia region in mid-February 2002, Russia immediately expressed its approval, stating that the structure was worthy of serious consideration. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, In Relation to the Statement by Japan's Defense Agency Chief, Gen Nakatani, regarding the Creation in Asia of a Security Structure (268-15-02-2002), February 15, 2002, for this Russian response.

from nuclear aid, the image of confrontation between the Japan-U.S. and the China-Russia blocks might become even stronger. As a result, Japan may face a situation where it could engage in a conflict between China and Taiwan directly or indirectly, and may lose an opportunity to settle the North Korean WMD problem. In any case, while military détente between China and Russia is welcome to Japan, Japan cannot overlook the byproducts that might contribute to the instability of East Asia.

The second point is the unpredictable future of Sino-U.S. relations, especially of the U.S. policy against China. As contrasted to the Clinton administration, which pursued a strategic partnership with China, the Bush administration deems China as a strategic competitor and has tried to control its movement. On the other hand, concerning U.S. unilateralism, China has opposed the U.S. missile defense program in exchange for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. China also has misgivings about the Russian rapprochement with the U.S., with the September 11 terrorist attacks as a turning point. The July 2001 Sino-Russian Moscow joint statement⁸² shows China's concern about Russia. However, it is critical that China does not have enough power to manage these problems. In the new strategic environment, it is quite probable that the U.S., which sought rapprochement with China in order to reduce Soviet power based on the assumption that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," seeks another rapprochement with China in order to "divide and control" the post-Cold War world, as was done by the Roman Empire. This development assumes coincidence of the strategic assessments of China and the U.S., and the development of U.S.-Russian relations will bear this hallmark.

The strategic environment surrounding Japan still contains many unpredictable elements, and it is difficult to foresee what affects the future security of Japan. However, it is not only undesirable but also even dangerous for Japan to idly sit by. First, it is easy to suggest that, if Japan aims to keep its status as a major economic power, it should promote military stability in East Asia without increasing military tension, while keeping effective defense capabilities like Europeans, who have obtained an opportunity of integration to restore their economic strength and international status through the EU in line with the principles of market democracy that have prevailed in the post-Cold War world.

Second, it is essential for Japan, who greatly owes its security to the U.S., to minimize the impact of unpredictable disruptive factors in the region, such as the transition of Sino-Russian relations and of Sino-U.S. relations as well as the conversion of the U.S. military strategy and the change in its military presence, for its long-term stability and security. That is why Japan should lead the way in building a multi-layered security structure that enhances reassurance in the region and deterrence for itself. With a well-developed new security structure, the new shared values and security perspectives would strengthen cooperation in the region.

The next issue is how Japan should establish the security structure in the region in order to promote reassurance. The OSCE (and its predecessor the CSCE) has embodied the whole

⁸² The text of the Moscow Joint Statement can be accessed at <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/15723.html>>.

of Europe, and therefore, NATO had to justify its military activities by the name of CSCE “responsibility,” as well as of UN “authority” when it conducted military campaign in former Yugoslavia beyond the range of peacekeeping operations.⁸³ Likewise, if Japan opts the “Asia-Pacific” as an ideal framework for its regional security structure, it has to persuade the party states to see it as an authoritative body. In other words, it should establish a framework in which no party states can take any military activities that violate the spirit of reassurance when they join the framework with their own consent. In this sense, albeit the limits that result from its ASEAN leadership, it is more realistic to expect the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in which North Korea joined as an official member at the July 2000 Cabinet Council, to play this role rather than to create a new framework. In this case, the ARF should strengthen the function to promote military détente in the region.

Considering the diversity of “threats” that states of the Asia-Pacific have faced, the ARF itself is too large to manage specific security issues. A sub-regional framework and issue-oriented framework may be more useful than the ARF. However, in this case, strong ties with the ARF must be ensured so that the results of the CFE talks, in which states of the East and the West alliances participated, are examined with all members of the CSCE, including non-allied and neutral states. This is because this measure ensures that the outcomes of arms control and disarmament achieved in a sub-regional framework will not damage the security of other members of the ARF.

Thus, in view of Japan’s security from this perspective, it is necessary for Japan to consider two aspects. The first aspect is to specify Japan’s objective to obtain security through arms control and disarmament, and, the second is to establish the framework within which to obtain security.

There are two points in specifying the objectives for Japan. The first is to limit or prohibit the amphibious capabilities and WMD that Japan does not possess in observing an exclusively defensive posture. Particularly with today’s concerns over the possession, transference and proliferation of missile technology, in parallel with the examination of active defense (that is, development of the missile defense technology), the elimination of WMD is indispensable for Japan from a cost-effectiveness perspective, too. The issue has become more acute as a result of the North Korean (nuclear) missile problem. In this respect, cruise missiles should be taken into account. Next is how to solve the problem in the ARF, in full awareness of the fact that the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. has existed,⁸⁴ and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has

⁸³ NATO, which was “authorized” by the UN and the CSCE to bring about a military solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, carried out military operations that differed from the territorial defense mission stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO, seeking to break out of the existing “military alliance,” conducted activities akin to coercion in line with the collective security specified in the UN Charter, rather than the right of collective self-defense specified in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

⁸⁴ President Bush, seeking to restart stalled U.S.-D.P.R.K talks, called on North Korea to adopt a less threatening conventional military posture not dependent on NBC weapons or long-range missile capability in June 2001. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President, June 13, 2001.

worked to persuade North Korea to settle the problem, and that North Korea has recently unilaterally cancelled the freeze on nuclear facilities stipulated in the 1994 agreement. The process in this event would be outlined as follows. A multilateral framework for negotiation should be established among states that directly share military concerns about North Korean missiles, states that can assert their influence over North Korea (this could also include the EU participating in KEDO as well as Russia and China), and ARF states that can act as neutral third parties. Then, the participating states should deposit the fruits of negotiations to the ARF so that the authoritative body can assure the results as the common property of the whole region. If it truly becomes a rational method, this process could help North Korea to reassure its security. However, so long as the non-democratic North Korean government persists in using the process as a simple bargaining tool as it has shown in the KEDO and the Agreed Framework, the process will not work right away. There are no rational ways to redress irrational ways of thinking.

Another issue arises from the fact that Japan is surrounded by the sea. It is decisively different from the European case, whose arms control and disarmament measures have been applied mainly in ground attack forces, with some naval units becoming involved as well. Japan cannot avoid arms control and disarmament at sea in the region in terms of the future expansion of China's blue-water navy and the revival of the Russian navy. For the time being, the focal point will be bilateral arrangements similar to the Incidents at Sea Agreements for international waters, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the closing stages of the Cold War. However, Japan would face difficulties if it proceeds with naval disarmament, such as restrictions on the number and displacement of warships and other vessels, restrictions on armaments and naval bases, and limitations on operations, maneuvers and areas of deployment. This is because the restrictions would naturally apply to the U.S. Navy, which has worked as an important element of deterrence for Japan. Moreover, considering the principle of free passage and the wide range of naval activities, disarmament would probably be difficult to apply to the sea unless a global agreement could be reached like London and Washington naval disarmament treaties of the past.

It has already been described that Japan has strategic advantages for constructing a multi-layered security structure in the region. The difficulties for Japan in building a strategic framework based on reassurance have also been pointed out. However, it should be noted that in Europe, attempts at arms control and arms reduction that began in the mid-1950s took 20 years to achieve their first results in the Helsinki Agreement (Accord) of August 1975, and the CFE Treaty took another 20 years to reach. Considering that, it is necessary for Japan to sustain efforts for the creation of a regional security structure on the basis of a long-term perspective.