

Capacity Building Assistance in the International Community: The Cases of the United States and China*

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Abstract

This article aims to understand the emerging practice of capacity building assistance in the contemporary world through an examination of recent US and Chinese efforts in this area. Capacity building assistance is defined here as assistance to enhance the capacity of developing countries to address security issues.

The article consists of two parts. The first part takes up four US Department of Defense (DoD) activities: support to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to strengthen their maritime security capabilities in the Celebes Sea; the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP); the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) program; and the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS). Between 2006 and 2010, the United States provided comprehensive packages of equipment and personnel training necessary for the three coastal states to improve their counterterrorist and counter-piracy operational capabilities in the Celebes Sea. With the aim of providing counterterrorist training and educational opportunities to US allies and partners, the CTFP has now grown into a program attended by more than 3,000 people from over 130 countries every year. The DoD's HMA program is characterized by a focus on demining skills and risk education, and is conducted in coordination with other government-funded programs such as those by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Finally, GEIS is also a government-wide program to address the threat of emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases by helping improve disease surveillance, preparedness and response capabilities worldwide. As part of GEIS, the DoD's overseas laboratories work with partner countries through workshops and training exercises as well as coordinated outbreak response initiatives. Partly driven as well as enabled by its global military presence, the United States has thus been providing capacity building assistance in a fairly wide range of fields.

The second part of the article describes recent Chinese activities—demining assistance, medical assistance using the hospital ship of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and education of foreign military officers and personnel. China's demining assistance includes financial contribution to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, provision of demining equipment and materials, demining activities on the ground by demining units and experts on multinational (as part of UN peacekeeping) and national platforms, and training of foreign deminers at national training centers or through deploying personnel. As for medical assistance, China has deployed the naval "Peace Ark" hospital ship four times to provide medical assistance abroad

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(Harmonious Mission). In these missions, PLA medical personnel provided medical services to China's deployed troops and local residents in the country, conducted clinical services at local hospitals, and engaged in medical exchange with local doctors and experts including the offering of joint services to the local population. China has a longer history of educating foreign servicemen that dates back to the 1950s. While their main method of educational exchange was and continues to be via the sending of trainers and instructors abroad, there is a gradual shift towards in-country education with increasing willingness to accept foreign students. Overall, China's capacity building assistance is characterized by a clear emphasis on raising the country's international profile and on strengthening the relationship with governments and militaries deemed important for China's external strategy. It was pointed out, however, that this promotion-oriented assistance posture does not necessarily lead to substantive improvements in the capabilities of the recipient countries.

The article concludes by pointing out the potential diversity in the objectives, tools, timeframes and implementing frameworks of capacity building assistance and that Japan may also be required to adapt itself to such diversity if it is to make a more active contribution in this area.

Introduction

Capacity building assistance (defined here as assistance to enhance the capacity of developing countries to address security issues) has been becoming an increasingly important part of the international community's effort to improve and stabilize the international security environment. Starting with projects in Cambodia and Timor-Leste in FY2012, the Ministry of Defense of Japan (MOD) has also engaged in capacity building assistance programs.¹ As an area of study, however, capacity building is a relatively new area, and there is no significant body of work on the subject in Japan and even internationally. As such, it is difficult to gain a perspective on the background, developments and trends of international capacity building assistance.²

With this in mind, the article aims to examine specific cases of capacity building assistance conducted in the international community. It does so through detailed case studies on the United States and China, and by analyzing the characteristics and objectives of their activities. As noted above, capacity building has already been launched as an MOD activity. Gauging the activities undertaken by other major countries will enable an informed discussion about Japan's capacity building policy in terms of its international impact and future direction.

In the two sections below, this article will take up the capacity building assistance efforts by the United States and China, followed by a brief analysis of the trends identified through such cases and their suggested policy implications.

¹ For more information on the capacity building programs of MOD, see "Noryoku Kochiku Shien nitsuite [Capacity Building Assistance]," <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/cap_build/index.html>. The explanation currently provided by MOD defines capacity building assistance broadly as "to help other country improve its own capacity by utilizing Japan's capacity."

² For the few available examples, see: Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, Georgetown University Press, 2010.

United States

Maritime security capacity in the Celebes Sea (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines)

Overview and purpose

The Celebes (Sulawesi) Sea as well as the adjoining waters (Molucca Sea and Sulu Sea) comprise maritime borders for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. This sea area has not only witnessed acts of piracy but also been used by terrorist groups in the region (e.g., Jemaah Islamiya: JI, Abu Sayyaf, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front: MILF) for their operations and as routes for the movement of equipment and supplies that they use in their activities.³ In order to enhance the capacity to tackle this situation, the United States provided assistance to the three coastal countries from 2006 to 2010 using new program funding.

This assistance was funded under the authority that was added by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, and since then has been extended every year. This authority is intended to build the capacity of foreign military forces (and maritime security forces) to: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations; or (2) enable their participation in and support for stability operations in which the US Forces are a participant.⁴ The disbursements initially had a cap of \$200 million but increased to \$350 million from FY2009. Through FY2012, approximately \$1.78 billion was used for programs in 41 countries.⁵

From its start through FY2009, Section 1206 funding placed particular priority on enhancing capacity for counterterrorism operations ((1) above).⁶ It was in this initial period that the United States provided assistance to the three coastal states surrounding the Celebes Sea to help build their maritime security capacity.

Activities and achievements

Table 1 lists the Section 1206 assistance programs that were provided to the three countries in each fiscal year. Table 1 includes assistance that covers areas other than the Celebes Sea area (e.g., Malacca Strait) as well as assistance that is not necessarily specific to maritime security (C4ISR, command center, and precision guided weapons). Moreover, the table merely lists the items and contains little information on their actual details. Nonetheless, it shows the US intention to provide packages of equipment, infrastructure and training necessary for the three countries to enhance the intelligence and maritime interdiction capabilities in the Celebes Sea and its surrounding waters.

³ US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, April 2006, pp.18-19; and Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, "Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines," *RAND Occasional Paper*, 2012, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP372.pdf>, accessed June 3, 2013.

⁴ Section 1206, FY2006 NDAA, P.L. 109-163, January 6, 2006. The amendment to add "maritime security forces" to the eligible recipients of assistance was made in FY2009. Section 1206 (a), FY2009 NDAA, P.L. 110-417, October 14, 2008.

⁵ Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform: 'Section 1206' Background and Issues for Congress," CRC Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2013, p. 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Table 1 Section 1206 Assistance for Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (FY2006-FY2010, figures inside parentheses in units of \$ million)

Indonesia \$80.0 million	
2006	Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) (18.4)
2007	Eastern Fleet Regional Command Center (3.8), Eastern Fleet maritime equipment (7.3), Celebes Sea and Malacca Strait information network system (6.1), coastal surveillance stations (11.5)
2008	Coastal surveillance stations (4.3), Western Fleet Command and Control (C2) Center and HQ (2.0), C4SR (4.0)
2010	Maritime special operations forces counterterrorist capability (10.8), aviation counterterrorism interdiction capability (11.8)
Malaysia \$43.8 million	
2007	Eastern Sabah maritime domain awareness (MDA) radars (13.6), Strait of Malacca MDA support (2.2), U.S. CENTRIX stations (0.5)
2008	MDA package (11.5), C2 Center for Joint Forces Sabah HQ (7.1), maritime interdiction package (9.0)
Philippines \$82.8 million	
2007	Maritime training and equipment for interdiction purposes (3.0), Coast Watch South (CWS) high frequency radios (1.8), maritime interdiction capability (6.4), interdiction and offensive capabilities improvement of UH-1 helicopters (4.4)
2008	Radars for Sulu Archipelago (11.1), interdiction operation capability for border control (5.8)
2009	CWS radars for Eastern Mindanao and adjacent border surveillance (14.5), CWS intelligence—operations counterterrorism capability (8.1)
2010	Precision guided weapons capability for counterterrorism operations (18.4), maritime strike capability (Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance Battalion) (9.3)

Note: The total amount of all disbursements may not equal the country total (Malaysia).

Source: Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform: 'Section 1206' Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, March 3, 2011, pp. 30-31; and Nina M. Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform: 'Section 1206' Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2013, pp. 23-24.

For example, an Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) was first provided to Indonesia. Prior to this, Indonesia had installed two IMSS stations in Eastern Sumatra. However, more stations were needed to conduct continuous coastal surveillance for which purpose the following equipment and assistance were provided in FY2006:

- 8 IMSS stations (X & S band radars, cameras, and an automatic identification ship [AIS] tracking system);
- 7 X-band ship radars (with installation);
- Upgrade of the navy headquarters' high frequency radio;
- Development of a concept of operations (CONOPS); and
- Spare hardware for two additional IMSS and a training, logistics, and technical assistance package.⁷

A total of \$18.4 million was used for these assistance programs. Furthermore, starting in FY2010, 12 rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and related equipment and training package, as well as equipment and training assistance to improve day and night counterterrorism air missions were provided to build the maritime counterterrorism capacity of special operation forces.⁸

⁷ DoD/DoS Inspectors General, *Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program*, August 31, 2009, pp. 76-80.

⁸ Serafino, "Security Assistance Reform," April 19, 2013, pp. 23-24.

In the case of the Philippines, assistance for the Philippine Government's Coast Watch South (CWS) initiative forms the main pillar of the Section 1206 assistance. CWS is a project that the Philippine Government launched in 2005 to increase maritime domain awareness (MDA) capability in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. The project was planned with the support of Australia. The program mainly includes the establishment of 17 stations along the coast stretching from the Sulu Sea to the Celebes Sea (Palawan Island to Eastern Mindanao Island), equipped with radars, high-speed patrol boats, and helicopters.⁹ As of April 2011, 11 stations were built, and 10 RHIBs were provided.¹⁰ This support from the United States (and Australia) has enabled the Philippine Government to build its MDA capacity in the Celebes Sea area through the CWS initiative. In September 2011, the government established the National Coast Watch System (NCWS), an inter-agency integrated mechanism in charge of maritime security issues.¹¹

As these examples demonstrate, the US assistance was provided here in coordination with the initiatives of the recipient countries and with an eye on covering the longer-term operational and maintenance needs of the provided equipment such as spare parts and equipment training.

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)¹²

Overview and purpose

The CTFP began in 2002 to assist US friends and allies in enhancing their counterterrorist capability through the provision of education and training.¹³ The CTFP's specific goals are to: (1) develop and strengthen human and intellectual capital that understands the ideologies and mechanisms of terrorism and the ways and means of countering them; (2) build the counterterrorist capabilities of partner nations; (3) build a global network of counterterrorist experts and practitioners; (4) counter ideological support for terrorism; (5) harmonize views about the threat of terrorism; and (6) develop mutual understanding on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN). The

⁹ Australian Embassy to the Philippines, "Australia-Philippines Defence Cooperation," <<http://www.philippines.embassy.gov.au/files/mnla/PUBLIC%20AFFAIRS%20FACT%20SHEET%20Defence%20Cooperation%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Final%202009.pdf>>, accessed June 6, 2013; and Ian Storey, "The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia's Ungoverned Space," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 5, Issue 19, Jamestown Foundation, October 11, 2007, p. 3.

¹⁰ Sheldon Simon, "Dismay at Thai-Cambodia Skirmishes," *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 13, No. 1, May 2011, p. 55.

¹¹ "Executive Order No. 57," September 6, 2011. It has been suggested that this initiative, especially the installation of surveillance stations in Palawan Island, is intended not only to combat piracy and terrorism in the region but is also aimed at monitoring the South China Sea which geographically extends north of the island and politically involves territorial disputes between China and the coastal states in the region. Simon, "Dismay at Thai-Cambodia Skirmishes"; and Renato Cruz De Castro and Walter Lohman, "U.S.-Philippines Partnership in the Cause of Maritime Defense," *Backgrounder*, No. 2593, August 8, 2011, The Heritage Foundation, p. 9.

¹² This program initially had the name "Counter Terrorism," instead of "Combating Terrorism." The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act changed the name into the latter based on the recognition that defeating terrorism must include not only counterterrorism, but also a wider range of efforts, including anti-terrorism activities, border control, and homeland defense. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates*, May 2009, Vol. 1, p. 425.

¹³ This became a permanent program by the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act. While the CTFP is a program unique to the Department of Defense, other programs for anti-terrorism and counterterrorism activities are implemented jointly with the Department of State, such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSI). FY2004 NDAA, P.L. 108-136, November 24, 2003, Section 1221; and Nina M. Serafino, "The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress," Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2008, Appendix G.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/ Low Intensity Conflict (ASDSO/ LIC) oversees the CTFP at the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for its program and financial management.¹⁴

Activities

The selection of the fellows is based on the recommendation by regional combatant commands to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which then approves the candidates.¹⁵ The program takes the form of participation in training courses and educational events (seminars and symposiums) hosted by the US Forces' regional centers abroad or military educational institutions within the United States. The participants are mostly drawn from mid- and senior-level military officials, ministry of defense officials, and other security officials of the partner countries.¹⁶

Specifically, the courses and events are mainly organized by five regional centers—Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), George C. Marshall Center (GCMC), Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESAS), and Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)—and six educational and training institutions in the United States—Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Post Graduate School (CCMR), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), National Defense University (NDU), and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Most of the CTFP courses are offered through these 11 centers and institutions, although some course offerings are made with contributions from other organizations.

The academic courses that were approved for offering in FY2013 included the following (Table 2). Of these courses, for example, the Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism course offered by the CCMR is available in two formats—at the CCMR, and worldwide by mobile education teams.¹⁷ The former, the course's flagship course, is offered twice a year (April and September) and is conducted over two weeks. Twenty-five to forty participants invited from various regions (mid- and senior-level military officers and civilian officials)¹⁸ take the course during which they normally reside on the NPS campus. Courses offered through mobile teams consist of two types: courses that the CCMR directly arranges and offers through the US force's liaison officers (Security Assistance Officers) in the respective regions; and courses hosted by regional combatant commands. Both courses generally last for one to two weeks and envisage around 30 to 60 participants. For these courses, curricula are developed to meet the needs of the recipient country. The program is conducted using two to three smaller conference rooms at the venue (e.g., peacekeeping training center or hotel). Aside from these courses, the CCMR also offers short-term courses on specific topics upon request from the host country or region (e.g., Consequence Management, Defusing Terrorist Ideology, Intelligence and Combating Terrorism, and Maritime Terrorism). These courses are typically comprised of lectures, small group discussions, and (in

¹⁴ DoD, "Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program Report to Congress, FY 2010," p. i.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁶ DoD, "Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program Report to Congress, FY 2004," p. II-1.

¹⁷ Unless otherwise specified, information on this course is based on the following: CCMR, *Course Catalog 2012*, <www.ccmr.org/pdf/CCMR-Course-Catalogue.pdf>, accessed May 28, 2013.

¹⁸ Paul Shemella, "Center for Civil-Military Relations Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program," *DISAM Journal* 29, No. 4, December 2007, p. 9.

the case of two-week courses) map exercises. To meet a range of educational needs, the CCMR develops its own lecture materials on a broad range of cases and themes.¹⁹

Table 2 CTFP Course List (FY2013)

Defense and Military	
General	Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism (CCMR), International Counterterrorism Fellows Program (NDU), International Crisis Command and Control Course (Coast Guard Training Center), International Information Warfare (NPS), Counterterrorism Policy & Strategy (Masters Program, NPS)
Intelligence	CCMR Executive Program in Defense Decision Making (CCMR), International Combating Terrorism and Tactical Intelligence Course (Ft. Huachuca), International Intelligence Fellows Program (DIA/ Bolling Air Force Base), Combined Strategic Intelligence Training Program (DIA/ Bolling Air Force Base)
Maritime	Maritime Terrorism (CCMR), International Antiterrorism Officer Course (NITC), Strategic Level Small Craft Combating Terrorism (Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School)
Legal	International Law of Military Operations (DIILS), Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism (DIILS), Stability Operations: Legal Aspects of ROE/ RUF Afghanistan (DIILS), Rule of Law & Disciplined Military Operations (DIILS/ Lackland Air Force Base)
Special Operations	Special Operations (Masters Course, NPS), Special Operations and Combating Terrorism Course (JSOU), Advanced Special Operations and Combating Terrorism Course (JSOU), Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Forces (SOF) Staff Officer Course (NATO Special Operations School: NSOS), Combined Joint Forces ISAF SOF Pre-deployment Course (NSOS), Combined Joint Forces SOF Intelligence Course (NSOS), Combined Joint Forces SOF Advanced Intelligence Course (NSOS), Building Partners Aviation Capacity Course (Air Force Special Operations School)
Regional Center Courses	Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (APCSS), Program in Advanced Security Studies (GCMC), Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (GCMC), Senior Executive Seminar (GCMC), Combating Terrorism Language Program (GCMC), Seminar on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction/ Terrorism (GCMC), Senior-level Combating Terrorism Executive Seminar (NESA), Terrorism and Counterinsurgency Seminar (CHDS)
Mobile Courses (offered by mobile education and training teams)	Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism (CCMR), Special Operations/ Combating Terrorism (JSOU), Counterterrorism Strategic Planning (JSOU), Advanced Special Operations/ Combating Terrorism (JSOU), Operational Planning Course (JSOU), International SOF: Whole of Government Collaboration to Confront Future Threats Course (JSOU), Legal Aspects of Combating Terrorism MET (DIILS)
Homeland Defense	
Continental United States	Counterterrorism Fellows Program Homeland Defense Short Course (NDU), Stabilization and Reconstruction (Masters Program, NPS), International Security and Civil-Military Relations (NPS), Maritime Terrorism (CCMR), Legal Aspects of Combating Corruption (DIILS)
Regional Center Courses	Seminar on Transatlantic Civil Security (GCMC), Program for Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (GCMC), Comprehensive Crisis Management (APCSS), Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (APCSS), Combating Transnational Organized Crime (CHDS)
Mobile Courses (offered by mobile education and training teams)	International Homeland Defense (CCMR), Disaster Planning (Defense Institute for Medical Operations: DIMO), Leadership Program Disaster Planning (DIMO), Bio-security and Safety (DIMO), Seaport Security and Antiterrorism (USCG), Port Security Vulnerability Assessment (USCG), Waterside Port Security (USCG), Maritime Security (CCMR), Consequence Management (CCMR)

Source: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), "Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) Course List," <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/itm/sctrainprog/ctfp_fy13_course_list_19mar12.pdf>, accessed May 16, 2013.

¹⁹ As of 2007, themes featured in the course include "Terrorism and Insurgency," "Maritime Terrorism," "Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism," "Terrorist Networks," "Terrorist Financing," "Information as a Weapon in Combating Terrorism," "Media Issues in Combating Terrorism," "Ethics and Combating Terrorism," and "Restructuring the Security Sector for Responding to Terrorism." Case studies are drawn from Turkey, Kenya, El Salvador, Colombia, Malaysia, Peru, United Kingdom, Spain, and Chechnya. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

Another example, the Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism (CSRT) course offered by the APCSS,²⁰ is a four-week course designed mainly for counterterrorist officials and practitioners in Asia-Pacific countries. While focusing on the non-military aspects of counterterrorism, the curriculum is aimed at achieving a more comprehensive understanding on terrorism and counterterrorism from a multidisciplinary approach. The 2011 course included 25 lectures, 4 exercise modules, 2 case studies, and individual research.²¹ The number of course offerings varies by the year. Although in some years the course was offered three times a year, since 2009 it has been offered once a year every spring.²² Because of this fluctuation in the number of course offerings, it would be fair to identify the trends in participants and countries on the basis of the figures since 2009. Since that year, the number of participants has been 91 (46 countries and regions) in 2009; 82 (37) in 2010; 86 (46) in 2011; 81 (47) in 2012; 85 (40) in 2013; and 101 (44) in 2014.²³ The number of participating countries and regions suggests emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, although participation is also open to the other regions. For instance, in 2013 approximately 60% of the participants came from the Asia-Pacific region, while the program was also joined by participants from Latin America and the Caribbean including Brazil and Colombia, Central and Near East including Jordan and Lebanon, Africa including Djibouti and Tanzania, Europe including Bulgaria, and North America including Canada and the United States as well as from the United Nations (UN).²⁴

Achievements

The budget, initially set at \$20 million, increased to \$25 million from FY2007 and \$35 million from FY2009.²⁵ The actual budget outlays appear to be fairly consistent with these increases (see Figure 1).

²⁰ Unless otherwise specified, information on this course is based on the following: APCSS, "Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism Course," <<http://www.apcss.org/college/#csrt>>, accessed May 29, 2013; and APCSS, "News," <<http://www.apcss.org/news/>>, accessed May 29, 2013.


²¹ Lecture topics included "Definition and Evolution of Terrorism," "US Policy and Combating Terrorism," "Leadership and Terrorism," "Radicalization," "Counter and De-Radicalization," "Southeast Asia and Radicalization," "Non-Governmental Organizations and Counterterrorism," "Cyber Issues and Terrorism," and "Interpol." Exercise themes included "Complexity (Simulation)," "Strategic Communications," "Interagency," and "Regional Cooperation (Capstone)." Case studies covered Abu Sayaff (Philippines) and the Communist Party of India. APCSS, "Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism Course 11-1 Curriculum Overview," <http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/CSRT_11_1_List_of_Course_Topics.pdf>, accessed May 29, 2013.

²² The course was offered two times in 2004, three times in 2005-2006 and 2008, and once in 2007 and 2009 onwards. In 2015, the course is scheduled to be offered in February. APCSS, "News," accessed August 26, 2014; DoD, "Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program Report to Congress, FY 2004," p. II-8; and "FY14 Activities Calendar," <http://www.apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/FY14_APCSS_Calendar.pdf>, accessed May 29, 2013.

²³ The number of participants in the preceding years was as follows: 91 (33 countries and regions) in the third semester of 2005; 40 (18) in the first semester of 2006; 35 (23) in the second semester of 2006; 30 (20) in the third semester of 2006; 59 (27) in 2007; 62 (31) in the first semester of 2008; 69 (35) in the second semester of 2008; and 29 (22) in the third semester of 2008.

²⁴ APCSS, "Eighty-five Complete CSRT 13-1," <<http://www.apcss.org/eighty-five-complete-csrt-13-1/>>, accessed May 30, 2013.

²⁵ DSCA, *Fiscal Year (FY) 2008/ FY 2009 Budget Estimates*, February 2007, Vol. 1, p. 422; and *Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates*, February 2008, Vol. 1, p. 445.

Figure 1 CTFP Activities (Budget Outlay, By Fiscal Year)

Source: DSCA, *Budget Estimates (FY2004-FY2014)*.

Along with the increases in the budget, the number of eligible countries and fellows has also risen. Table 3 lists the total number of fellows and the number of their countries of origin from FY2004 to FY2010 for which data is available. According to this data, the number of fellows exceeded 3,000 and the number of countries of origin exceeded 130 in FY2006, FY2009, and FY2010. This trend has continued almost every year since FY2011. In FY2011, about 3,200 people reportedly participated. In FY2013 and FY2014, 3,000 to 3,300 people are estimated to have participated in 450 to 500 programs (including 45 to 50 events in 30 to 35 countries).²⁶

Table 3 CTFP Participants

Fiscal Year	Total No. of Fellows	No. of Countries of Origin
04	1,000+	66
05	2,782	93
06	3,392	133
07	2,737	115
08	2,343	114
09	3,223	137
10	3,176	134

Source: DoD, "Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program Report to Congress" (FY2004-2010).


Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the CTFP participants by region of origin. Because the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) was established in 2008, data on participants from the USAFRICOM region (the whole African continent excluding Egypt) is available for cross-regional comparison only since that year.²⁷ Nevertheless, it can be noted that: (1) there have

²⁶ In FY2012, the number of participants is estimated at around 2,700 to 2,900 due to increases in operation costs and other expenses. DSCA, *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates*, February 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 466-467; and DSCA, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates*, April 2013, Vol. 1, pp. 507-508.

²⁷ However, prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, the United States European Command (USEUCOM) was responsible for the African continent, excluding the "Horn of Africa" region including Sudan (United States Central Command: USCENTCOM) and Madagascar (United States Pacific Command: USPACOM). From this one can surmise that many of the participants from Africa in and before 2007 were included in the figures for USEUCOM.

consistently been many participants from the regions overseen by the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and the United States European Command (USEUCOM); and (2) in recent years, the number of participants from Africa has been increasing, whereas the number of participants from the region overseen by the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has been decreasing. Despite these regional discrepancies, it is clear that on the whole, the CTFP is an extremely global program, inviting military and security organization personnel from over 130 countries and regions around the world every year.

Figure 2 Breakdown of Participants (By Regional Combatant Command)



Source: DoD, "Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program Report to Congress" (FY2005-2010).

As the examples of the CCMR and APCSS demonstrate, the CTFP has grown into a program that conducts outreach for a broad range of policy professionals and practitioners engaged in combating terrorism from various countries, including but not limited to the military. Through such activities, the US military are building an extremely global network of counterterrorist experts and practitioners.

DoD Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) program

Overview and purpose

US activities related to mine clearance include those financed and overseen mainly by the Department of State (DoS) and those by the DoD.²⁸ The DoS Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) is responsible for the former pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The latter is currently pursuant to the authority for humanitarian demining assistance that was added to the United States Code (U.S.C.) by the FY2007 NDAA.²⁹ The budget is capped at \$10 million, and funds are disbursed from the DoD Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) budget. This section takes up the DoD program.

The U.S.C. provides that the DoD HMA assistance shall be carried out if it will promote either: (1) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; or (2) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the US

²⁸ Unless otherwise specified, information in this paragraph is based on the following: DSCA, "DoD Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program: Information Paper," <[http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/2013/Humanitarian%20Mine%20Action%20\(HMA\).pdf](http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/2013/Humanitarian%20Mine%20Action%20(HMA).pdf)>, accessed June 12, 2013.

²⁹ Section 1203, FY2007 NDAA, P.L. 109-364, October 17, 2006.

Forces who participate in the activities.³⁰ In carrying out this assistance, the members of the US Forces are banned from engaging in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines or other explosive remnants of war (ERW) (unless the member does so for the concurrent purpose of supporting a US military operation).³¹ The main purpose of this program therefore is to enhance the landmine and ERW removal capability of partner countries. By extending this assistance, it is expected that the US Forces will: (1) gain access to areas otherwise not normally available to US Forces; and (2) increase their unit and individual readiness by providing training opportunities in a variety of environments outside of the United States.³²

Activities and achievements

As with the CTFP, ASDSO/ LIC and DSCA are responsible for administering the DoD HMA program. However, in regard to the overall US Government assistance for mine action in foreign countries, the interagency coordination framework called the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) Sub-Group on Humanitarian Mine Action plays an important role at a higher level than such departmental administration. Its predecessor framework was established in 1993 pursuant to the instructions of the National Security Council (NSC) to the DoS. The Sub-Group consists of representatives from the NSC (Chair), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), DoD, DoS, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).³³ This group is responsible for coordinating US assistance plans based on requests from the countries seeking assistance. Specifically, a country submits a request for assistance to the DoS through a US embassy. In response, the Sub-Group conducts a needs assessment based on a field survey and other sources. If it is determined that the assistance is necessary, the Sub-Group formulates an educational and training program that is tailored to the country.³⁴ It makes reason to consider that assistance projects under the DoD HMA program are also arranged according to such a cycle.

The DoD explains its HMA activities by classifying them into five categories: (1) infrastructure development for host nation mine action agencies (e.g., establishment of a national mine action center); (2) training of educators and trainers on landmine and ERW risks; (3) training of personnel with demining skills (detection, marking, mapping, clearance, and quality assurance/ control); (4) training in victim assistance (first response, surgical and nursing care); and (5) assessment visits to monitor and improve the effectiveness of the above activities.³⁵ Table 4 outlines the activities of each category that were carried out by country from FY2008 to FY2012 for which data is available.

³⁰ 10, U.S.C. 407 (a)(1).

³¹ 10, U.S.C. 407 (a)(3)(A).

³² DoD (DSCA), "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Fiscal Year 2008," March 1, 2009 (no pagination).

³³ The present name and composition have been adopted since 2001. DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, "PCC Sub-Group on Humanitarian Demining," <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/4945.htm>>, July 31, 2001, accessed June 19, 2013.

³⁴ Serafino, "The Department of Defense Role," Appendix C, p. 46. For more details, see for example: The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, "US Government Interagency Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan," January 21, 2001, <<http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/spec/2819.htm>>, accessed June 19, 2013.

³⁵ DoD (DSCA), "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Fiscal Year 2008"; and DSCA, "Humanitarian Mine Action: Train the Trainer," <http://www.dsca.mil/hama_cd/hd/train_trainers.htm>, accessed June 21, 2013.

Table 4 DoD Demining Program Activities (FY2008-FY2012)

Country	Type of Assistance (fiscal year in which the activities were implemented)					Total Cost (\$ thousand)	Cost of Support for Participating Country
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)		
Europe and Eurasia (9)							
Estonia		08,09,11	10,11			1,041	801
Albania	11		10	10,11		576	233
Armenia	08,09	08	12			402	245
Azerbaijan	09	09				330	330
Ukraine			10			318	155
Romania	11		11			149	111
Montenegro			12			109	71
Uzbekistan	08		08			69	50
Bosnia	12					23	
Latin America and the Caribbean (5)							
Colombia	08	08,12	09, 10	08,10		1,679	862
Ecuador	08	12	08,09,10,11	10		896	599
Peru	11,12		09,11			109	39
Chile			09			83	36
Argentina	08					78	45
Africa (10)							
Mozambique	11	11,12	09,10,11,12	09,10		1130	238
Democratic Republic of the Congo		11,12	10,11,12	10		775	167
Chad		11,12	12			604	181
Kenya		11,12	09,10,12	10		604	127
Namibia		11,12	10,12	10		598	147
Burundi		11,12	09	09		494	149
Tanzania		12	11,12	11		429	99
South Sudan	12	12	12			367	202
Republic of Congo		12	12			267	54
Mali		08				70	5
Asia-Pacific (4)							
Sri Lanka			09		12	380	360
Cambodia				12	12	235	150
Vietnam					12	213	
Laos					12	30	

Source: DoD (DSCA), "Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs" (Fiscal Years 2008-2009), "Humanitarian Mine Action Program" (Fiscal Years 2010-2012).

This table puts the 28 countries to which assistance has been provided into four regions and lists them in the order of their total assistance amounts within their regions. The table also shows by country which category of assistance was provided in which fiscal year. As the total expenses include not only the cost of provided equipment, supplies, and services but also the travel and subsistence expenses of US Forces personnel conducting the assistance activities,³⁶ the table also

³⁶ 10, U.S.C. 407(c)(2).

gives the sub-total of the former, which makes up a substantive part of the assistance.

This table shows that in terms of region, a majority of the assistance is directed at Africa as well as Europe and Eurasia, and in terms of assistance category, for the enhancement of demining technologies (category (2) in the table) and landmine risk education (category (3)). With regard to region, the table indicates a number of priority countries for each region—Estonia, Colombia and Ecuador, and Mozambique for which the US assistance far exceeds that for the other countries. For Estonia, for example, the DoD procured media equipment and training materials to support mine risk education in FY2009.³⁷ In FY2010, the US Army carried out a train-the-trainer program for 18 Estonia Rescue Board (an agency within Estonia’s Ministry of the Interior in charge of disaster relief) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.³⁸ In FY2011, the DoD again conducted mine risk education and EOD training for Rescue Board trainers and managers, and provided 15 ground-penetrating radar (GPR) detectors, UXO detectors, large search heads, related software, and other items.³⁹ In the meanwhile, the DoS has also provided demining assistance to Estonia since FY1999 (assistance has totaled \$2.499 million through FY2010), supplying state-of-the-art mine detectors in FY2011.⁴⁰

Both the number of recipient countries and the assistance totals are relatively low for the Asia-Pacific region compared to other regions. Moreover, the DoD HMA assistance for the Asia-Pacific region started relatively late. Perhaps related to these trends, assessment visits appear to constitute most of the assistance. Since the 1990s, demining assistance for these countries has been provided under a budget framework separate from the HMA program. Given this, the intention of the visit assessments may be to evaluate the effectiveness of such past activities.

For example, in the case of Vietnam, the US Government as a whole began to extend assistance to Vietnam from the late 1990s (US-Vietnam military exchanges officially started in November 1996). Around this time, the US Forces began demining training in Vietnam (however, its details are unknown).⁴¹ In addition, financial assistance was provided for the establishment of a mine awareness and training center using DoS disbursements.⁴² Later, in June 2000, the US-Vietnamese Humanitarian Demining Program was formally approved.⁴³ The United States has provided equipment (e.g., computers and trucks) for Vietnamese demining efforts, conducted mine awareness training, and funded a national survey to scope the landmine problem.⁴⁴ This assistance was smaller in scale compared to the US assistance for neighboring countries such as Cambodia,

³⁷ DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, 9th edition, July 2010, p. 32.

³⁸ DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, 10th edition, July 2011, p. 30.

³⁹ DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, 11th edition, July 2012, p. 33.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*; and David McKeeby, “U.S. Supports Estonian Demining Efforts,” <<https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/02/09/us-supports-estonian-demining-efforts>>, accessed June 26, 2013.

⁴¹ “Defense Cooperation in Vietnam,” <<http://photos.state.gov/libraries/vietnam/8621/pdf-forms/15anniv-DAO-Factsheet.pdf>>, accessed June 24, 2013.

⁴² Kela Moorehead, “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program: Engagement in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand,” *Journal of Mine Action* 5, No. 1, April 2001, <http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/kela_moorehead/moorehead.html>, accessed June 24, 2013.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Al Swanda, “Military-to-military Cooperation with Vietnam,” USAWC Strategic Research Project, March 18, 2005, <<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a431831.pdf>>, accessed June 24, 2013, p. 9; and US Embassy in Vietnam, “(HA) Programs in Vietnam,” <<http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/usassistancevn1.html>>, accessed June 24, 2013.

Thailand, and Laos. Moreover, the DoS was the lead agency in these projects with limited direct support from the US Forces.⁴⁵ This relatively low-profile DoD engagement in Vietnam may be related to the fact that the landmine issue in Vietnam was a legacy of the Vietnam War era.⁴⁶ In actuality, following the assessment visit in FY2012, full-fledged demining assistance for Vietnam by the US military has not yet materialized.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, it should be noted that while small in nature and slow in development, the United States and Vietnam have conducted exchanges in this domain.

As regards the activities conducted in Sri Lanka in 2009, a team of six members from the DoD and US Forces visited Sri Lanka in late June and spent about a month studying its HMA training needs and the logistical requirements for training implementation. Subsequently, from late August, the team held a ten-day train-the-trainer course for 26 Sri Lankan Army officers in the Sri Lanka School of Military Engineering and provided demining equipment valued at approximately \$90,000.⁴⁸

As the Estonia example also illustrates, in many cases DoD has carried out HMA assistance following or concurrently with DoS and USAID activities in the same area. In this way, the activities of different departments mutually complement each other in US HMA capacity building programs.

DoD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (GEIS)

Overview and purpose

GEIS is a system that was established in 1997 in accordance with the Presidential Decision Directive NTSC-7 (June 12, 1996). NTSC-7 demands that the relevant US Government agencies and organizations improve their domestic and international surveillance, prevention, and response capabilities to the emergence of new infectious diseases and to the spread of existing infectious diseases. The US Forces, which have significant worldwide presence and possess disease-related laboratory and treatment facilities in various regions, are included in the system. Specifically, the Directive ordered the DoD to: (1) include support of global surveillance, training, research, and response to emerging infectious diseases in its mission and strengthen the DoD's global disease reduction efforts; and (2) make available diagnostic capabilities on-site through the DoD's domestic and overseas laboratories, and utilize its overseas laboratory facilities to serve as focal points for the training of foreign technicians and epidemiologists.⁴⁹

Within the DoD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is responsible for GEIS.

⁴⁵ Swanda, "Military-to-military Cooperation with Vietnam," p. 10.

⁴⁶ Mark E. Manyin, "U.S.-Vietnam Relations in 2011: Current Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, May 18, 2012, p. 22.

⁴⁷ DSCA, *Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Estimates (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid)*, February 2012, p. 116; and DSCA, *Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid)*, February 2012, p. 122. In both fiscal years, Cambodia Thailand, and Mongolia are designated as assistance recipient countries in the Asia-Pacific (PACOM) region.

⁴⁸ Amy Crockett, "Humanitarian Mine Action Training Mission to Sri Lanka," *Journal of Mine Action* 14, No. 1, Spring 2010, <<http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/14.1/Focus/crockett.htm>>, accessed June 25, 2013; and *To Walk the Earth in Safety*, 10th edition, p. 22.

⁴⁹ Executive Office of the President, Presidential Decision Directive NTSC-7, June 12, 1996, para.8. Although GEIS was launched in this manner as part of the efforts to strengthen the US Government's overall measures for the risk of infectious diseases, GEIS has also gained significance for addressing the risk of bioterrorism following the terrorist attacks in 2001. For example, see: DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY2001, p. 2 and Annual Report FY2002, pp. 1, 3.

Its administration is currently handled by the section in charge at the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC, established in February 2008) (AFHSC-GEIS).⁵⁰ According to the AFHSC-GEIS, GEIS has four strategic goals in five priority areas (respiratory infections, gastrointestinal infections, febrile and vector-borne infections, antimicrobial-resistant infections, and sexually-transmitted infections) These goals are to: (1) conduct surveillance and response activities; (2) expand surveillance and epidemiology training and capacity building within the US military and in partner nations; (3) support research, innovation and integration initiatives that will enhance force health protection; and (4) assess and communicate value added by creating a surveillance network.⁵¹ The following section overviews GEIS with a focus on the efforts for the second strategic goal of improving the capability to respond to emerging infections in partner nations.

Activities and achievements

GEIS's entire budget is appropriated from the Defense Health Program Account.⁵² Table 5 shows the budget for FY1998 to FY2010 for which data is available.

Table 5 GEIS Budget Trends (unit: \$ million)

98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
2.9	3.3	7.1	8	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12 (+39)	11.5 (+40)	11.7 (+40)	12 (+40)	n.a.

Source: DoD-GEIS, Annual Reports FY1999-FY2010. For FY2009, Kevin L Russell, et.al., "The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System (GEIS), a U.S. Government Tool for Improved Global Biosurveillance: A Review of 2009," *BMX Public Health* 11, Supplement 2, March 4, 2011, <<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3092412/pdf/1471-2458-11-S2-S2.pdf>>, accessed June 26, 2013, p. 2.

Note: From FY2006, expenses for avian influenza measures (amounts inside parentheses) have been added as part of the supplementary budget.

This table shows the entire budget of GEIS, which includes overall program funding for improving the capability to respond to infectious diseases. While there is no data that gives a detailed breakdown of the uses of the funds, capacity building activities at overseas laboratories make up roughly 60% of the budget.⁵³ Moreover, for the actual execution of the programs, funds are appropriated also from non-GEIS budgets—for instance, the budgets of organizations other than regional Combatant Commands and the DoD (e.g. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:

⁵⁰ Prior to the AFHSC-GEIS, the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) was the central administrator of GEIS. Robert F DeFraitas, "The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center: Enhancing the Military Health System's Public Health Capabilities," *BMX Public Health* 11, Supplement 2, March 4, 2011, <<http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2458-11-S2-S1.pdf>>, accessed June 26, 2013, p. 2.

⁵¹ AFHSC-GEIS website, <<http://www.afhsc.mil/geis/>>, accessed August 7, 2013. Unless otherwise specified, information about this program is based on information on this website.

⁵² 10, U.S.C. 1100; and Russell, "The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System," p. 2.

⁵³ For example, in FY1999 and FY2002, 65% of the total budget was appropriated for activities at overseas laboratories. In the FY2007 budget, \$6.17 million (53.68%) of \$11.494 million was allocated for activities at overseas laboratories. DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY1999, p. 9; Annual Report FY2002, p. 11; and Annual Report FY2007, p. 6.

CDC and USAID).⁵⁴ Given this, the total budget actually spent on GEIS programs will be larger than the amounts shown in the table.

Five overseas laboratories implement infectious disease-related capacity building for overseas partner institutions: Egypt (Naval Medical Research Unit No. 3: NAMRU-3); Kenya (US Army Medical Research Unit-Kenya: USAMRU-K); Thailand (Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences: AFRIMS); Indonesia (Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2: NAMRU-2); and Peru (Naval Medical Research Center Detachment: NMRC).⁵⁵ While no comprehensive data is available on the activities conducted, the GEIS Annual Report lists the following examples of activities carried out by NAMRU-2 and AFRIMS, the two organizations based in the Asia-Pacific region.

Table 6 Activities by the Naval Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2, Indonesia): Examples

1999	Held outbreak response training workshops jointly with the World Health Organization (WHO) in Laos, Indonesia, and Cambodia (with AFRIMS assistance).
2000	Trained nine laboratorians from the Royal Cambodian Army and the National Institute of Public Health as part of the effort to strengthen surveillance capability for hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., dengue fever) in Southeast Asia; conducted eight short-term (ten days) outbreak investigation courses for public health professionals in Indonesia, Cambodia, and Laos by FY2000; gave a training course (five days) in malaria microscopic diagnosis to a total of 65 students in five locations in Indonesia; and provided a malaria vector entomology training course (two weeks, Java).
2001	Held a ten-day training workshop for 30 students in collaboration with the Ministry of Health of Vietnam (August 2001); and continued to offer various workshops in Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia.
2002	Supported the establishment of an NPO for malaria control in Indonesia (funds provided from USAID); offered a course for 80 professionals from the Ministry of Health of Indonesia on techniques of bacterial isolation; and trained personnel at six influenza surveillance sites in Indonesia in specimen collection and influenza detection techniques.
2003	Assisted in formulating a regional strategy to control the SARS pandemic at the request of the Indonesian National Institute of Health Research and Development; trained laboratory staff and scientists from Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in diagnostic techniques for SARS; provided training to identify <i>Vibrio</i> bacteria in Indonesia; and held a technical workshop related to infectious disease testing for laboratory staff from the Cambodian Ministry of Health.
2004	Trained a total of over 400 personnel from six Southeast Asian nations in infectious disease outbreak response and testing techniques; developed new malaria diagnostic sets for the education and training of diagnosticians; and provided advice to Indonesian government agencies on the reorganization of the country's infectious disease outbreak response structures.
2005	Provided diagnostic support to the Ministry of Health of Indonesia on the identification of avian influenza cases; held infectious disease outbreak investigation training courses in Sri Lanka and Vanuatu (over 60 participants); and provided training in diagnostic testing techniques at the Ministry of Health of Indonesia.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY1999, p. 17. The budget allocation process begins in the third quarter (April-June) of the previous fiscal year by requesting each implementing agency to submit its program request. Actual allocations are then determined based on deliberations regarding the submitted plans. For example, in FY2009, 198 plans were submitted, of which 130 (approximately 66%) were granted budgets in whole or in part (56% as a ratio of the amount budgeted to the total amount requested). See Russell, "The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System," pp. 5-6.

⁵⁵ Although NTSC-7 lists six overseas laboratories, one of them—the US Army Medical Research Unit-Brazil (USAMRU-B)—was closed in 1999 due to reasons including staff and budget shortages. Since then, NMRC collectively serves as the hub for the South American region. Domestic laboratories currently consist of four centers: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR); Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC); Naval Health Research Center (NHRC); and US Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM). DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY1999, p. 13; and Annual Report FY2010, n.p.

2006	Provided training in avian influenza diagnostic testing at the Ministry of Health of Indonesia; conducted training in microbiology, biostatistics, and malaria microscopy with the Indonesian Ministry of Health and the University of Indonesia; provided a training opportunity in the United States for scientists at the Indonesian Ecology and Health Status Research and Development Center and the Indonesian National Institute of Health Research and Development; and provided microbiology and epidemic surveillance technical training to laboratory staff from the Ministry of Defense of Cambodia.
2007	Supported the establishment of a new laboratory in cooperation with the Ministry of Health of Cambodia and local hospitals.
2008	Provided training to staff at three hospitals in Laos in patient enrollment, specimen collection, and information gathering.
2009	Provided assistance for facilities and technologies related to: malaria, febrile and vector-borne illness, enteric, blood culture, and antimicrobial resistance testing (Cambodia); influenza and acute febrile illness testing (Indonesia, Cambodia, and Singapore); and surveillance data management (Laos).
2010	Trained 5 Cambodian National Institute of Public Health technicians and 30 Cambodian nationals in influenza strain sequencing, surveillance, and epidemiology; and provided bacterial testing support to six Ministry of Health hospitals.

Source: DoD-GEIS, Annual Reports FY1999-FY2010. For FY2009, Jose L Sanchez et.al., "Capacity-building Efforts by the AFHSC-GEIS Program," *BMX Public Health* 11, Supplement 2, March 4, 2011, <<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3092412/pdf/1471-2458-11-S2-S2.pdf>>, accessed June 26, 2013, p. 3, Table 2.

Table 7 Activities of the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS, Thailand): Examples

2000	Provided training and technology transfer to establish diagnostic capabilities at the Vector-borne Disease Research and Training Center (Hetauda, Nepal).
2001	Supported the establishment of an information system network between the hospitals of the Royal Thai Army that will contribute to enhancing infectious disease surveillance capabilities.
2002	Trained ten scientists from the Institute of Virology in Uzbekistan in various testing techniques; and provided diagnostic kits for agents such as hepatitis and leptospirosis to countries in the region.
2003	Provided diagnostic kits for agents such as hepatitis and leptospirosis to countries in the region.
2004	Visited facilities, trained staff, and implemented infrastructure development projects in Cambodia (e.g., development of a training plan for local staff on malaria microscopic testing and educational materials), Maldives, Nepal, and Thailand.
2005	Supported the establishment of a Royal Thai Army surveillance system to detect and study infectious disease outbreaks along Thailand's borders; supported the introduction of a reporting system for sharing information on symptoms of zoonotic illnesses between the Thai Ministries of Public Health and Livestock Development; and trained scientists from countries in the region.
2006	Provided diagnostics and training at the Nepalese National Public Health Laboratory; and conducted training in avian influenza diagnosis and first response in various areas of the region.
2007	Conducted training at six hospitals of the Royal Thai Army in Thai border sites in influenza treatment, testing, data collection, sample processing, and other topics, as well as provided relevant equipment and supplies (e.g., freezer/ refrigerator and centrifuge) (ongoing program since 2002).
2008	Provided training for relevant staff of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health of Bhutan in early response to influenza; and provided training in infectious disease treatment and malaria microscopy for Thai medical practitioners.
2009	Provided assistance for facilities and technologies related to: influenza and malaria testing (Philippines and Cambodia); enteric and influenza laboratory upgrade (Nepal and Thailand); blood culture (Nepal); influenza testing (Bhutan); and influenza antiviral resistance (Thailand).
2010	Trained 1,049 Royal Thai Army personnel at five border areas in Thailand in infectious disease surveillance; and trained 20 Cambodian civilians and over 70 military personnel in malaria microscopy and diagnostics.

Source: DoD-GEIS, Annual Reports FY1999-FY2010. For FY2009, Sanchez, "Capacity-building Efforts," p. 3, Table 2.

Note: No relevant activity was reported in the FY1999 edition.

These are primarily examples of direct assistance (e.g., training) aimed at improving local capabilities in infectious disease surveillance and response. Other programs that contribute to capacity building include a variety of collaborations with relevant local ministries and research institutes. For instance, in Southeast Asia, US centers and institutions partner with local health and public health ministries, national research institutes (e.g., Laotian National Center for Laboratory and Epidemiology, Cambodian National Institute of Public Health, Cambodian National Malaria Center, and the Vietnam Institute Pasteur)⁵⁶ as well as the health divisions of military forces to continuously provide new equipment, systems, and technologies to these countries. In addition, they conduct research and diagnosis jointly with local partners in response to actual outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as the avian influenza outbreak in 2005.

The purpose of DoD-GEIS is to manage the health of US Forces personnel who are deployed worldwide and (especially since 9/11) to control infectious diseases that pose as security risks. As such, the primary goal of GEIS activities is to strengthen the readiness of the US Forces, the US Government, and relevant organizations (e.g., international organizations, research institutes, and universities) and to establish cooperation networks among them. Compared to such activities, building the capacity of foreign military forces and relevant organizations should be understood as of secondary importance. On the other hand, given the fact that disease outbreaks and new infectious diseases typically occur in (sub-) tropical regions of developing countries, the improved capacity of governments and experts in these regions, combined with the development of cooperative relations with such actors, will significantly contribute to the prevention of the spread of diseases in a mid- to long-term basis. Moreover, it has been acknowledged in the United States that enhancing international cooperation in the area of infectious diseases has not just technical but also policy and diplomatic implications.⁵⁷ Expectations in that regard therefore constitute part of the objectives of capacity building under GEIS.

Summary

Characteristics of US capacity building assistance

This section introduced four examples of US capacity building assistance in different sectors. This subsection reviews these activities and suggests implications for Japan's capacity building assistance.

On the whole, these four activities by the United States suggest a few general points. The first observation concerns the size of the US assistance. US assistance not only has a variety of purposes (maritime security, counterterrorism, landmine clearance, and infectious disease control), but also has diverse means such as the provision of equipment (including parts and skills for repair and maintenance), training (exercise), education (workshop and training course), technical assistance, collaboration with local partners, and the development of information networks. Especially with

⁵⁶ DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY2001, pp. 22-23; and Annual Report FY2004, p. 25.

⁵⁷ The FY2009 report incorporates the concept of "global health diplomacy" (the term originally introduced by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California San Diego). This refers to "a political change activity that meets the dual goals of improving global health while maintaining and strengthening international relations abroad, particularly in conflict areas and resource-poor environments." The report notes that GEIS may be characterized as comprising a part of this diplomacy. Russell, "The Global Emerging Infection Surveillance and Response System," p. 4; and IGCC website, <<http://igcc.ucsd.edu/research/environment-and-health/global-health/>>, accessed October 2, 2013.

regard to the means of capacity building assistance, US programs demonstrate a variety of methods ranging from material to non-material assistance. Furthermore, US assistance is provided to a vast number of countries and practically covers all the regions of the world. While this article focused on four activities for which information is available, these are of course not the only US programs aimed at overseas capacity-building; they make up no more than a small fraction of overall US assistance.

Secondly, the worldwide scale of the US capacity-building may be understood at least in part against background factors unique to the United States. As the CTFP shows in particular, regional combatant commands are key components to the implementation of US capacity building assistance. This assistance is funded by the budget allocated for the program, as well as the budget of each command. The US assistance is made possible on such a scale only because of the availability of this infrastructure. On the other hand, it is also important to understand that the United States has its own reasons for making the scope of its assistance global. GEIS is most illustrative of this. This is to say, as US Forces are deployed all over the world, personnel are always exposed to the risk of diseases and infectious diseases. These practical needs underpin GEIS's basic rationale: "It is only through vastly increasing the capacity of public health systems around the world that the challenge of emerging infections can be met."⁵⁸ Insofar as controlling the Celebes Sea area and the CTFP are based on the US counterterrorism strategy since 9/11, these programs too must inevitably be global due to the nature of the terrorist threat.

Implications for Japan

There are many differences between Japan and the United States in their capacity building activities, with the United States being, for instance, a far bigger provider of the assistance than Japan. Nonetheless, the discussion so far leaves several pointers that will be of relevance to Japan.

The first concerns the means and method of capacity building assistance. As noted earlier, US capacity building involves a variety of formats and resources. This may be instructive for Japan to expand its menu of capacity building assistance in the future. Taking the example of education and training, while US education programs are mainly offered to national military forces and defense ministry officials, eligible recipients also include officials from other relevant ministries (CTFP and GEIS), and, indirectly, even local populations (HMA). As for the provision of equipment and materials, US assistance provides not just relevant hardware but also infrastructure development and software (maritime security and GEIS). Such diversity of assistance formats is presumably based on the nature of the assistance and the needs of the partner country; and this indicates in turn that Japan should similarly anticipate such diversity of assistance needs. With regard to the project implementation, it is worth noting that the US Forces makes full use of its educational and training assets on mainland United States and at the regional combatant commands, and as necessary, develops new education programs. Furthermore, the US military makes efforts to coordinate with the DoS and USAID to ensure the complementarity of their programs and budgets.

The second concerns the question of how Japan should collaborate with the United States on capacity building. Japan already has a track record in collaborating with the United States

⁵⁸ DoD-GEIS, Annual Report FY2002, p. 29.

for peacekeeping capacity building through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).⁵⁹ However, the discussion here suggests that there are possibilities for wide-ranging cooperation in other areas as well. Japan can expect to acquire lessons learned and knowhow on capacity building assistance from the years of experiences of the United States in different countries. Additionally, collaboration through capacity building projects may serve as new opportunities for deepening Japan-US security cooperation. Of course, there are and will continue to be differences between the two countries in budgetary scale and implementation procedures. From the Japanese perspective it may also be necessary to ensure that partnering with the United States in capacity building do not obscure the Japanese contribution in this area. However, the United States can be a beneficial partner for Japan in developing its policy and posture for effective capacity building assistance.

China

Landmine clearance assistance

Background

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is deemed to possess a wealth of experience and a high level of capability in clearing buried landmines. In the course of the war that broke out between China and Vietnam in 1979, a vast number of landmines were buried around their land border. The buried landmines were then neglected due to tensions between the two countries that continued over a decade. Mine clearance emerged as an issue when the two countries normalized their relations in 1991. The PLA carried out large-scale mine clearance operations near the China-Vietnam border in two phases: Phase 1 lasted from April 1992 to November 1994; and Phase 2 lasted from November 1997 to August 1999. The unit that played a central role in this endeavor was the mine clearing company with the engineer corps at the Chengdu Military Region.⁶⁰

In response to the growing international calls for the prohibition on the use of inhumane weapons, including landmines, the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons was convened in 1979. In October of the following year, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) was adopted. With regard to landmines specifically, Protocol II to the Convention, "Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices" (1980 Mine Protocol), was adopted at the same time. Subsequently, in response to the growing international calls for the complete prohibition of anti-personnel mines, negotiations to amend the Mine Protocol took place, and the amended Mine Protocol was adopted in 1996.⁶¹ China signed the amended Protocol and ratified it in October 1998. At the time of ratifying the amended Mine Protocol, China began to make use of its forces that have mine clearance experience and capability to provide mine clearance assistance in developing countries.

⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The 3rd U.S.-Japan Global Peace Operations Initiative Senior Mission Leaders Course," November 8, 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000071.html>, accessed November 8, 2013.

⁶⁰ "Heping xingdong [Peace operations]," *Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily]*, May 12, 2004.

⁶¹ See Eiichi Sugie, "Taijin Jirai Zenmen Kinshi eno Michi [Path to Complete Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines]," *Chukyo Hogaku [Chukyo Law Review]*, Vol. 34, No. 1 and 2, 1999, pp. 1-53.

Provision of funding and equipment

In 1994, the UN established the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance to support the collection of information on demining technologies, the development of such technologies, the preparation of training plans, and the relief and social rehabilitation of mine victims. China contributed \$100,000 to the Voluntary Trust Fund in November 1998. It is reported that Chinese funds were utilized for demining operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶²

Following this, China began to provide equipment necessary for mine clearance to countries directly, in addition to indirect mine clearance assistance in the form of financial contributions to international organizations. From 2001 to 2002, China provided mine clearance equipment totaling as much as \$1.26 million to seven countries: Eritrea; Cambodia; Namibia; Angola; Mozambique; Ethiopia; and Rwanda.⁶³

Minesweeping by dispatched units

China deploys PLA minesweeping forces and experts to mine sites to clear the mines by themselves. In July 2003, China dispatched a mine clearing study team comprised of PLA personnel and civilian experts to Afghanistan, where the US Forces' attacks against the Taliban had nearly subsided. This study team was sent to an area where a water supply facility rehabilitation project funded by Chinese assistance was under way. The team is said to have searched for mines in this area, and contributed to the smooth implementation of the project.⁶⁴

The country where the PLA is most actively engaged in overseas mine clearance operations is Lebanon. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed to Lebanon as a PKO force since 1978, in which China has been participating since April 2006. The PLA has minesweepers accompanying its mission to Lebanon. These personnel actively conduct minesweeping operations for the execution of UNIFIL's mandate. In October 2006, China's mission to Lebanon received international accreditation for mine clearance based on an examination given by UN mine clearance experts.⁶⁵ It is alleged that the mine clearance operations of Chinese forces are safe and quick, and are commended by the UNIFIL commander.⁶⁶

Education and training

The PLA also offers education and training on mine clearance for personnel of other military forces. In October 1999 and May 2000, the Engineering Institute of Engineering Corps at the PLA University of Science and Technology established an international training course on mine clearance. The course was offered to 40 mine clearance experts from seven countries. The Engineering Institute offered a similar course from September to December 2006, in which

⁶² "Wei shijie heping dianji [Foundation for world peace]," *PLA Daily*, January 13, 2003.

⁶³ "Heping xingdong," *PLA Daily*.

⁶⁴ "Zhongguo jiji lvxing 'Xiuding dilei yidingshu' xiangguan guoji yiwu [China actively implements international obligations relating to the 'Amended Mine Protocol']," *PLA Daily*, February 13, 2007.

⁶⁵ "Zhongguo 'lankui': Wei heping dianji [China's 'blue helmet': For cementing peace]," *Huanqiu Junshi [Global Military]*, No. 14, 2007, pp. 20-22.

⁶⁶ "Zhongguo dishibi fu Libanen weihebudui qicheng [China's 10th PKO unit for Lebanon departs]," *Chinanews.com*, June 9, 2012.

minesweeping technologies were taught to mine clearance experts from Lebanon and Jordan.⁶⁷ In 2010, the Engineering Institute newly formed the “International Humanitarian Minesweeping Training Course.” To date, six mine clearance courses have been offered for military personnel in countries such as Sudan, South Sudan, and Afghanistan.⁶⁸

In addition, China dispatches PLA military personnel overseas to provide education and training to local minesweepers. In November 2002, the PLA dispatched personnel to Eritrea to give technical guidance to local minesweeping personnel. In March of the following year, minesweeping experts from the PLA were again dispatched to Eritrea. Through two trips to the country, the experts educated and trained 60 minesweepers in Eritrea, and gave guidance for the mine clearance operations conducted by local personnel across an area of 100,000 km².⁶⁹ In September 2005, China dispatched PLA minesweeping experts to Thailand to support mine clearance training in the Thailand-Cambodia border area.⁷⁰ Furthermore, China has deployed experts to Cambodia for training minesweeping personnel. In January 2014, the second training was conducted in which 12 Chinese experts trained 52 Cambodian trainees on mine clearance.⁷¹

Medical assistance activities via a hospital ship

Background

The PLA Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first full-fledged, large hospital ship in December 2008. Named “Daishandao,” this hospital ship is a large vessel with displacement as high as approximately 14,000 tons. It is said to have 300 hospital beds as well as the capacity to perform eight surgeries simultaneously. Additionally, equipped with six lifeboats and one helicopter, this hospital ship has excellent capacity for swiftly accommodating the wounded and patients, as well as transporting medical personnel and supplies to the sites.⁷² By commissioning a hospital ship that has such high-level capabilities, PLAN is able to enhance its logistic support system, including the accommodation and treatment of the wounded during contingencies. In addition, this hospital ship plays a significant role in maintaining and strengthening the PLA’s maritime presence during peacetime. In October 2009, Daishandao was deployed to the South China Sea for around 40 days, during which time the ship patrolled the islands of the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands that the PLA occupies and provided health services and treatment for officers guarding these islands.⁷³

At the same time, PLAN uses the Daishandao to engage in international medical assistance operations to help improve the PLA’s image in the international community and to deepen China’s

⁶⁷ “Zhongguo canyu qingchu shashang renyuan dilei guoji hezuo [China participates in international cooperation for clearing anti-personnel mines],” *PLA Daily*, March 19, 2007.

⁶⁸ “Shouqi Zhong-A saolei jishu jiaoliu peixun yuanman luomu [First China-Afghanistan mine clearance technology exchange completes smoothly],” *Youth.chinamil.com*, May 22, 2014.

⁶⁹ “Zhongguo jiji canyu guoji saolei yuanzhu huodong [China proactively engages in international demining assistance activities],” *PLA Daily*, November 27, 2003.

⁷⁰ “‘Bingzhuanjia’ xiaobao guoji leichang [‘Military expert’ is proud at overseas mine field],” *PLA Daily*, June 25, 2009.

⁷¹ “Zhongguo yuan Jian saolei peixunban juxing zonghe yanlian [China’s minesweeping training group for Cambodia conducts comprehensive exercise],” *CRI online*, January 9, 2014.

⁷² Cui Yan, “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan jiemi [Secrets of hospital ship ‘Peace Ark’],” *Zhongguo Chuanjian [China Ship Survey]*, No. 10, 2010, pp. 74-76.

⁷³ “Zuida yiyuanchuan shouci xunzhen Nansha daojiao [The largest hospital ship goes around Spratly Islands for the first time],” *Xinhuanet*, November 25, 2009.

relations with various countries. Normally referred to by its nickname of “Peace Ark,” this hospital ship has been deployed to distant areas overseas in order to carry out a mission called “Harmonious Mission” since its commissioning in 2008. The mission’s duties include providing medical assistance in the destination countries, including treating patients and giving guidance to physicians, as well as conducting exchanges among military forces. Harmonious Mission has been carried out three times to date. The hospital ship has performed a variety of activities, including capacity building assistance, in the Middle East and Africa direction in 2010, the South America direction in 2011, and the South China Sea and Indian Ocean direction in 2013.

Harmonious Mission 2010

On August 31, 2010, the Daishandao left the military port in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province to conduct “Harmonious Mission 2010,” the ship’s first international medical assistance mission.⁷⁴ The purpose of Harmonious Mission 2010 was to visit the five countries of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh to provide medical services, as well as to offer medical examinations and treatment for PLAN officers carrying out counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Aboard the Daishandao were 428 people, including 100 medical practitioners selected from multiple PLAN hospitals. In his address at the departure ceremony, PLAN Commander Wu Shengli noted that this mission, in which PLAN is, for the first time, dispatching a hospital ship to foreign countries to provide humanitarian medical services “will present an image that China is a responsible power that actively executes international obligations, and will demonstrate the PLA forces’ proactive attitude to protect peace and cherish life.” He went on to state that Harmonious Mission 2010 would play a proactive and vital role in deepening the longstanding friendships between China and the countries in Asia and Africa.⁷⁵

The Daishandao traveled down the South China Sea, passed through the Strait of Malacca, and reached the Indian Ocean on September 8. On this day, the ship received fuel and water replenishment from “Poyanghu,” a PLAN replenishment ship that was returning to China after completing counter-piracy operations off the Gulf of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The Daishandao then traveled the Indian Ocean westward and arrived in the Gulf of Aden. On September 17, health checkups and medical examinations were conducted for the crew of the large-scale landing ship “Kunlunshan” that was carrying out counter-piracy operations at this site.⁷⁶

On September 22, the Daishandao arrived at the Port of Djibouti in the Republic of Djibouti and started providing medical services over seven days.⁷⁷ At the Port of Djibouti, the Daishandao provided medical examination and treatment services to local residents. Simultaneously, the ship dispatched two medical units to a local hospital and an army hospital to provide treatment for diseases as well as medical services for hospitalized patients. On September 23, the Daishandao

⁷⁴ For an overview of the “Harmonious Mission 2010” activities, see National Institute for Defense Studies, *China Security Report 2011*, 2012, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁵ “Wu Shengli chuxi huansong yishi bing daoci [Wu Shengli attends send-off ceremony and makes remarks],” *PLA Daily*, September 1, 2010.

⁷⁶ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuan chuan shouci wei huhang guanbing tigong yiliao fuwu [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship for the first time gives medical service to personnel participating anti-piracy operation],” *PLA Daily*, September 18, 2010.

⁷⁷ “‘Hexie shiming 2010’ yiliao fuwu xingdong zhengshi qidong [‘Harmonious Mission 2010’ medical service activity officially starts],” *PLA Daily*, September 23, 2010.

succeeded in saving a two-year-old child who was transported to the ship for emergency care. On September 26, the ship performed surgery through the collaboration of Chinese and Djiboutian physicians, as well as Cuban physicians who were conducting medical assistance activities in Djibouti.⁷⁸ During its medical assistance activities through September 29, the units provided medical services to 2,719 Djiboutian people and to another 1,570 people on board the Daishandao and performed secondary tests for 2,588 people.⁷⁹

On October 13, the Daishandao arrived at the Port of Mombasa in Kenya and commenced a five-day medical assistance operation. Units performed medical examinations and provided treatment to local people on board the Daishandao. In addition, medical personnel were dispatched to provide medical assistance at facilities in Mombasa, including the Red Cross Hospital, an orphanage, and a primary school for the poor. The personnel also held exchanges with local medical practitioners, promoted awareness regarding sanitation, and conducted donation activities. During the five days, 2,682 patients were seen by medical personnel and 16 surgeries were performed on the Daishandao.⁸⁰ On October 19, the Daishandao arrived at the Port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and began a five-day medical assistance operation. On October 22, six medical personnel were dispatched from the Daishandao to a base of the Tanzania Naval Command (TNC). PLAN medical personnel and TNC surgeons conducted medical exchanges regarding the treatment and transport of wounded troops. PLAN personnel also provided treatment for TNC officers.⁸¹ Furthermore, medical personnel with the Tanzania People's Defense Force were invited to the Daishandao to jointly carry out medical consultations for the ill, surgeries, and scholarly exchanges. During its stay in Tanzania, the Daishandao conducted medical tests and provided treatment for over 3,500 people as well as performed 15 surgeries.⁸²

The Daishandao arrived at the Port of Victoria in Seychelles, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, on October 27. In Seychelles as well, the Daishandao provided medical examination services aboard the ship for the local people. It also dispatched medical personnel to remote islands where the development of medical clinics lags behind. During the five-day operation, the Daishandao saw 1,235 local people and performed 22 surgeries.⁸³ On November 9, the Daishandao arrived at the Port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, the final port call destination of Harmonious Mission 2010. During the six-day period of activity, the Daishandao provided medical examinations for the local people. Medical personnel were also dispatched to a Bangladesh Navy hospital, a primary school for children of naval personnel, a hospital for disabled children, among other facilities, to offer medical services jointly with medical practitioners in Bangladesh.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ “Zhong Ji Gu sanguo yisheng zai jibuti lianhe kaizhang shoushu [Doctors from China, Djibouti, and Cuba conduct joint surgery in Djibouti],” *PLA Daily*, September 28, 2010.

⁷⁹ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yuanman wancheng dui Ji yiliao fuwu [‘Peace Ark’ smoothly completes medical service for Djibouti],” *PLA Daily*, September 30, 2010.

⁸⁰ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan likai kennyia [‘Peace Ark’ leaves Kenya],” *PLA Daily*, October 19, 2010.

⁸¹ “Zhong Tan haijun kaizhan lianhe xunzhen he yixue jiaoliu [Navies of China and Tanzania conduct joint round and medical exchange],” *PLA Daily*, October 24, 2010.

⁸² “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan likai Tansangniya [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship leaves Tanzania],” *PLA Daily*, October 25, 2010.

⁸³ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan jishu dui Saisheer yiliao fuwu [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship ends medical service for Seychelles],” *PLA Daily*, November 3, 2010.

⁸⁴ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiliaochuan dida Mengjialaguo [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship arrives in Bangladesh],” *PLA Daily*, November 10, 2010.

On November 26, the Daishandao returned to China and completed Harmonious Mission 2010. During the 88-day navigation that covered a distance of 17,800 nautical miles, physical examinations were conducted for 2,127 people, medical examinations were conducted for 12,806 people, and medical visits were conducted for 2,164 people, including for PLA officers engaged in counter-piracy operations and the people in the five countries that were visited. In addition, the Daishandao successfully conducted 97 surgeries and provided 790 varieties of medicine. In his address at the return ceremony for the Daishandao, PLAN Deputy Political Commissar Xu Jianzhong praised Harmonious Mission 2010, saying that as a result, PLAN “projected an image that China is a responsible power that actively executes international obligations” and was able to “further deepen the longstanding friendships with Asian and African countries.”⁸⁵

Harmonious Mission 2011

In 2011, following on from the previous year, PLAN conducted “Harmonious Mission 2011” that deploys the Daishandao overseas to provide medical services. In this mission, the Daishandao visited four countries in Latin America and the Caribbean: Cuba; Jamaica; Trinidad and Tobago; and Costa Rica. In these countries, the ship provided medical examinations and treatment, as well as held medical exchanges with the countries’ military forces. A total of 416 people were aboard the Daishandao to participate in the 105-day Harmonious Mission 2011, which had a navigation distance reaching 23,500 nautical miles, including 107 medical personnel selected from PLA’s ten medical institutions.⁸⁶ In his interview prior to departure, Rear Adm. Qiu Yanpeng, commander of the dispatch mission, made clear its intention to help build up the capacity of medical practitioners in each country, saying that as part of its duties, the mission “will hold medical exchanges and collaborate with military and civilian medical practitioners in the four countries, hold medical courses, set an example of nursing techniques, and showcase Chinese traditional medicine.”⁸⁷

On September 15, 2011, the Daishandao departed the military port in Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province and commenced its Harmonious Mission 2011 duties. The Daishandao navigated the Pacific Ocean eastward while conducting emergency medical care and rescue exercises and other activities. By October 16, the ship was navigating the Panama Canal towards the Atlantic Ocean.⁸⁸ On October 21, the Daishandao arrived in the Port of Havana in Cuba to carry out a six-day medical assistance operation. During its stay in Cuba, the Daishandao provided medical examinations for 97 people, including Chinese Embassy officials, Chinese company employees, ethnic Chinese people, and overseas Chinese, and performed nine surgeries. Furthermore, officers were dispatched to the Cuban Naval Academy and a training vessel, where they engaged in discussions regarding such

⁸⁵ “Yuanman wancheng fu haiwai zhixing rendaozhuyi yiliao fuwu [Humanitarian medical service abroad is smoothly completed],” *PLA Daily*, November 27, 2010.

⁸⁶ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan jiang chufang Lamei zhixing yiliao fuwu renwu [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship to visit Latin America for conducting medical service task],” *PLA Daily*, September 16, 2011.

⁸⁷ “Fang ‘Hexie shiming 2011’ renwu haishang zhihuiyuan Qiu Yanpeng [Interview with Qiu Yanpeng, commander of the ‘Harmonious Mission 2011’],” *PLA Daily*, September 18, 2011.

⁸⁸ “Zhongguo haijun ‘Heping fangzhou’ hao chenggong chuanyue Taipingyang [‘Peace Ark’ of the PLAN successfully goes across Pacific Ocean],” *PLA Daily*, October 16, 2011; and “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao shouci tongguo Banama yunhe [‘Peace Ark’ goes through the Panama Canal for the first time],” *PLA Daily*, October 18, 2011.

topics as education and oversight and far seas training.⁸⁹ On September 26, Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who was visiting Cuba, toured the Daishandao and stated as follows: Harmonious Mission 2011 is “a concrete practice for presenting an image that China executes international obligations and is a responsible power.”⁹⁰

On October 29, the Daishandao arrived in the Port of Kingston in Jamaica. In Jamaica, medical examinations were provided at the Daishandao. Additionally, medical personnel were dispatched to the Olympic Medicare Centre to provide treatment, including surgeries for the local people.⁹¹ On November 8, the Daishandao arrived in the Port of Spain in Trinidad and Tobago, the third destination. Here too, the Daishandao provided medical examinations and treatment for local people aboard the ship. On November 9, medical personnel were dispatched to a base of the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force to provide complimentary medical services for military personnel, including acupuncture treatment.⁹² On November 10, a 12-personnel medical squad was dispatched to Tobago. The squad treated 80 patients, offered health checkups and health guidance to 44 primary school students, and provided pharmaceuticals to the local hospital.⁹³

On November 15, the Daishandao departed the Port of Spain, transited the Panama Canal once again, and reached the side of the Pacific Ocean. Subsequently, on November 23, the ship arrived in the Port of Puntarenas in Costa Rica, the final destination. While China and Costa Rica established diplomatic relations in 2007, the Daishandao’s visit marked the first military exchange between the two countries since the establishment of their diplomatic relations. The Daishandao provided medical examinations and treatment for the local people, ethnic Chinese people, and overseas Chinese. It also held medical scholarly exchanges with medical practitioners in Costa Rica.⁹⁴ On November 28, Chinese medical practitioners and Costa Rican physicians succeeded in performing a collaborative surgery procedure using a laparoscope on the Daishandao.⁹⁵ On November 29, the Daishandao completed a seven-day medical assistance operation in Costa Rica and departed for China. In Costa Rica, the Daishandao provided medical examinations and treatment for 6,315 people and performed 56 surgeries.⁹⁶

⁸⁹ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan likai Guba [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship leaves Cuba],” *PLA Daily*, October 28, 2011.

⁹⁰ “Guo Boxiong zai Guba kanwang wo haijun ‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan guanbing [Guo Boxiong observes crew of the ‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship in Cuba],” *PLA Daily*, October 28, 2011.

⁹¹ “‘Dongfang tianshi’ qingdong Jinsidun [‘Eastern angel’ impresses Kingston],” *PLA Daily*, November 1, 2011; and “Wo jiang yisheng mingji Zhongguo pengyou [I’ll remember Chinese friends throughout my life],” *PLA Daily*, November 2, 2011.

⁹² “Junren, Yong youyi zengjin youyi [Soldier, promoting friendship by friendship],” *PLA Daily*, November 11, 2011.

⁹³ “‘Heping fangzhou’ yiliao fendui shenre Duobagedao song yi song yao [A squad of the ‘Peace Ark’ enters Tobago Island and offers medical service and medicine],” *PLA Daily*, November 13, 2011.

⁹⁴ “‘Heping fangzhou’ fangwen Gesidalijia [‘Peace Ark’ visits Costa Rica],” *PLA Daily*, November 25, 2011.

⁹⁵ “Shoushushi li de ‘xieyouqu’ [‘A concerto’ in an operating room],” *PLA Daily*, November 30, 2011.

⁹⁶ “Zhongguo haijun ‘Heping fangzhou’ hao Gesidalijia youhao fangwen [‘Peace Ark’ of the PLAN pays a friendship visit to Costa Rica],” *PLA Daily*, December 1, 2011.

Harmonious Mission 2013

On June 10, 2013, the Daishandao once again departed the military port in Zhoushan to execute its third international medical assistance operation, “Harmonious Mission 2013.”⁹⁷ In the 118-day Harmonious Mission 2013 which, in its entirety, covered 18,000 nautical miles, the Daishandao visited the eight Asian countries of Brunei, Maldives, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Cambodia. The ship provided medical services for the local people, ethnic Chinese people, and overseas Chinese. In addition, in Brunei, the mission participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)/ Military Medicine (MM) Exercise. The ship provided medical services to the navies of various countries in the Gulf of Aden, and participated in a multilateral emergency medical care exercise and a military parade held in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia.

The Daishandao arrived in Brunei on June 16, and from the following day (17th), participated in the ADMM-Plus HADR/ MM Exercise. China co-organized this exercise with Brunei, and deployed its landing ship Kunlunshan and Air Force transport aircraft for the exercise in addition to the Daishandao. On the Daishandao, an emergency medical care exercise as well as a study session and experience-sharing activities related to military medicine were conducted.⁹⁸ After completing its six-day stay in Brunei, the Daishandao transited the Strait of Malacca and reached the Indian Ocean. On June 29, the ship arrived in the Maldives. In the Maldives, the Daishandao utilized equipment such as ship-based helicopter and high-speed craft to dispatch ten medical squads to eight remote islands to provide medical examinations and treatment for the local people. The personnel performed surgeries together with local medical practitioners, provided medical examinations and treatment at such facilities as an orphanage, nursing home, and primary school, and presented pharmaceuticals.⁹⁹

On July 13, the Daishandao arrived in the Gulf of Aden. It provided medical examinations and treatment for the crew of PLAN vessels engaged in counter-piracy operations. In addition, the ship provided medical services for the vessels of foreign navies and began activities to conduct medical exchanges. During this 15-day operation, the Daishandao saw 359 Chinese officers, treated 213 officers, and performed 7 surgeries. It conducted medical scholarly exchanges with the vessels of foreign countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Turkey, Pakistan, and the Netherlands, on five occasions, and carried out medical examinations and treatment for 11 foreign military officers.¹⁰⁰

On July 30, the Daishandao arrived in the Port of Karachi in Pakistan. During its seven-day stay, the ship provided medical examinations and treatment for 2,029 people and performed 28 surgeries. It also provided medical examinations and treatment at the hospital and training base of

⁹⁷ Activities of “Harmonious Mission 2013” are described in detail on the special page of *navy.81.cn* <<http://navy.81.cn/hpfz2013.htm>> and the special page of *CRI online* <<http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2013/06/04/Zt147s4136584.htm>>.

⁹⁸ “Dongmeng fangzhang kuodahui jizhi rendaozhuyi yuanzhu jiuzai he junshi yixue lianhe yanlian lakai weimu [ADMM-Plus HADR/ MM exercise starts],” *PLA Daily*, June 18, 2013.

⁹⁹ “‘Heping fangzhou’ hao yiyuanchuan di Maerdaifu [‘Peace Ark’ hospital ship arrives in Maldives],” *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], June 30, 2013.

¹⁰⁰ “Heping fangzhou hao wancheng wei huhang guanbing tigong yiliao fuwu likai Yadinwan [Peace Ark completes medical service for personnel of anti-piracy mission and leaves Gulf of Aden],” *PLA Daily*, July 27, 2013.

the Pakistan Navy.¹⁰¹ On August 6, the Daishandao entered into the Port of Mumbai in India and started a six-day operation. During its stay, the Daishandao provided medical examinations and treatment for 76 employees of Chinese companies, ethnic Chinese people, and overseas Chinese and performed five surgeries. Additionally, the ship conducted medical exchanges with several hospitals of the Indian Navy.¹⁰² On August 19, the Daishandao arrived in the Port of Chittagong in Bangladesh and provided medical services over six days.¹⁰³ On August 28, the Daishandao entered into the Port of Thilawa in Myanmar and carried out a six-day medical service operation.

On August 29, Myanmar's physicians were invited to the Daishandao to perform surgery in collaboration with Chinese physicians.¹⁰⁴ On September 10, the Daishandao conducted medical examinations and exchanges with Indonesia's hospital ship and Singapore's transport vessel in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia.¹⁰⁵ Following this, the Daishandao visited the Port of Jakarta on September 18 and conducted exchanges before heading to the final destination of Cambodia. On September 24, the Daishandao entered into the Port of Sihanoukville and conducted a six-day medical examination and treatment operation as well as exchanges. The ship then departed for China on September 30.¹⁰⁶ On its return to China, the Daishandao conducted a rescue operation for the crew of a Chinese fishing vessel that got caught in a typhoon in the South China Sea. On October 12, the ship returned to the military port of Zhoushan.¹⁰⁷ In 2014, the Daishandao participated in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise off the coast of Hawaii, and then visited the Pacific countries of Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea to carry out Harmonious Mission 2014.

Education for foreign military officers

Background

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the PLA has provided education and training for foreign military officers through subsidiary academic institutions. The nature and characteristics of such programs have changed with the evolution of time. In broad terms, they may be categorized into three different timeframes.¹⁰⁸

The first period is 1950 to 1963. During this period, the PLA provided education and training for military personnel with diverse expertise. They numbered more than 6,700 personnel from China's friendly nations, including Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, and Albania. The PLA also

¹⁰¹ "Heping fangzhou likai Bajisitan qianwang Yindu [Peace Ark leaves Pakistan for India]," *PLA Daily*, August 4, 2013.

¹⁰² "Heping fangzhou hao yiyuanchuan jieshu fangwen Yindu [Peace Ark ends its visit to India]," *PLA Daily*, August 18, 2013.

¹⁰³ "Tupian xinwen [Photo news]," *People's Daily*, August 20, 2013.

¹⁰⁴ "Heping fangzhou you ge 'guoji dajiating' [Peace Ark has an 'international large family']," *PLA Daily*, September 1, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ "Heping fangzhou hao dida Yinni canjia duoguo haijun lianhe xunzhen [Peace Ark arrives in Indonesia and participates in multilateral joint round]," *PLA Daily*, September 11, 2013.

¹⁰⁶ "Heping fangzhou yiyuanchuan likai jianpuzhai qicheng huiguo [Peace Ark leaves Cambodia and heads for home]," *PLA Daily*, October 1, 2013.

¹⁰⁷ "Haijun Heping fangzhou yiyuanchuan yuanman wancheng renwu fanhui Zhoushan [Peace Ark of the PLAN smoothly completes its mission and returns to Zhoushan]," *Xinhuanet*, October 12, 2013.

¹⁰⁸ The information below is based on Shan Xu, "Jiefangjun waixun 60 nian [60 years of the PLA's overseas training]," *Dong Xi Nan Bei [Four points of the compass]*, No. 20, 2012, pp. 12-13.

dispatched over 700 military experts to these countries to provide assistance for local education and training programs.

The second period is 1964 to 1978. During this period, Chinese diplomacy veered in a leftward and radical direction due to the influence of the Cultural Revolution. In the meantime, a number of African colonies gained independence and achieved statehood. Under such circumstances, China extended cooperation especially for the building of military forces in African countries. During this period, China dispatched about 6,400 military experts to over 40 nations. In addition, it accepted approximately 8,000 students to assist the education and training of the military forces of various countries. The content of the education and training was wide-ranging, covering even topics such as the method of use of weapons by infantry, basic tactics, specialized skills involving the heavy equipment of the army, navy, and air force, and joint tactics.

The third period is 1979 and beyond. China introduced the reform and opening-up policy, and accordingly, began to pursue an economic growth-oriented path. Consequently, the PLA shifted its assistance to one which, as the main activity, dispatches experts to recipient countries for the provision of education and training for their military officers, and as a secondary activity, accepts students from recipient countries. Education and training programs during this period were intended to help enhance the capacity of the military forces of recipient countries to provide their own trainings, and to help the military forces gain command of the weapons and equipment provided by China. Since 2000, however, China has adopted a modified policy for the provision of education and training for foreign military forces. It has begun to accept students from foreign military forces into PLA academic institutions more proactively than before.

College of Defence Studies, National Defence University

The College of Defence Studies (CDS) is an academic institution that is subordinated to the National Defence University. Its main task is to provide education and training for senior officers of foreign militaries as well as senior officials of foreign governments. The history of the CDS's provision of education and training for senior officers of foreign militaries dates back to the 1950s. However, it is since 2004 that the CDS began to accept hundreds of students from foreign militaries every year, as well as receive visits from many senior foreign government officials, senior military officers, scholars, and experts. The number of graduates has reached 4,000, coming from as many as 157 countries. It is said that more than 300 of the graduates have returned to their countries and went on to assume leading ranks, including defense minister, chief of general staff, military commander, and government minister.¹⁰⁹ For example, President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has studied at the CDS.

It is reported that the CDS puts efforts into teaching China's traditional military ideologies, as represented by *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu. It also adopts a flexible curriculum to increase relevance, utility, and scientific understanding, while taking into consideration the diverse demands and cultural backgrounds of foreign students.¹¹⁰ For coursework, students are divided into groups based on their language of use, such as English, French, Russian, and Spanish. The CDS adopts

¹⁰⁹ Chu Zhenjiang et al., "Naxie 'zhongzhi' youyi de ren [Someone 'planting' friendship]," *Jiefangjun Shenghuo* [*PLA Life*], No. 11, 2011, pp. 9-11.

¹¹⁰ "Zhongguoshi waixun de 'Changping yangben' ['Changping model,' overseas training with Chinese characteristics]," *PLA Daily*, September 5, 2010.

mainly the style of holding debates among a small number of people on concrete issues, including combating terrorism and disaster relief. The CDS is also committed to inviting people from outside of the school as lecturers for classroom lectures. For instance, the CDS has signed education agreements with Tsinghua University and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Non-CDS experts and senior government officials make up more than 50% of the lecturers of classroom lectures. In principle, in the military course, senior officers from the CDS and PLA give lectures, and in the civil-military joint course, domestic experts, senior government officials, foreign ambassadors and others give lectures. In September 2014, the CDS for the first time conferred master's degrees in military studies to 61 foreign students.¹¹¹

Nanjing Army Command College

The Nanjing Army Command College (NACC) is another institution which, alongside the CDS, accepts many senior military officers and government officials from other countries as foreign students for education and training.¹¹² Through 2011, the NACC has accepted nearly 4,000 foreign students from 107 countries. The International Military Education Exchange Center (IMEEC) is the principal entity that oversees the education and training of foreign students, as well as the exchange activities with foreign military forces and other organizations. While the NACC has accepted students from foreign military forces for about half a century, it is only in recent years that the number of accepted students has increased dramatically. In the past, the NACC accepted no more than 20 foreign students from a single country in a single term. Since the beginning of this century, however, the school has shifted to accepting hundreds of foreign students from dozens of countries in a single term. It is said that the IMEEC emphasizes advocating the philosophy of a "harmonious world," presenting an image of an open PLA, and spreading Chinese traditional culture. Furthermore, it is said to be proactively exploring new forms of open academic programs and international exchanges.

The NACC makes curriculum improvements in accordance with the changes in the times and the requests of foreign students. For example, it has newly launched courses, such as "Counterterrorism and Security Maintenance," "International Peacekeeping," and "Humanitarian Relief." In addition, the NACC has established a dozen or so education demonstration bases, including in the hometown of Confucius as well as at the East Sea Fleet and high-tech companies. The school has also created frameworks of international scholarly exchanges, such as the "Zhongshan International Forum" and the "International Military Academic Symposium." Moreover, the NACC has been channeling efforts into offering practical education through the installation of map exercise equipment and simulation equipment that makes full use of high-technologies. The school has reportedly developed a "Chinese-style system of curriculum" comprised of five courses: basic course; specialized course; seminar; research; and practicum. At the same time, the NACC has set up a course entitled "China in the Eyes of Foreign Military Personnel," which is taught by foreign

¹¹¹ "Guofang daxue Fangwu xueyuan shouyu 61 ming waiguo gaoji junguan junshi shoushi xuewei [The College of Defense Studies confers master's degree of military studies to 61 foreign high-ranking officers]," *PLA Daily*, September 6, 2014.

¹¹² Unless otherwise noted, the section below referred to "Ganshou duiwai junshi peixun de Zhongguo meili [Feeling appeal of China's overseas military training]," *PLA Daily*, March 21, 2011 and "Chuanbo Hexieshijie linian, Zhanshi guojia jundui yinxiang [Disseminate the principle of harmonious world, show an image of the national military]," *PLA Daily*, March 21, 2011.

students. Foreign students give presentations on topics, such as coursework at the NACC and the Chinese economy, society, and culture. This is aimed at giving Chinese students exposure to “China as seen by the world” and heighten their sense of honor and confidence.¹¹³

Summary

Characteristics of China’s capacity building assistance

This section has thus far examined three capacity building assistance activities by China, namely, landmine clearance, medical assistance activities using a hospital ship, and education for foreign military officers. On the whole, the following three characteristics may be identified.

First, all three activities have a clear purpose, which is to improve the international assessment of the PLA. The rapid advances in the modernization of the PLA have triggered international distrust and suspicions over China’s military power. In response, China endeavors to spread an image to the world as a “responsible power,” through the provision of landmine clearance assistance and medical services. In addition, China invites senior military officers and senior government officials from foreign countries for education programs, with the aim of deepening their understanding of China’s peaceful and friendly posture. China uses official media, including the PLA Daily, to strongly appeal to domestic and overseas audiences that the PLA makes contributions to the international community.

Secondly, China utilizes capacity building assistance to deepen its relations with nations as well as military forces that are critical to China’s foreign relations strategy. Many of the countries that are recipients of Chinese assistance are found in Africa. For China, African countries are increasing in importance as partners in international politics that can stand up against developed countries, as well as China’s suppliers of natural resources such as oil. It is inferred that China is deepening its relations with the US hinterland of Latin American and Caribbean countries to keep the US “rebalance to Asia” strategy in check. Furthermore, it is deemed that the strengthening of China’s relations with Indian Ocean countries has significance for ensuring the stability of the sea lanes that are essential for China. China’s capacity building assistance appears to be conducted in accordance with China’s overall foreign relations strategy.

Thirdly, looking at the activities examined in this section, the PLA’s capacity building assistance does not seem to have produced significant outcomes by way of enhancing the capacities of recipient countries. In the area of landmine clearance, foreign personnel received training at the PLA University of Science and Technology, and Chinese trainers were dispatched to Eritrea and Thailand to provide education to local personnel. However, these efforts were by no means large-scale programs. Furthermore, while these activities were conducted until the mid-2000s, no related news has been reported since then, suggesting they are no longer conducted. As regards the medical assistance activities using a hospital ship, their primary activity is to provide medical examinations and treatment to local people and military personnel during a short period of around one week. It is difficult to imagine that this is leading to the capacity building of local medical practitioners. Additionally, the education programs for senior military officers and government officials of foreign countries at the CDS and NACC are focused on instilling an image of a peaceful

¹¹³ Ji Benlin et al., “Nanjin lujun zhihuixueyuan zhashi kaizhang jiaoyu huodong jishi [A record of educational activities at the Nanjing Army Command College],” *Jundui dang de shenghuo* [*The Party Life of Army*], No. 6, 2012, p. 47.

and friendly PLA, coupled with forging amiable relations with the senior officials of the relevant countries. It is thus suggested that there is greater emphasis on exchanges and advertising than capacity building in a real sense.

Implications for Japan

The case of China offers a number of pointers for Japan's implementation of full-fledged capacity building assistance activities.

First, Japan needs to also make use of domestic and overseas media to actively communicate information about its capacity building assistance activities in other countries, in order for Japan and the Self-Defense Forces to be seen more as fulfilling their responsibilities for international peace. China makes clear that the objective of its capacity building assistance is to improve the image of China in the international community. This approach taken by China could be instrumental for Japan in planning its capacity building policy.

Secondly, however, to improve Japan's image in the international community, it is also essential that Japan carries out sustained efforts that substantively build up the capacities required by recipient countries, without excessively emphasizing exchanges and advertising similar to China. A campaign that appeals the activities that have not delivered concrete outcomes may still improve Japan's image temporarily and on the surface, but such a campaign will not have long-lasting effects.

Thirdly, Japan, like China, should select recipient countries by giving priority to those in which the development of deeper bilateral relations will contribute to Japan's diplomatic and security interests. Japan, for example, can invest efforts into capacity building assistance for Indian Ocean countries that will contribute to Japan's national interest of securing the stable use of sea lanes, or, from the perspective of countering China's maritime expansion, give priority to assistance for Southeast Asian countries that are facing pressure from China.

Conclusion

This article discussed capacity building assistance activities by the United States and China, and examined how the two countries engage in capacity building through these programs. While the main purpose of this study is to provide an overview of such actual cases, let us conclude by briefly noting a number of observations that emerge from this overview.

First, the US and Chinese activities demonstrate the diversity of capacity building assistance in terms of its means, objectives, timeframes, and implementation frameworks. The means include: (1) education and training; (2) provision of equipment; (3) provision of advice; (4) infrastructure development; and (5) operational collaboration. A closer look at the actual activities reveals that their implementation takes an even wider range of forms. In equipment provision, for instance, it usually does not end with the transfer of hardware itself but requires the continual provision of spare parts for maintenance as well as technical assistance to operate it. Furthermore, the priority areas of assistance may change as the project progresses. As regards the timeframe, some capacity building assistance programs are based on regular annual cycles and permanent budgets (in particular, educational programs and advising), while some are intended for implementation during a three- to five-year timeframe (equipment provision and infrastructure development). In

terms of implementation frameworks, there are programs that national military forces and defense ministries administer on their own, as well as programs that are implemented in coordination with other relevant ministries (mainly the ministries of development and foreign affairs).

With regard to objectives, the two countries are similar in that both identify deepening security relations with recipient countries as a key objective. However, the United States and China differ in the way they define this goal in more concrete terms. The United States regards the improved governance capacity of the recipient countries as a key achievement that will also benefit the United States and endeavors to provide assistance tailored to their needs. On the other hand, China appears to place emphasis on appealing its contribution to the international community through capacity building activities. This difference is of course a relative one, with the latter aspect found to some extent in the US case and the former aspect in the Chinese case. Nonetheless, the two countries are engaged in capacity building with clearly different intentions and expectations. This is to say, whereas US capacity building assistance is mainly intended to enhance the governance capacity of recipient countries, China's capacity building assistance aims to make a diplomatic appeal to the international community (and probably to China's domestic public opinion). In this aspect, their activities present a marked contrast.

The second observation concerns implications for Japan. In light of the history of Japan's international peace cooperation and foreign aid, there is reason to assume that Japan's capacity building will be closer to the US model. However, in order to provide such assistance more proactively, Japan needs to deepen and gain a greater understanding on how capacity building assistance contributes to the national security interests of Japan—a question that applies, indeed, to Japan's international peace cooperation as a whole. Furthermore, given that capacity building assistance has the aforementioned diverse formats and assistance needs, Japan will need to consider how to diversify its menu of assistance programs including through improved coordination among relevant ministries and agencies.