

# Redefinition of Cooperative Security and “Regional” Security in the Asia-Pacific

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## Introduction

The threat of a total nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union has been removed with the end of the Cold War. It has not, however, brought about peace to the world. Uncertainty in the international order has intensified even further due to a number of outbreaks of regional conflicts and existence of various instabilities.

Several attempts have been devised that employ a “region” as a unit in order to resolve those problems. These attempts include multilateralism with the key word “cooperative security” concept as seen in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), or those that try to shift the function of military alliances from “deterrence” to “stabilization” as apparent in the reformation of the NATO or the “reaffirmation” of the Japan - U.S. alliance. The former is the efforts to create and consolidate a cooperative framework to the “region” while the latter is the efforts to secure force to maintain stability of the international order in the “region.” Therefore, both may be defined as efforts to grasp a “region” as one entity and seek security in the entire entity.

The author has used the term “region” here. The term is not necessarily synonymous to a geographical “region.” This is because the geographic definition cannot accommodate for the commitment of the United States located in the western hemisphere to the security issues in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and it is difficult to consider that the ARF grouping was formed geographically, because twenty-one nations and one international organization (as of March 2000) including the EU (European Union) are participating in the ARF. Therefore, it is necessary to make the analyses with a new framework that is different from the geographical concept.

In this paper, the author shall view the above phenomena as “localization” of security, define the “security complex” concept advocated by Barry Buzan as the analytical concept instead of geographical “regions,” and discuss the “security order” as the dynamics in relation to the security complex. Upon conclusion, the author shall analyze the “cooperative security” concept and discuss the security order in the Asia-Pacific “region” toward the 21st century through the review on the relationship between the concept and enforcement by force.

## 1. “Security Complex” Concept: “Localization” of Security

### (1) “Localization” of security

During the Cold War period, security issues that were inherent to the “regions” had been suppressed in order to prevent escalation to a global, all-out war between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War ended, however, while the threat of an all-out nuclear war was removed, a number of regional conflicts have broken out since the linkage between the “regional” and “global” issues has been cut off.

Before considering such “regionalization of conflicts,” it is necessary to first ask the question, why a “region” is employed as a unit instead of a “global” or “nation,” or why it is necessary to analyze the security issues with the “region.”

A “region” is, in short, a unit that exists between national-level and the global-level. The question is, however, how to define a “region” in what standard and in what range.

In the context of security studies, a “region” should not be a simple geographical definition of the word. This is because the “region” in the security studies is the space generated as a result of interactions of nations and has different *raison d’être* from that of the geographical definition. If the term “region” is geographically defined, its utility as an analysis tool in security studies would be limited since it does not include the dynamic elements such as the dynamics of the international politics. Therefore, the author believes that the “region” in security studies must be defined with due consideration to include the dynamic elements in addition to the geographical elements.

Prof. Akio Watanabe presented a question as to why the “regionalism” is required in this post-Cold War era, and considered that the “regionalism” has become necessary as a means to counter “global” issues since each issue has grown too large for an individual nation to tackle by itself, which led to exposure of doubt in the problem solving capability of the nations.<sup>1</sup> When the “region” is regarded under such connotation, it should be considered as one level of various “arenas” that are generated around the problems and issues in our present world and through our involvement in them.

In this paper, the author shall define the “region” in security studies as an “arena” generated mainly from the perception of issues and concerns shared by each agent. It is a set of actors to be formed in the level higher than the “national” one but lower than the “global” one, and the author shall clearly distinguish it from a geographical concept of a “region” and employ the term “local level” to avoid confusion in the concept.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Akio Watanabe, *Asia-Taiheiyou no Kokusai Kankei To Nihon* (trans. by author: International Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region and Japan) (Tokyo University Press, 1992), pp. 225-229.

<sup>2</sup> Distinction between “local” and a geographical concept “region” is often made in cultural studies. For example, David Morley and Kevin Lobins distinguished the two and said, “This cultural localism reflects, in turn, deeper feelings about the inscription of human lives and identities in space and time.” David Morley and Kevin Lobins, *Spaces of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 115-118.

When the above is taken into account, after the end of the Cold War, the “localization of security” has arisen because the global level had lost significance as the “arena” of conflicts and local levels had extensively emerged as the major “stage” for security. The most effective concept of analysis in security studies in local levels seems to be the “*security complex*” concept advocated by Barry Buzan.

(2) Introduction of “*security complex*” concept

The “*security complex*” is the concept advocated by Buzan when he noticed that the disputes and confrontation between India and Pakistan had been developing in a manner other than the dynamics of the Cold War.<sup>3</sup> He understood security as an issue that arises from interactions among nations and considered that it is necessary to grasp the pattern of the issue,<sup>4</sup> and went on to define the security complex as a set of nations that cannot be separated because their security concerns are linked together.<sup>5</sup> It is formulated by the amity/enmity pattern among nations in a certain geographical area, and is a geographical spread of nations that are involved in some kind of concerns over the security issues. In other words, the security complex is formulated as a local unit which is formed surrounding the concerns for a certain issue. The geographical element is only one of the standards here.

Another point is that the security complex does not distinguish whether the relationship among nations within it has positive or negative character.<sup>6</sup> The security complex may be formulated among a group of nations with amicable relationship where any dispute is unthinkable such as the Western nations, as well as between India and Pakistan and among other nations that have conflictive relations and confronted with threat to one another. In that sense, it is value-neutral, and has high utility as an concept of analysis.

David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan added further studies onto this security complex concept advocated by Buzan to reduce the geographical element. They presume that the post-Cold War world has a number of regional orders instead of a single international order.<sup>7</sup> They then point out that regions are showing apparent characteristics in the international order, and the circumstances developing in the regional context have more important meaning than those in the global context.<sup>8</sup> The regions here, however, are not a miniature version of a global sphere, but maintain a certain degree of autonomy and have different patterns from that in the global system. Therefore, they insist that the regional system should be defined as a process of regional security where the circumstances develop under a rule that is different from that in the global

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<sup>3</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, second edition (Colorado: Lynne Rinner Publishers, 1991), pp. 186-229.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 190

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 193

<sup>7</sup> David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regionalism in Security Affairs,” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

system,<sup>9</sup> and the security complex is formulated as a result of that process.

The key to formulation of the security complex is the *externalities* of the security concerns. When there exists an *issue* in the society, the actors who constitute the society receive some influence from the issue. In other words, such an *issue* exerts externalities to each actor. The externalities where a certain security concern influences each nation are focused here, and it is defined that the intensity of the externalities determines the interaction pattern among nations, that is, the combination of nations and the degrees of interactions.<sup>10</sup> The *issue* here does not necessarily mean any specific conflict. It includes, for example, obscure uncertainty concerning security environment. Lake and Morgan define the *security complex* as a set of nations that share issues and concerns, and that are linked together with those issues and concerns at the core.

Therefore, the actors who constitute a security complex are not determined by geographical factors. This is because they cannot be defined by a geographical concept alone especially when a major world power like the U.S. shares the concerns with the regional actors and participates in local issues.<sup>11</sup> Thus, it is defined that the security complex is not made of mere geographical factors but consists of actors who may have major concerns.<sup>12</sup> In other words, the security complex is not formed by geographical factors alone, but as a set of actors who exert influence in certain interrelations to one another. The important point here is the degree of commitment in the *issue*, and the geographical factor may be significant as long as it concerns such degree.<sup>13</sup>

The *density* of a security complex depends on the gravity of the *concern* over the core issue. When the concern is more grave, the interactions among actors become stronger and the security complex bears higher *density*, and *vice versa*.<sup>14</sup> A certain nation may become a constituent actor in several security complexes, or some issues may be linked to one another to create overlapping of various security complexes since nations may have several concerns at the same time. The typical example is the Cold War. The security complex with high *density* that spread in vast geographical areas and that was formed with an extremely serious concern at the core, as seen in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, overlaps into other local security complexes and exerts influence.<sup>15</sup>

### (3) Security complex and *security order*

A security complex generates from the process developed among the actors centered around an issue. It has a strongly context-dependent characteristic since the historical context, density

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>10</sup> David A. Lake, "Regional Security Complexes," in Lake and Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders*, p. 52.

<sup>11</sup> Patrick Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in Lake and Morgan eds., *Regional Orders*, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>13</sup> Of course if they are geographically in proximity, the possibility that they may be involved in the issue is high.

<sup>14</sup> Lake, "Regional Security Complexes," in Lake and Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders*, pp. 45-67.

<sup>15</sup> Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, pp. 219-221.

of the interactions among actors and the order principle of the core issue vary at each security complex.<sup>16</sup>

Its strong context-dependency means that the amity/enmity pattern woven by the actors at each security complex varies. Therefore, difference is generated in the dynamics that governs the relationship among the actors who constitute the security complex. The dynamics is the *security order*. The characteristics of a security complex are determined by the characters of the *security order*.<sup>17</sup>

The *security order* may roughly be distinguished by the types where cooperative dynamics mainly controls and the others where competitive dynamics mainly controls. More specifically, it may be categorized in the order of the cooperative elements as integration, pluralistic security community, collective security, concert system, balance of power and conflictive enmity relations.<sup>18</sup> These indicate the characteristics of a certain point of time in a security complex, and does not present a development model such as the "evolution" from a concert system to collective security. Those listed above are theoretical, and in actuality one nation may be a constituent to several security complexes or there may be complicated characteristics in the core issue or concern. In such situation, various orders would combine and form the entire structure.

As a security complex is formed with a certain issue at the core, when the characteristics of the core issue change, the order there would change accordingly and the specificity of the security complex would also change.<sup>19</sup> It is also possible that the internal order is *overlaid* from other security complexes as seen during the Cold War. The development process around the core issue changes continuously by the influence exerted by various elements since the security complex is an open system exposed to external influence. Therefore, at analyses of characteristics of each security complex, special attention must be given to the characters and gravity of the issue, internal order and the degree of external influence before at proceeding with the argument.

The *cooperative security* is not included in the above categorization. The author shall examine the *cooperative security* concept in the next chapter and position it in the security order since it is a comparatively new concept born after the end of the Cold War and various arguments exist.

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<sup>16</sup> Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," p. 25.

<sup>17</sup> Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," pp. 31-33.

<sup>18</sup> This categorization was made by adding the conflictive enmity relations to the classification made in Morgan's "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," pp. 32-41. When such categorization is made, the "common security" is sometimes listed but it is omitted here because the "common security" was conceived in the Cold War in the context of the Cold War, and it is simply a variation arose from the balance of power or the conflictive enmity relationship. David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-15; Mataka Kamiya, "Asia-Taiheiyou Ni Okeru Jusoteki Anzenhoshou Kouzou Ni Mukete," *Kokusai-Seiji*, Vol. 105 (trans. by the author: "Toward a Multi-Layered Security Structure in the Asia-Pacific Region: Limitations of Multilateral Security Cooperation and Roles of the US-Japan Security Treaty System."

<sup>19</sup> This is a phenomenon seen as the Cold War ended.

## 2. Redefinition of *Cooperative Security* : *Order and Policy*

### (1) Origin of *cooperative security*

During the Cold War, Europe was situated at the frontline in the confrontation between the East and the West. The urgent problem was how to prevent a nuclear war, and as a means to solve the problem a nuclear deterrence system for both the East and the West was first structured. Facing a threat of a nuclear war, the *international security* or *common security* concept was emerged in the 1970s.<sup>20</sup> This was due to the new understanding that if one side tried to strengthen its security unilaterally, it would bring about the *security dilemma* and it would be highly likely to create a more dangerous situation to the entire scene. In other words, it was the concept formulated from the recognition that there must be a measure to strengthen security on both sides as they experienced the *imaginary war* and *imaginary destruction*<sup>21</sup> during the Cold War that could also be termed as the “virtual war.”

This is a conception to enhance the overall security not by unilateralism but by taking a certain degree of cooperative actions with the potential enemy. Therefore, the origin of the present *cooperative security* concept was in the security complex in Europe. The security complex, however, is formed with certain autonomy and it is context-dependent. Therefore, further study will be required to determine the characteristics that have generality in order to equip the concept with certain universality.

### (2) What is *cooperative security* ?

The *cooperative security* is a comparatively new concept since it emerged after the end of the Cold War. Various arguments exist for that reason, which may roughly be divided into three types of understanding, namely *nonmilitary-type cooperative security*, *cooperative security for ethnic conflicts* and *collective security-type cooperative security*.

The *cooperative security* discussed in the nonmilitary-type has the characters of the multilateralism defined by John G. Ruggie;<sup>22</sup> does not define specific enemies but internalizes

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<sup>20</sup> Refer to the following for development of the security concepts during the Cold War. David A. Baldwin, “Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,” *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1995), pp. 117-141; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones “International Security Studies,” *International Security*, Vol., 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27.

<sup>21</sup> Takahiko Tanaka, “Power Politics No Henyou To Reisen,”(trans. by the author: “Changes in Power Politics and Cold War”) Takehiko Kamo, ed., Kouza: Seiki-Kan No Sekai-Seiji (trans. by the author: “Lecture: World Politics in Centuries), Vol. 5” (Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1994), pp. 69-133.

<sup>22</sup> The multilateralism of Ruggie is international relationship that satisfies the conditions; 1) generalized organizing principles logically entail an indivisibility among the members of collectivity with respect to the range of behavior in question, 2) “diffusea reciprocity” , that is ,the arrangement is expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time, 3) there is nondiscrimination and has no negative externalities. John Gerald Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” in John Gerald Ruggie, eds., *Multilateralism Matters* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-47.

them, and has understanding that security policies would develop in a comprehensive manner that is not limited to military measures. The basic elements include comprehensive security that contains economic development, etc., a non-provocative security policy that does not threaten to the others, such as confidence-building measures and multilateral framework.<sup>23</sup> Some opinions point out the limitation of *cooperative security*, but their arguments are also along the above understanding.<sup>24</sup>

The *cooperative security for ethnic conflicts* sets the major objective of the *cooperative security* in the solution of domestic conflicts in the Third World. In other words, it conceives that ethnic conflicts are the clear and present threat in the international security in the post-Cold War era, and insists on cooperative involvement of the international society.<sup>25</sup> It considers enforcement by force the style of *cooperative intervention*. The special characteristic is that it does not particularly concern coordination or stability in the international relations.

The *collective security-type cooperative security* is contrary to the *non-military-type cooperative security*, and is an understanding of cooperative security that contains enforcement by force.

The objective of the cooperative security here is prevention of large-scale organized invasions, and more specifically, it aims to prevent accumulation of weapons of mass destruction and other offensive arms in the world and at the same time remove the causes that necessitates offensive arms and shift the military system in each nation toward more defensive military posture.<sup>26</sup> In other words, it aims to construct a cooperative relations that are closer to that in the concert system and to reduce the possibility of wars among nations. The major characteristic is the definition of the concept that includes enforcement by force. In other words, while one of the objectives is the construction of cooperative relations, it advocates *cooperative military*

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<sup>23</sup> Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security"; Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, identity and institution-building," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Routledge, 1997), pp. 319-346; Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Kyouchouteki Anzenhoshou No Kanousei," (trans. by the author: "Possibilities of Cooperative Security") *Kokusai-Mondai*, Vol. 425 (August 1995), pp. 2-20. And as Takako Ueta pointed out, it is often understood this way inductively from the experiences in Europe. Takako Ueta, "Oushu Anzenhoshouno Hendou To Kyouchouteki Anzenhoshou Kouzou," (trans. by the author: "The Evolution of the Cooperative Security Structure in Europe: The CSCE and NACC") *Kokusai-Seiji*, Vol. 100 (August, 1992), pp. 126-151; Akiko Fukushima, "Kyouryokuteki Anzenhoshouno Kigen Wo Miru," (trans. by the author: "Locate the Origin of Cooperative Security") *Kaigai-Jijo*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (March 1996), pp. 44-59. According to the categorization made by Yoshinobu Yamamoto, cooperative security is not included. Yoshinobu Yamamoto, "Anzenhoshou Regime," (trans. by the author: Security Regime") *Kokusai-Seiji*, Vol. 117 (March 1998).

<sup>24</sup> Mataka Kamiya, "Asia-Taiheiyou Ni Okeru Husoteki Anzenhoshou Kouzou Ni Mukete"; Shinichi Ogawa, Anpotaiwa; Nichibeidoumei To Asia Taiheiyou Shokoku," (trans. by the author: "Security Treaty Dialogue; Japan - U.S. Alliance and Asia-Pacific Nations") *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 1998), pp. 64-82, etc.

<sup>25</sup> I. William Zartman, "Systems of World Order and Regional Conflict Reduction," in I. William Zartman and Victor A. Kremenyuk, *Cooperative Security* (Syracuse University Press: New York, 1995), pp. 3-24; Gereth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 3-20.

<sup>26</sup> Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 7-11; "The Concept of Cooperative Security," in Janne E. Nolan, eds., *Global Engagement* (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1994). And Gereth Evans presented understanding closer to this concept. Gereth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993).

intervention by major powers upon an outbreak of invasion, with the Gulf War as its model.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, it can be said that it defines the *cooperative security* in the condition closer to that in the *collective security*. The differences from the collective security are that the objective is not a simple countermeasure against invasion but to construct cooperative relations among major nations as preventive measures, and the countermeasure against invasion may be taken by some major powers, not necessarily by coalition of all nations.<sup>28</sup>

a) Two aspects of *cooperative security*

As discussed above, some interpretations exist on the *collective security*. The common characteristics among them may be the objective to create or maintain cooperative international relations at least among major powers. It must be pointed out that interpretations without enforcement by force are not necessarily common. Based on such, the author shall try to redefine the *cooperative security* concept.

The concept of security has three different sides, namely the *status*, *means* and *international order*. For instance, the environmental security that focuses on the “value” to be protected is the security concept that emphasizes the *status*, and the concept that focuses on the “method” to protect and defines the contents of the policies which the governments and other agents develop to protect themselves is the concept that emphasizes the *means*.<sup>29</sup> The *comprehensive security* concept, for example, emphasizes the *means* side of security as it argues that the “means” of national security should contain more than military measures. In a sense, however, these are the two sides of a coin because it requires some kinds of *means* to create the *status*.

On the other hand, the security concept that concerns the *international order* side aims at the international system to guarantee “security” at a certain time as seen in the collective security. In other words, while the former two are the concepts in a national level, the last is a concept in an international relation level and has a totally different quality.<sup>30</sup>

Based on the above, as the author analyzed the three types of interpretations on the *cooperative security* discussed earlier, the *non-military cooperative security*, for example, has the two sides. Namely the *international order* and the *means* as apparent in their argument that the aims are to construct a multilateral system without assuming specific enemies but include them within, and to promote comprehensive security policies that are not limited to military actions. The *cooperative security for ethnic conflicts* and the *collective security-type cooperative security* also advocate construction and maintenance of cooperative relations among major powers and cooperative intervention to conflicts, thus contain both sides. It is likely that the fact that “it has

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<sup>27</sup> Carter, Perry, Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, p.41; “The Concept of Cooperative Security,” in Nolan, eds., *Global Engagement*, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> If the cooperative security is to be understood in this manner, it would be a similar concept to the “Loose Collective Security” advocated by George W. Downs and others. George W. Downs, eds., *Collective Security beyond the Cold War* (The University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1994).

<sup>29</sup> Sugio Takahashi, “Anzenhoshou Gainenn No Maikakuka To Saikouchiku,” (trans. by the author: “What is Security: Clarification and Reconstruction”) *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 1997), pp. 130-137.

<sup>30</sup> The term “security”, however, denoted the collective security at first. *Ibid.*, p.132.

not been identified whether it means a system or the various policies oriented toward cooperative security environment"<sup>31</sup> is the cause of confusion in arguments concerning the *cooperative security*.

In other words, the concept of the *measures* and the concept of the *international order* have different qualities,<sup>32</sup> and the term *cooperative security* should be defined after making distinction between them. The *cooperative security for ethnic conflicts* and *collective security-type cooperative security*, however, contain cooperative enforcement by force. In addition, it is difficult to define a concept of security that totally ignores enforcement by force when the international politics have the anarchic character since absolute authority is non-existent. Therefore it would be necessary to contain enforcement by force or at least to define the relations with force in a certain manner in order to have utility in analyzing the international relations.

### *Cooperative Security Order and Cooperative Security Policy*

#### (1) *Cooperative security order*

As discussed earlier, the *cooperative security for ethnic conflicts* and the *collective security-type cooperative security*, emphasize the structure of a framework for enforced by force in the cooperative intervention with the presumption of establishment of cooperative relations among major nations. In other words, it is believed that the *cooperative security* will be formed as a combination of both.

As discussed above, it is necessary to define the relations with enforced by force to create a concept with utility in the real international politics. Therefore, the definition of the *cooperative security order* here would be more appropriate to contain the function of force close to the understanding of the latter two.

Thus, the author defines the *cooperative security order* as the security order where "the international relations, especially those among major powers, have the basic principle of cooperation, there is a consensus that problems or conflicts are to be solved primarily with diplomatic means, and major powers will lead enforced by force cooperatively against conflicts."

Here the relations among major powers have the qualities of the *pluralistic security community* or the *concert system*, and since cooperative military intervention is contained, it also has the quality as a sub-species of the *collective security*. As long as the prerequisite is cooperative relations among major powers, the hypothetical targets for the cooperative military intervention are domestic or ethnic conflicts and regional disputes against the nations that have intentions to destroy the present situations. In this case, disputes among major powers are not taken into consideration (the condition where a dispute among major powers breaks out is not

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<sup>31</sup> Jun Tsubouchi, "OSCE Process To ASEAN," (trans. by author: "OSCE Process and ASEAN: Searching for Framework of Analysis in Asia-Pacific Security") *Kokusai-Seiji*, No. 116 (October 1997), p. 69.

<sup>32</sup> Even if there is a confrontation, it is quite possible that they conduct confidence-building, defense exchange and other "cooperative" policies. The relationship between India and Pakistan, for example is such. Mari Izuyama, "India-Pakistan No Shinrai-Jousei-Sochi," (trans. by the author: "Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan; The Process that Builds Little Confidence") *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 1998), pp. 1-16.

cooperative security order by definition).

(2) *Cooperative security polity*

The cooperative security as a policy would be defined as the security policy that does not assume specific enemies such as confidence-building measures, defense exchange, security dialogues or promotion of multilateral framework and others which are advocated *in the non-military type cooperative security*. These, however, does not necessarily guarantee security. As discussed earlier, it is necessary to define the relations with force in some way to make it a concept with utility in the international relations. Therefore, the author proposes the *cooperative security policy* and *competitive security policy*. The *competitive security policy* includes policies of reinforcement of individual military powers, strengthening military alliance and other reinforcement measures for deterrence and countermeasure capabilities.

Now, the author shall discuss the relationship between these two kinds of policies. First of all it must be pointed out that the two are not in mutually exclusive. They have totally different objectives, characteristics and means, and they are to be combined to meet the needs in the circumstances. In the *cooperative security order* defined earlier, for example, the *cooperative security policy* is the one executed with the objective to maintain the cooperative relations among major powers, and the *competitive security policy* is the one executed with the objective to construct a framework for enforcement by force. Another point to be made is that the relationship between the two are not only supplementary. It is possible, for instance, that synergistic relations may be established where one exerts positive influence to the other, such as the situations where the cooperative security order has been established, the international relation has stabilized, and enforcement by force has become easier upon occurrence of contingencies as a result of promotion of *cooperative security policy*.<sup>33</sup> At that time, it is not only supplement that has a connotation of passiveness as to “supply what is lacking.” On the other hand, it is also possible that a trade-off that exerts negative influence to each other might emerge where promotion of the *competitive security policy* obstruct development of *cooperative security policy*, or deterrence and countermeasure capabilities are deteriorated by promotion of *cooperative security policy* (e.g. by excessive arms restriction measures).<sup>34</sup> Therefore, there must be a balance somewhere between these two.

b) Functions and conditions of *cooperative security*

The author shall discuss the functions and conditions of the *cooperative security policy* based on the above. At first, the author shall argue the conditions where the cooperative security policy is to be developed with the objective to create *cooperative security order*.

The requirements would be; 1) non-existence of significant enemies, 2) participation of

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<sup>33</sup> It is these circumstances that the collective security-type cooperative security is trying to promote.

<sup>34</sup> Jun Tsubouchi defines the cooperative security measures here as the “preventive approach” and the competitive security policies as the “counter approach”, and insists that the preventive approach is not confined to a supplementary role for the alliance but has its own significance and functions. Tsubouchi, “OSCE Process To ASEAN,” pp. 72-75.

potential enemies in negotiations, 3) participation of potential enemies in the subsequent cooperative actions, and other conditions required for establishment of multilateralism in security.<sup>35</sup> There are, however, the prerequisites in constructing the multilateral framework for security, and do not necessarily bring about establishment of *cooperative security order*. This is because the multilateral framework is no more than one of individual frameworks although it is an important constituent element in the *cooperative security order*. The security order indicates the entire structure of the security complex and cannot be represented by one framework.

*Cooperative security order* is established when the major powers have cooperative relations and a framework for cooperative intervention against conflict exists. The requirements for it would be added to the three conditions described above would be the conditions where major powers have no intentions of changing the status-quo by their forces, the participants are the status-quo powers that mutually share the interest, and thus there is a support to the agent (major power) that executes force in conflicts (again, conflicts among major powers are not the subject here).

The latter two elements, in particular, could be decisive factors in forming the *cooperative security order*. A good example lies in the comparison between Europe and Asia-Pacific. The objective in Europe is to integrate the eastern European nations in the field of security.<sup>36</sup> In other words, Europe is likely to pursue integration of the eastern European nations based on the recognition that the existing *cooperative security order* in the western Europe as the "status-quo." On the other hand, the objective in the Asia-Pacific is re-directing the "unclear and uncertain" international environment after the end of the Cold War toward stability. In other words, there is a higher degree of difficulties in the Asia-Pacific because the recognition of the basic "status-quo" is not necessarily shared and a new order must be established.

When the degree of seriousness in the issue itself in the core of the security complex is low, the interactions that develop surrounding the issue would be weak, and as a result the possibility of making change in the circumstances would be small. Under such condition, the possibility of achievement of the goal of the policy would be limited. This point must be the difference that exists between Europe which had been exposed to the threat of a nuclear war in the Cold War and the present Asia-Pacific where no clear threat exists.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Masashi Nishihara, "Asia-Taiheiyō Chiiki To Takokukann-Kyouryoku No Wakugumi Wo Chuushinn Ni," (trans. by author: "Asia-Pacific Region and Framework for Multilateral Security: with the ASEAN Forum at the Center") *Kokusai-Mondai*, No. 415 (October 1994), pp. 71-72.

<sup>36</sup> Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner clearly presents a target to integrate Russia. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, pp. 44-45. For the arguments on this matter, refer to: Takako Ueta, "Oushuu Ni Okeru Gunji Doumei No Henyou To Kyouchouteki-Anzenhoshou Kouzou," (trans. by the author: "Transformation of the Military Alliance in Europe and Cooperative Security Structures") *Kokusai-Seiji*, No. 117 (March 1998), pp. 175-190; Yuzuru Kaneko and Tomonori Yoshizaki, "NATO no Kakudai," (trans. by the author: "Enlargement of NATO: From Military Alliance to Cooperative Security Organization?"), *NIDS Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 1998), pp. 17-34.

<sup>37</sup> Cooperative security policies may be executed even if they are not planned to construct the cooperative security order. For example, the CSCE process may be considered as a cooperative security policy, but the objective was to reduce the risk of incidental war, and structure of the cooperative security order was not its original objective. (Tsubouchi, "CSCE Process To ASEAN", p. 74.)

The *cooperative security policy*, however, has a possibility of creating the elements themselves listed above, for creating *cooperative security order*. In other words, introducing the constructivism which has the theory that the structure itself would be formed through the inter-subjective process while an agent and a structure interact,<sup>38</sup> the *cooperative security policy* might be defined as the promoter of such inter-subjective process.<sup>39</sup> Then, it is possible that repeated efforts on the cooperative security policy help the participants to share the value and structuring of stable cooperative relations might bring about consolidated *cooperative security order*.

### 3. Security Order in the Asia-Pacific “region”: toward the 21st Century

The author has given conceptual argument on the security complex and cooperative security. Based on above, the author shall argue the security in the Asia-Pacific region, in relation to the cooperative security in particular.

#### (1) Security complexes in the Asia-Pacific

Before discussing the security in the Asia-Pacific, it is necessary to first identify what types of security complexes the Asia-Pacific exists.

At present, it seems that there are two sub-local security complexes and another security complex that comprehends the two in a double-strata structure in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, the “Southeast Asia security complex” which consists of the ASEAN nations at the core with participation of the United States, China and Japan; “Northeast Asia security complex”<sup>40</sup> which mainly concerns the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait issues where Japan and the United States participate; and the overall “Asia-Pacific security complex.”<sup>41</sup> Among these three, the Asia-Pacific security complex was formed in the circumstances that the region

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<sup>38</sup> For the arguments on the constructivism, refer to; Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No.1 (Summer 1998) , pp.171-200; Kimikazu Shigemasa, “Takokukan Anzenhoshou Mechanism No Naka No Daini Track Gaikou,” (trans. by the author: “Constructing the CSCAP: A Search for Theoretical Foundations”) *Kokusai-seiji*, No. 119 (October 1998), pp. 70-94.

<sup>39</sup> Adler and Barnett eds., *Security Communities*. Achrya argues that such process is in progress in the Asia-Pacific. Achrya, “Ideas, identity and institution-building.”

<sup>40</sup> Susan L. Shirk, “Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers,” in Lake and Morgan, *Regional Orders*, pp. 245-270; Yuen Foong Khong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex,” in Lake and Morgan, *Regional Orders*, pp. 318-339. The Asia-Pacific security complex seems to consist of the participating nations in the ARF and CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific).

<sup>41</sup> Buzan states that there existed three security complexes in Asia, namely the Southeast Asia, South Asia and South Pacific during the Cold War (the Northeast Asia is omitted because the overlay of the Cold War was strong and it had little autonomy). Barry Buzan, “The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation,” in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., *Pacific Cooperation* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 130-151. However, if the “Asia-Pacific security complex” as a whole is to be defined as done in this paper, the South Asia is omitted because it has received little overlay and has extremely strong autonomy. The South Pacific is also omitted because it seems to have been incorporated into the Asia-Pacific security complex.

had acquired autonomy in security because of the high rates of economic growth in the early 1990s and liberation from the overlay of the Cold War by the end of the Cold War, and it is a comprehensive entity with the major concern set at establishment of more stable international order. The Southeast Asia security complex has the major concerns over the maintenance of economic growth, construction mutually trusting relations among the participating nations, and reduction of the possibilities of armed conflicts. The major concerns of the Northeast security complex are how to solve the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.

## (2) Asia-Pacific security complex and cooperative security order

Those three security complexes described above have the relationship where the Asia-Pacific security complex exists comprehensively, and the Southeast security complex and the Northeast security complex are formed as sub-local security complexes that are overlaid from the former. Therefore, when security in the Asia-Pacific is to be considered, it is necessary to analyze the characteristics of the Asia-Pacific security complex. Two major problems have been identified in the studies of the feasibility of establishment of the cooperative security order in the Asia-Pacific.

The first problem arises from the comprehensiveness of the Asia-Pacific security complex itself. As discussed earlier, when the concern for the core issue is serious, it is more likely that specific measures are taken as seen in Europe during the Cold War. Normally, however, when comprehensiveness is higher, the concerns of issues become more diversified and the interests become broader and thinner. Therefore, in a security complex with high comprehensiveness, concerns are diffused and it is difficult to take specific measures. The Asia-Pacific security complex has strong comprehensiveness and does not recognize any immediate threats. Thus policies developed there do not bring about specific results easily at least in a short run.

The second problem arises from the differences in the characteristics between the Asia-Pacific security complex and its sub-local constituent element, the Northeast Asia security complex. According to the categorization made earlier of the security order, the Asia-Pacific security complex is similar to the "*concert system*"<sup>42</sup> and the Southeast security complex has slightly more cooperative element. The Northeast security complex, however, seems to be the order where the "*balance of power*" or "*conflictive enmity relations*" are apparently dominant due to the characteristics of the core concerns. Thus, single approach toward the security issues in the Asia-Pacific is difficult because a security complex with a totally different security order is incorporated into the Asia-Pacific security complex. The conditions for establishment of the cooperative security order are not met because it is impossible to formulate common recognition for the "status-quo" to be maintained unless the core issues in the Northeast Asia security complex, in particular, are solved ultimately and stably. Especially, the Taiwan problem that is a core issue in the Northeast Asia security complex, contains the possibility to damage the cooperative relations among major powers.

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<sup>42</sup> Acharya, "Ideas Identity and Institution-Building."

Therefore, it would be necessary to take separate approaches in two levels for the Northeast Asia security complex and the Asia-Pacific security complex when considering the construction of cooperative security order in the Asia-Pacific security complex.

### (3) *Cooperative security policies* in the Asia-Pacific region

In this section, the author shall discuss the positioning of the cooperative security policy in the Asia-Pacific with a focus on the relation with the competitive security policy in particular.

This subject is occasionally understood in the context of the relationship between bilateralism and multilateralism, but it should not be discussed with the distinction by the number of the participating nations. Generally speaking, bilateralism in this region means the alliance between Japan and the United States, and multilateralism is a framework as seen in the ARF. Alliances, however, are not confined to two nations. NATO, for example, is a multilateral organization, and if categorization is simply based on the number, organizations with considerable difference in characteristics for example, NATO and ARF would be taken up on the equal basis. Therefore, this subject must be understood with the focus on the functions rather than the number of the participants as the relationship between a military alliance pursued as a competitive security policy and the cooperative framework among nations pursued as a cooperative security policy.

As discussed above, the cooperative security policy and the competitive security policy are not mutually exclusive. The relationship between the two is not “supplementary” which means supplying what is lacking, but it exerts “complementary” influence to each other that is synergic up to the balancing point of the two. In other words, dialogues as a cooperative security policy can proceed only when the framework for crisis management has been assured by the competitive security policy. On the other hand, justification of the framework of crisis management can be reinforced when the concerned parties share the understanding of the “status-quo” to be maintained. Thus the relationship between the two may be said to be “coordination” rather than “supplementary.”

Therefore, the cooperative security order is difficult to achieve because there exists the Northeast Asia security complex that has totally different characteristics in the Asia-Pacific as discussed earlier. Thus, it would require two levels of policy, where the objective is to create common understanding on the “status-quo” in the Northeast Asia, and the objective in the entire Asia-Pacific is to establish the cooperative security order by organically linking the cooperative multilateral framework and military alliance.

## Conclusion

In this paper, the author has defined the cooperative security concept from two aspects, namely the security order and security policy, and analyzed an orientation of the *regional* security in the Asia-Pacific. This approach of analyzing the cooperative security from two aspects, has determined the significance of individual framework such as ARF and at the same time identified each framework as a constituent unit of the entire concept. It is now possible to comprehensively understand the security environment in the entire regions when the effects of the Japan-U.S.

alliance and other constituent elements that have the characteristics of competitive security policy are added in consideration.

The *cooperative security* concept employed in this paper is a concept that has been built up from the *collective security-type cooperative security*. The *collective security-type cooperative security* was conceived from the phenomena seen in the Gulf War, that is, the circumstances where major powers cooperated in taking countermeasures against a challenger to the order. It is another question altogether whether the same situation will occur or not.<sup>43</sup> In that sense it may be said that it is a concept to which reality has preceded a theory.

Japan is developing a security strategy based on the Japan - U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific where little clear threats exist at present. One of the problems is how to define the relationship with the multilateral framework.<sup>44</sup> They are of course not in an alternative, but they are not merely supplementary, either. Therefore, it will lead to establishment of a desirable security environment in the long run when the linkage between the two are recognized more positively. Therefore, it is necessary that the linkage between the two are recognized more positively and the cooperative relationship is established among major nations after the reduction of uncertainty in the region through the Japan-U.S. alliance. That should generate stable support for the Japan-U.S. alliance to take countermeasures as the framework of enforcement at contingencies and enhance its effectiveness. When such conditions are met, it will lead to establishment of a desirable security environment in the long run.<sup>45</sup> At that time, cooperative security order will be established in the Asia-Pacific.

The prerequisites, however, are that the cooperative relations among major nations continue and no clear threats exist. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the *hedge* in case the prerequisites are no longer met. That is precisely the major role of the competitive security policy, but it is not productive to make a-priori assumption that the cooperative relations among the major nations will deteriorate. When there arises an opportunity to structure a cooperative security order, such assumption may cause to miss such an opportunity. Therefore, it would be necessary to *prepare* to seize such opportunities for the cooperative security order. What is needed for that is the sense of balance between the cooperative security policy and competitive security policy. In other words, it is now necessary to combine cooperative security policy and competitive one appropriately, and develop security strategies with the sensitivity required for identification of the situations whether they link well and exert synergic effect or they have fallen into a trade-off.

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<sup>43</sup> Skeptical views include; Lawrence Freedman, "The Revolution in Strategic Affairs," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 318 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 32.

<sup>44</sup> Kamiya argues that "The Japan - U.S. security treaty and the ARF are not exclusive and will have relation in which both strengthen each other." Kamiya "Toward a Multi-Layered Security Structure in the Asia-Pacific Region," p. 157.

<sup>45</sup> The expression used on the alliance and dialogues between two or among more nations, "these frameworks complement rather than supplant one another, serving to promote general stability" in *the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998* (so-called the "East Asia Strategic Report") published in November following the new "Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" in September 1997 is suggestive along this line. Department of Defense, *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998*, (November 1998), p. 19 (available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf>).