Abstract

Since the adoption of an action plan at the Sea Island Summit in 2004, the Group of Eight (G8) has addressed the issue of global peacekeeping capacity-building. This peacekeeping capacity-building assistance agenda includes military, police and civilian aspects of peacekeeping, and aims at the development of a comprehensive range of peacekeeping capabilities worldwide. The G8 initiatives have produced some positive results for those nations receiving assistance. However, on the other hand, the G8 members’ actual assistance programs have placed an emphasis on the training of military peacekeepers at the cost of some other areas, including logistic and financial assistance, which have not received sufficient attention.

Unlike the United Nations (UN), the G8 is not an operational actor in peacekeeping. However, from a diplomatic perspective, the G8, like the UN, is a global actor while being unique in that it has a more flexible organizational structure and agenda-setting capacity. The G8 can play a significant role in global peacekeeping by mobilizing and legitimizing international assistance to global actors and governments engaged in peacekeeping as well as peacekeeping capacity-building. As a founding member of the G8, Japan is expected to actively draw linkages with the G8’s peacekeeping capacity-building agenda with its own peacekeeping policy and to take the initiative in further developing the G8 agenda.

The Group of Eight Summit (G8) is held each year, involving leaders of the world’s eight major nations. The G8 is different from the UN and other international organizations in that it does not have a permanent secretariat or charter; the common perception about the group is that its major role lies in the coordination of economic and financial policy among the leading economic powers. However, in recent years — since the adoption of an action plan at the Sea Island Summit in 2004 (Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan) — G8 actions in the field of peacekeeping have become more conspicuous. Why has the G8 added peacekeeping to its agenda, and what does this mean for contemporary global peacekeeping? This article intends to address these questions. It first aims to establish why the G8 added peacekeeping to its agenda and then examines and evaluates the forum’s involvement up to now. It concludes by discussing the significance of the
G8’s peacekeeping initiatives, including its implications for Japan. While studied in terms of
the performance of the summit meetings or mentioned as part of the analysis of major donors’
capacity-building assistance programs, the G8’s initiatives in the field of peacekeeping have rarely
constituted a main subject of analysis. The article aims to fill this lacuna and thereby contribute to
a more comprehensive understanding of an emerging global peacekeeping regime.

The G8 Peacekeeping Agenda

G8 and Peacekeeping

The G8 was originally a six-nation summit first held in Rambouillet, France in 1975, involving
the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Japan and France. From the beginning its
role has been to coordinate policies among these major states. As is known, it was the areas of
economy and finance that were consistently the major fields of interest for the G8. On the other
hand, by the late 1970s the G8 began addressing political and security issues such as arms control
and terrorism. However, it was only after 2000 that the G8 officially included peacekeeping in its
agenda. Behind this change were two major issues: conflict prevention and assistance to Africa.

The G8 first became involved in conflict prevention and management during the Kosovo
conflict in 1999. At the 1999 Cologne Summit, an emergency Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was
held on June 8, at which final deliberations took place towards the adoption of a UN Security
Council resolution (adopted June 10, UN Resolution 1244). At the summit, the G8 leaders also
acknowledged the importance of effective conflict prevention and management and showed
a willingness to support the enhancement of the UN’s and regional organizations’ conflict
management and conflict resolution capacity. At the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in December
following the summit, conflict prevention officially became a priority of the G8. Following this

2 An exception is Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, “The Implementation of the Joint
Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations” (Chatham House, April
Security/g8africapso.pdf>, accessed August 1, 2011. This article, however, has a specific focus on African
peacekeeping and does not encompass all G8 initiatives concerning peacekeeping.

3 See, e.g., Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji M. S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, “Enhancing African Peace and Security
Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8?” International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March 2005), pp. 325-
Report for Congress (Updated June 11, 2007).

4 G8 research has been led by the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto. The group has developed
a dedicated website (http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/) and publishes regular research papers. See, for instance,
Nicholas Bayne, Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005);

5 Canada and Russia became official members of the G8 in 1976 and 1998 respectively, and the European
Community (now the EU) has sent delegates (usually the President of the European Commission and the
President of the European Council) to the G8 since 1977.

6 Bayne, Staying Together, Ch. 1; see also Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation
and Conflict in the Seven-power Summits, revised and enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

7 Conflict prevention had been on the agenda prior to the 1990s. See John J. Kirton and Radoslava N. Stefanova,
“Introduction: the G8’s Role in Global Conflict Prevention,” in: Kirton and Stefanova (eds.), The G8, the
United Nations, and Conflict Prevention (Farnham: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 4-5.


announced, the “G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention” was adopted at the next G8
summit, which was held in Kyushu and Okinawa. The document recognized UN peacekeeping
as “a critical element in conflict prevention,” and emphasized the importance of developing an
agreement, in cooperation with UN Member States, that will facilitate effective planning and
implementation of peacekeeping operations.10

It was also at the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit where Africa was raised as a major G8 agenda
item. The presidents of three African nations, Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria, were invited to a
meeting in Tokyo prior to the summit.11 At the Genoa summit held the following year, the “Genoa
Plan for Africa” was adopted. This plan established a basis for partnerships with African nations
to address issues including conflict prevention, management and resolution in African and other
nations. The “G8 Africa Action Plan,” adopted at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, expressed the G8’s
intent to provide financial and technical assistance to the peacekeeping capacity-building efforts
of regional organizations and governments in the continent.12 In the following year at the Evian
Summit, “A Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support
Operations” (Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan) was adopted. This plan set out and
defined the G8 Africa Action Plan adopted at the previous year’s Kananaskis Summit. The African
Union (AU), the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that was established in
2002, announced in July of the same year its vision of developing the African Standby Force
(ASF), a continent-wide standby force for conflict and crisis management in Africa. The Joint
Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan focused on one of the goals of this vision (development
of “multi-dimensional field capability”), and identified the following ten items that would form the
foundation for such capacity:13

1) The establishment, equipping and training by 2010 of coherent multinational, multi-
disciplinary standby brigade capabilities including civilian components, at the AU and
regional level, in particular integrated mission planning capability, mission field headquarters
and strategic headquarters, which would be available for UN-endorsed missions undertaken
under the auspices of the UN, AU or an African sub-regional organization;
2) The development of capacities to provide humanitarian, security and reconstruction support
in the context of complex peace support operations;
3) The establishment of a continental network of regional observation and monitoring (early
warning) centres, linked electronically to a centre in the AU;
4) The development of institutional capacities at the continental and regional level to prevent
conflict through mediation, facilitation, observation and other strategies;
5) The establishment of priority regional logistic depots to enhance existing capabilities;
6) The standardisation of training doctrines, manuals, curricula and programs for both civilian

10 “G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention,” July 13, 2000. The plan was developed in line with the report
of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) which was to be released the following
month, August 21.
11 Bayne, Staying Together, p. 80.
13 “Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations,” June 1, 2003,
para. 3.4.
(including police) and military personnel for use in national and regional peacekeeping training schools and centres of excellence, and support for IT options to join up training centres within Africa and with international peacekeeping centres;

7) Enhanced capacity in regional peace training centres;
8) Continued joint exercises at the regional level;
9) Current regional peacekeeping initiatives;
10) Consensus building in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to consider as official development assistance a more inclusive range of assistance provided to enhance capacities to undertake peace support operations and related activities.¹⁴

These ten items were, in principle, in line with the ASF’s concept and thus limited to the context of Africa. However, as illustrated below, Africa would continue to be treated as a high priority under the 2004 Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan. The G8’s identification of the critical peacekeeping capacities in Africa at Evian constituted an important element for later G8 discussions on the theme in the global context.

The G8’s first involvement in conflict prevention and management issues, and using peacekeeping operations for that purpose, was prompted by the Kosovo conflict, with the G8 later addressing the issue of peacekeeping capacity-building through the Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan. The 2004 Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan was a product of this movement with a global scope.

The Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan and Later Additions

The Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan adopted at the 2004 Sea Island Summit maintained many of the goals of the Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan and added some new ones. The following is a summary of the objectives outlined by the 2004 action plan:

• Training of military peacekeepers: By 2010, train and, if necessary, equip a world-wide total of 75,000 military peacekeepers and support the improvement of the peacekeeping management capacity of regional organizations.
• Coordination of assistance programs for peacekeeping capacity-building in Africa: G8 members, the UN, the AU and other partners are to coordinate their programs, including by launching an Africa Clearing House for the sharing of information and expertise.
• Logistic assistance: Enhance transportation and logistic assistance to peacekeeping operations.
• Equipping and training police forces, including formed police units (FPU) in peacekeeping: Contribute to the establishment of Gendarmerie- or Carabinieri-type police contingents through programs including the establishment of international or regional training centers.
• Global peacekeeping capacity-building: By 2010, expand the geographical scope of peacekeeping training and exercises to regions outside Africa.

¹⁴ Ibid., para. 5.1.
The last two items were new, having not been mentioned in the 2003 Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan. The Miyazaki Initiatives had already asked the UN and regional organizations to enhance civilian police forces and to provide training to local police forces in post-conflict nations.\(^\text{15}\) The Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan was notable for its focus on the enhancement of FPU capacity.\(^\text{16}\) In relation to support for peacekeeping operations outside Africa, the declaration of the 2006 St Petersburg Summit announced that the G8 will contribute to the development of conflict prevention and response capacity by “regional actors in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.”\(^\text{17}\)

Since the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, a greater emphasis has also been placed on the civilian components of peacekeeping:

- Reinforcement of the civilian components of peacekeeping: Following the AU’s decision to develop the civilian strand of the ASF, strengthen such civilian capacities so that the civilian and military strands of the ASF can operate in close cooperation with each other.\(^\text{18}\)

The civilian components of peacekeeping had been addressed at previous summit meetings (see, i.e., the first item of the Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan); however it was only after the Heiligendamm Summit that it was given a level of focus that was equivalent to military and police capabilities. The 2010 G8 Muskoka Declaration reaffirmed this focus in a more global context. The declaration acknowledged that there was “a chronic shortage of ready and trained civilian experts” in the fields of security, governance and law. The declaration also showed the willingness of the G8 to develop the capacity of developing countries and new donor countries to train, prepare and deploy civilian experts, and to increase the number of civilian experts dispatched from G8 members.\(^\text{19}\)

Considering that the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan established 2010 as the target year, it might be argued that the Muskoka Summit constitutes an end point of the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping capacity-building. In fact, the Muskoka Accountability Report, released during the summit, includes a section that summarizes G8 actions in this area. However, in light of the high level of interest in peacekeeping among at least some of the G8 members, and considering that peacekeeping operations are still in great demand globally, it is highly likely that issues related to peacekeeping will remain, in some form, on the G8 agenda in the foreseeable future.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{15}\) See “G8 Miyazaki Initiatives,” Section II.5.

\(^\text{16}\) This was reconfirmed at the Muskoka Summit. “G8 Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings,” June 25-26, 2010, Annex II (“Strengthening Civilian Security Systems”), Section III.


\(^\text{18}\) “Growth and Responsibility in Africa,” June 8, 2007, para. 42; See also “Chair’s Summary,” June 8, 2007, Section II.

\(^\text{19}\) “G8 Muskoka Declaration,” Annex II, Section I.

\(^\text{20}\) Peacekeeping was not a major agenda item at the 2011 Deauville Summit (May 26-27). However the Summit Declaration stated that the G8 will promote the development of “an enhanced capacity-building coordination mechanism in partnership with the United Nations.” “G8 Declaration: Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy,” May 26-27, 2011, para. 93; See also the section on Africa in “Meeting of Foreign Ministers: Chairman’s Summary,” March 14-15, 2011.
**Table 1: G8 Summits and Major G8 Statements and Policies on Peacekeeping**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summit</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Kyushu and Okinawa</td>
<td>G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>Genoa Plan for Africa</td>
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| 2002 | Kananaskis | G8 Africa Action Plan  
G8 Conflict Prevention: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| 2006 | St Petersburg | G-8 Declaration on Cooperation and Future Action in Stabilization and Reconstruction |
| 2008 | Hokkaido Toyako | Progress Report by the G8 African Personal Representatives (APRs) on Implementation of the Africa Action Plan |
| 2009 | L'Aquila | G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding |
| 2010 | Muskoka | G8 Accountability Report Strengthening Civilian Security Systems (Declaration, Annex II) |

Note: As Chair’s Summary, Summit Statement and Declaration are produced every year at each summit, only those that are relevant to this article have been included.

**G8 Assistance in Practice**

**“Comprehensive” Assistance for Peacekeeping Capacity-Building**

All G8 activities in the field of peacekeeping that we have reviewed thus far are designed to encourage peacekeeping capacity-building efforts by governments and organizations. As stated earlier, the G8 does not have a permanent secretariat, nor does it have the capability to organize its own peacekeeping missions. The G8 has left the role of field actor to international organizations, regional organizations and national governments. The G8 has mobilized assistance with the aim of enhancing the capacity of those actors, so that they can better organize their operations.

The G8’s assistance in this regard has been wide-ranging and comprehensive. This is obvious from the expanding range of fields in which the G8 has shown interest over the years. In fact, the political issues declaration of the 2009 L’Aquila Summit stated that the G8 will “continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to sustaining global peace encompassing security, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.”

Since 2004, the G8 has expanded its peacekeeping capacity-building agenda both in terms of assistance areas (which now include civilian, police and military components) and geographical scope.

However, the G8’s pursuit of a “comprehensive approach” may be qualified in at least two ways. Firstly, the concept of a comprehensive approach did not exist when peacekeeping discussions first took place at the G8. The concept came to the fore in recent years after the G8

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21 “Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future: Political Issues,” July 8, 2009; See also “G-8 Conference of Senior Officials on Capacity-Building,” Gatineau, May 2-4, 2010.
examined its record of commitments and was added almost as an afterthought. During the first few years after the adoption of the G8 Action Plan, the main concerns of the G8 revolved around enhancing the peacekeeping capacity of African nations. It was only after the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit that the G8 showed a genuine interest in the civilian components of peacekeeping. At the summit the leaders of G8 members affirmed that “military solutions alone cannot secure peace in the long term” and that “the political, economic and social conditions needed for promoting human security and stability would have to be aimed for.” As stated earlier, behind this change was the AU decision to develop the civilian strand of the ASF, in response to which the G8 announced the plan to enhance the planning and management capacity of the civilian components and the development of African civilian experts.  The Hokkaido Toyako Summit held in the following year highlighted “the need for a comprehensive approach” through coordination of civilian and military activities. Furthermore, the political issues declaration of the 2009 L’Aquila Summit used “comprehensive approach” in the title of a section concerning peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The declaration also endorsed the report of an experts’ meeting that called for “a comprehensive approach based on a clear and strategic vision.” In sum, the G8 has adapted its areas of interest in response to the emergence of new issues and demands, particularly from Africa. Consequently, the G8 has continued to expand the issues that it addresses. Adopting the language of “comprehensive approach” can be seen as an attempt to give some kind of conceptual frame to what would otherwise have been a hodgepodge of various commitments and aspirations.

Mixed Record of Implementation

Secondly, however, the implementation of the G8’s stated “comprehensive” assistance has been decidedly mixed: the progress of the G8’s assistance to peacekeeping field actors has varied significantly between areas. One of the accomplishments of the Muskoka Summit was the production of a progress report on areas in which the G8 has been involved, including peacekeeping capacity-building. According to the progress report, since 2004 the G8 has trained approximately 130,000 peacekeepers—a considerably larger number than what was targeted in the G8 Action Plan. The major contributor to this achievement was the US-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which has provided training for 113,255 peacekeepers since 2005, while the UK and France have also conducted their own training programs. Additionally, a number of G8 nations have provided training and financial assistance to peacekeeping training centers in Africa and other regions. Financial and logistic (particularly transport) assistance has also been provided to UN and AU missions. Furthermore, the Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA), intended as a coordination mechanism of logistic assistance between donor nations, was developed under the leadership of the US. Although small in scale, the TLSA has been allocated financial resources

\[\text{22} \quad \text{“Chair’s Summary,” p. 4.}\]
\[\text{23} \quad \text{“Growth and Responsibility in Africa,” para. 42.}\]
\[\text{24} \quad \text{“G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration,” July 8, 2008, para. 70.}\]
\[\text{25} \quad \text{“Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future: Political Issues.”}\]
\[\text{26} \quad \text{“G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding,” July 9, 2009, para. 13; see also “Muskoka Accountability Report,” Annex V (“G8 Member Reporting: Peace and Security”), p. 60 and “G-8 Conference of Senior Officials on Capacity-Building.”}\]
\[\text{27} \quad \text{“Muskoka Accountability Report,” Annex V, pp. 2-4.}\]
that were used for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).\textsuperscript{28} In terms of efforts to enhance police capacity, Italy established the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza. The center has been providing police and FPU officers and trainees with pre-deployment and other general training.\textsuperscript{29} France, the EU, Japan and other nations provided assistance to the International School of Security Forces (EIFORCES) that was established in Cameroon in 2008 with the aim of providing training to 1,000 officers each year (six formed police units and 160 police officers).\textsuperscript{30} Meanwhile, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada continues to provide training and equipment in cooperation with training centers and programs in Africa.\textsuperscript{31} In response to an increased demand for civilian specialists, the US and UK both introduced systems for the deployment of civilian experts within their governments: the US Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and the UK Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG). In addition, the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Germany and the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) are equipping and training future civilian peacekeepers and peacebuilders.

However, there are areas in which very little progress has been made, or has been excluded from the G8’s agenda itself.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is one of these areas. The 2002 G8 Declaration concerning DDR recognized the significance of DDR in the context of peacekeeping operations in the following terms:

- The G8 acknowledges that peacekeeping missions, where appropriate, should include a post-conflict small arms and light weapons disarmament and destruction component.
- The G8 recognises the important role which the UN can play in promoting DDR programmes given its experience and activity in the fields of peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation.
- The G8 recognises the role to be played by regional organisations in supporting DDR, as part of post-conflict peace-building, based on examples which include ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group] in Liberia and the potential for such support by OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] in Nagornyy Karabakh.
- The G8 accepts that peace-building activities such as DDR require skilled personnel to work on the ground for long periods of time and supports capacity building within both international institutions and non-governmental organisations in order to achieve this.
- The G8 recognises that lessons have been learnt from past-peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and undertakes to support the important research and training efforts developed by DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and relevant peacekeeping missions


\textsuperscript{29} See “Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU): Nature,” <http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/01_nature.htm>, accessed September 15, 2010. According to this website, CoESPU intends to train a total of 3,000 trainees.


Peacekeeping Capacity-building Assistance

including UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor).32

In light of the G8’s recognition of the significance of the DDR in 2002, it would seem strange that neither the Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan nor Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan mentioned DDR. However, DDR has not been altogether removed from the G8’s agenda. As the declaration of the Kananaskis Summit suggests, the G8’s interest in DDR derives from issues of small arms control in regions of conflict. The statement at the 2005 Gleneagles Summit concerning Africa pledged that the G8 will strengthen the provision of grant aid to address “reconstruction needs” including DDR.33 Notably, while this item was presented as part of the G8’s contribution to reconstruction assistance together with debt relief, peacekeeping-related items were treated under the separate heading of conflict prevention.34 In short, G8 involvement in DDR came to be viewed in a context slightly different from peacekeeping. Consequently, G8 treatment of DDR is now distinct from its assistance to peacekeeping capacity-building.

The second issue that does not receive sufficient attention from the G8 is financial assistance to peacekeeping operations by regional organizations, especially those operating in Africa. As mentioned earlier, the G8 Africa Action Plan expressed the G8’s intent to provide “technical and financial assistance” that would enable African nations and organizations to organize peacekeeping operations.35 However, all other G8 statements that followed the G8 Africa Action Plan, including the Joint Africa/G8 Peace Support Operations Plan and the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan, did not mention financial contributions by the G8 for this purpose. In fact, the majority of the initiatives implemented by G8 member nations have been limited to material assistance such as the provision of training programs or logistic assistance.

However, it is widely known that one of the greatest issues facing current peacekeeping in Africa is the fragility of the financial base. In fact, the G8 Accountability Report admits frankly that “finding a means to provide reliable and sustainable funding remains a challenge.”36 Nevertheless, the stance that G8 members have taken on this issue is to avoid making a regular and formal commitment that would entail direct financial responsibility. Instead, they have made use of voluntary contributions via trust funds at the UN and regional organizations. One could argue that while the G8 has focused on the development of peacekeeping capacity for the future, the G8 has

33 “Gleneagles Communiqué: Africa,” July 8, 2005, para. 11(b).
34 See ibid., 10(b); See also “Muskoka Accountability Report,” Annex V, pp. 21-23.
36 “Muskoka Accountability Report,” p. 64.
not necessarily addressed the pressing current needs of African peacekeeping.\(^{37}\)

The third issue is a lack of assistance to peacekeeping operations in regions other than Africa. The Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan expressed the G8’s intent to build peacekeeping capacity by 2010 in “other regions.” Following this, Japan, for example, provided financial assistance to a peacekeeping center established in Malaysia, while from 2007 the HPC commenced a training project that targets people from Asia. Canada cooperated with a training center in Guatemala and runs an e-learning program for peacekeepers in Latin American countries.\(^{38}\) However, all these initiatives, in comparison to those implemented for African nations and organizations, are limited in terms of quality and quantity. The priority for G8 members in Europe, apart from Africa, is to build the peacekeeping capacity of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).\(^{39}\)

Considering the already high level of military and civilian capabilities of European nations, it is debatable whether these initiatives count as contributions to the objective of the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan, i.e., peacekeeping capacity-building on the global scale.

Finally, although the provision of training surpassed initial objectives in terms of quantity, the coordination of the training programs of different countries still remains largely unaddressed. For instance, the G8 Accountability Report points out the lack of effective coordination of peacekeeping training provided by G8 donor nations as below:

> While G8 countries have met their commitments for training and equipping troops and police, it has been difficult to quantify progress given the lack of indicators for success, and only limited coordination between donors on training activities. As a result, donors have had to work to reduce training waste, i.e., to avoid situations where trainees do not deploy or use their acquired skills, or undertake duplicate training from other donors.\(^{40}\)

Due to the diversified nature of today’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, coordination is inevitably difficult and, in this sense, the lack of coordination may not be very surprising. However, this issue still deserves some scrutiny because behind this particular problem is a factor unique to the G8. The G8++ Global Peace Support Operations Capacity Building Clearing


\(^{38}\) Muskoka Accountability Report,” Annex V, p. 3 and 5.

\(^{39}\) For example, the UK includes in this description financial and personnel contributions to EU missions. “Muskoka Accountability Report,” Annex V, p. 3.

\(^{40}\) “Muskoka Accountability Report,” p. 64.
House (G8++GPSOCBCH) provides a good example. The Clearing House was introduced in 2007 with the purpose of facilitating information sharing among G8 donors, recipient nations and international organizations. However, in reality this is only an informal event held once a year with the attendance of policymakers of these governments and organizations, and the results of their discussions do not necessarily form the basis of deliberations at G8 summits and foreign ministers’ meetings. In short, the main focus of the clearing house is networking and information sharing among policymakers. It is not designed to facilitate the substantive coordination of capacity-building assistance programs.\textsuperscript{41}

Indeed, the absence of practical coordination applies to the G8 itself. The G8’s stance on this issue is clear in the following quotation from the G8 Accountability Report:

Experience has shown that programming support for transportation and logistics can be very effective when coordinated and delivered on a case-by-case basis as was done successfully for AU operations in Darfur (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) through close cooperation with the AU and through donor contact groups. Similarly, excellent support for the UN Darfur operation was coordinated through established networks and permanent missions at the UN. \textit{The lesson is that while donor coordination is always critical, it is seldom necessary for the G8, or its individual partners, to establish new mechanisms which duplicate or parallel existing networks.}\textsuperscript{42}

This suggests that not only does the G8 lack organizational ability to coordinate capacity-building programs; it is also the G8’s policy to not play those roles. As was demonstrated in the Kosovo crisis, the G8 can be effective in coordinating diplomatic efforts by major countries and international organizations.\textsuperscript{43} However, the G8 is limited in the ability to coordinate practical issues such as peacekeeping capacity-building.

\textbf{Conclusions}

This article has thus far examined the background of the G8’s peacekeeping capacity-building assistance and then analyzed the record of its achievements. In conclusion, I want to discuss the implications of the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping both internationally and for Japan.

With regard to international implications, it might be useful to start by pointing out two broad contexts. One is the multilateralization of peacekeeping field actors. Peacekeeping is now not limited to the UN but are in fact run by a diverse range of regional organizations. In some cases coalition forces are also engaged in missions that are at least in part similar to peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, as peacekeeping has evolved to include a diverse range of tasks, peacekeeping missions have to coordinate with an increasing number of institutions and organizations (other international and regional organizations, and NGOs). The G8’s interest in peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, rose against these trends.

\textsuperscript{41} Interview at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (September 20, 2010).
\textsuperscript{42} “Muskoka Accountability Report,” pp. 64, 65. Emphasis added.
Secondly, there have been changes in the role played by the G8 itself in today’s international community. A brief comparison with the Concert of Europe, established after the French Revolution, might be in order here to mete out the nature of this institution.\textsuperscript{44} According to Dobson, the Concert of Europe and the G7/8 are similar in a number of ways: (1) They emerged from a crisis; (2) They represent an agreement between major countries to maintain the existing international order; and (3) They value personal relationships between leaders and avoid formal frameworks.\textsuperscript{45} In short, the G8 has played the role of an informal and flexible framework that facilitates consensus building between major countries on common issues.

It was the post-Cold War period when the summit’s flexibility was most prominent. The G7 during the Cold War consisted of major Western Bloc countries and was therefore a western framework. However, since the end of the Cold War, the G7 has transformed into a global institution by inviting Russia as an official member, networking with international organizations, developing countries and NGOs, and addressing a wide range of issues beyond the traditional focus on international economy and finance.\textsuperscript{46} In the background of the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping are also these changes to the nature of the G8 itself.

Overall, the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping capacity-building has two important implications for the G8 and its members.

The first is that the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping allows the group’s members to present their collective position to international organizations that organize these missions. This is particularly pronounced in the G8’s relationships with the UN and AU. The G8 has consistently showed support for the ASF and has succeeded in mobilizing assistance for the ASF from the UN, EU and bilaterally. Additionally, the G8 is also consistent in its support of the UN as the central peacekeeping actor. Using the expression used in the political issues declaration at the 2009 meeting, the G8’s role can be described as supporting the role of the UN, “in particular the Security Council in the area of peacekeeping operations,” and as assisting “the UN to further develop partnerships with regional organizations, contributing countries and other actors.”\textsuperscript{47}

The second value of the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping concerns the capacity-building programs of individual G8 members. In fact, the majority of the G8 Accountability Report and the G8 Report on Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding is devoted to the description of initiatives by G8 members on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Moreover, they often make references to the G8 Action Plan and the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan in explaining their own initiatives. For example, Italy uses the Action Plan as the basis for establishing the CoESPU.\textsuperscript{48} The GPOI and TLSA have also been explained with reference to the Action Plan.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[44] For a useful review of analytical frameworks on the G7/8, see Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20, pp. 3-5.
\item[46] Dobson, “Global Governance and the Group of Seven/Eight,” pp. 33-37; see also Penttilä, The Role of the G8, Chapter 2.
\item[47] “Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future: Political Issues.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In other words, the G8’s involvement in peacekeeping is significant in terms of its role of mobilizing and legitimizing international assistance (and resources as necessary) for global and national actors engaged in peacekeeping and peacekeeping capacity-building. As has been mentioned several times, the G8 does not organize peacekeeping missions of its own. However, as a diplomatic actor, the G8 has a global stature like that of the UN as well as a uniquely flexible organizational structure and agenda-setting capacity. In light of the ever-diversifying background of peacekeeping field actors and peacekeeping operations that continue to grow larger in scale and complexity, the G8 should continue to be valuable as a global diplomatic framework for peacekeeping capacity-building assistance.

Given this implication for G8 members, what does the G8’s peacekeeping capacity-building agenda mean for Japan’s international peace cooperation activities?

First of all, it should be noted that Japan is one of the G8’s founding members and is involved in all of its activities. In this sense, Japan is different from multilateral peacekeeping actors such as the UN, EU or AU. The G8, in fact, provides Japan with an important avenue for multilateral diplomacy. More specifically, the G8’s capacity-building agenda can be important for Japan in the following two ways.

One is related to the question of how to use the G8 peacekeeping capacity-building initiative in explaining Japan’s activities in this field. Within the G8 Accountability Report Japan has provided a detailed report on its peacekeeping capacity-building programs (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance to peacekeeping training</th>
<th>Co-hosting training programs with the US as part of the GPOI program. Financial assistance to peacekeeping centers in Africa and Asia. Assistance to NGOs engaged in conflict prevention.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>Financial assistance and provision of equipment to AMIS, AMISOM and UNMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian and police capacity-building</td>
<td>Training civilian peacebuilders. Deployment of experts and provision of financial assistance to peacekeeping centers. Assistance to police training at peacekeeping centers in Africa and in DR Congo.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These activities under the G8 should be actively publicized, not only internationally but also domestically. However, in Japan the G8 is not normally recognized as a diplomatic framework for peacekeeping capacity-building. This may be attributed to the fact that the G8 is widely seen in Japan as an international economic and financial forum. However, it is clear that the G8’s role is no longer limited to coordinating the economic and financial policies of major countries.

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While in that role the G20 may be seen as replacing the G8, the G8 now serves as a venue to form consensus on broader issues. The G8 move to include peacekeeping capacity-building in its agenda clearly illustrates this point.

The second concerns Japan’s contribution to the agenda of peacekeeping capacity-building under the G8. Japan has made an important contribution to the agenda by inviting African leaders to a meeting prior to the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit and through the development of the G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention. However, considering the level of progress of the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan, there is still room for Japan to make unique contribution to the implementation of the plan. One potential contribution that Japan could make is the advancement of the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan in regions other than Africa. We already saw the limited accomplishments achieved under the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan thus far in regions outside Africa. In that sense, the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan has yet to be truly globalized. Considering that there are still many ongoing internal and regional conflicts in Africa, it may make sense to prioritize capacity-building assistance to African regional organizations. However, these conflicts are not unique to Africa and continue to break out in other regions. Additionally, it is unrealistic to suggest that a conflict that breaks out in one region should only be dealt with by the same region alone. After all, the overall objective of the Global Peace Support Operations Action Plan is to enhance the crisis management capacity of the international community as a whole by improving global peacekeeping capacity. This may be one of the roles that Japan, as the only Asian G8 member with a record of peacekeeping capacity-building assistance in the region, can seize with more vigor.

This article has shown that the G8 is now beginning to play an important security role in the post-Cold War world. In mapping its future role in international security, Japan should re-acknowledge the fact that it is indeed a founding member of the G8.

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53 Penttilä argues that since the 1990s Japan has taken the strategy of encouraging the globalization of the G8 agenda while emphasizing its position as the only G8 member from Asia. Penttilä, *The Role of the G8*, p. 63.