

Coercive Diplomacy and Peace Operations: Intervention in East Timor*

Ken Ohnishi**

Abstract

This paper analyzes the activities of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) from the perspectives of compellence and coercive diplomacy with the recognition that the proactive use of force is also effective in peace operations and the appropriate concept underpinning such actions is coercion, particularly compellence and coercive diplomacy. After a referendum on independence from Indonesia in August 1999, East Timor was thrown into confusion by large-scale destruction and forced displacement of residents by anti-independence militias. INTERFET that intervened to restore security to East Timor used its military force to proactively put pressure on militias and part of Indonesian troops to induce them to alter their actions. These behaviors of INTERFET can be captured in line with the structure of coercive diplomacy and INTERFET's high-level military capability and the existence of its clear objectives can be cited as factors contributing to its success. As suggestions for peace operations in general, it can be pointed out that coercion by denial, rather than by punishment, seems to be more effective in the context of peace operations and that it is necessary to practice threats of denial across all areas of operations.

Responses to civil wars that erupt in many parts of the world have been getting much attention as a major security issue after the end of the Cold War. With civil wars likely to continue erupting, the successful execution of peace operations as one of the measures to respond to civil wars represents a challenge for the international community. However, peace operations in recent years have not necessarily achieved satisfactory results because of their diverse tasks and severe operational environment. In particular, there is an increasing number of interventions in situations where conflicts are effectively going on or where the resumption of fighting is highly likely despite a ceasefire agreement, with the issue of the use of force in peace operations still remaining as a serious challenge. At a time when missions of peace operations are becoming diverse, how to utilize military force in peace operations represents a major issue, and it is important to learn lessons from past experiences about how the military force can function in the context of peace operations.

Thus, this paper seeks to obtain new suggestions regarding the function of the military force in peace operations through an analysis of peace operations from the perspective of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that combines military pressure and diplomatic

* Originally published in Japanese in *Boei Kenkyusyo Kiyo* (NIDS Security Studies), Vol. 14, No. 2, March 2012.

** Fellow, Policy Studies Department.

negotiations, designed to induce opponents through threats without completely defeating them. This strategy per se is intended for conflicts between states, but a similar structure can be observed in peace operations. This paper particularly addresses the case of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 and analyzes peace operations from the perspective of coercive diplomacy based on the actual case example.

The first section below sorts out the concept of “coercion,” including coercive diplomacy, and discusses how it is applicable to the context of peace operations. The second section gives an overview of the background of the deployment of INTERFET and its activities and casts it into the structure of coercive diplomacy. Finally, based on this, the third section discusses factors that seem to have contributed to the success of INTERFET from the standpoint of coercive diplomacy and lessons to be learned from its success for peace operations in general.

Concept of Coercion and Peace Operations

This section firstly provides an overview of the concept of coercion. As various advocates and writers use diverse terms and definitions in their discussions of “coercion” in international relations, it is necessary to sort out and define the meanings of the terms used in this paper. Then, the section discusses how the concept of coercion, particularly “compellence” and “coercive diplomacy,” is applicable to the context of peace operations. While various actors have come to be involved in peace operations, including regional organizations and multinational forces, in recent years, the perception of the United Nations (UN) still seems to provide some sort of benchmark in considering peace operations in general. In this section, therefore, using the perception of the UN regarding peace operations as a clue, it is argued that the application of the concept of compellence and coercive diplomacy is useful in overcoming problems confronting peace operations in recent years.

Concept of Coercion


The scope of activities embraced in the term “coercion” varies significantly depending on who uses it.¹ In this paper, coercion and other related concepts are sorted out as shown in Figure 1. When an actor seeks to achieve a certain objective and that objective is related to actions by others, there are broadly three ways to achieve the objective. The most peaceful way of them is “persuasion.” Persuasion seeks to influence and change the fundamental values or beliefs of the opponent. Persuasion does not induce the opponent through such elements as cost benefit considerations and pressure by force, and the opponent takes actions desirable for those who persuade based on more fundamental preferences.²

In contrast, the most violent way is the achievement of the objective by “brute force.” In this way, the objective is achieved directly by force regardless of the will of the opponent by crushing

¹ For summaries of the previous studies, see Patrick C. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful? And Why Can’t We Agree on It?,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 3, Summer 2005; and Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence: An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2006.

² David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller and William H. Taft, V, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*, RAND, 2002, p. 8.

Figure 1



Source: Prepared by the author based on Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, original ed., 1998, p. 12; and David E. Johnson, Karl P. Mueller and William H. Taft, V, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*, RAND, 2002, p. 9.

its options and depriving the opponent of or skirting around the means of resistance.³

In the middle of these two is “coercion.” Coercion is designed to induce the opponent to voluntarily take actions that are desirable to the coercer by working on the opponent’s anticipation of what is going to happen. Coercion seeks to induce the opponent to take particular actions, but it is different from persuasion in that coercion seeks to manipulate the opponent’s rational cost benefit calculation by using threats or offering positive incentives. While coercion is intended to have the opponent take actions desirable for the coercer through various approaches including the threat of force, it still represents inducement. In other words, whether the opponent ultimately takes actions desirable for the coercer entirely depends on decisions to be made by the opponent. In this respect, coercion is different from the achievement of the objective directly by force, where the achievement of the objective is sought regardless of the will of the opponent by rather proactively denying decision-making by the opponent.⁴

Coercion can be distinguished into “deterrence” and “compellence.” Deterrence is urging the opponent not to take a particular action with threatening that, if the opponent takes that action, the opponent would be subject to costs larger than benefits to be gained from such an action. Conversely, compellence is intended to induce the opponent to take a particular action by demanding the opponent to do so and threatening the imposition of costs if the opponent fails to take that action.⁵

Compellence is a concept clarified by Thomas C. Schelling.⁶ Alexander L. George argued that as compellence may be used both as an offensive and defensive tool, the two should be distinguished. George describes the type of compellence to persuade an opponent to change the status quo as “blackmail” and the type of compellence to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action that is not desirable to the coercer as “coercive diplomacy” and developed his arguments particularly about the latter.⁷

³ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 7-9.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 10, 13.

⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, with a new preface and afterword, Yale University Press, 2008, original ed., 1966, p. 71.

⁷ Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds., *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., Westview Press, 1994, pp. 7-8.

In addition, coercion by military force can be distinguished between coercion by “punishment” and coercion by “denial” based on the difference of the threats used. The former involves threatening to impose costs on the opponent which exceed the expected benefits from the action as punishment for taking that action. The latter involves threatening to prevent the opponent from acquiring the benefits expected from the action. This distinction is widely known in the discussions of deterrence, but the distinction can be applicable to compellence as well.⁸

Since compellence is intended to encourage a voluntary change in the opponent’s actions by employing threats, it is possible to achieve an objective at a lower cost than achieving an objective with brute force in a war. However, as compellence is a kind of bargaining, an objective cannot be achieved by compellence when demands made are unacceptable for the opponent or when threats or assurance is incredible. If the opponent does not bow to threats and compellence fails to work, then the one resorting to compellence would be faced with the choice between to give up achieving an objective and to achieve an objective by brute force, removing the opponent’s resistance. Furthermore, using pressure of force in a tense crisis situation would be precariously on the edge of an inadvertent escalation by such factors as the misinterpretation of signals and information.⁹

As seen above, compellence is a strategy that entails many risks. However, while deterrence is a passive strategy, compellence makes it possible to act proactively in order to create a desirable situation. Thus, though deterrence was the main strategy adopted during the Cold War, compellence was also used in crisis management and limited wars in order to pursue objectives while avoiding an all-out nuclear war. After the end of the Cold War, when the clear axis of confrontation is gone, the military force has come to be employed often as responses to conflicts that have arisen rather than just deterring war, with compellence and coercive diplomacy drawing keen attention in this context.¹⁰

Coercion and Peace Operations

The theory of coercion in international relations has thus far been developed mainly in regard to inter-state relations. But the applicability of the concept of coercion is not limited to inter-state relations. Generally speaking, coercion is the mechanism that is played out in every scene of society. For example, the maintenance of domestic security relies largely on the mechanism of coercion through police and the judiciary system. In international relations as well, coercer and coerced can be non-state actors and thus coercion is applicable to conflicts other than among

⁸ Johnson, Mueller and Taft, *Conventional Coercion*, pp. 16-17; and Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 18-19.

⁹ George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” pp. 9-10; and Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” George and Simons, *Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, pp. 290, 293.

¹⁰ Toshihide Yamauchi, “Gunjiryoku to Gaiko [Military force and diplomacy],” Defense Studies Society, National Defense Academy of Japan ed., *Gunjigaku Nyumon* [Introduction to military studies], Kaya Shobo, 1999, pp. 32-42; and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, original ed., 1998, p. 1.

states. Peace operations are no exception.¹¹ Peace operation is an umbrella term for activities of the international community to deploy personnel for the purposes of the resolution of and recovery from conflicts, such as peace enforcement and peace building conceptualized after the end of the Cold War with interventions in civil wars in mind, in addition to peacekeeping devised as a complement to collective security that had been paralyzed during the Cold War.

Peacekeeping is activities born out of necessity and practices and its modes have been established in the course of practices rather than on legal and theoretical foundations. Peacekeeping is regarded as non-coercive activities. In traditional peacekeeping during the Cold War, such activities as ceasefire monitoring of international conflicts were conducted from a neutral stance based on agreements between parties to conflicts. Peacekeeping troops were allowed to use force for self-defense, but they were made up of lightly-armed soldiers. Peacekeepers basically did not assume the use of force because parties to conflicts gave consent to their activities.

After the end of the Cold War, however, the trend shifted to complex peacekeeping with diverse missions, including the maintenance and recovery of security, humanitarian assistance and the rebuilding of state functions in post-civil war states. In this new environments, peacekeeping activities guided by the traditional three principles of consent by parties to conflicts, impartiality and non-use of force for purposes other than self-defense have come to experience their limitations. Ceasefire agreements in civil war collapsed in many cases, and peacekeeping often encountered situations where conflicts effectively continued. Even when parties to conflicts consented to the deployment of peacekeepers, they often retracted their consent or obstructed peacekeeping activities thereby effectively withdrawing their consent to peacekeeping. Under these situations, peacekeeping based on the traditional three principles becomes unable to carry out its tasks.

In order to prevent large-scale human rights violations and humanitarian crises that are often associated with civil wars, the UN has in recent years come to show the stance of not hesitating to use force against spoilers¹² who obstruct the execution of peacekeeping missions by redefining the three principles in favor of the effective functioning of peacekeeping. The so-called Brahimi Report, released in 2000 as a report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations set up by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, stated, "Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate professionally and successfully." The report also said peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves as well as other personnel and the mandate of the

¹¹ Examples of arguments that the concepts of compellence and coercive diplomacy are applicable in the context of peace operations and humanitarian interventions include the following: Barry R. Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 79-86; John Gerard Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?," Michael Pugh, ed., *The UN, Peace and Force*, Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 13-14; Fred Tanner, "Weapons Control in Semi-permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence," Pugh, *UN, Peace and Force*; Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999; Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 175-200; Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 157-160, 376-378; Johnson, Mueller and Taft, *Conventional Coercion*, pp. 35-43; and Taylor B. Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*, Oxford University Press, 2008, original ed., 2007, pp. 38-40.

¹² "Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests, and will therefore work to undermine it." United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, UNDPKO, 2008, p. 43n21.

mission, and, when attacked, they should be allowed to mount counterattacks sufficient to silence the attackers. In order to make this possible, the report argued on the meaning of impartiality that the bases of impartiality are the principles of the UN Charter as well as mandates of the mission based on them, and impartiality should be distinct from neutrality that treats every parties of the conflict equally.¹³

The so-called Capstone Doctrine released by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2008, also retains this stance. The Capstone Doctrine noted that robust peacekeeping, which is authorized by UN Security Council resolutions to “use all necessary means” for the purposes of deterring obstruction of the political process, protecting civilians, and supporting the efforts by the host state to maintain law and order, has successfully created environments necessary for restoring order as well as peace building through “proactively using force in defense of their mandates.”¹⁴

When the execution of missions is prioritized and the means of the execution include the use of force under unstable civil war situations, what functions are required of military force? If an international force is deployed to carry out peace operations in a situation where a ceasefire agreement, albeit fragile, is established, the international force can apply the strategy of deterrence. It means that there is peace that should be maintained and the application of deterrence, a strategy for maintaining the status quo, is appropriate. Also, the deterrence strategy is similarly applicable to the protection of civilians if there are no attacks for the moment. Even when peacekeepers have the mission to change the status quo, such as the disarmament of parties to a conflict, it is basically not necessary to assume the use of force in the execution of that mission if the consent to peace operations is obtained from parties to the conflict.

As noted earlier, however, these assumptions often do not hold true in interventions in civil wars. Ceasefire agreements are broken frequently and parties to conflicts often withdraw their consent to activities of international forces. Once a ceasefire collapses, it means that there is no peace to be maintained by peace operation troops, with the continuance of fighting becoming the status quo. Therefore, what an international force should do is to restore the ceasefire, which represents changing the status quo. Similarly, an international force seeks to change the status quo while parties to a conflict do not desire in cases where it tries to stop ongoing attacks on civilians or disarming parties to a conflict unwilling to do so. It is impossible to apply deterrence, a strategy for the maintenance of the status quo, in order to achieve these objectives.

When deterrence by an international force does not work or when an international force intervenes in an ongoing humanitarian crisis, an international force needs to take proactive actions. On the other hand, however, peace operations are activities to contain conflicts, and as such, it is necessary to avoid combat as much as possible. Therefore, it is difficult to choose an option of completely defeating spoilers even for the purpose of restoring peace. Given that reconciliation between parties to a conflict is necessary after the end of a civil war, it is not desirable to stir up mutual hatred by an escalation of the fighting by an international force.

Instead, when an international force proactively uses military force in peace operations, it

¹³ United Nations, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, paras. 49-50.

¹⁴ UNDPKO and DFS, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, p. 34.

seems that compellence should be sought as its function. In other words, an international force puts pressure on spoilers who, for example, abrogate a ceasefire and attack civilians by threatening that they would be subjected to costs by the use of military force by an international force unless they cease actions undesirable for the international community and restore the original state of affairs. Unlike sheer sanctions of the Gulf War type to defeat an “enemy” by recognizing aggressors, an option to induce spoilers to take particular actions by compellence makes it possible to proactively influence actions by parties to a conflict with the pressure of military force while maintaining impartiality. Given this perspective, coercion that includes both deterrence and compellence appears to be the best concept that underlies the use of force by peace operation troops that intervenes into a civil war.

There is a description in the Capstone Doctrine where the concept of coercion that includes compellence in addition to deterrence is implied. The doctrine states that the objective of the use of force in peacekeeping is “to influence and deter spoilers” and “not to seek their military defeat.”¹⁵ The function of “influence” shown here in tandem with “deterrence” should be able to include the use of active influence, or compellence, in order to induce parties to a conflict to take actions in a particular direction. When this passage is interpreted in this way, the expression is indeed consistent with the concept of coercion discussed earlier.

However, before and after this passage, the doctrine notes that use of force is a last resort in peacekeeping, and restraint is necessary in using.¹⁶ Thus, it must be pointed out that the Capstone Doctrine is also cautious about the use of force in peacekeeping. Activities to restore international peace and security that adopt coercive measures, including the use of military force, are positioned as peace enforcement,¹⁷ and the proactive use of military pressure such as compellence has a rather high affinity to peace enforcement.

On the other hand, there seem to be areas where it is difficult to make the distinction between peace enforcement and peacekeeping. The Capstone Doctrine noted that robust peacekeeping is different from peace enforcement in that it uses force only at the “tactical level” while maintaining the consent of parties to a conflict at the political level.¹⁸ However, it seems difficult to apply this distinction to actual operations. As discussed earlier, the consent of parties to a conflict is extremely precarious and can be withdrawn easily, and the Capstone Doctrine also pointed to similar points.¹⁹ Given this, it should be recognized that the consent of the parties subjected to the use of force is highly likely to be withdrawn completely. Then, aside from the traditional peacekeeping, it appears difficult to draw a line between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The doctrine recognizes the connections and overlaps between various types of peace operations and presents the way of capturing them in a spectrum.²⁰ Pushing forward the idea of capturing peace operations in a spectrum, we should recognize that the nature of peace operations can change easily. Furthermore, given the present environment of civil war, it is extremely difficult for an international force to protect others from violence in conflicts by the passive use of force alone. Therefore, both the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 34-35.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

active and passive use of force should be assumed in high-intensity peace operations, particularly robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement, though with differing weight in accordance with the situations of where they are deployed.

Needless to say, not all parties to a conflict necessarily take actions desired by the international community because of threats by an intervening international force. If parties to a conflict do not bow to threats, compellence would fail, and an international force would be confronted with a choice between the defeat of parties to a conflict and the abandonment of the intervention and withdrawal. Therefore, it must be recognized that the adoption of the compellence strategy in peace operations involves the risk of an escalation into a larger-scale use of force. As discussed earlier, however, it is deemed difficult to restore stability by deterrence alone in today's civil war situation and the strategy of deterrence is inapplicable in the first place to cases where the fighting is effectively going on. When the situation requires it after taking necessary risks into account, the application of the strategy of compellence should be considered in peace operations as well.

Situations in which the pressure based on military force must be exerted in peace operations are presumed to be cases where parties to conflicts take actions that contravene already-concluded peace agreements or cases where humanitarian crises occur, including attacks on civilians. Therefore, the pressure by the international community is to be exerted in order to halt such undesirable actions or restore the original state of affairs. Thus, when compellence is used in peace operations, such compellence should basically correspond to coercive diplomacy.²¹

Coercive Diplomacy by INTERFET

As discussed in the preceding section, the use of force in accordance with the ideas of compellence and coercive diplomacy is deemed effective in peace operations as well. In fact, there exist cases of peace operations in the past where the use of military force by international forces can be captured as compellence or coercive diplomacy. Thus, this section takes up INTERFET in the intervention in East Timor as one of such cases and presents, based on specific examples, how the concepts of compellence and coercive diplomacy are applicable to the context of peace operations.²² INTERFET was the peace operation of the Australia-led coalition of the willing. Since peace operations by actors other than the UN are increasing more than ever in recent years and can no longer be described as exceptions, it should be possible to derive lessons for peace operations in general from the case of INTERFET. Below, the section first provides an overview of the developments leading up to the intervention of INTERFET in East Timor and INTERFET activities, and then present how the activities of INTERFET can be captured in line with the structures of compellence and coercive diplomacy.

The Background of the East Timor Problem

In 1975, East Timor, which was a colony of Portugal, plunged into a civil war over the future course

²¹ Below, the term "coercive diplomacy" is used to describe a case as a whole where a peace operation exerts active pressure. On the other hand, the term "compellence" may also be used as necessary to describe the exertion of active pressure at the tactical level because the term "diplomacy" is unnatural and also because an international force does not necessarily exert pressure as a reaction when a moment of each scene is cut out.

²² Previous studies that view intervention by INTERFET as compellence include Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention*, pp. 254-261.

after its independence, and Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor: FRETILIN), which called for social democracy, came out victorious. Neighboring Indonesia believed that East Timor that was lagging behind in development could not sustain its independence and feared that FRETILIN's victory in the civil war might be conducive to the increased influence of communist powers. Thus, in disregard of the proclamation of independence by FRETILIN, Indonesia decided to integrate East Timor by force and announced the signing of the Balibo Declaration by pro-Indonesia East Timorese. The declaration called for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia and the intervention by Indonesian military forces. Using the declaration as an excuse, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor in full scale and drove out FRETILIN, placing East Timor under Indonesia's effective control. Indonesia had the Popular Assembly of East Timorese express the hope for the integration with Indonesia, and in July 1976 formally integrated East Timor into Indonesia with the approval of Indonesian parliament.²³

However, Indonesia's subsequent rule over East Timor was not stable, and remnant forces of Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor: FALINTIL), the military wing of FRETILIN, continued their resistance. Since 1989, in parallel with frustrating military resistance, demonstrations were staged frequently to appeal the situation of East Timor to the international community. But Indonesia responded to these developments by suppressing the independence movement.²⁴

The situation changed significantly with the Indonesian currency crisis that began in 1997 and the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998. New President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, who replaced Suharto, needed the support and assistance of the international community to rebuild the Indonesian economy. In June 1998, as part of the efforts to obtain international support, Habibie announced a special plan of autonomy for East Timor. Furthermore, in January 1999, Habibie said Indonesia would allow the "separation" and independence if residents in East Timor do not want autonomy.²⁵ Following this, intergovernmental consultations between Portugal and Indonesia, held on and off since 1992, made major headway and finally reached agreements on May 5, 1999. The biggest decision under the 5 May Agreements was the holding of an effective referendum in East Timor on the autonomy plan proposed by Indonesia.²⁶ The Agreements stated that if the majority of voters supported the acceptance of the autonomy plan, East Timor would remain as part of Indonesia, and if the majority of voters rejected the autonomy, East Timor would become independent after being placed under the transitional rule of the UN.²⁷

Despite such progress, however, the local situation in East Timor deteriorated. In particular,

²³ Akihisa Matsuno, *Higashi Timoru Dokuritsu-shi* [History of the independence of East Timor], Waseda University Press, 2002, pp. 54-55, 80-118.

²⁴ In particular, the "Santa Cruz Massacre" of 1991, in which Indonesian troops opened fire indiscriminately on demonstrators, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to two East Timorese independence activists in 1996 provided a momentum for the international community's increased support of the East Timorese people and increased pressure and condemnation against Indonesia. The number of victims of the massacre is believed to exceed 200. *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127, 151-165, 170-174, 179-181, 192-200.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 207-209, 212, 224.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 189, 218-220, 224-228. The vote was not called "referendum" due to Indonesia's opposition, and the wording used instead was "a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot."

²⁷ "Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the question of East Timor," Annex I to United Nations, "Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General," UN Doc. A/53/951-S/1999/513, May 5, 1999.

Indonesian forces that became unable to take large-scale repressive actions recruited East Timorese to organize pro-integration militias in various parts of East Timor, expanding violent activities using militia organizations.²⁸ While there were strong calls for the dispatch of peacekeepers to secure safety in the referendum, Indonesia refused to accept them, insisting that Indonesia was responsible for the maintenance of security in East Timor. Under the ultimate agreement, it was decided that Indonesian police would be in charge of maintaining security, while the UN civilian police would advise Indonesian police and also supervise the transportation of ballot boxes.²⁹

In order to carry out the referendum set forth in the 5 May Agreements, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was deployed in East Timor. Since Indonesian forces and police failed to clamp down violence and destruction caused by pro-integration militias, in spite of Indonesian government's pledges, the preparatory work for the vote was conducted without any improvement of security. Though the referendum schedule was postponed several times due to the deteriorating security situation, the vote finally took place on August 30. There were no major incidents of violence or sabotage on voting day, and the balloting took place without commotion, with voter turnout reaching 98.6%. The voting results showed that votes against the autonomy plan, or in favor of independence, accounted for 78.5% of the ballots cast.³⁰

However, the violence and destruction by pro-integration militias that had subsided temporarily resurfaced again immediately after the end of the voting, and pro-integration militias began a scorched earth operation across East Timor following the announcement of the voting results on September 4. An estimated 500 to 1,500 people were killed in the series of violent and destructive actions, and over 200,000 people were forcefully moved to West Timor. Attacks were launched against UNAMET immediately after the end of the voting, and victims included UN staff at polling stations. People driven out of their homes by the violence and destruction were transported to West Timor by pro-integration militias, Indonesian forces and police, evacuated to mountains or found refuge in churches or the UNAMET headquarters. But they suffered from starvation and diseases in the mountains, and churches were attacked and became scenes of massacres and forced displacement. The UNAMET headquarters was also put under siege by militias, and some 2,000 residents who took refuge there, along with UN staff, had to withstand militia's threats by relying on depleting water and food.³¹ While the UNAMET staff and residents who took refuge at the UNAMET headquarters were able to evacuate in the subsequent evacuation operations carried

²⁸ Matsuno, *Higashi Timoru Dokuritsu-shi*, pp. 213-214, 219-223, 229-232. Large-scale incidents of violence included the Liquiça massacre on April 6, 1998, in which at least 50 people were killed by militias at a church in Liquiça. Indonesian troops were present at the scene but gave a tacit nod of approval to the actions of militias. John R. Ballard, *Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United Nations Peacemaking in East Timor*, Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 38.

²⁹ Matsuno, *Higashi Timoru Dokuritsu-shi*, pp. 226-227.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-236, 241-242.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-243. Refugees in West Timor reached 100,000 by September 10, and it was estimated that a further 150,000 were internally displaced within East Timor. A report of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that of the 800,000 East Timorese residents, only 200,000 were able to remain in their homes. After September 3, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was unable to provide support because of worsening security, and the situation of refugees severely deteriorated. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), *East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge*, DFAT, 2001, p. 129.

out by Australian and New Zealand forces,³² the rest of the East Timorese residents were still left behind under extremely deteriorating humanitarian conditions.

In response to the ever-increasing violence and destruction, international pressures mounted on the Indonesian government, responsible for the maintenance of security under the 5 May Agreements. While President Habibie accepted the results of the referendum,³³ he took the stance of refusing the deployment of an international force until Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (The People's Consultative Assembly) decided on the separation of East Timor. Indonesian Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto repeatedly insisted that Indonesian forces could cope with the situation, and under the martial law declared on September 6, sent in reinforcement units to restore security in East Timor.³⁴ However, neither Habibie nor Wiranto could maintain their positions in the face of the situation in ever-heightening chaos. Wiranto, who visited Dili along with an investigation mission of the UN Security Council, witnessed the actual state of the destruction and admitted before the media the necessity to consider the acceptance of an international force. Habibie also recognized that the continued refusal to accept an international force would cause grave loss to Indonesia. Pressures from the international community included references to the suspension of economic and financial assistance that was essential for the rebuilding of the Indonesian economy that collapsed in the currency crisis. With even Wiranto acknowledging the necessity of accepting an international force, Habibie finally decided to accept an international force on September 12.³⁵

After Indonesian President Habibie consented to the deployment of an international force, the UN Security Council on September 15 unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1264 for the deployment of an international force in East Timor. The resolution decided to establish a multinational force with the tasks "to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations," authorizing countries comprising the multinational force "to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate."³⁶

³² At the request of UNAMET and with the consent of Indonesia, Australian forces launched evacuation operations for Australian nationals, UNAMET international staff and local staff on September 6. New Zealand forces also joined the evacuation operations. On September 12, the evacuation of East Timorese residents who took refuge at the UNAMET headquarters was permitted, and Australian and New Zealand forces evacuated them. From September 6 through September 14, Australian and New Zealand forces evacuated about 2,600 people, including some 1,900 East Timorese, by transport planes. DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, pp. 130-131. The non-combatant evacuation operation was called Operation Spitfire by Australian forces. For details of Operation Spitfire, see, for example, Bob Breen, *Mission Accomplished, East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Forces East Timor (INTERFET)*, Allen and Unwin, 2001, pp. 1-14.

³³ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 125.

³⁴ Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom*, Allen and Unwin, 2002, pp. 249-250; and Geoffrey Robinson, *"If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor*, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 172.

³⁵ Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, pp. 251-252, 258-262. The international community's attempt to induce the Indonesian government, which had initially refused to accept an international force, to accept the international force by applying pressure can be seen as coercive diplomacy. While efforts made by the international community until Indonesia's acceptance of the international force are a very important point at issue, this paper does not delve into this point as its subject for consideration is coercive diplomacy in the context of peace operations that actually deploy military forces. For international pressures on the Indonesian government to accept the international force, see, for example, Marianne Jago, "InterFET: An Account of Intervention with Consent in East Timor," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 17, No. 3, June 2010.

³⁶ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1264, September 15, 1999.

Activities of INTERFET

The Australian forces-led INTERFET formed in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1264 started the deployment in East Timor on September 20, only five days after the adoption of the resolution. The first element of INTERFET, comprising 1,100 troops from Australian forces, New Zealand forces and the Gurkhas of British forces, promptly secured an airport and port in Dili. Within the subsequent 24 hours, the strength of troops deployed increased to 2,300, and they secured various places in Dili and also secured an airport in Baucau on September 22.³⁷ On September 27, Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, who served as commander of Indonesian forces in East Timor after the declaration of martial law, delegated the authority to maintain security in East Timor to INTERFET Commander Maj. Gen. Peter Cosgrove. Thereafter, the presence of Indonesian forces in East Timor was confined to the securing of barracks, a power plant, a fuel storage facility and a communication center in Dili. Syahnakri reduced the strength of Indonesian forces stationed from 15,000 to just 1,300 within eight days.³⁸

Once it secured Dili, INTERFET began the deployment to the western boundary region. By October 12, a total of 5,650 troops were deployed, and INTERFET almost brought under its control areas other than part of the western boundary region and Oecussi, an enclave within West Timor. The restoration of security helped the life of residents gradually return to normal, and over half of the pre-referendum population returned to Dili and markets reopened for business. As for humanitarian assistance activities, it became possible to distribute supplies over land in addition to airdrops.³⁹

During stabilization operations in the western region, fighting erupted between INTERFET and the militias several times. On October 6, INTERFET troops opened fire at a line of vehicles of pro-integration militias that tried to break through the checkpoint in Suai in the western part of the country, injuring a few pro-integration militias. Subsequently, an INTERFET convoy was ambushed by the militias while transporting over 100 detained militias. INTERFET troops shot two militias to death in their counterattack, and while the rest of militias withdrew, the two injured among them died. In this attack, two INTERFET soldiers were also injured and evacuated for treatment. Then, on October 9, INTERFET troops were shot by militias near the western boundary, and INTERFET counterattacked and shot one militia to death. On October 16, a patrol team of INTERFET was attacked by militias near Bobonaro. In this contact as well, INTERFET troops counterattacked, killing three militias and injuring the same number of militias.⁴⁰

On top of the fighting with militias, fighting erupted between INTERFET and Indonesian forces and police on October 10. INTERFET troops advanced toward Motaain near the western boundary line after obtaining information that the militias are operating there. As INTERFET troops came closer to the boundary line, however, Indonesian security forces opened fire on INTERFET troops with the belief that they were trying to cross over the boundary line to intrude into West Timor. INTERFET troops counterattacked, killing one Indonesian policeman and injuring two others. The confirmation of the situation after the fighting settled down found that maps used by

³⁷ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, pp. 145-146.

³⁸ Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, pp. 57-58.

³⁹ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, pp. 146-147.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148; and Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, pp. 70-75, 87.

INTERFET and Indonesia were different and that while the point where the fighting erupted was in East Timor on the map used by INTERFET, it was exactly on the boundary line to cross into West Timor on the Indonesian map.⁴¹ INTERFET and Indonesia conducted a joint investigation into the fighting, and recognized the need for closer coordination and communication. In Motaain, the location of the fighting, on November 22, a meeting was held among INTERFET, Indonesian forces, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), FALINTIL and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke. The meeting produced agreements on the return of refugees and boundary management, and also established a permanent communication channel between Indonesian forces and INTERFET. Furthermore, in January 2000, INTERFET, Indonesian forces and UNTAET concluded the Memorandum of Understanding on boundary management.⁴²

On October 22, INTERFET deployed to Oecussi, completing the deployment of its troops across East Timor. Though the security situation near the western boundary line and in Oecussi was still tense at the time, security was all but secured overall. Indonesian forces completed their withdrawal from East Timor on October 31, and the strength of INTERFET grew to 9,400 troops by early November. There was no death toll from battle on the part of INTERFET, with only two soldiers died in a traffic accident and from disease. Casualties were also limited among the militias and Indonesian troops.⁴³

On October 25, UN Security Council Resolution 1272 was adopted for the establishment of UNTAET, the peacekeeping for the purpose of provisional administration until East Timor, which opted for independence in the referendum, becomes capable of standing on its own. UNTAET began its deployment in January 2000 to gradually take over from INTERFET, and the transfer of responsibilities and powers to UNTAET was completed on February 23.⁴⁴ Subsequently, after some two and a half years of provisional administration by UNTAET, East Timor became independent as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on May 20, 2002.

Structural Outline of Coercive Diplomacy in East Timor

As stated earlier, coercive diplomacy, when the opponent takes undesirable actions, is designed to demand the opponent to stop or reverse such actions with the use of threats. In the case of East Timor, the international community demanded pro-integration militias that resorted to destructive actions after the referendum and Indonesian forces that supported them put an end to their violent and destructive behaviors. In order to sort out INTERFET in the structure of coercive diplomacy, this section firstly provides an overview of pro-integration militias and Indonesian forces, the subjects of coercive diplomacy. In particular, Indonesian forces deployed in East Timor at the time of intervention by INTERFET are broadly divided into two groups to identify Indonesian forces that became subject to coercive diplomacy by INTERFET. Next, the objectives of violence and destruction by pro-integration forces blocked by the international community are examined. On the basis of the understanding of these matters, it is presented how actions of INTERFET can be captured in the structure of coercive diplomacy.

⁴¹ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 147; and Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, pp. 76-78.

⁴² DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, pp. 148-149.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 153-154.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

(i) *Pro-Integration Militias*

The principal subject of compellence by INTERFET was pro-integration militias. The bulk of violence during periods before and after the referendum, or from 1998 to 1999, was committed by the pro-integration militias. The pro-integration militias were organized by Indonesian forces in order to counter pro-independence forces that became active due to the autonomy proposal and the referendum proposal, including acceptance of independence, by President Habibie. Even before this, however, Indonesian forces had organized and used East Timorese for the rule of East Timor and operations to clean up the resistance, and militia organizations since 1998 were formed by restructuring personnel in these existing bodies or organizations themselves.⁴⁵ Indonesian forces provided the pro-integration militias with weapons, funds and training, and also directly and indirectly supported their actions.⁴⁶

In 1999, an umbrella organization to control militia organizations across East Timor, called Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (Integration Fighters Force: PPI), was built up, and João Tavares, leader of Halilintar, a militia organization in Maliana, assumed the post of “supreme commander” of the pro-integration militias. While Tavares put the strength of the militias at 13,000 and Eurico Guterres, leader of Aitarak, a major militia organization in Dili, and deputy commander of PPI, at 50,000, the Australian government estimated the effective militia strength at several thousands. As there was a great deal of overlap of members among militia organizations as well as among formal local resident organizations formed by Indonesia, the precise scale of militia organizations is unknown.⁴⁷

Of members of militia organizations, voluntary participants included those who sided with Indonesia since 1975, those whose relatives were killed by FALINTIL, those who were relatively successful under the rule by Indonesia, rogues and those who were attracted by bounties offered by Indonesia, etc. On the other hand, activities to recruit militias were also undertaken in line with norm imposed by regional governments or the military, and there were many people who were forced to join militia organizations under threat. Moreover, there were cases where Indonesian soldiers dressing like militias became mixed with militia organizations. In addition to the disguise by Indonesian soldiers, this happened because the same people belonged to both Indonesian forces and militia organizations and also because there were cases where some militia organizations were positioned within Indonesian forces.⁴⁸

(ii) *Indonesian Forces Subject to Coercion*

Maj. Gen. Syahnakri of Indonesian forces explained that Indonesian troops were not able to put down the militias committing destructive actions because of strong psychological bonds with

⁴⁵ For leaders, areas of operations and roots of militia organizations active between 1998 and 1999, see Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, “Part 4: Regime of Occupation,” *Chega!: The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CAVR)*, <<http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/cheгаReport.htm>>, pp. 28-30.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-37.

⁴⁷ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, pp. 59-60; Harold Crouch, “The TNI and East Timor Policy,” James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, ANU E Press, 2003, original ed., 2000, p. 151; and Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁸ Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, pp. 100-103.

colleagues who, along with Indonesian forces, fought against FALINTIL for many years. Thus, what Syahnakri did to restore order in East Timor was to withdraw troops that have been stationed in East Timor for years and developed strong psychological bonds with the militias and deploy new troops that can be controlled by Jakarta to replace them. Syahnakri initially planned to withdraw all of the troops deployed in East Timor previously as well as the militias and replace them with troops to be dispatched from Jakarta before the deployment of INTERFET, but actually he failed to withdraw them in time for the deployment of INTERFET.⁴⁹

Consequently, Indonesian forces stationed in East Timor at the time of the deployment of INTERFET could be broadly divided into two groups. One group was Indonesian troops that had been stationed in East Timor since before the referendum. Of them, territorial troops had a high percentage of locally recruited East Timorese soldiers,⁵⁰ who strongly objected to and were resentful of the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. Commanders of the units could not have full control over East Timorese soldiers.⁵¹ In addition to territorial troops, troops stationed in other regions, Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command: KOSTRAD) and Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command: KOPASSUS) were deployed in East Timor in rotation. Particularly since the mid-1990s, the influence of KOPASSUS is said to have grown stronger. In August 1998, about 10,000 territorial troops and some 8,000 non-territorial troops were deployed.⁵² Troops that provided direct and indirect support to destructive actions by the militias were these troops that had been stationed in East Timor since before the referendum, and they regarded INTERFET as “an invading force.”⁵³

Another group of Indonesian forces that was in East Timor at the time of the deployment of INTERFET was troops newly sent in from Jakarta under martial law, which consisted mainly of KOSTRAD, marines and air force special forces. These troops also resented the loss of East Timor and acceptance of foreign forces and had rather sympathetic feelings toward the pro-integration militias. But they were at the same time ordered to cooperate with INTERFET and prepare for the withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor.⁵⁴ In fact, those troops newly dispatched from Jakarta cooperated with the deployment of INTERFET and provided the means of transportation to INTERFET troops immediately after their arrival at an airport in Dili.⁵⁵ Therefore, the subjects of compellence by INTERFET were the pro-integration militias and Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor since before the referendum.

(iii) Objectives of Violence and Destruction by Pro-Integration Militias and Indonesian Forces

Regarding violence in East Timor, Indonesia took the position that it was a civil war between East

⁴⁹ Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, pp. 228-229, 280.

⁵⁰ East Timorese soldiers are believed to have accounted for about 30% of all Indonesian forces stationed in East Timor by the end of the 1990s. But most of them were rank-and-file soldiers and were not full-time soldiers. They were recruited based on short-term training programs to foster reservists. Samuel Moore, “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of its Secret Documents,” *Indonesia*, Vol. 72, October 2001, p. 28.

⁵¹ Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 271.

⁵² Moore, “Indonesian Military’s Last Years,” pp. 25-27.

⁵³ Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 271.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, pp. 31, 34, 48.

Timorese that occurred spontaneously because of the culture of violence inherent in East Timor.⁵⁶ Actually, however, the series of violence is understood to have been schemed by Indonesian forces and executed by mobilizing the militias under the direction and support of Indonesian forces. Intelligence and internal documents have revealed a variety of cooperative relationships between the militias and Indonesian forces, and it may be gathered from that fact that militia activities had calmed down when important missions visited East Timor that Indonesian forces had full control over the militias, as described by UNAMET staff as “a water faucet that could be turned on and off at will.”⁵⁷ However, such control by the center of the Indonesian military was effective before the referendum, and the control by Indonesian forces appeared to be not functioning so well over the post-referendum violent and destructive behaviors of the militias. As described earlier, coming under international pressure to contain the violence after the referendum, Indonesia declared martial law and tried to demonstrate that it can restore order on its own. However, the confusion failed to be contained thereafter, making it clear that the Indonesian government was incapable of controlling the situation in East Timor.⁵⁸

It is not necessarily clear what were the objectives of the violent and destructive actions that were conducted on the basis of the scheme and control of the Indonesian government but exploded out of control after the referendum. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately describe the intentions and objectives of the militias and Indonesian forces that had been subjected to coercion. Still, the following assumptions have so far been presented, and the objectives of the militias and Indonesian forces are thought to have shifted as the situation develops.

⁵⁶ Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, pp. 9-10, 103.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁵⁸ On September 7, Gen. Wiranto issued written orders to Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor to use the necessary force to put an end to the violence and destruction. However, the order failed to be executed, as described earlier. Wiranto, who visited Dili along with an investigation mission of the UN Security Council, was observed to be shocked by the horrendous destruction, indicating that he did not have an accurate grasp of what had happened. Maj. Gen. Syahnakri also has admitted that it was difficult to control East Timorese soldiers. Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, pp. 226, 229, 258. On the other hand, there are assertions that the post-referendum violence was well-controlled, citing the fact that destructive actions in Dili ceased only on the day of the visit by an investigation mission of the UN Security Council. Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, p. 197. It has also been pointed out that the post-referendum destruction and forced displacement of residents were so organized that they could not be done without the plans and involvement of Indonesian forces. These points may suggest that there was a certain level of planning on the part of the Indonesian forces but do not necessarily mean there was control by the Indonesian government. For example, Harold Crouch argued that he has no doubt that violent actions before the referendum had been planned in advance by Wiranto, but questioned whether the post-referendum violence had also been premeditated. The Garnadi document and Lumintang's telegram, the internal documents often cited as proof of the planning of the forced displacement of residents by Indonesian forces, indeed refer to the necessity to prepare for the evacuation and displacement of residents. But the contexts of these documents suggest the evacuation of pro-integration residents and Indonesian government officials who might be persecuted in the event of a victory of pro-independence forces in the referendum. While they also referred to the destruction of “vital facilities” in the process of the evacuation, that significantly differs from the forced displacement of pro-independence residents or the scorched earth operation that were actually carried out. Though it is true that Indonesian forces, together with the pro-integration militias, were engaged in the destruction and forced displacement of residents, there is no direct proof that they were carried out under the planning and command and control of the Indonesian government. Crouch, “The TNI and East Timor Policy,” pp. 155-163. If the destruction and violence after the referendum had been planned by the Indonesian government, Syahnakri's cooperation extended to INTERFET under martial law would be unnatural. Therefore, this paper assumes that even if some sort of control had been exercised, it was at the regional level and the violence and destruction in East Timor were not part of the intent of and outside of the control of the Indonesian government.

It is believed that the objective of the initial phase of violence after President Habibie proposed the referendum in January 1999 was to head off the referendum itself. Subsequently, by the time when the holding of the referendum became the default course of action under the 5 May Agreements, the objective became to influence the voting behavior of residents by threat in order for them to opt for autonomy in the referendum.⁵⁹ The violence at this stage is thought to have been engineered under the command and control of the Indonesian government. The independence of East Timor was unacceptable for Indonesian forces in the first place, both in view of the interests they had in East Timor and from the self-pride as the guardian of the integrity of Indonesia. Nevertheless, Indonesian forces did not object to the holding of the referendum in which independence might be chosen. Underlying this attitude, it has been pointed out, was the idea that Indonesian forces were capable of making sure that the autonomy plan was chosen by controlling the voter population.⁶⁰

In contrast, it is deemed that the violence and destructive behaviors which followed the announcement of the voting results against the autonomy proposal were outside of the control of the Indonesian government and had multiple objectives. First of all, the forced displacement of East Timorese residents to Indonesian territory was designed to undermine the credibility of the referendum results by making it appear as though the exodus was based on their own will because they did not want to leave Indonesia's rule.⁶¹ It appears that such an attempt was deemed likely to succeed given that at the time, it was considered that there was hardly any possibility of international military intervention, or at least the possibility of prompt intervention.⁶² Furthermore, there were people who advocated the partition of East Timor, based on the "willing" exodus, to have the western part where many people favor the integration into Indonesia remain in Indonesia and let only the eastern part become independent.⁶³ The objectives of destructive activities may have included to retaliate against and punish the East Timorese,⁶⁴ to exclude international presence, such as the media, UNAMET staff and staff of other international organizations, to serve as a warning for other regions of Indonesia where independence movements exist,⁶⁵ and to obliterate records of acts of violence committed by Indonesian forces and the pro-integration militias.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Hamish McDonald and Richard Tanter, "Introduction," Richard Tanter, Gerry van Klinken, and Desmond Ball, eds., *Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 3.

⁶⁰ In particular, Feisal Tanjung, who was in the Cabinet as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, managed to have local representatives in West Papua choose the integration into Indonesia in a referendum and is believed to have judged that a similar plan could be executed in East Timor as well. The military is said to have initially entertained an optimistic view that some 75% of East Timorese would choose the integration into Indonesia. The military leadership regarded East Timorese as people who have a low level of political awareness and can be manipulated easily. Moore, "Indonesian Military's Last Years," pp. 33-35.

⁶¹ McDonald and Tanter, "Introduction," pp. 3-4; DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 129; and Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, pp. 172-173.

⁶² Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, p. 173.

⁶³ *Ibid.* When the staff of Indonesian and Australian forces met to discuss how INTERFET should be deployed on September 14-15, an attempt was made to place the western part of East Timor under the control of Indonesia. At the meeting, Indonesia presented a plan to partition East Timor into two districts under the control of Indonesia and INTERFET, respectively, with Indonesian forces withdrawing to the western district of East Timor. The proposal was rejected by Australia. Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 265.

⁶⁴ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 129; and Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, p. 172.

⁶⁵ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 129.

⁶⁶ McDonald and Tanter, "Introduction," p. 4.

(iv) Coercion of Pro-Integration Forces by INTERFET

Despite the progress in the replacement of Indonesian troops under martial law and the Indonesian government's decision to accept an international force, the violence and destruction by the pro-integration militias and part of Indonesian forces were still going on at the time of the deployment of INTERFET.⁶⁷ They were hostile to INTERFET and committed acts of provocation.⁶⁸ In the face of this, INTERFET troops deployed in East Timor tried to induce the militias and Indonesian forces to stop their violence and destruction by using threats of denial, such as patrols, detention and disarming of the militias and forceful counterattacks when attacked. In other words, activities of INTERFET as outlined earlier were exactly what can be captured as coercive diplomacy as overall.

Actions of INTERFET were designed not to subdue and obliterate the militias by brute force but to induce them through pressures backed up by powerful military force. At the time of the arrival of INTERFET, Indonesian troops and the militias were driving on Dili streets in trucks at night for looting, firing their guns and setting buildings on fire. These pro-integration forces, when they passed near INTERFET troops, made death threats to INTERFET troops through words and gestures.⁶⁹

Under these circumstances, INTERFET troops patrolled Dili streets frequently and proactively detained militia members by searching inside buildings day and night. Proactive search and detention operations by INTERFET troops ready to combat sent out a message to the militias that they "could no longer operate with impunity." Within a few days of its deployment, INTERFET came to wield a significant influence on decision-making by the militias. The presence and detention operations of INTERFET troops put pressure on the militias, forcing them to stop their activities or flee out of Dili.⁷⁰

On September 24, a particularly large-scale operation to detain the militias was carried out in Dili. By mobilizing all the armored vehicles and helicopters available, in addition to two battalions of the Australian forces and the Gurkhas, INTERFET conducted the detention operation from 12:30 pm to 4:00 pm exactly. The operation was designed to demonstrate that INTERFET troops can carry out their operations anywhere immediately and end them at any time at their own discretion. The objectives of the operation were to crush the will of militias who intended to stay in Dili and also to imbue the sense of awe for INTERFET in Indonesian forces stationed in East Timor. There were those in Indonesian forces who thought that they could still behave as they pleased on the strength of their overwhelming numerical advantage, provoking and threatening INTERFET troops. After the detention operation on September 24, threatening acts against INTERFET troops by Indonesian soldiers and the militias from their trucks decreased dramatically.⁷¹

⁶⁷ After taking over from his predecessor commander in East Timor Maj. Gen. Adam Rahmat Damiri on September 9, Maj. Gen. Syahnakri started the withdrawal of stationed troops to implement his plan for the replacement of military units. Syahnakri insisted that cases of arson of buildings ceased within four days because of this. However, his assertion differs significantly from UNAMET's estimation that 30% of the destruction in Dili occurred over two weeks after martial law was declared on September 6. Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 229.

⁶⁸ Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, p. 34.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

Since the detention of militias deprive the detainees of the freedom of choice, detained militias themselves should see it as the imposition of the will of INTERFET by brute force, rather than coercion. However, the fact that militias are detained by INTERFET has the effect of discouraging other militias from committing acts of destruction or carrying weapons with them, and represents coercion when looking at this aspect. Furthermore, INTERFET handed detained militias over to Indonesian police stationed in East Timor, and they are believed to have been set free after the handover. Therefore, the detention is no more than the temporary detention and detained militias recovered the freedom of behavioral choice soon afterwards.⁷² In this sense, the detention by INTERFET represented compellence.

In the deployment in the western part of East Timor, INTERFET troops duplicated the pressure by frequent patrols seen in Dili. Forceful counterattacks by INTERFET in the event of actual fighting between INTERFET troops and pro-integration militias are also believed to have functioned as compellence. In most of the clashes, the militias launched attacks on INTERFET troops and INTERFET troops mounted counterattacks. INTERFET had a small number of injured soldiers in these clashes, but no soldier was killed in fighting. On the other hand, INTERFET responded with fierce counterattacks and beat back the militias in each incidence of fighting. The attacking militias saw their intentions shattered by brute force. However, these counterattacks by INTERFET have the effect of discouraging other militia members from resisting INTERFET by demonstrating that militias who attack INTERFET troops would be subjected to painful counterattacks. Such illustrative effect can be seen as compellence.

As seen above, while the actions of INTERFET troops proactively worked on pro-integration forces engaged in the violence and destruction, the proactive use of force in these actions was different from the use of force in a war where all pro-integration forces are recognized as enemies and attacks are launched with the purpose of annihilating them. The threat and use of force by INTERFET was expected to have the effect of influencing decision-making by pro-integration militias and Indonesian forces so that they would voluntarily cease their acts of destruction. As INTERFET demonstrated its high military capability and the will to use it, pro-integration forces had no choice but to cease their acts of destruction, and they withdrew to West Timor, together with Indonesian forces that were ordered by Maj. Gen. Syahnakri to clamp down on destructive actions and withdraw. These relationships can be summarized as shown in Figure 2.

An Analysis of INTERFET as Coercive Diplomacy


As shown in the preceding section, INTERFET can be captured in the structure of coercive diplomacy. This section firstly analyzes factors that are deemed to have contributed to the success of INTERFET from the perspectives of coercive diplomacy and compellence, and then consider what suggestions the characteristics seen in the case of INTERFET provide for peace operations in general.

Factors that Contributed to the Success of INTERFET

When looking at INTERFET from the perspective of coercive diplomacy or compellence, we can

⁷² Peter Cosgrove, *My Story*, HarperCollins, 2006, pp. 191-192.

Figure 2



point out the following two points as the factors that are deemed to have contributed to the success of INTERFET. The first point is the credible threat of denial. Coercive diplomacy is an attempt to influence decision-making by the opponent with the use of threat. It is necessary for the coercer to make the opponent think that they would suffer losses larger than benefits to be obtained by continuing their behaviors. In the case of INTERFET, this threat had the nature of denial. The threat was designed to send out the message that if pro-integration forces continue their acts of destruction, INTERFET is capable of blocking them by brute force and that they had better to halt their acts of destruction before INTERFET blocks them.

The credibility of the threat of denial by INTERFET stemmed from the relative difference in the military capabilities of INTERFET and pro-integration forces. INTERFET combined its superior military capability with the will to use it. Australian forces that provided some 5,500 troops⁷³ to INTERFET, which had 11,500 members at the peak, had a high level of proficiency as well as a full line of advanced equipment. In particular, they overwhelmed militias in terms of night combat capability, armor and aviation. Australian forces also had the will to use its military force. They were well aware of risks associated with the intervention in East Timor,⁷⁴ and intervened by accepting these risks. On the grounds, Australian forces proactively worked on pro-integration forces with the offensive posture, while maintaining restraints to avoid an unnecessary escalation.

⁷³ DFAT, *East Timor in Transition*, p. 153.

⁷⁴ Hugh White, "The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor, December 1998-September 1999," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2008, p. 84.

In contrast, the combat capability of pro-integration militias, the principal subject of compellence, was low. Their equipment did include automatic firearms, but they did not have many such firearms, with most of their weapons being low-performance aging guns and hand-made firearms, or knives and machetes.⁷⁵ Furthermore, their will to stand up against the threats made by the intervention side was weak. Despite vociferous threats against the intervention side made before the deployment of INTERFET or in the initial phase of their deployment, the militias were almost incapable of launching any effective attacks after being actually confronted by INTERFET with high military capability. Though a large number of militias were engaged in the violence and destruction, they apparently included many of those who had been forced to join militia organizations under threat or opportunistic participants. Thus, it is believed that there were not so many militias who took up arms to block the independence of East Timor even at the risk of losing their own lives.

As seen above, when the military capabilities of INTERFET and pro-integration forces were compared, INTERFET had an advantage. Even if the militias had tried to fight back against INTERFET, INTERFET is believed to have been capable of removing the resistance to block their actions. It can be said that because INTERFET was successful in making the pro-integration forces aware of this, the pro-integration forces thought the resistance against INTERFET would be fruitless and stopped their destructive actions without actually putting up much resistance.

The second contributing factor to the success of INTERFET was the existence of clear objectives. On this score, the existence of the 5 May Agreements had played a significant role. From the perspective of coercive diplomacy and compellence, this was the factor conducive to the success of INTERFET in a twofold sense that the clear objectives enabled the coercer to unify efforts toward them and also helped clarify what was being required of the parties being coerced. For the coercer, the 5 May Agreements were their political objectives per se and it was possible to derive the military objectives from the agreements. As East Timorese showed their will in the referendum, the independence of East Timor had to be sought under the 5 May Agreements. The realization of this was the political objective. However, this process could not be pushed forward due to the violence in East Timor. Thus, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 to organize the multinational force and established the military objective of restoring a secure environment to move forward with the process toward the independence of East Timor in accordance with the 5 May Agreements. In the case of INTERFET, clear political and military objectives existed, making it possible to unify actions and efforts toward fulfilling these objectives.

From the standpoint of the parties being coerced, the 5 May Agreements were effective in making clear the objectives of the intervener. Theoretically, compellence presents a challenge that it must be clear how the demands of the threatening side can be met. This is one of the significant differences from deterrence. In the case of deterrence, the demand is the maintenance of status quo, and as such, actions to be taken (or not to be taken) by the opponent are relatively clear. In contrast, in the case of compellence, the demand is to change the status quo, and therefore, it has to be clear what kinds of actions as well as to what extent are being demanded. Unless this is clear, the threatened side may have a fear that if they bow to the threat, they may be confronted with further and limitless demands. In such a case, even when the threatened side sees it advisable to

⁷⁵ Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, p. 121.

accept the current demand under rational calculations if it is the only thing being required of them, they still could not accept it. Therefore, in compellence, it is necessary to clarify what is not being demanded as well as what is being demanded.⁷⁶

In the case of East Timor, the existence of the 5 May Agreements made clear what INTERFET was trying to realize as well as what INTERFET was not trying to realize. The objective of INTERFET was the restoration of security in East Timor and the militias, as long as they stay in East Timor, had to abandon their weapons and put an end to the violence and destruction. Meanwhile, the mandate of INTERFET covered only their activities within East Timor, and as such, INTERFET did not try to extend its power of influence to West Timor. Therefore, forces that resented being placed under the influence of INTERFET or pro-independence forces could flee to West Timor.⁷⁷

Moreover, the withdrawal to West Timor was encouraged by the existence of the withdrawal order by Maj. Gen. Syahnakri. As discussed earlier, Syahnakri dispatched reinforcement troops from Jakarta and at the same time proceeded with the withdrawal of Indonesian forces stationed in East Timor since before the referendum, including the pro-integration militias.⁷⁸ Compared with deterrence, the bowing to threats in compellence is more visible from outside. In the case of deterrence, as it demands no action be taken, even when the threatened side took no particular action, it is hard to tell whether they did not take the action because of the threat or whether they had no intent to do so from the beginning. Even when they actually bowed to the threat, the threatened side could save face by insisting that they had no intention of taking the particular action from the beginning. In the case of compellence, particular action to alter the status quo is demanded. Thus, when the demand of the coercer is accepted, those who coerced have to take particular action demanded under threat, the impression that they succumbed to the threat is more apparent. Therefore, compellence is believed to be more successful if the environment is created to allow the coerced to accept the demand of the coercer without losing face.⁷⁹ In the case of East Timor, Syahnakri's withdrawal order can be considered as having played this role. Compared with being forced to withdraw under the pressure from the interveners from outside alone, if there exists a withdrawal order issued by an organization they belong to, those who coerced should have less resistance to the withdrawal. However, this does not mean that the halt to the violence and the withdrawal have been achieved without outside pressure. As pointed out earlier, despite martial law and the issuance of the withdrawal order, the violence and destruction in East Timor did not cease. The pressure by INTERFET was indeed necessary to put a halt to the violence and destruction. As Bob Breen put it: "Syahnakri [sic] had provided the authority and the means for withdrawal. Cosgrove had provided consequences for not doing so."⁸⁰

Suggestions for Peace Operations in General

Considering making active use of the pressure of the use of military force in the context of peace

⁷⁶ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 72-75.

⁷⁷ Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention*, p. 258.

⁷⁸ Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, p. 276.

⁷⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 82-84; and Byman and Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion*, pp. 9-10.

⁸⁰ Breen, *Mission Accomplished*, pp. 58-59.

operations, the first lesson to be learned from the case of INTERFET is that the threat of denial, rather than that of punishment, is to be used. The logic of punishment, if pure and simple one is assumed, appeals to the overall cost benefit calculation by threatening to impose costs elsewhere when actions of the opponent cannot be blocked directly.⁸¹ Therefore, in order for the threat of punishment to function effectively, the opponent has to own certain valuable assets to which the coercer can cause damage.

However, the pro-integration militias, the principal target of INTERFET, did not have assets which can be damaged as punishment. For example, if the pro-integration militias had maintained a large-scale mechanized force but kept it in the rear without using it for the destruction in East Timor, such a force would have been a highly valuable asset comprising an important part of the overall military power of militia organizations even when it had not been directly used for the destruction and persecution of residents in East Timor. In such a case, the coercer would have been able to frame the threat of punishment by threatening to attack mechanized troops in the rear. Also, if the pro-integration forces had had areas under their control in East Timor that would provide them with more solid bases, INTERFET could have threatened punishment by threatening to destroy major infrastructures in these areas. In reality, however, the pro-integration militias were paramilitary organizations and had only small arms, knives and machetes. They did not have any highly valuable assets other than those directly used for the violence committed in East Timor. The pro-integration forces also did not have particularly solid base areas in East Timor or infrastructures to be attacked.

These characteristics can be deemed highly likely to be applicable to peace operations in general. Not infrequently, parties to civil wars are irregular armed groups and rarely have highly valuable assets that can be targeted for punishment. If these parties to conflict are forces based in particular areas, infrastructures in those areas can be targeted for punishment. But attacks on such infrastructures could weigh heavily upon civilians who are to be rescued particularly in the context of peace operations, and as such, such attacks may well be means that cannot be adopted in the first place. It appears, therefore, that in peace operations in general as well, the pressure of military force may be more easily applicable in the form of denial rather than punishment.⁸²

In the case of INTERFET, it was necessary to exemplify the threat of denial across all areas of its activities. Regardless of whether the threat is for punishment or denial, coercion generally requires that leaders of the threatened side, while it is possible to continue with the present actions, accept the coercer's demand to change these actions based on rational calculations and make that decision followed across their organizations. In the case of compellence by denial, if the opponent is highly organized, the illustrative effect of making the threat to some troops may have the effect of blocking the entire intentions of the adversary.

In the case of East Timor, however, over 20 militia organizations were formed in each area and their organizational structure was very segmentalized. PPI existed as an umbrella organization to supervise them, but connections among individual militia organizations were loose at best. Thus, even after INTERFET put pressure on militias in Dili, violence continued in areas where

⁸¹ Johnson, Mueller and Taft, *Conventional Coercion*, p. 16; and Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford University Press, 2003, original ed., 1998, pp. 29-31.

⁸² Posen, "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters," pp. 89-90.

INTERFET was yet to be deployed.⁸³ This means that the pressure by INTERFET may be effective against militias in that particular area, it did not have any direct effect upon militias operating around the western boundary region. It was necessary for INTERFET to actually deploy in the western boundary region to demonstrate there the threat of denial once again to militia organizations operating around the western boundary.

As discussed above, when the target of the pressure has only a low degree of organization, the coercer needs to make threats to the whole target of the pressure. As pointed out earlier, parties to conflicts targeted in peace operations in general are often irregular armed groups and the degree of their organization are assumed to be low. Therefore, in the context of peace operations, intervening troops not only have to make threats to block actions by some of parties to conflicts targeted by coercion but also may need to deploy troops across all areas of operations to demonstrate the threat of denial to be able to block all actions.

However, the realization of the threat of denial across all areas of operations involves risks. Even parties to conflicts having only rudimentary military capabilities can try to put up resistance against ground forces, and in the perspective of coercion, this means that counter-coercion is easy. Counter-coercion is an attempt by those who coerced to hit a soft spot of military actions by the coercer to undermine its coercive behaviors or have the coercer retract coercive behaviors by causing damage.⁸⁴ Of such attempts, in the context of peace operations, a particular attempt to cause intervention to fail by dampening the momentum of intervention by taking a toll on the intervening side may prove successful.⁸⁵ In Western countries today, the capacity to accept the loss of human life in military actions has declined significantly. In the case of peace operations in particular, the intervention is generally made in conflicts that do not involve vital interests of intervening countries, and in those cases, it is possible that the capacity to accept the loss of human life is low all the more. Thus, a relatively small scale of the loss of human life could dampen the intervening side's will to continue operations.

In the case of East Timor, while INTERFET had enormous overall military capability, injuries were caused to INTERFET troops as a result of the ambush by pro-integration militias. As INTERFET had to act in small units in operations, such as reconnaissance teams, an examination of each contact or each incident of confrontation between INTERFET and the militias that did not develop into actual fighting reveals that there were some instances where the militias overwhelmed INTERFET troops. While there were many militias who surrendered or fled in the face of the advanced equipment of INTERFET even when the militias outnumbered INTERFET troops, there existed many opportunities where militias with somewhat high motivation to fight back could have caused damage to INTERFET troops.

As seen above, the case of INTERFET shows that in peace operations, the threat of denial is more easily applicable than the threat of punishment and that the threat of denial should be made not only in some areas but across all areas of operations. In view of the risks associated with the deployment of ground forces across all areas of operations, even when active pressure is

⁸³ Robinson, *If You Leave Us Here*, p. 205.

⁸⁴ Freedman, "Strategic Coercion," p. 30; and Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, "Defeating US Coercion," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 108, 111.

⁸⁵ Byman and Waxman, "Defeating US Coercion," pp. 114-116.

used, peace operations require troops that have high self-protection capability along with offensive capability and it is also important to deploy troops after accepting the possibility of suffering casualties among one's own troops.

Conclusions

This paper analyzed the case of INTERFET from the perspective of compellence and coercive diplomacy with the recognition that the proactive use of force is also effective in peace operations, and the appropriate concept underpinning such actions is coercion, particularly compellence and coercive diplomacy. The first section sorted out the concept of "coercion," including coercive diplomacy, and discussed how it is applicable to the context of peace operations. The second section provided an overview of the background to the deployment of INTERFET and its activities and cast it into the structure of coercive diplomacy. Finally, based on this, the third section discussed factors that seem to have contributed to the success of INTERFET from the perspective of coercive diplomacy and lessons to be learned from its success for peace operations in general.

In traditional peace operations, military troops were deployed, but their functions were limited to ceasefire monitoring and some other tasks, and they were not expected to fulfill the fundamental function of military force, such as destruction and killings. In peace operations in recent years, however, troops are committed in situations where they are expected or have to fulfill the fundamental function of military force. The military force committed to peace operations today requires the military capability in its more fundamental sense for the protection of humanitarian assistance activities and unarmed local citizens from attacks by armed forces or having parties to conflicts taking actions in contravention of ceasefire or peace agreements to stop hostilities. As seen in peace operations conducted in the 1990s, however, the proactive use of force in peace operations involve significant risks and difficulties. Discussions on the role and use of military force in peace operations are prone to become mired in discussions of principles. In order to carry out peace operations successfully, it is absolutely imperative to capture peace operations as military operations and make an objective analysis of what is required of the military force and how to use the military force to that end is effective.

The use of military force on the basis of the concept of coercion, particularly compellence and coercive diplomacy, should become a useful approach in peace operations as military operations. However, this approach is not guaranteed to succeed in any situation. It is necessary to make clear under what purpose and circumstances the active use of the pressure of military force will be effective. There are other examples of peace operations besides INTERFET that can be analyzed from the perspective of compellence and coercive diplomacy. It is necessary to accumulate more knowledge about the possibilities and limitations of the use of military force in peace operations in the form of compellence and coercive diplomacy through an analysis and comparative study of many more case examples.

