

Tracing Criticisms of the “Basic Defense Force Concept” During the Second Cold War —Controversies over Japan’s Defense Policy in the 1980s—*

CHIJIWA Yasuaki**

Abstract

This research discusses why Japan’s “Basic Defense Force Concept” adopted earlier was maintained amidst the widely-discussed demise of détente and the arrival of the “Second Cold War” between the United States and the Soviet Union entering the 1980s. From the perspective that perceives the Basic Defense Force Concept as a “beyond-the-threat theory,” the defense controversies that unfolded during the Second Cold War were waged between the Basic Defense Force Concept and criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept resembling the “counter-threat theory” based on the increasing threat recognition. As a result, the Basic Defense Force Concept was not abandoned, which probably might finish with the victory of the Basic Defense Force Concept against the “counter-threat theory.” However, that was actually not the case. The Basic Defense Force Concept began to coexist with the “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement,” a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept that took prominence during the Second Cold War, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement” and the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change,” considered to be a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept as well, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation.”

Introduction

This research discusses why the “Basic Defense Force Concept (*Kibanteki Boeiriyoku Koso*),” adopted in the “National Defense Program Outline (*Boei Keikaku no Taiko* or *Boei Taiko*) for FY 1977 and Beyond” (1976 NDPO) formulated on October 29, 1976, was maintained amidst the widely-discussed demise of détente (easing of tensions) and the arrival of the “Second Cold War (*Shin Reisen*)” between the United States and the Soviet Union entering the 1980s, based on official documents, the oral histories and interviews of related people, and more while taking up criticisms from inside and outside Japan regarding the concept as well as various discussions concerning the concept in the political process. Until now, although there has been discussion

* Originally published in Japanese in *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyo* [NIDS Security Studies], vol.21, no.2, March 2019. Some parts have been updated.

** Senior Fellow, National Security Policy Division, Center for Military History

regarding the rising criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept in the 1980s,¹ there has not been a sufficient explanation for why the concept was maintained despite this. Answering this question will lead to understanding of the sustainability of Japan's defense concept, the theoretical structure in the background, and the development of Japan's defense policy during the Second Cold War, and provide hints for future security policy.

On January 1, 1979, the U.S. and China normalized their diplomatic relations that had been antagonistic during the Cold War. Prior to this, Japan and China had normalized their relations on September 29, 1972. The Soviet Union, which had a disadvantage in the strategic environment due to Japan and the U.S.' reconciliation with China in the 1970s, turned to coercive activity abroad. Entering 1979, there were frequent activities around Japan by Soviet missile destroyers, cruisers, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, anti-submarine aircraft, and more. The regional threat posed by the Soviet Union increased with the confirmation by the Japan Defense Agency of Soviet ocean minesweeping augmentation (January 1979), weapons transport to Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island (May), the Far East deployment of the *Minsk* aircraft carrier (July), as well as the construction of military base on Shikotan Island and the Far East deployment of supersonic, long-range Backfire bombers and mid-range SS-20 missiles (October)². In addition, following the Iran hostage crisis at the American embassy in Iran on November 4, 1979, the Soviet Union suddenly invaded Afghanistan on December 24. Western countries were shocked that the Soviet Union had carried out military intervention outside its sphere of influence. President James E. Carter, Jr. announced the "Carter Doctrine" that called for protecting interests in the Persian Gulf on January 28, 1980, which caused the widely-discussed demise of the *détente* and the arrival of the Second Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The tensions between the East and West soon extended to Northeast Asia.

The Basic Defense Force Concept defined Japan's ideal defense force as follows: "[T]he possession of the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support," "Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance," "At this time, the present scale of defense capability seems to closely approach target goals of the above-mentioned concept," and Japan's defense concept "will be standardized so that, when serious changes in situation demand, the defense structure can be smoothly adapted to meet such changes." The premise of the Basic Defense Force Concept was a recognition that "the international political structure in this region - along with continuing efforts for global stabilization - will not undergo any major changes for some time to come, and that Japan's domestic conditions will also remain fundamentally stable."³ In other words, there is no question that it was a defense concept premised on *détente* in the 1970s. Therefore, based on the rapid developments in the international situation following the formulation of the 1976 NDPO, the Basic Defense Force Concept began to be treated as a "enfant

¹ Hideo Otake, *Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji: Detanto kara Gunkaku he* [Japan's Defense and Domestic Politics: From *Détente* to Military Buildup] Sanichi Shobo, 1983; Akihiro Sado, *Sengo Nihon no Boei to Seiji* [Defense and Politics of Japan after the War] Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003; Takao Sebata, *Boei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichi-Bei Gaidorain* [The NDPO and the Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation] Bokutakusha, 1998.

² Otake, *Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji*, pp.270-276.

³ "The National Defense Program Outline For FY 1977 and Beyond" (Approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976).

terrible” (Haruo Natsume, who contributed as the Agency’s Director of the Defense Division to the Post-4th Defense Build-up Plan (*Boeiryouku Seibi Keikaku*) issues connected with formulation of the 1976 NDPO)⁴.

From the perspective that perceives the Basic Defense Force Concept as a “beyond-the-threat theory (*datsu-kyoi ron*),” the defense controversies that unfolded during the Second Cold War were waged between the Basic Defense Force Concept and criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept resembling the “counter-threat theory (*kyoi taiko ron*)” based on the increasing threat recognition. As a result, the Basic Defense Force Concept was not abandoned, which probably means a finish with the victory of the Basic Defense Force Concept against the counter-threat theory. However, that was actually not the case as shown in this research. The Basic Defense Force Concept began to coexist with the “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement (*Boeiryouku Zokyo Ron*),” a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept that took prominence during the Second Cold War, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement (*Beppyō Soki Tassei Ron*)” and the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change (*Beppyō Shusei/Koso Henko Ron*),” considered to be a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept as well, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation (*Beppyō Shusei/Koso Keizoku Ron*).” The Attached Table (*Beppyō*) showed a concrete plan for unit organization and equipment procurement of the NDPO.

Furthermore, the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement mentioned here has the same meaning as the traditional counter-threat theory and the Required Defense Force Concept (*Shoyō Boeiryouku Koso*).

While the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement also essentially means Basic Defense Force early achievement, the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement and the Basic Defense Force Concept were perceived coexisting under the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement because it was possible to avoid conceptual disputes (at the stage of the non-achievement of the attached table, the counter-threat theory and the beyond-the-threat theory were considered to be the same for carrying out defense force buildup) by focusing on the attached table. Moreover, against the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change, the concept of changing the defense concept accompanied by attached table revision to the counter-threat theory, the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation had the concept of it not being necessary to change the Basic Defense Force Concept even if there was revision of the attached table.

1. The “OK Personal Paper” and Rise to Prominence of the “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement”

When Michita Sakata, who promoted the formulation of the 1976 NDPO, resigned from his post as Director General of the Defense Agency on December 24, 1976, those who succeeded him as Director General did not necessarily have positive sentiment toward the 1976 NDPO as he did. Ganri Yamashita, who served as Director General during the Masayoshi Ohira administration from December 1978, stated at the Diet on March 6, 1979 that “the current situation has certainly become more severe” in comparison to the international situation at the time of the

⁴ National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies [hereafter GRIPS] (eds.), *Natsume Haruo Oraru Hisutori* [Oral History of Haruo Natsume] GRIPS, 2004, p.245.

formulation of the 1976 NDPO⁵. Although Joji Omura, who became Director General during the Zenko Suzuki administration in July 1980, stated, “There is no need to change the NDPO if the ‘1981 Mid-term Planning Estimates’ (*Chuki Gyomu Mitsumori* or *Chugyo* estimates on the main work of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for the next 5 years) planned to be formulated in 1982 are in line with it.” He also stated, “If a case occurs in which that does not happen...there would have to be discussion on such points in the National Defense Council or in a Cabinet meeting⁶.” In a speech at a business leader meeting on March 28, 1979, Ground SDF Chief of Staff Shigeto Nagano, as a leader of the people in uniform, mentioned the deployment of 32 divisions of the Far Eastern Soviet Army, improvement of the performance of tanks and range of artillery, the presence of Soviet military bases on Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island, the Far East deployment of the Kiev-class aircraft carrier *Minsk* and the increasing breadth of landing operations by helicopters, restrictions on the actions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet by the Far East deployment of the supersonic, long-range Backfire bombers, and more. He also stated, “The situation has changed, and we have to turn to revising the NDPO bit by bit in the near future.”⁷ This was the first time for a leader of the people in uniform to mention in an official capacity the necessity to revise the 1976 NDPO⁸. In addition, the changes in the situation surrounding the 1976 NDPO also affected the writing style of the *Defense White Paper*. The *FY1978 Defense White Paper* still stated that there had not been any major changes in the basic domestic and foreign situations from the time of the formulation of the NDPO, so defense force would be built up in accordance with the NDPO.⁹ However, in the FY1979 edition, although it is stated that “...showing that the international situation around Japan includes factors of instability...severe factors are recognized in the situation,” subtle phrasing is used that “it is believed there have been no drastic changes (*henkasitatoha ienaito mirareta*) in the conditions forming the premise of the outline.”¹⁰ At the Defense Councilor meeting on May 1, 1979 that deliberated the *FY1979 Defense White Paper*, a discussion took place on “...Explanation of NDPO: Simplification” according to the minutes.¹¹

⁵ May 6, 1979, Minister Ganri Yamashita’s response during the Budget Committee of the 87th House of Representatives, No. 20, the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=10576&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=8564&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=22&DPOS=14&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=11902.

⁶ November 25, 1980, Minister Joji Omura’s response during the Cabinet Committee of the 93rd House of Councilors, No. 10, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=10576&SAVED_RID=4&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=9633&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=18&DPOS=2&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=26321.

⁷ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), March 29, 1979.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *FY1978 Boei Hakusho* [Defense White Paper], p.81; See also Atsuyuki Sassa and Hajime Doba, “Kohan na Mondaitteki de Kokumin no Rikai Kitai: 53 nenban Boei Hakusho no Shiten to Tokucho” [Expectations for Citizens’ Understanding by Widespread Raising of Issues: Views and Characteristics of the FY1978 Defense White Paper] *Kokubo* [National Defense] 27:9, September 1978, p.8.

¹⁰ *FY1979 Defense of Japan* (English version), p.81.

¹¹ “Dai 4 Kai Sanjikan Kaigi Giji Yoroku” [Abstract of Minutes from 4th Councilors Meeting] (May 1, 1979), Historical Division of the Defense Agency, *Sanjikan Kaigi Giji Yoroku, Showa 54 Nen* [Abstract of Minutes from Councilors Meeting (1976)] ½, p.1137 (Main building 4A-034-00/2005 Defense 01221100) [Archived in National Archives of Japan].

At this time, Japan’s ally the U.S. began to intervene in earnest in Japan’s defense force buildup. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, who met with Foreign Minister Saburo Okita on March 20, 1980 during Okita’s visit to the U.S., stated, “The Government of the U.S. hopes for (Japan) to have a steady, remarkable increase in its defense spending.¹² At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Ohira and President Carter in Washington, D.C. on May 1, 1980, President Carter himself stated, “I would like Japan’s efforts to be made to quickly achieve a pre-existing governmental plan in order to respond to the new situation,” implicitly requesting advancing implementation of the Mid-term Planning Estimates.¹³ On December 12, 1980 as well, during his visit to Japan, Brown requested Prime Minister Suzuki to raise defense spending 9.7% above the previous fiscal year within the FY1981 budget compilation.¹⁴

Amidst this, the main leadership of the so-called “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement” that criticized the Basic Defense Force Concept was Hisahiko Okazaki, who served as the Japan Defense Agency Councilor (in charge of international relations) from July 1978 as a transferred official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1979, Okazaki wrote a paper entitled “Judgment of the Situation of the NDPO (Draft),” which he called the “OK personal paper” as an homage to the thesis entitled “Concept for Japan’s Defense Buildup” (also known as the “KB personal paper”) by Takuya Kubo, the former Director-General of the Defense Bureau.¹⁵ The KB personal paper was a source of the Basic Defense Force Concept. Within it, Okazaki wrote, “In the 1976 NDPO, judging from the big-picture perspective, synergy is being built up from specific military force to amount of equipment to formation, and organization is being built up with the understanding that the specific program will not change if there are no changes to the ‘basic’ situation.” However, he also wrote, “The ‘five conditions’ (the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement, peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, confrontation between China and the Soviet Union, closer relations between the U.S. and China, and maintenance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula) were not the NDPO itself, but part of the explanation.” It is certainly true that the recognition of the international environment was not from the 1976 NDPO but rather as indicated in the FY1976 and FY1977 editions of the *Defense White Paper*.¹⁶ Thus, because the judgment of the situation and program content of the 1976 NDPO “originally had no direct connection,” he pointed out that it was possible to separate them and only discuss the program, and advocated the following.

¹² *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), March 22, 1980.

¹³ *Ibid*, May 2, 1980 (evening paper).

¹⁴ *Ibid*, December 13, 1980.

¹⁵ In addition to Okazaki, people within the Inner Bureau at this time such as Defense Division Director Hisakatsu Ikeda (November 1978-December 1980) also criticized the Basic Defense Force Concept. GRIPS (eds.), *Hoshuyama Noboru Oraru Hisutori* [Oral History of Noboru Hoshuyama] (below) GRIPS, 2005, p.59.

¹⁶ The *FY1977 Defense White Paper* states that “major changes in the international environment” would correspond to major changes occurring to the following various points. A) Effective future maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security system. B) Efforts to avoid nuclear war and large-scale conflict apt to lead to nuclear war by the United States and the Soviet Union. C) No fundamental resolution of Sino-Soviet confrontation, allowing for minor improvement. D) Continued adjustment in Sino-American relations. E) Generally unchanged Korean Peninsula situation along present lines and continued unlikelihood of at least major conflict there. *FY1977 Defense of Japan* (English version), pp.55-56.

“As the future department working system, without losing sight of the big-picture international situation, based on detailed analysis of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and the results of research under the Guidelines (the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation formulated on November 27, 1978), objective, scientific operations will be carried out that calculate the defense force that Japan should build up, and those results must be Japan’s new defense concept substituting for the “NDPO” that is already finishing its historic mission.”¹⁷

Okazaki later stated that the Basic Defense Force Concept was “a strategy that completely does not envision potential enemies, and would be fine with a full selection of defense equipment such as swords and battle flags,” and also stated, “I thought it was quite stupid, and never once used Sakata’s concept when answering questions in the Diet when I was Defense Councilor.”¹⁸

Against counter-threats, the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement that represented the OK personal paper, Noboru Hoshuyama, who was deeply involved in the formulation of the 1976 NDPO as a senior staff member of the Defense Division (and held positions following the formulation of the 1976 NDPO including Head of the System Analysis Office to Head of Defense Planning, 4th Contract Section Head of the Central Procurement Office, and 2nd Surveying Section Head of the Defense Bureau), critically reacted, stating, “(The Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement insisted) ‘what we have now is based on the NDPO, so nothing can be done to break away from the NDPO.’ It was a leap in logic.”¹⁹ Hoshuyama also stated in regard to the U.S. pressuring Japan on defense that the “anti-NDPO faction in Japan...caused such statements in a foreign country.”²⁰ Hoshuyama reflected that discussions took place between “people who could understand that great efforts were required to achieve this (the 1976 NDPO), people who also understood what was explained by Kubo (such as beyond-the-threat theory), and people who were critical of such concepts and thought they wanted to achieve something in their own age.”²¹

2. The Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement

However, the conflict between the Basic Defense Force Concept and the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement has become unexpectedly tranquil.²² This was because of the appearance of the argument of the concept of the early achievement of specific Basic Defense Force military size indicated in the attached table of the 1976 NDPO, also known as the “Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement.”

On April 2, 1979, Prime Minister Ohira himself established his Comprehensive Security Research Group as his personal advisory committee, entrusting it to consider security policy from

¹⁷ “‘Boei Keikaku no Taiko’ no Josei Handan ni Tsuite (Soan)” [Judgment of the Situation of the NDPO (Draft)] (May 6, 1979), p.1 (quote from Sado, *Sengo Nihon no Boei to Seiji*, pp.316-318).

¹⁸ Hisahiko Okazaki, *Kokusai Josei Handan Hanseiki* [International Situation Judgments: 50 Years] Ikuhoshia, 2005, pp.84-85.

¹⁹ GRIPS (eds.), *Hoshuyama Oraru Hisutori* (Oral History of Hoshuyama) (below), pp.58-59.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² See also Keiji Omori, *Waga Kuni no Kokubo Senryaku* [Japan’s National Defense Strategy] Naigai Shuppan, 2009, pp.266-267.

the so-called “comprehensive security (*Sogo Anzen Hosho*)” perspective.²³ Comprehensive security had the recognition that security policy until then was biased toward military matters, and based on the first oil crisis that accompanied the outbreak of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War since October 6, 1973 and other events, is a concept that perceives security issues from wide perspectives including economic issues and energy issues. In the following year on June 12, 1980, Prime Minister Ohira suddenly passed away, but the Group submitted the “Comprehensive Security Research Group Report” to Acting Prime Minister Masayoshi Ito on July 2. Within the report, the Group requested not only a review of the 1976 NDPO but also its “early implementation.”

“Maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement, maintaining denial power, and building up the Basic Force that are all established within the NDPO are not being realized. That is a problem.”

“Filling the gap (meaning maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement, building up denial power, and building up the Basic Force) are matters that should be given high priority. That is just for implementing the NDPO. In reality, the fact that what the government decided has not been implemented must be said to be governmental negligence. The government has an obligation to clarify to the citizens that even the minimum necessity of the denial power is not being built up in the current situation, and swiftly implement the NDPO.”

“Of course, the NDPO itself has the characteristic that it should be revised according to the changes in the international situation. However, if Japan’s military force is premised strictly as being for self-defense, as long as there are close relations between Japan and the U.S., there is an upper limit on the military force that is necessary, and that upper limit should not be shifted carelessly.”²⁴

²³ The members were as follows. Chairman: Masamichi Inoki, Chairman, Research Institute for Peace and Security. Policy Researchers and Executive Secretaries: Tsuneo Iida, Professor, Nagoya University; Masataka Kosaka, Professor, Kyoto University; Policy Researchers: Hiroshi Akuto, Assistant Professor, University of Tokyo; Jun Eto, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology; Toshio Oosu, International Organization Section Chief, International Finance Division, Ministry of Finance; Tokio Kano, Vice President, Energy Conservation Center, Tokyo Electric Power Company; Hiroo Kinoshita, Director, Secretarial Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Hiroshi Kimura, Professor, Hokkaido University; Kimitaka Kuze, Deputy Director-General, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Home Affairs; Kisho Kurokawa (Architect); Kenji Konosu, Head of Planning Office, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Masamori Sase, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan; Atsuyuki Sassa, Director General, Personnel and Education Bureau, Defense Agency; Seizaburo Sato, Professor, University of Tokyo; Ayako Sono (Writer); Yasushi Tanahashi, Deputy Vice-Minister, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Transport; Tooru Toyoshima, Head, Paris-Japan Trade Center, Japan External Trade Organization; Mineo Nakajima, Assistant Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies; Koji Watanabe, Councillor, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Shoichi Watanabe, Professor, Sophia University; Policy Researchers and Secretaries: Yasuhiko Okada, Assistant to the Director, Research Planning Division, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Finance; Yasuo Saito, Assistant to the Director, Northeast Asia Division, Asian Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Advisors: Kenichiro Hirano, Assistant Professor, University of Tokyo; Mitsuru Yamamoto, Professor, Hosei University.

²⁴ Comprehensive Security Research Group, *Sogo Anzen Hosho Kenkyu Gurusupu Hokokusho* [Comprehensive Security Research Group Report] (July 2, 1980), Research Office of Akihiko Tanaka, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo, *Detabesu Sekai to Nihon* [Database World and Japan] [Online] Available at: <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19800702.O1J.html>.

The Japan Defense Agency also publicized that it took the same position as the Comprehensive Security Research Group in answers in the Diet and the *Defense White Paper*. In this process, the Japan Defense Agency referenced the interpretation resembling counter-threat theory of the Basic Defense Force Concept. At the House of Representatives Committee on Cabinet on November 4, 1980, Director Omura stated in the Diet, “I believe that it is not true to say that there was absolutely no consideration for potential threats in the foundation (of the Basic Defense Force Concept),” “In the *Defense White Paper* the following year as well, there will also be an explanation at an appropriate page length concerning the issue of such threats.”²⁵ (In the *FY1977 Defense White Paper* mentioned by Omura, there was certainly the statement, “The essential, universal nature of defense is preparation to meet external threats. Obviously, any defensive system which disregards external threats is inherently untenable.” Although it was stated, “The qualitative requirements of the Standard (Basic) Defense Force are defined as those elements of defense capability needed to confront threats,” at the same time, beyond-the-threat theory-like phrases were used such as “This approach, which centers on quantitatively assessing defense capability based on peacetime defense preparedness...”²⁶ and “conclusiveness in a certain sense,”²⁷ and among the uniform group there were people who were dissatisfied because they interpreted the Basic Defense Force Concept as the counter “low-threat” theory). The opposition parties did not accept these answers. While the government stated that the NDPO was not created with specific countries as threats, on the other hand, in response to beyond-the-threat theory criticism, it was answered that it was not the case that there was absolutely no envisioning of threats because limited and small-scale aggression was envisioned, but that was strange.²⁸ In response, Defense Bureau Director General Akira Shiota (June 1980-July 1982) answered in line with the Comprehensive Security Research Group report, stating, “Current buildup is being carried within the bounds of the NDPO. Moreover, in the current situation, when I thought about the current situation in which the attached table created based on that concept has not yet been attained, I view matters such as the Soviet army’s recent reinforcement in the Far East to be increasing potential threats. Based on this international situation, we are saying that at the very least, the NDPO’s attached table created through the Basic Defense Force Concept should be swiftly achieved.”²⁹ On the 25th of the same month at the House

²⁵ November 4, 1980, Minister Joji Omura’s response during the Committee on Cabinet of the 93rd House of Representatives, No. 7, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=25805&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=3874&DPAGE=5&DTOTAL=368&DPOS=88&SORT_DIR=0&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=25863.

²⁶ *FY1977 Defense of Japan* (English version), pp.52-53, 74.

²⁷ *FY1977 Defense White Paper*, p.52. The nuance of this part in *FY1977 Defense of Japan* (English version) is slightly differ from the original Japanese text.

²⁸ November 4, 1980, House of Representatives member Yuichi Ichikawa’s question during the Committee on Cabinet of the 93rd House of Representatives, No. 3, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=25805&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=3874&DPAGE=5&DTOTAL=368&DPOS=88&SORT_DIR=0&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=25863.

²⁹ November 4, 1980, Government Delegate Akira Shiota’s answer during the Committee on Cabinet of the 93rd House of Representatives, No. 7, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=25805&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=3874&DPAGE=5&DTOTAL=368&DPOS=88&SORT_DIR=0&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=25863.

of Councillors Committee on Cabinet, Shiota spoke further, “Although I believe the Basic Defense Force Concept is typically spoken of as a concept of beyond-the-threat theory, so to speak, I believe that is not necessarily the case.”³⁰

The thinking seen in the responses by the Japan Defense Agency in the Diet are organized in the *FY1981 Defense White Paper*. While indicating that “the Defense Agency acknowledges that the circumstances have changed in various ways since 1976 when the outline was determined,” the white paper states the following:

“It takes the stand that when the outline is reexamined, consideration should be given not only to a change in the international situation but also to various trends in Japan and the progress of the outline’s implementation. For the immediate future, the agency considers it imperative to attain the level of defense capability as envisioned by the outline – which can become a nucleus for a shift to a stronger posture at any time – as soon as possible. Therefore, it has no thought of revising the outline immediately.”³¹

In other words, based on the increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union, because the current defense force still had not reached the Basic Defense Force level indicated in the 1976 NDPO attached table, the attached table would be swiftly achieved. In addition, as the white paper stated that the “(the level of defense capability as envisioned by the NDPO) can become a nucleus for a shift to a stronger posture at any time – as soon as possible,” it does not forget to reference the so-called “expansion clause” in the 1976 NDPO of “it (This defense capability) will be standardized so that, when serious changes in situations so demand, the defense structure can be smoothly adapted to meet such changes.” GSDF member Takeshi Oba indicates regarding the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement, “At a glance, unrelated to increasing threats, it takes the form of continuing defense buildup based on the Basic Defense Force Concept, but in reality it reinforces defense force linked with increasing threats, and can be interpreted as adjusting the trajectory by skillfully taking the Required Defense Force Concept.”³²

Through the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement in this way, it became possible for the Basic Defense Force Concept and the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement to unexpectedly coexist at the stage of the attached table being unachieved. Additionally, from the standpoint of the people in uniform, it was not a review of the Basic Defense Force Concept, but rather firstly a shift to advocating that a review was necessary for the cap of using 1% of GNP for defense in

³⁰ November 25, 1980, Government Delegate Akira Shiota’s answer during the Committee on Cabinet of the 93rd House of Representatives, No. 10, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=28976&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=5&DOC_ID=7568&DPAGE=5&DTOTAL=368&DPOS=94&SORT_DIR=0&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=29100.

³¹ *FY1981 Defense of Japan* (English version), p.173.

³² Takeshi Oba, “Kibanteki Boeiryoku ni Motozuku Shorai no Rikujo Boeiryoku no Arikata” [Ideal Future Ground Defense Force Based on Basic Defense Force] *Rikusen Kenkyu* [Studies of the Land Warfare] 48:3, March 2000, p.31.

order to build the Basic Defense Force.³³ Originally at the time of the establishment of the 1% of GNP cap, the anticipated figure for 1% of GNP was a little over 12 trillion yen, and although the expenses cap in the Japan Defense Agency's preliminary calculations was 8-9 trillion yen, so it showed a considerable surplus. Following this the defense budget surplus under the 1% of GNP cap was lost because the economic growth rate was more sluggish than predicted and expensive main equipment was stockpiled in large amounts. For example, Hideo Miyoshi, who contributed as GSDF Chief of Staff in the formulation of the 1976 NDPO, stated at the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Defense Force Buildup Subcommittee on October 2, 1984 following his retirement, "The 1% figure was not used during the deliberations for drawing up the NDPO. ...It would be desirable to withdraw this (the 1% of GNP cap) and carry out the NDPO according to its intent."³⁴ (Later, the 1% of GNP cap was abolished by a Cabinet decision on January 24, 1987.)³⁵

When he wrote the paper "Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense Second Draft," Okazaki, the author of the OK personal paper, made efforts to "organize the issues through flexible interpretations in accordance with the NDPO ideas as much as possible in order to simplify the future transfer and developments from the NDPO."³⁶ In his new paper, although he stated, "The 'minimum' necessary amount is originally relative to the surrounding military capabilities, and it should not be denied that the surrounding military force has greatly changed compared to 1976," he also states, "At the present time, there are existing only defense buildup goals decided by the government, as well as unachieved goals, and it is firstly an urgent matter to achieve these goals."³⁷ In addition, on June 14 he addressed Omura, stating in his personal opinion entitled "Judgments and Countermeasures regarding Japan's Defense Force Reinforcement Requests by the U.S." that "it is fully expected that (the future results of Japan-U.S. consultations) will be to find common ground between the NDPO's goals and the proposals by the U.S. However, in any event, the early achievement of the NDPO is increasingly important as a midway goal, and it is not considered necessary to issue the conclusions of the talks within this fiscal year."³⁸ He thus actually amended the position he worked out in the OK personal paper and returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the same year.

On July 23, 1982 at a National Defense Council meeting discussing the 1981 Mid-term Planning Estimate that was decided the same day, the Japan Defense Agency reported,

³³ National Institute for Defense Studies [hereafter NIDS] (eds.) "Muramatsu Eiichi Oraru Hisutori" [Oral History of Eiichi Muramatsu] in NIDS (eds.), *Oraru Hisutori, Reisenki no Boeiryoku Seibi to Domei Seisaku* [Oral History, Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy During the Cold War] (3) NIDS, 2014, pp.300-302. Orient Shobo Editorial Department, *Jieitai Tatakawaba: Boei Shutsudo* [If SDF Battle: Defensive Mobilization] Orient Shobo, 1976, pp.300-302.

³⁴ "Boeiryoku Seibi Sho Iinkai" [Defense Force Buildup Subcommittee], Omura Joji Kankei Bunsho [Joji Omura-Related Documents] III-1-9-7 [Archived in Center for Modern Japanese Legal and Political Documents, University of Tokyo].

³⁵ "Kongo no Boeiryoku Seibi ni tsuite" [Future Defense Force Buildup] (Approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet meeting on January 24, 1979).

³⁶ "Koto Setsumeian, 5 gatsu 13 nichi, Okazaki Ki" [Oral Explanation Draft, May 13, Okazaki's Writing] pp.2-3, *Hoshuyama Noboru Kankei Bunsho* [Noboru Hoshuyama-Related Documents] (63-1), pp.3-4 [Archived in the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library in Japan].

³⁷ Hisahiko Okazaki, "Nihon no Boei Senryaku Dai 2 Ko" [Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense Second Draft] (March 25, 1981), pp.23-24. *Hoshuyama Kankei Bunsho* [Hoshuyama-Related Documents] (63-2).

³⁸ Councillor Okazaki, "Beikoku ni Yoru Waga Boeiryoku Zokyo Yosei ni tsuite Handan to Taisaku" [Judgments and Countermeasures regarding Japan's Defense Force Reinforcement Requests by the U.S.] (56.6.14), p.5, *Omura Kankei Bunsho* [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-7-3).

“Compared to 1976 when the NDPO was formulated, the recent international military situation surrounding Japan is increasingly severe due to the considerable reinforcement of the Soviet Union’s Far Eastern Army and other vigorous activities. On the other hand, the current situation of Japan’s defense force has not reached the scale determined in the NDPO and has various issues. There is still a gap with the level of the NDPO. By correcting such substantive and qualitative deficiencies, major enhancement of Japan’s defense capabilities can be expected compared with the current situation.”³⁹

3. Defense Pressure on Japan by the U.S. and the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change

On the other hand, even after the change from the Carter administration to the Ronald W. Reagan administration on January 20, 1981, the U.S. still did not change its stance of requesting Japan to reinforce its defense force. On March 9, 1981 at a press conference, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael J. Mansfield, who retained his post after the administration change, from the position that stressed defense force content and “role-sharing” between Japan and the U.S. more than defense spending numbers as favored by the previous Carter administration, stated that it was hoped that Japan would take a responsibility for Japanese mainland and the surrounding waters, where there was a shortage of military power accompanying the deployment change of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the West Indian Sea, and mentioned strengthening Japan’s anti-submarine capabilities and air defense.⁴⁰ At the time, the U.S. had adopted the “Swing Strategy” that would divert the U.S. fleet and others in the Asia-Pacific to Europe if Europe was attacked by the Soviet Union, and if that happened, it would need an expanded role by Japan in defense fields in order to fill the gap. It was hoped that the SDF would guard U.S. aircraft carrier mobile troops, detect Soviet submarines through escort vessels and antisubmarine aircraft, place blockades on the Soya, Tsugaru, and the Tsushima Straits, and other actions. The Soviet navy had 100 submarines in the Pacific Ocean alone at the time, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet only had 25 antisubmarine aircraft.⁴¹

In regard to Japan’s concept of the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement, in a discussion between Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito, who was visiting the U.S., and Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Ito stated, “The government intends to make efforts to quickly achieve the defense force level decided in the NDPO,” and it is recorded that this was conveyed in the meeting to the U.S. side.⁴² However, after this on the same day during a meeting with Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Weinberger pointed out to Ito that “compared to the time the NDPO was

³⁹ “Kokubo Kaigi ni okeru Boeicho no Hokoku Yoshi” [Defense Agency’s Report Summary in the National Defense Council] (July 23, 1982). However, as Chairman of the Joint Staff Council Tsugio Yada stated in a speech during the business leader meeting on May 7, 1981, “The NDPO has become unsuitable for the situation due to the changes in the international situation,” among the people in uniform there was still a tendency to call for revision of the 1976 NDPO. *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), May 7, 1981.

⁴⁰ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), March 10, 1981. See also Yasuaki Chijiwa, *Taishitachi no Sengo Nichi-Bei Kankei – Sono Yakuwari wo Meguru Hikaku Gaikoron 1952-2008* [The Ambassadors and Post-war Japan-U.S. Relations: Diplomatic Consideration on Their Roles 1952-2008] Mineruva Shobo, 2012, pp.133-134.

⁴¹ James E. Auer, “Engaging Japan: An American Naval Officer’s Relationship with Japan during the Cold War,” *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 15 (2008), p.97.

⁴² “Ito Gaimu Daijin Heigu Kokumu Chokan Kaidan” [Discussions Between Foreign Minister Ito and Secretary of State Haig], p.4, *Omura Kankei Bunsho* [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-3-9).

formulated, the international situation was changing.”⁴³ At a press conference following his return to Japan, Ito stated that he did not interpret Weinberger’s statement as a request to review the NDPO.⁴⁴ However, according to U.S. Department of Defense documents, there was spreading recognition within the Department until June that “We believe the outline has become obsolete and needs to be revised.”⁴⁵ James E. Auer, who served as Special Assistant for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for close to 10 years from April 1979 during the Carter administration to August 1988 during the Reagan administration, reflects, “To Americans, at least, *Taiko* strategically was almost meaningless. Japan will deal with small-scale attack, but Japan’s only potential enemy was the Soviet Union. And there is no way the Soviet Union will make a small-scale attack. So that part, we thought, was meaningless. Attached to the *Taiko* was the Standard (Basic) Defense Force, *beppyō*, annexed. And *beppyō* was reasonable. However, Japan didn’t have forces around in the *beppyō*. So *Taiko* itself look us to be strategically not logical. And the *beppyō* was a goal. But Japan didn’t have a capability, that kind of force didn’t exist, and we didn’t see any schedule or plan to achieve that level.”⁴⁶

From June 10-12, 1981, the 13th Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee (SSC) was held in Hawaii. During the discussions, the Japanese side approached the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement with a policy of conveying, “We consider it a major step forward that the goal is beginning to be seen for achieving the defense force level determined in the NDPO, which had not been foreseen to be achieved until now, in the (to be formulated in the following year) 1981 Mid-term Planning Estimates.”⁴⁷ In response, according to the memo of Defense Bureau Director-General Shiota, one participant from the U.S., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Francis J. West, concluded that the NDPO was “out of date,” and pressed the Japanese side for more defense efforts.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the U.S. side presented the following concrete proposal for requests such as defense of surrounding sea and airspace, defense of 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes, and response capability buildup against the Soviet Union’s Backfire aircraft.

- 12 air force units of fixed-wing antisubmarine aircraft, 125 P-3C aircraft (the attached table level was 10 air force units of aircraft excluding 6 air force units with HSS2 patrol helicopters from 16 air force units of land-based anti-submarine aircraft. An additional 80 P-3C aircraft were needed)
- 5 escort flotillas of antisubmarine ship units for maneuvering purposes, 70 antisubmarine ships, 20 submarines (the attached table had 4 escort units, about 60 ships and 16 ships for each)
- 14 air force units of interceptor aircraft (the attached table level was 10 air force units of aircraft. A further 80 F-15 aircraft were needed for the additional 4 air force units)

⁴³ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), March 27, 1981 (evening paper).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, June 30, 1981, No. 00906, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, Part II: 1972-1992, National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.).

⁴⁶ Author’s interview with James E. Auer, November 7, 2012, Tokyo.

⁴⁷ “Jeitai no Heiryoku Tassei Gaikan ni tsuite no Setsumei (An)” [Explanation Regarding the SDF Force Achievement Outline (Draft)] (56.5), Omura Kankei Bunsho [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-4-14).

⁴⁸ “Boeikyokucho Memo” [Defense Bureau Director-General Memo] (6.15), Omura Kankei Bunsho [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-4-4).

- 2 air force units of early warning aircraft, 16 E-2C airborne early-warning system (the attached table level was 1 air force unit)
- 3 months’ worth of ammunition storage quantity (not written about in the attached table)⁴⁹

The U.S. requests at the 13th SSC shocked Japan (Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda used the expression “asking Japan to build a 10 story building out of a 1-story house⁵⁰). At a press conference after the SSC, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Toru Hara, who had attended, said that against the Japanese attendees discussed based on the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement, in regard to the SDF’s battle continuation capabilities, combat readiness, and modernization, in particular air defense and antisubmarine capabilities, “In the U.S. side opinion, there are some points beyond the framework of the NDPO,” “in the regard to the NDPO itself, the U.S. side might think that the time of its enactment and the current circumstances were different.”⁵¹ In addition, Hara stated in response to a reporter’s question that it seemed the U.S. side was saying that Japan could not handle even small-scale aggression, “There were people who made statements like that.”⁵² In respond to these requests by the U.S., Japan responded, “It would be troubling to force out the NDPO. It is not possible to review the NDPO from the current domestic situation. The priority is to achieve the NDPO level.”⁵³ In the end, Hara had to generalize by stating, “There was a clash of opinions with nothing but requests to ‘make more efforts’ by the U.S. side. Although the Japanese side was thinking within the boundaries of the NDPO, the U.S. side was thinking of throwing out the NDPO. They were completely different views.”⁵⁴ Shiota says, “We thoroughly said we wanted to quickly achieve the lines decided by the NDPO’s attached table. We said we would not listen at all to being told to do this or that for such and such purposes while not being able to reach that. That was our basic stance.”⁵⁵ Further, Shiota says he did not show the U.S. side counter-threat theory-like interpretation of the Basic Defense Force Concept.⁵⁶

However, the U.S. side did not accept this. On the 29th of the same month, Defense Agency Director General Joji Omura visited the U.S. to meet with Secretary of Defense Weinberger. It is recorded in Omura’s memo that Weinberger stated, “Your efforts leave something to be desired in terms of timing aspects and in nature. Change the 1976 program.”⁵⁷ On April 26, 1982 the following year at a press conference with Japanese press organizations in Hawaii, Pacific Commander in Chief Robert L. J. Long stated, “The 1976 NDPO is out of date now when the Soviet Union

⁴⁹ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), June 16, 1981. See also Fumiaki Nishiwaki, “Shiireen Boei he “Kyodo Sakusen” – Fukamaru Nichi-Bei Domei Kankei” [Toward Defense of Sea Lanes “Joint Operations” – Deepening Japan-U.S. Alliance Relations], *Sekai Shuho* [World Weekly Report] 63:37 (September 21, 1982), p.15.

⁵⁰ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), June 18, 1981.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1981 (evening paper).

⁵² “Jimu Jikan Kaiken (SSC Shuryogo)” [Press Conference by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Following the SSC)] (June 14), p.6, Omura Kankei Bunsho [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-4-1).

⁵³ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), June 15, 1981 (evening paper).

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association (eds.), *Shiota Akira Oraru Hisutori* [Oral History of Akira Shiota], Japanese Modern Historical Manuscripts Association, 2006, p.117.

⁵⁶ Author’s Interview with Akira Shiota, April 2, 2013, Tokyo.

⁵⁷ “Wainbaga Kaidan Memo” [Weinberger Meeting Memo], Omura Kankei Bunsho [Omura-Related Documents] (III-1-6-1).

threat is increasing.”⁵⁸ The gist of Long’s comment was incorporated in the FY1983 edition of the *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, which states, “The 1976 NDPO did not address the serious issues of sustainability of Japan’s defense forces, the requirement for sea-lane defense protection, and has otherwise also grown seriously out of date.”⁵⁹ According to Japan Defense Agency analysis at the time, “A trend is seen in the U.S. Congress of linking trade deficits with Japan with Japan’s defense efforts.”⁶⁰ Haruo Natsume, who became Deputy Vice-Minister at the time (June 1980-July 1982), recalls, “The reality was that the Japanese side was extremely surprised and did not know what to do.”⁶¹

The Basic Defense Force Concept and the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement, which was originally a competing theory, could temporarily coexist at the stage in which the attached table was not achieved, but this kind of discussion would change when the U.S. side issued a request to not finish the attached table, and a review of the attached table itself is needed. Additionally, as Natsume states, “In the end, it (the pressure about defense from the U.S. on Japan) later changed to voices in Japan calling for a review of the NDPO,”⁶² pushed by the U.S. request for reinforcing defense force, the discussion strengthened on a review of the 1976 NDPO centered on influential LDP members on defense issue such as LDP Security Affairs Research Council Chairman Asao Mihara.⁶³

On July 18, 1981 immediately following the 13th SSC, at the taping of a TV program, Mihara disclosed that the LDP Security Affairs Research Council was promoting consideration of a review of the NDPO.⁶⁴ After this the formulation of the 1981 Mid-term Planning Estimates passed, and on December 21, 1984, the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, Security Affairs Research Council, National Defense Division, and the Special Committee on the Military Base Affairs acknowledged the “Proposal Regarding Defense Force Buildup” that clarified that “reconsideration would be started regarding the NDPO.”⁶⁵ On September 18, 1985, there was formulation of the 1986 Medium Term Defense Program (*Chuki Boeiryoku Seibi Keikaku* or *Chukibo*), which was a 5-year program that was raised in status from Mid-term Planning Estimates to a government program and determined necessary expenses. On October 6, the LDP decided to begin considerations regarding a review of the NDPO including not only the attached table but also the basic concept.⁶⁶ In other words, the idea was to change the defense concept to accompany the case of having to amend the attached table differ from the early achievement of the attached table in order to strengthen defense force. In the Diet in April 1986, LDP House of Councillors Member Masao Horie, who was also the former Commanding

⁵⁸ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), April 28, 1982.

⁵⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to United States Congress, 1983* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1983), p.55.

⁶⁰ Japan Defense Agency, “Showa 57 Nendo Boei Yosani ni taisuru Beigawa no Hankyo ni tsuite” [The U.S. Reaction to the FY1982 Defense Budget] (57.1.8), p.1, Doba Bunsho [Doba Documents] (E-49), (Archived in the Research Institute for Peace and Security).

⁶¹ GRIPS (eds.), *Natsume Oraru Hisutori* [Oral History of Natsume], p.319.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Sebata, *Boei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichi-Bei Gaidorain*, p.154, 204; *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), April 16, 1981.

⁶⁴ *Asahi Shimbun* (Asahi Newspaper), July 18, 1981 (evening edition).

⁶⁵ LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, Security Affairs Research Council, National Defense Division, and the Special Committee on the Military Base Affairs, “Proposal Regarding Defense Force Buildup,” *Jiyu Minshu* [Liberal Democracy] 385, April 1985, p.48.

⁶⁶ *Tokyo Shimbun* (Tokyo Newspaper), October 7, 1985.

General of the GSDF Western Army, asserted, “It would be too contradictory and illogical to only take command of land, sea, and air forces within the general boundaries of the attached table while simply leaving in place the basic NDPO concept. It would probably not be possible to respond to the changes after that.”⁶⁷ It is possible to perceive the above discussion as the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change,” which is a form of the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement.

In addition, the Research Council on Peace Issues, established by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (inaugurated on November 27, 1982) on August 5, 1983 as his personal advisory council, pointed out the following in its report (*Comprehensive Security Policy for the International State, Japan*) compiled on December 18, 1984 the following year.⁶⁸

“While promoting reform efforts, the NDPO should be reconsidered. Eight years have already passed since its formulation and the international situation, including the military situation, has changed. Although Japan’s economic strength is growing, its financial affairs are worsening, and it has become necessary to introduce new viewpoints for circumstances such as configuration of military force content changes accompanying technological development.

Because the achievement period for the NDPO was thought to be comparatively short, there were self-imposed restraints on defense efforts, the expression form for the limited principles was slightly narrow, and it did not have a sense of completion as a valid combat readiness force against aggression that could occur at some point. The idea of the ‘Basic Defense Force’ central concept was primarily for defense buildup in peacetimes and does not clarify the response process and principles for a situation with increasing tension or a situation with a predicted emergency. Therefore, at the same time as being inadequate for responses, it is also inadequate in that it does not clarify necessary self-restraint principles demanded for responding to such a severe situation. The defense structure that should be created going forward should allow more flexible responses, and at the same time must also clarify more efficient, comprehensive defense systems and self-restraint principles. That is different from the essence of the Basic Defense Force Concept.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ April 23, 1986, Question by House of Councillors Member Masao Horie, 104th House of Councillors Special Investigative Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security No. 2, [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=18041&SAVED_RID=2&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=6&DOC_ID=2401&DPAGE=2&DTOTAL=53&DPOS=31&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=24538. See also NIDS (eds.), “Horie Masao Oraru Histori” [Oral History of Masao Horie], NIDS (eds.), *Oraru Hisutori, Reisenki no Boeiryou Seibi to Domei Seisaku (1) – Yojibo Made no Boeiryou Seibi to Nichi-Bei Anpo Taisei no Keisei* [Oral History, Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy During the Cold War (1) – Defense Buildup Until the 4th DBP and Formation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement], NIDS, 2012, pp.332-333.

⁶⁸ The members were as follows. Chairman: Masataka Kosaka, Professor, Kyoto University; Members: Yoshihisa Ojimi, Director and Counsellor, Arabian Oil Co.; lawyer Kinko Sato, Director, Fusosha Publishing; Tatsuro Sato, Advisor, Jiji Press; Ryuzo Sejima, Member, Provisional Council for Administrative Reform; Michio Takeuchi, Chairman of the Board, Tokyo Stock Exchange; Sohei Nakayama, Chairman of the Board, International University of Japan; Yoshihiro Nakayama, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University; Masayoshi Namiki, Head of the Food Policy Research Institute, Food and Agriculture Policy Research Center; Yoshiji Miyata, Senior Advisor, Japan Federation of Basic Industry Worker’s Union; Takashi Mukaibo, Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

⁶⁹ Research Council on Peace Issues, *Heiwa Mondai Kenkyukai Hokokusho, Kokusai Kokka Nihon no Sogo Anzen Hoshō* [Research Council on Peace Issues Report: Comprehensive Security Policy for the International State, Japan] Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau, 1985, p.82.

The chairman of the Research Council on Peace Issues who stated that “the Basic Defense Force’ central concept was primarily for defense buildup in peacetimes and does not clarify the response process and principles for a situation with increasing tension or a situation with a predicted emergency” and requested the reconsideration of the NDPO had also taken an important role in the advocacy for the concept of “resistance force (*teiko ryoku*)” as a former member of Defense Agency Director General Sakata’s personal advisory committee the “Committee to Study Defense” (*Boei wo Kangaeru Kai*) and supported the Kubo Concept since the KB personal paper from an international politics viewpoint. He was Masataka Kosaka, a professor at Kyoto University.

4. The Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation

In January 1985, Noboru Hoshuyama, who had been appointed Director of the Defense Division, says, “In January 1985 when I became a Director of the Defense Division, it was a major issue whether to reform the NDPO, which had been formulated 10 years earlier.⁷⁰ However, the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change was replaced by that can be called the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation” which regarded revision of the attached table under the Basic Defense Force Concept was possible.⁷¹

This concept was clarified by Prime Minister Nakasone through his answers in the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives on April 8, 1986.

“As stated in the main text of the NDPO, in the case of a need arising for changing equipment systems and other matters in order to respond to technical level trends of various countries, through deliberations and decisions in Cabinet meetings and the National Defense Council, it is considered to be possible to change the attached table. As part of making this change, I believe it will not be immediately reviewing the fundamental concepts of the NDPO including the Basic Defense Force Concept, which is the fundamental spirit of the NDPO, and repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance, and other matters. In any event, the government is not considering amending not only the NDPO but also the attached table and other matters for the present.”⁷²

In response to this, like Hoshuyama, there was a concept that “it has come to be thought generally and ordinarily until now that the NDPO attached table was substantively halted. Even if the halt was slightly increased, it is doubtful that there is persuasive power to explain that ‘it is

⁷⁰ Noboru Hoshuyama, “Hyoshi/Memo”[Cover/Memo] Hoshuyama Noboru Kankei Bunsho (Dai 2 ji Ukeirebun) [Noboru Hoshuyama-Related Documents (Second)] (1075) (Archived in the Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room of the National Diet Library in Japan).

⁷¹ See also Asao Mihara (with Kazuo Yasuhara), “‘1 % Waku’ Minaoshi ha Shincho ni: Yakudatsu Jieitai niha mada Sobi Busoku” [Carefully Reviewing the ‘1% Cap’: There is Still Insufficient Equipment in the SDF Useful] *Economist* 62:32, August 7, 1984, pp.61-62; Eiji Fukazawa, “Boei Keikaku no Taiko’ Minaoshi Rongi no Kiseki” [Trajectory of the Discussion on the Review of the NDPO] *Rippo to Chosa* [Legislation and Research] 144, March 1988, pp.29-30.

⁷² April 8, 1986, Responses of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to Questions in the Diet, the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives of the 104th Diet, No. 8, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=39030&SAVED_RID=2&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=6&DOC_ID=2393&DPAGE=2&DTOTAL=71&DPOS=28&SORT_DIR=0&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=44262.

not being reviewed.”⁷³ However, the *Defense White Paper* of the same fiscal year also stated that the government does not intend to amend the attached table. It also showed the same view as the answers in the Diet of Nakasone, stating, “Moreover, when the need arises for a reformation of equipment structure and other systems of the Self Defense Forces in order to cope with further changes in, for example, the technological standards, the attached table of the Outline can be amended after deliberation and approval by the Security Council of Japan (reorganized from the National Defense Council in July 1, 1986) and the Cabinet. Even if alterations to the attached table were to be made, this should not be interpreted as an immediate ‘revision’ of the Outline which would mean a change of the fundamental concept of the Outline such as the ‘possession of defense forces capable effectively coping with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression’ outlined in the text.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, in the *FY1987 Defense White Paper* within the “Mechanism of the Outline” item, in response to criticism that there was a change in scale and content of limited and small-scale aggression and the NDPO could not effectively repel it, it is stated that the NDPO “has its own built-in mechanism which enables it to cope with changes in the circumstances,” and it is mentioned that the 1976 NDPO provides that the nation’s defense buildup be carried out “with due consideration given to qualitative refinement and improvement of the defense capability so that it can cope with changes in technological standards in other countries.” The response was that “[t]hrough qualitative improvement of main defense equipment within the outline, it will be possible to deal with such changes over a considerably long period of time.” Continuing on, the white paper focuses on a note that in the attached table, “this list is based upon the equipment structure that SDF possesses or is scheduled to possess” at the time of drafting of the NDPO. “This is in consideration for the possibility that quantitative figures of the units and main equipment as specified in the attached table may be altered depending on changes in equipment systems that can result from scientific and technological progress in the future.” “The fundamental concept underlying the Outline is to seek to build up a more efficient defense capability. This means that quantitative figures for main equipment can be altered even without changes in equipment systems. For example, when new equipment is introduced to replace separate functions held by more than one Self-Defense Force and when it is considered appropriate, from the standpoint of greater efficiency, to place the new equipment under control of one of the forces, the boundaries separating the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as defined in the attached table may be altered or slightly changed in the quantitative figures for main equipment set aside for each of the three forces.” This means it is possible to change the attached table accompanying equipment system changes and other matters or defense force optimization.⁷⁵

On November 20, 1986 before this, Prime Minister Nakasone stated during answers in the Diet, “Now is the time to exert all efforts to achieve the NDPO level.” He indicated the Basic Defense Force Concept would be continued for the time being, stating, “In regard to problems afterwards, they should be thought about taking into consideration all of the circumstances at that point in time. Therefore, whether the Basic Defense Force will be further extended or whether

⁷³ Noboru Hoshuyama, “‘Boei Keikaku no Taiko’ no Minaoshi” [Review of the NDPO] Hoshuyama Noboru Kankei Bunsho (Dai 2 ji Ukeireibun) [Hoshuyama-Related Documents (Second)] (1536).

⁷⁴ *FY1986 Defense of Japan* (English version), p.81.

⁷⁵ *FY1987 Defense of Japan* (English version), pp.77-78. See also GRIPS (eds.), *Hoshuyama Oraru Histori* [Oral History of Hoshuyama] (below), pp.67-68.

a new concept will emerge should be appropriately thought about taking into consideration the various conditions...at that time.”⁷⁶ In the “Instructions Regarding Creation of Defense Programs and Other Matters” established in April 1977, although it was assumed that there would be a review of the NDPO based on the “Joint Mid-term Defense Estimates” based on the “Joint Long-term Defense Estimates” drawn up by the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council,⁷⁷ Seiji Ema, who served as Head Planner of the Defense Bureau from July 1984-July 1986, states, “From my perspective working on the mid-term programming later until 1986 Medium Term Defense Program, there was no suggestion of having to change the NDPO by reflecting this (the Joint Mid-term Defense Estimates) to that (the NDPO).”⁷⁸ In the end, the attached table was not revised during the 1976 NDPO period.

In reality, both the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change and the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation had strong sides that argued for advocating the vague Basic Defense Force Concept or criticisms against it, and it cannot be said that it became a sophisticated concept. Therefore, both ideas might seem contradictory at a glance, but there remain vague parts regarding whether there were essential differences in the concepts. For example, if the threat recognition of the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change is limited to small scale aggression, the problem is the relative scale of limited and small-scale aggression, and although there is no need to change the Basic Defense Force Concept itself, it seems such logic was not fully sophisticated.⁷⁹ Consider this background for the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation simply supplanting the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change.

Conclusion

The defense controversies that unfolded during the Second Cold War were not waged between the Basic Defense Force Concept and counter-threat theory-like Basic Defense Force Concept criticisms that responded to rising recognition of threats. It is also not the case that the Basic

⁷⁶ November 20, 1986, Responses of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone to Questions in the Diet, House of Representatives Committee on Cabinet of the 107th Diet, No. 6, Kokkai Kaigiroku [Minutes of the Diet] [Online] Available at: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_dispdoc.cgi?SESSION=4461&SAVED_RID=1&PAGE=0&POS=0&TOTAL=0&SRV_ID=6&DOC_ID=8290&DPAGE=1&DTOTAL=1&DPOS=1&SORT_DIR=1&SORT_TYPE=0&MODE=1&DMY=5518. However, Nakasone later gave his opinion, “I did not necessarily approve of the ‘Basic Defense Force Concept’. Rather than that, what was important was to think about how to create a realistic system that could respond to aggression by a foreign enemy. For example, specific issues such as how to deploy Tomahawks. Although building up Basic Defense Force was important, it was necessary to have something above it. Incidentally, if I advocate that, the Socialist Party will get riled up. Basic Defense Force means political safety, but I also felt it was useless to just go down such a safety road. It was a position that required defense force for emergencies were needed.” Yasuhiro Nakasone (Interviewed by Takuma Nakashima, Ryuji Hattori, Amiko Nobori, Hidekazu Wakatsuki, Narushige Michishita, Ayako Kusunoki and Takao Segawa), *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaiko* [Japanese Foreign Policy since 1945: Yasuhiro Nakasone Oral History] Shinchosha, 2012, pp.258-259.

⁷⁷ Defense Division, Defense Bureau, “Boei Shokeikaku Kunrei no Gaiyo To ni tsuite” [Regarding Defense Programs Instructions], *Boei Antena* [Defense Antenna] 202, May 1977.

⁷⁸ NIDS (eds.), “Ema Seiji Oraru Hisutori” [Oral History of Seiji Ema] in NIDS (eds.), *Oraru Hisutori, Reisenki no Boeiryoku Seibi to Domei Seisaku* [Oral History, Defense Buildup and Alliance Policy During the Cold War] (7), NIDS, 2017, p.140.

⁷⁹ Such points were made sophisticated in Defense Bureau Director-General Seiki Nishihiro’s “‘Power Vacuum’ Theory” (*Chikara no Kuhaku Ron*) clarified in the House of Representatives Special Security Committee on August 24, 1987, but I would like to discuss this again in a different manuscript.

Defense Force Concept emerged victorious as a result. From when the Basic Defense Force Concept was originally established, there were ambiguous interpretations like beyond-the-threat theory-like interpretation, counter low-threat theory-like interpretation, the “Validation Theory” (*Kensho Ron*, theory that it is possible to oppose in the end when verifying whether it is possible to oppose low threats with defense force derived from the beyond-the-threat theory) interpretation.⁸⁰ As Shigeki Nishimura, a staff of the Ground Staff Office at the time, pointed out regarding the reality of the Basic Defense Force Concept, “This term has vague logic and has been degraded with dirty fingers marks due to opportunistic usage.”⁸¹

Based on the increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia with the demise of détente and the arrival of the Second Cold War, as well as the pressure regarding defense from the U.S. on Japan, criticisms within Japan grew against the Basic Defense Force Concept, and the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement emerged as represented in Councillor Hisahiko Okazaki’s OK personal paper. However, according to the Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement that appeared in the Comprehensive Security Research Group Report, Defense Bureau Director-General Akira Shiota’s answers in the Diet, the *FY1981 Defense White Paper*, and more, the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement unexpectedly began to coexist with the Basic Defense Force Concept. There was greater interest among people in uniform about the 1% of GNP cap on defense spending that was capable of hindering building Basic Defense Force, and Okazaki changed his position. Following this, the U.S. issued requests not settled in the attached table at fora such as the 13th SSC. In Japan as well, people centered on influential LDP members on the defense issue called for the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change, a form of the Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement, and the Research Council on Peace Issues Report also requested reconsideration of the Basic Defense Force Concept. However, the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change was supplanted by the Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation that enabled revising the attached table under the Basic Defense Force Concept shown in the FY1986 and FY1987 editions of the *Defense White Paper*. Competing counterarguments to the Basic Defense Force Concept were, we can say, successively incorporated into the Basic Defense Force Concept itself. This is understood through tracing criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept during the Second Cold War.

⁸⁰ Yasuaki Chijiwa, “Unfinished ‘Beyond-the-Threat Theory’: Japan’s ‘Basic Defense Force Concept’ Revisited,” *National Institute for Defense Studies Journal of Defense and Security* 18:1, November 2015, pp.97-98.

⁸¹ Shigeki Nishimura, *Boei Senryaku to ha Nanika* [What is Defense Strategy?] PHP Institute, 2012, p.203.

