

China's Peacekeeping Diplomacy and Troop Dispatch: A New Avenue for Engagement with the International Community

Masayuki Masuda*

Abstract

Approaching from a diplomatic perspective, this paper clarifies the significance and issues of troop dispatch to the UN peacekeeping operations that China began full-scale in the early 2000s. China has solidly maintained a cautious attitude about dispatching troops concerning respecting national sovereignty, complying with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, limited use of force and other traditional principles. However, since the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, China has increased involvement with UN affairs by dispatching troops and forces to maintain and strengthen UN authority and roles in international security. China also added a new context of international contribution and responsibility in troop dispatch and created a constructive role for China in international security. The international community, nevertheless, is asking China for more concrete involvement in the consensus-building process, so that China will move beyond troop dispatch to contribute to resolving disputes and building peace.

Introduction

China's National Defense in 2008 published by the Information Office of the State Council of China summarizes China's efforts in "international security cooperation (*guoji anquan hezuo*)."¹ The defense white paper lists three elements that comprise China's efforts in international security: (1) regional security cooperation; (2) participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs); and (3) military exchanges and cooperation with other countries.¹ Obviously, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is involved in all of the three activities. However, apart from strategic consultations and confidence building, participation of the PLA —in other words, international security cooperation that constantly involves dispatch of troops— has been mostly limited to UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, in China, dispatching personnel to UN peacekeeping operations is understood as an example of China's proactive contribution in international security.² Chinese President Hu Jintao emphasized that "China has already become an important member of the international system" in terms of international security, and specifically, taking China's active involvement in the dispatch

* Senior Research Fellow, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies.


¹ Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xinwen Banggongshi (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China), "2008nian zhongguo de guofang (China's National Defense in 2008)," *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, January 21, 2009. Professor Pu Ning, at the PLA National Defense University Department of Strategic Studies, also exhibits the same categories, by saying that, in the framework of the international security cooperation, China "plays constructive roles at each of the three levels." See, Zhang Tiannan, "Guoji anquan hezuo zongheng tan (General Talk About International Security Cooperation)," *Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily)*, September 11, 2006.

² See, for example, Wei Heping, *Chinese Peacekeeping Troops*, (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2011).

of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions as an example,³ he recognized that China was “seriously undertaking its relevant international responsibilities.”⁴ In fact, since its first dispatch of military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in April 1990,⁵ China had sent a total of more than 14,000 personnel to UN peacekeeping operations by the end of 2009.⁶ In addition, according to statistics from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), as of the end of 2009, China had registered 2,136 personnel (191 police officers, 53 military observers, and 1,892 troops) to 10 UN peacekeeping missions, which is the largest number among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.⁷

However, it does not mean that China was constantly dispatching a large number of personnel to UN peacekeeping missions from the beginning, like it does now. In terms of the scale, China only started active participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the early 2000s, especially from 2003 when dispatching troops/forces became constant. Until 2002, China has only dispatched a small number of personnel. In April 2003, China sent a 218-member unit of the PLA to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), followed by the dispatch of Chinese peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sudan; thus the scale of China’s participation rapidly expanded.

Figure 1: The number of personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations by China



Source: UN DPKO, “Monthly Summary of Contributions (Police, Military Observers and Troops)” (as of December 31 of each year).

³ Hu Jintao, “Jianchi gaige kaifang, tuijin hezuo gongying (Continuing Reform and Opening-up, and Promoting Win-win Cooperation),” (April 12, 2008), Xinhua Yuebao she ed., *Shizheng Wenxian Jilan: March 2008–April 2009*, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2009), p. 890.

⁴ See, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s Speech at the seventh Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in October 2008. Wen Jiabao, “Tongzhou gongji, huli gongying (When on a Common Boat, Help Each other, and Mutual Benefit and Win-win),” (October 24–25, 2008), *ibid.*, pp. 945–947.

⁵ “Zhongguo jiang shouci paichu junshi renyuan, canjia lienheguo tingzhan jiandu zuzhi (China Will Send Military Personnel and Join an UN Cease-fire Organization)” *Renmin Ribao*, April 20, 1990.

⁶ “Wo jun zhanshi zixin de xin xingxiang: bayi de zhi sheng (Our Armed Forces Display a New Confident Image: Voice of the People’s Liberation Army),” *Renmin Ribao*, January 8, 2010. See also, “Zhongguo ‘lankui’ rang shijie kan shenme (What Do Chinese Peacekeepers Let World See?),” *Zhongguo Guofang Bao (China Defense Daily)*, January 4, 2010.

⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “UN Mission’s Summary Detailed by Country,” (December 31, 2009), pp. 7–8.

Following these actual policy developments, studies on China's policy on UN peacekeeping operations and troop dispatch started being published in China. For example, Zhao Lei, researcher at the Institute of International Strategic Studies, the Party School of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, discusses China's diplomatic behavior toward the UN as a mutual interaction of "cultural structure," "national identity" and "national interests" from the perspective of constructivism, studying China's conception and policy on UN peacekeeping operations.⁸ Zhang Huiyu, associate professor at the Department of Management, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy, examines the expansion process of the range and capacity of China's participation in UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990s, and points out the shift in understanding for the definition of China's own role in international security and overall UN affairs that lies behind.⁹ A series of studies in China, including the above, use more or less the same chronological divisions for the Chinese recognition and policy toward UN peacekeeping operations. Since the early 1980s, China started taking a more cooperative attitude toward UN peacekeeping operations, and therefore the 1980s is described as a period of "dealing with each case with a limited participation"; the 1990s, on the other hand, after the end of Cold War, is a period of "vigorous support and active participation."¹⁰ These chronological divisions could be right on the mark as a bird's-eye view. As Jing Chen points out, in the early 1990s, China voted in favor for the establishment of several non-traditional UN peacekeeping operations and started taking a more "flexible attitude" toward UN peacekeeping operations.¹¹ Given these points, China's policy on UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s can be seen as a process of accumulation/development of a "flexible attitude," and described as "vigorous support and active participation."

However, there are some reservations in seeing China's policy on UN peacekeeping operations from the 1990s to the present as a single period. Although China showed a "flexible attitude" toward the establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the PLA sent two batches of 800 engineers to the mission from April 1992 to September 1993, this was an exceptional case and its full-scale troop dispatch did not start until the early 2000s. According to Pang Zhongying, researcher at the Institute of World Political and Economic Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, it was not the "flexible attitude" but the "strict attitude" toward the principles of state sovereignty and concerns about the use of force" among the Chinese

⁸ Zhao Lei, *Jianguo Heping: Zhongguo dui Lianheguo Waijiao Xingwei Yanjin* (Constructing Peace: Evolution of China's Diplomatic Behavior toward the United Nations), (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshe, 2007). Besides it, as a relatively earlier example, Professor Tang Yongsheng at the PLA National Defense University studied China's gain from joining UN peacekeeping operations. See, Tang Yongshen, "Zhongguo yu lianheguo weihe xingdong (China and UN Peacekeeping Operations)," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (*World Economics and Politics*), No. 9 (2002), pp. 39–44.

⁹ Zhang Huiyu, "Zhongguo dui lianheguo weihe xingdong de gongxian (China's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations)," *Wujing Xueyuan Xuebao* (*Journal of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force Academy*), Vol. 20, No. 5 (October 2004), pp. 30–32; Zhang Huiyu, "Toushi zhongguo canyu lianheguo weihe xingdong (Overview of China's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations)," *Sixiang Lilun Jiaoyu Daokan* (*Journal of Ideological & Theoretical Education*), No. 9 (2004), pp. 46–49.

¹⁰ Zhong Longbiao and Wang Jun, "Zhongguo dui lianheguo weichi heping xingdong de renzhi he canyu (China's Conception of and Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations)," *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* (*Contemporary China History Studies*), Vol. 13, No. 6 (November 2006), pp. 78–85.

¹¹ Jing Chen, "Explaining the Change in China's Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Change Perspective," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 18, No. 58 (January 2009), pp. 159–160.

leaders that made China dispatch troops to the UNTAC an exception in the 1990s.¹² In addition, following the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, China particularly emphasized the principles of traditional peacekeeping operations — mutual respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and non-use of force— and this attitude was invoked during its debate over UN peacekeeping operations. This article will examine the relation between China’s principle to the peacekeeping operations of the UN and full-scale troop dispatch.¹³ This paper begins with a confirmation of China’s principle to UN peacekeeping operations defined when the country began to send personnel to UN peacekeeping missions in the late 1980s. Then the paper clarifies that it has become difficult for China to maintain its principle to UN peacekeeping operations especially since 1999. Based on this, it further analyzes the background when China started full-scale troop dispatch in the new millennium, as well as the new context that enabled the dispatch and the following policy developments.

1. Change and Continuity in China’s policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations

(1) Establishment of China’s Principle

It was the late 1980s when China started to express its understanding of the active roles and functions of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, a commentary in the September 10, 1988, issue of the *People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao)* expressed an understanding for “UN peacekeeping operations as an important supplementary means to arbitrate and solve disputes.”¹⁴ The background to this was that China praised the UN for its role as an arbitrator in the process of solving regional conflicts. The commentary referred to arbitrating efforts of the UN Secretary-General in Afghanistan’s problems and the Iran–Iraq War at that time, and emphasized that such efforts are “undoubtedly advantageous for developing international affairs in a healthy direction.” In addition, in a commentary published in *The Outlook (Liaowang)*, a weekly publication affiliated with the Xinhua News Agency, at the end of the same year pointed out that “the UN is playing an increasingly important role in maintaining international peace and promoting international cooperation,” and then emphasized that the UN had achieved “unprecedented results” in Afghanistan’s problems and the Iran–Iraq War.¹⁵ It also recognized the importance of the UN’s role in solving problems with Cambodia which was one of the national security concerns of China at that time. Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei said “international supervision should be implemented to withdraw Vietnamese troops, maintain peace in Cambodia, and call a general election,” and expressed his expectation for role of UN

¹² Pang Zhongying concluded “these issue only served to highlight the emerging contradictions and ambiguities with regard to China’s position on the nature of peace operations.” Pang Zhongying, “China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2005), p. 91.

¹³ As for a study to clarify China’s principle of national sovereignty in its policy on UN peacekeeping operations by investigating its voting behavior, see, Mao Luipeng, “Zhuquan yuanze yu zhongguo zai lienheguo weihe yi’an zhong de toupiao xingdong (The Sovereignty Principle and China’s Voting Records Regarding UN Peacekeeping Operations: 1994–2004),” *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*, No. 4 (2006), pp. 55–60. A detailed discussion of how China sifted its perceptions and policies as responses to conceptual change of UN peacekeeping operations can be found in Stefan Stähle, “China’s Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operation,” *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 195 (September 2008), pp. 631–655.

¹⁴ Guo Jisi, “Lianheguo de zuoyong zai jiaqiang (Role of the UN Is Strengthened),” *Renmin Ribao*, September 10, 1988.

¹⁵ Qian Wenrong, “Guoji fengyun bianhuan zhong de lianheguo (Changes in the International Situation and the UN),” *Liaowang Xinwen Zhoukan (Outlook Weekly)*, No. 51 (1988), p. 38.

peacekeeping operations in the context of international monitoring.¹⁶

Based on such expectations for UN peacekeeping operations to solve regional conflicts and ease international tensions, Ambassador Li Yuye, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations submitted an application to participate in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to the UN Secretary-General on September 22, 1988. The application positioned the peacekeeping operations as “an effective measure to maintain peace and security,” and specified that China will “contribute to enhance the efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations in cooperation with other member countries.”¹⁷ China’s participation in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations was approved at the 43rd General Assembly’s Special Political Committee held on November 2 of the same year,¹⁸ and China’s first “contribution” was realized by the dispatch of civilian officers to the UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG). In January 1989, the Chinese government submitted an application for the participation in the UNTAG to the UN Secretary-General.¹⁹ Following this, the UNTAG started the operation in April 1989, and at the end of October when it was preparing for the first international election monitoring operation by civilian officers, Ambassador Yu Mengjia, Permanent Representative of China to the UN, stated that “the Chinese government had already decided the number of personnel to be dispatched to the peacekeeping operation” at the 44th General Assembly’s Special Political Committee, and then 20 civilian officers were sent to the UNTAG in November.²⁰ In terms of military personnel, the Chinese government’s application for dispatching five military observers to the UNTSO was approved by the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General in November 1989, and thus those observers were dispatched in April 1990.²¹

According to the aforementioned essay published in *People’s Daily*, the reason why UN peacekeeping operations is an important political measure in the process of resolving conflict is that it is easier for the conflicting parties to accept the “neutral” position of UN peacekeeping missions and the UN Secretary-General who serves as an arbitrator. “Dispatching UN peacekeeping troops and military observers to conflict regions based on the approval of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council is a peacekeeping measure that the UN has been developing in its practices

¹⁶ “Tian Zengpei fuwaizhang zai jizhe zhaodaihui shang shuo xiaochu zhongsu guanxi san zhang’ai huo shizhi jinzhan (Vice Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei Said at the Press Conference There Was Being Substantial Progress in Removing the Three Obstacles in Sino–Soviet Relations),” *Renmin Ribao*, February 5, 1989. At ministerial talks on Cambodian issues in Paris on July 31, 1989, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stressed, as one of clues for settling the questions, that all foreign troops must leave the nation under UN supervision. See, Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), p. 46.

¹⁷ “Wo shenqing jiaru lianheguo weichi heping xingdong teweihui (China Applied to Join the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations),” *Renmin Ribao*, September 30, 1988; “Lianda tebie zhengweihui tongguo jueyi (Resolution was Carried When Submitted to the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly),” *Renmin Ribao*, November 4, 1988.

¹⁸ “1988 nian shijie jingji yu zhengzhi dashiji (Major Events of World Economics and Politics in 1988),” *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*, No. 2 (1989), p. 79.

¹⁹ Xie Yixian ed., *Zhongguo Dangdai Waijiaoshi (Diplomatic History of Contemporary China)*, (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 2007), p. 452.

²⁰ “Wo daibiao zai lianda zhengzhi teweihui shang huyu jiaqiang lianheguo weichi heping xingdong de zuoyong (Chinese Representative Call for Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Role at the UN Special Political Committee),” *Renmin Ribao*, November 2, 1989.

²¹ “Woguo jijiang paiqian wu-ming junshi guanchayuan, canjia lianheguo weichi zhongdong heping xingdong (China Will Send Five Military Observers and Join UN Peacekeeping Operations in Middle East),” *Renmin Ribao*, November 24, 1989.

for the past several decades.”²² The essay also regards that since UN peacekeeping operations is based on the principles of consent of the parties concerned, it is able to control hegemonic actions that ignore national sovereignty, such as military invasion and stationing. It argued, “This is the fruit of unrelenting efforts by people in all countries to object to hegemonism and safeguard world peace,” and consequently, the permanent members of the UN Security Council formed “a new consultative mechanism.” The essay concluded that “there is no possibility” of emergence of another era when the US and the Soviet Union had crucially been antagonized.²³ That is to say, China found a new international trend where “dialogue replaces confrontation” in the UN Security Council and UN peacekeeping operations, and in order to participate in the “new consultative mechanism,” the Chinese government decided to join the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and dispatch personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.

In addition, in order to stabilize the new trend — from confrontation to dialogue — it was considered to be necessary to respect national sovereignty and especially to comply with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. At the 45th UN General Assembly in September 1990, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pointed out that “normalization of international relations can only be realized by universally respecting the five principles: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.”²⁴ Furthermore, at the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in May 1991, Chinese Representative Yu Shunin insisted that UN peacekeeping operations “must respect the independence and national sovereignty of the related countries and must avoid being involved in internal affairs.”²⁵

Following this, when China started dispatching personnel to UN peacekeeping missions, it established its principle position, defining that national sovereignty must be respected and consent between the conflicting parties must be implemented by the UN as an arbitrator, and therefore it took a cautious attitude toward dispatching personnel that involves the use of force — in other words dispatching troops — since it may not comply with the principles. For example, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen mentioned in an interview by a German newspaper that “although China has been participating in UN peacekeeping operations, it will not participate in the peacekeeping forces. This is China’s policy.”²⁶ Therefore, the personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations originally consisted mainly of police officers and military observers, and the troop dispatch to the UNTAC was an exceptional case. Moreover, as previously pointed out, China started actual participation in UN peacekeeping operations in order to take part in the “new consultative mechanism” that emerged from the late 1980s to the post-Cold War era among the UN Security Council, taking the place of the US–Soviet split, and the dispatch of personnel was one of the measures to achieve

²² Guo, *Ibid.*

²³ Qian Wenrong, “Cong lianheguo kan duojihua qushi (A Multipolar Trend Judging from the Movement in the United Nations),” *Renmin Ribao*, June 7, 1989.

²⁴ “Qian Qichen waichang zai lianda fayan (Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s Remarks at the UN General Assenbly),” *Renmin Ribao*, September 29, 1990.

²⁵ “Wo daibiao zai lianheguo youguan huiyi shang shuo, zhongguo yuanyi wei lianheguo weichi heping xingdong de zuochu nuli (Chinese Representative Said at an UN Meeting that China Hopes to Make an Effort to Contribute to UN Peacekeeping Operations),” *Renmin Ribao*, May 11, 1991.

²⁶ “Qian Qichen jieshou deguo ‘shangbao’ jizhe caifang (Interview of Qian Qichen by German Media),” *Renmin Ribao*, March 13, 1992.

this. In other words, the scale of personnel dispatch was not necessarily important to China in the post-Cold War era.

(2) “Humanitarian Intervention”: The 1999 NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia

Since 1999, China has been following a trend of increasing the number of personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations.²⁷ Taking an example of an individual UN peacekeeping mission, the process of establishing the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in October 1999 was a sign of a new policy development. The UNTAET was established to build a nation in East Timor after it was destroyed by anti-independence militia and left in chaos. The UNTAET's mission is to establish ministries of East Timor in the sectors such as finance, justice, infrastructure, education and medical service for the post-independence period: this was a new form of UN peacekeeping operations and described as “the UNTAET itself is a government.”²⁸ In addition, UNTAET's responsibilities were expanded further to include national security, police operation, implementation of elections, and conclusion of a treaty with other countries. Moreover, a new significance of the UNTAET was that it was defined as peace enforcement forces under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and nearly 10,000 troops were constantly dispatched to the UNTAET for its peace enforcement operation.

As previously pointed out, one of China's principles of dispatching personnel to peacekeeping missions of the UN was to respect national sovereignty; accordingly, China was originally opposed to the establishment of the UNTAET. This was because the responsibility of the UNTAET went beyond the concept of sovereignty and it was based on the assumption of dispatching a peacekeeping force. As for the deployment of UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor, Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed opposition to the establishment of the UNTAET by saying that “the Chinese government and its people oppose any interference in internal affairs of other countries that uses humanitarian crisis as an excuse, and even more oppose the willful use of force under the banner of ‘humanitarian intervention’ which has not been authorized by the UN Security Council.”²⁹

What's remarkable in Jiang Zemin's statement is the expression “the willful use of force under the banner of ‘humanitarian intervention’ which has not been authorized by the UN Security Council.” In terms of the establishment of the UNTAET, this probably expressed opposition to dispatching peace enforcement forces. However, the establishment of the UNTAET was obviously discussed by the UN Security Council, and therefore, the precondition of “not being authorized by the UN Security Council” cannot be satisfied. Instead, Jiang Zemin was considering situations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of Yugoslavia that started in March 1999 without authorization of the UN, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) that was established in June 1999 after the termination of bombing, with a limitation to

²⁷ In the following study, He Yin, Associate Professor at China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center, also defines 1999 as the turning point for China's UN peacekeeping policy, and argues that China has adopted a flexible stance. Yin He, *China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007).

²⁸ Katsumi Ishizuka, *Kokuren PKO to heiwa kouchiku (UN Peacekeeping Operations and Peacebuilding)*, (Tokyo: Souseisha, 2008), p 131.

²⁹ “Jiang Zemin jieshou faguo ‘feijialuo’ caifang jiu guoneiwai zhongda wenti fabiao kanfa bing chanshu woguo lichang (Jiang Zemin Accepted the Interview by the French Newspaper *Le Figaro* and Expressed His Views on Important Internal and External Issues),” *Renmin Ribao*, October 26, 1999.

civilian sectors.

Jiang Zemin explicitly stated these concerns in his speech at the UN Security Council Summit Meeting in September 2000.³⁰ He stressed that “how the UN can maintain international peace and security more efficiently” was becoming “an urgent issue.” He also stated that “we are facing unprecedented challenges, and the issues we encounter are very complicated,” and concluded that the principles established by the UN had to be strictly observed in order to resolve conflicts. In this speech, Jiang Zemin pointed out that behaviors such as “willful use of force and interference in the internal affairs of other countries in the name of ‘humanitarianism’” and the bombing of Yugoslavia by “the US-led” NATO forces was a breach of the principles. Furthermore, he stressed that it was the UN Security Council that should take “primary responsibilities” of international peace and security but not NATO, and those responsibilities should be fulfilled by the means of UN peacekeeping operations based on the principles of “respecting national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, agreement of the countries concerned, observing neutrality, and prohibiting the use of force except for self-defense.” In addition, Ambassador Qin Huasun Permanent Representative of China to the UN referred to the Kosovo crisis in his article contributed to *People’s Daily*, and described that the greatest challenge faced by the UN was the “humanitarian intervention” argument and stressed the urgency of strengthening the UN’s role, and especially maintaining the prestige of the Security Council. In this context, the ambassador also expressed China’s intention to “play a broader and deeper role in UN affairs.”³¹

The experts in China showed a more critical view of such “humanitarian intervention” trends. Qian Wenrong, Executive Deputy Director of the Center for World Affairs Studies at Xinhua News Agency, pointed out that the UN “was substantially forced into a rubber-stamping position” in the Kosovo crisis, and referred to the possibility that the UN authority could be dispersed to other organizations, triggered by the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. After the termination of bombing, in June 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted the peace plan that ended the Kosovo conflict. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in charge of the civilian sector and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in charge of the military sector were established based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and the UN’s leading position was confirmed to a certain degree.³² However, the fact was that Resolution 1244 was outsourced to willing countries and the KFOR mainly consisted of NATO. In addition, Kofi Atta Annan, the UN Secretary General, proposed to put the European Union (EU) in charge of reconstruction and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in charge of promoting human rights and monitoring elections. In such circumstances, Qian Wenrong found a possibility of “dispersion of the UN authority” and perceived that there was an intention of Western countries, led by the US, to “reduce the role of the UN” in the background.³³

³⁰ Jinag Zemin, “Zai anlihui shounao huiyi shang de jianghua (Speech at the Security Council Summit Meeting),” *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao (Gazette of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China)*, No. 32 (2000), p. 9.

³¹ Qin Huasun, “Lianheguo xuyao zhongguo, zhongguo xuyao lienheguo (The UN Needs China, and China Needs the UN),” *Renmin Ribao*, December 17, 1999.

³² S/RS/1244, June 10, 1999.

³³ Qian Wenrong, “Lianheguo xiang hechu qu? (Where is the UN Going?),” *Guoji Jingji Pinglun (International Economic Review)*, No. 9–10 (1999), p. 39. See also, Zheng Qirong, “Lianheguo mianxiang 21 shiji de weihe xingdong (UN Peacekeeping Operations in the 21st Century),” *Renmin Ribao*, August 17, 2000.

In other words, China saw the possibility of relative decline of the UN's status and role in NATO's military operations that bypassed the UN's approval and the subsequent establishment of the UNMIK and KFOR. It can be understood that such concerns were reflected in Chinese argument for the establishment of the UNTAET. In fact, during the negotiations toward establishing the UNTAET, China became more against the use of force in the name of humanitarianism that is not authorized by the UN. For example, at the UN Security Council meeting in September 1999, although China voted in favor of the resolution to establish the UNTAET, it strongly confirmed that operation of the UNTAET's multinational forces should be "authorized by the UN."³⁴ In addition, in January 2000, the Chinese government announced that it would dispatch 15 civilian police officers to the UNTAET, instead of troops that could have led to the use of force.³⁵

(3) Full-scale Troop Dispatch

Nevertheless, the experts and strategists in China found that military operation in the name of humanitarianism, which bypasses authorization of the UN, could potentially become a new trend in international relations. For example, Xing Yuchun, Associate Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, pointed out that "a new change is happening in the attitude of international society" in terms of international interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and evaluated that "the 'humanitarian involvement' in Kosovo was tacitly approved by many countries and as a result obtained consent."³⁶ In addition, *Annual Report on International Politics and Security*, edited by the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, points out that three trends: (1) "the enhancing influence of Western countries"; (2) "increasing pressure from the US"; and (3) "defensive position of developing countries," constantly emerge in arguments for UN reform.³⁷ This report mentions that there is an undeniable possibility that principles of "democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism" will be valued in the argument for UN reform led by Western countries, and "global intervention" based on "democracy, human rights, and humanitarianism" could be accepted under the name of UN reform in the security field, too. In other words, the experts in China raised a debate on finding indications of "global intervention" under the name of humanitarianism in the argument for UN reform, and expressed a strong sense of crisis regarding the decline of the role of the UN. Such concerns could be applied to UN peacekeeping operations, and it was considered that, as a result of UN reform, non-traditional peacekeeping missions would likely be intensified under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which refers to "necessary military measures in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

With these recognitions, China started full-scale troop/force dispatch to UN peacekeeping

³⁴ S/PV.4043, September 11, 1999.

³⁵ "China to Join UN Mission in East Timor," *Xinhua*, January 11, 2000.

³⁶ Xing Yuchun, "Guoji zhuqian yuanze de jich diwei yu mianlin de tiaozhan (Foundation of Sovereignty Principle and its Challenge)," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies)*, No. 6 (2003), p. 49.

³⁷ Li Dongyan, "Lianheguo gaige de jincheng, xianzhuang yu zoushi (The UN Reform: Process, Circumstance and Outlook)," Li Shenming and Wang Yizhou eds., *2006nian: Quanqiu Zhengzhi yu Anquan Baogao (Annual Reports on International Politics and Security 2006)*, (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2006), pp. 47–67; Li Dongyan, "Lianheguo 60 zhounian: zhenglun jiaodian yu gaige fangxiang (The 60th UN Anniversary: Focus of Debate and Direction of Reform)," Li Shenming and Wang Yizhou eds., *2005nian: Quanqiu Zhengzhi yu Anquan Baogao (Annual Reports on International Politics and Security 2005)*, (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2004), pp. 171–198.

missions. In December 2001, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office was newly established in the Ministry of National Defense. Its duty is to implement unified coordination and management within the army regarding troop dispatch to UN peacekeeping missions. In January 2002, the Chinese government officially decided to join the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) and registered the number of personnel that can be provided including troops to the UN Secretariat.³⁸ The UNSAS is a system for registering resources in advance that UN member states can contribute to the UN Secretariat in a certain time period, in order to enable agile deployment of UN peacekeeping operations and activities led by the UN Department of Political Affairs.³⁹ China registered one engineering battalion (525 personnel), one standard medical team (35 personnel), and two transport companies (80 personnel each), which were all non-combat units.⁴⁰ In addition, by the end of 2003, the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC) ratified the establishment of the Peacekeeping Center of Chinese Ministry of National Defense, a military institution that provides training for stand-by forces for UN peacekeeping missions.⁴¹

Following the development of the domestic system and the registration to the UNSAS, the Chinese government started dispatching troops and forces to UN peacekeeping operations more actively. In October 2002, an engineering battalion stationed in the Beijing Military Region was nominated as the stand-by force for the first time,⁴² and in April 2003, one engineering company (175 personnel) and one standard medical team (43 personnel) were sent to the MONUC.⁴³ Moreover, in July of the same year, the Chinese government decided to dispatch a peacekeeping unit, which consists of one transport company (240 personnel), one engineering company (275 personnel), and standard medical team (35 personnel), to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and they were sequentially assigned to their missions from December.⁴⁴ In 2004, China dispatched its first Formed

³⁸ “Gei shijie daiqu heping (Lead World Peace),” *Zhongguo Guofang Bao*, April 8, 2003.

³⁹ “Member States in the UNSAS,” April 15, 2005; Hikaru Yamashita, “Kokuren heiwa iji katsudo to ‘takokusekigun’: SHIRBRIG no keiken to sono imiai (United Nations Peacekeeping and ‘Multinational Forces’: The Experience of SHIRBRIG and Its Implications),” *Boei Kenkyusho Kiyō (NIDS Security Studies)*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 2007), p. 8.

⁴⁰ Shao Junwu, “Toushi lianheguo weihe xindong (See Through UN Peacekeeping Operations),” *Dangdai Shijie (Contemporary World)*, No. 6 (2005), p. 57; Tang Jiayu and Hong Minfu, “Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun canyu weihe xindong de huiyi yu zhanwang (Review and Survey on the PLA’s Participation in International Peacekeeping Operations),” *Dangshi Zonglan (Overview of the Party’s History)*, No. 4 (2010), p. 7. China registered its capabilities available for UN peacekeeping missions to UNSAS at the lowest Level I. The levels of registration include Level I, Level II, Level III and Rapid Deployment Level (RDL). In China, UNSAS levels are usually classified according to how much time it takes to deploy personnel after a government’s decision to participate in missions; 90 days for Level I, 60 days for Level II and 30 days for Level III. See, for example, “Zhongguo zhubu jiada canyu lianheguo weihe xingdong de lidu he guimo (China is Gradually Increasing its Participation in the UN Peacekeeping Operations),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, December 10, 2003.

⁴¹ “Guofangbu weihe zhongxin guapai, jiaqiang weihe renyan peixun (Ministry of National Defense Opens its Peacekeeping Center and Strengthens Training for Peacekeepers),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 26, 2009.

⁴² Xin Yang, “Heping dunpai: zhongguo jundui wei shijie hepong chuxheng (Peace Shield: Chinese Army Goes to the Front for World Peace)” *Guojia Anquan Tongxun (National Security Information)*, No. 8 (2003), p. 11.

⁴³ “Zhongguo fu gangguo (jin) weihe budui zhengzhuang daifa (Chinese Peacekeeper Unit is Ready to Leave for the Democratic Republic of Congo),” *Xinhua Meiri Dianxun (Xinhua Daily Telegraph)*, February 15, 2003; “Di’erpi weihe guanbing lijing fu gangguo (jin) (Second Peacekeeping Unit is to Leave Beijing for the Democratic Republic of Congo),” *Renmin Gong’an Bao (China Police Daily)*, December 6, 2003.

⁴⁴ “60 Chinese Peacekeeping Soldiers Leave for War-Torn Liberia,” *Xinhua*, December 9, 2003; “China Sends Another Team of Peacekeeping Troops To Liberia,” *Xinhua*, March 18, 2004.

Police Unit (FPU) of 125 officers to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).⁴⁵ The dispatch of FPU attracted attention from the perspective of the dispatch of “forces,” because FPU is a team of police officers which is well equipped and trained to act as a cohesive body capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies.

The Chinese government had been investigating the feasibility of constant dispatch of troops since the late 1990s. It decided to participate in the UNSAS, in principle, in May 1997, and when Deputy Ambassador Wang Xuexian, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, announced the decision to the UN, the intention of the government—to provide engineering, medical, transportation and other logistic contingents to UN peacekeeping operations in an appropriate time—was actually indicated at the same time.⁴⁶ The defense white paper published in July 1998 also specified China's intention of providing logistic service teams and stated that “China will continue to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in a positive and down-to-earth manner.”⁴⁷ However, at the same time, China's principle position for UN peacekeeping operations was stressed as follows.

In order to help UN peacekeeping operations achieve success and develop in a healthy way, the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations must be adhered to, especially the principles of respecting the sovereignty of all countries and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. In peacekeeping operations, the following principles should be adhered to: obtaining consent from the country concerned beforehand, strictly observing neutrality and prohibiting the use of force except for self-defense. Disputes must be settled using peaceful means, such as mediation, good office and negotiation. Double standards should be opposed, and military interference under the guise of the UN should not be allowed. Be practical and realistic. A peacekeeping operation should not be undertaken when conditions are not yet ripe, nor should a peacekeeping force become a party to a conflict, which would be a deviation from the fundamental purpose of peacekeeping operations.

The same description stressing the principle position for UN peacekeeping operations was seen in the defense white paper in 2000.⁴⁸ However, the 2002 version does not include such descriptions. Judging by this, it can be said that following the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, China became aware of “humanitarian intervention” in peacekeeping operations and the increasing possibility of the use of force based on such involvement, and the government faced conflicts between the principle position which China had been stressing and the reality surrounding UN peacekeeping operations in defining the concept and position of the dispatch of troops. This was

⁴⁵ “Chinese Peacekeeping Riot Police Arrive in Haiti,” *Xinhua*, October 18, 2004.

⁴⁶ “Lienheguo weihe daiming anpai: Zhongguo yuanze shang jue ding canjia (China Decided to Join the UNSAS in Principle),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, May 31, 1997; “Woguo duiwai guanxi dashiji: 1997 nian 3 yue-5 yue (Major Events of China's Foreign Relations: March–May 1997),” *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (International Studies)*, No. 3 (1997), p. 62.

⁴⁷ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, “Zhongguo de guofang (China's National Defense),” *Renmin Ribao*, July 28, 1998. See also, “Zhongguo jiji wushi canjia weihe (China's Active and Pragmatic Participation in Peacekeeping Missions),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, October 7, 1998.

⁴⁸ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, “2000nian zhongguo de guofang (China's National Defense in 2000),” *Renmin Ribao*, October 17, 2000.

probably the reason why it took nearly five years for China to decide to participate in principle and then to formally participate to the UNSAS. On the other hand, just before dispatching personnel to the MONUC, Dai Shao'an, deputy director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense referred that Chinese contingents would be "non-combat units"⁴⁹; however, when the Chinese government announced it would participate to the UNSAS in principle, it was described as "logistic contingents." This change of expression can be seen as China trying to emphasize that it strongly maintained its principle position to avoid the use of force in the actual dispatch of troops. Professor Tang Yongsheng at the PLA National Defense University regards the struggles China had to face in an effort to cope with both the principle and reality as follows.⁵⁰

After the Cold War, the authority and scope of UN peacekeeping operations has clearly expanded; however, the definition of peacekeeping operations has become more ambiguous and diversified, and accordingly China is facing serious challenges in both understanding and practice. Especially, it is required to enhance the ability to handle complicated situations and problems, and we need to seek a balance in a situation where interests of various powers collide. Although there has been a significant improvement in China's understanding of UN peacekeeping operations, China has participated for only a short time and the actual experience is limited; therefore, it is not easy to make a clear decision. In the present peacekeeping operations, the traditional principles have already been broken, the principles of neutrality and free will are diminishing, "enforced peace" is frequently used, and "humanitarian" intervention is becoming one of the important grounds for peacekeeping operations.

2. China's Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations as a "Responsible Power"

(1) "International contribution/responsibility"

Although China was struggling between the principle and reality in terms of its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, it decided to dispatch troops full scale. This was not only because it aimed to enhance the role of the UN but also found a new significance. As previously pointed out, the Chinese government expressed its intention to "continue to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in a positive and down-to-earth manner" since the late 1990s. In accordance with such statements, the UN started asking China for concrete contributions. For example, Kofi Annan visited China in January 2001, and told Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan that "China is an important member of the UN, and it has an important impact on peacekeeping operations. The developing and changing international situation called for the UN to revitalize its peacekeeping operations, and we hope China will make a greater contribution."⁵¹ Moreover, the scale of UN peacekeeping operations was expanding in the new century. As of October 2004, 17 UN peacekeeping operations were deployed all over the world and the total number of dispatched personnel had reached 62,000. This figure was almost twice as much as the total as of January 2003. The number of troops required for UN peacekeeping operations in 2005 was expected to reach 80,000, and it was estimated that the

⁴⁹ "Chinese Peacekeeper Unit is Ready to Leave for the Democratic Republic of Congo," *Xinhua*, February 15, 2003.

⁵⁰ Tang Yongsheng, "China and UN Peacekeeping Operations," p. 44.

⁵¹ "Tang Jiaxuan tong an'nan huitan (Meeting between Tang Jiaxuan and Annan)," *Renmin Ribao*, January 22, 2001.

necessary expenditure would reach US\$38 billion, an increase of \$10 billion.⁵²

Under these circumstances, and in a situation where troop dispatch by other major powers was slow, China expanded the scale of dispatching personnel including troops, which enabled China to exhibit its concrete “contribution” to UN peacekeeping operations and thus international security. A discussion published in *People's Daily* on October 29, 2004 insisted “big powers should take an active part” in UN peacekeeping operations. This was because active participation of big powers “will strengthen the UN peacekeeping ability, be beneficial to enhancing the prestige of the UN Security Council, and help to bring out the effect of a collective security mechanism,” as well as “being beneficial to enhancing the overall role and influence of the UN, and promoting solutions for world peace and stability in a framework for multilateral cooperation.” In addition, the discussion regarded the dispatch of troops to the MONUC in 2003 and the dispatch of FPU to the MINUSTAH in 2004 as “positive contributions” of China in this context, and suggested the difference from the contribution of other “big powers.”⁵³ Furthermore, when General Liang Guanglie, chief of the general staff of the PLA, inspected the stand-by engineering company for the MONUC operation, he stated that “our participation in UN peacekeeping operations is a concrete manifestation of China's political and diplomatic status and our increasing international dignity, as well as a new task for our army; it is an honorable mission.” He then expressed the expectation for the dispatched troops to “contribute to peace operations for mankind and win a great honor for the country and its people.”⁵⁴ Thus, a new context — active/proactive “contribution” — has been added to troop dispatch to UN peacekeeping operations.

In addition, some major media and strategists in China raised an argument to understand troop dispatch to UN peacekeeping operations as an example of the realization of China's “responsibility” for international security. Among articles published in *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*, an increasing number of articles have been discussing UN peacekeeping operations and dispatch of personnel from the standpoint of China's international “responsibility” since the full-scale dispatch of troops (Figure 2). Needless to say, arguments based on such a standpoint existed in China before. Articles and discussions that viewed UN peacekeeping operations from the perspective of “responsibility” were increasing in 1999 and 2000 as well. However, as previously pointed out, the tone of discussions at that time was more critical of “humanitarian intervention,” and argued the traditional principles of UN peacekeeping operations and China's principle position as a refutation against them. On the other hand, since the full-scale dispatch of troops has started, China's policy on UN peacekeeping


⁵² “U.N. Seeks ‘Clear, Strong’ Support for Peacekeeping Operations,” *Kyodo News*, March 7, 2004.

⁵³ He Hongze, “Zhongguo ‘lankui’ wei shijie heping tiancai (China's ‘Blue Helmet’ Adds Luster to World Peace),” *Renmin Ribao*, October 29, 2004. See also, “Lianheguo weihe xingdong: quebing queqian (UN Peacekeeping Operations: Lack of Soldiers and Money),” *Xinhua Meiri Dianxun*, November 7, 2004. Also in 2003, military observers China dispatched to UN peacekeeping missions increased in number. The main mission of military observers is generally to monitor compliance of armistice, and thus the observers are not allowed to be armed. China sends major and LTCs level as observers to UN peacekeeping missions on one or two-year rotation. See, “Ji zhongguo pai lienheguo junshi guanchayuan: junxian dou shi shaoxiao he zhongxiao (Record of Chinese UN Military Observers: Rank is Major and Lieutenant Colonel),” *Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily)*, July 28, 2006. Besides this, another article at the same day's *Remin Ribao* appreciated China's dispatch its personnel to UN peacekeeping missions by stating “it reflects China's sincere efforts as a responsible great power because such a policy adequately crystalizes China's stance to make contributions to world peace by concrete steady actions. See, “Jiji de gongxian (Positive Contribution),” *Renmin Ribao*, October 29, 2004.

⁵⁴ “Zhongguo fu gangguo (jin) weihe budui zujian wanbi (Chinese Units Were Ready for Their UN Peacekeeping Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, January 24, 2003.

operations and dispatch of personnel has been discussed from the standpoint of the realization of China’s active/proactive responsibility rather than refutation. For example, Major General Zhu Chenghu, Dean of the School of Defense, PLA National Defense University, stressed that “the Chinese government and the Chinese army are getting more clear recognition of their responsibility for international and regional peacekeeping” and remarked that the dispatch of troops not only provided “an opportunity for the Chinese army to see the world” but also “an opportunity for the world to understand the Chinese army,” which indicates that he was not taking the perspective of refutation.⁵⁵

Figure 2: Change in the number of articles that discuss UN peacekeeping operations from the perspective of “responsibility”



Source: Data from *People's Daily* and *PLA Daily*.

(2) Peacekeeping Operations and Military Diplomacy


In 2004, China recorded the largest number of personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations among the permanent members of the UN Security Council for the first time. It is said that such active contribution of personnel improved the international image and status of China. In November of the same year, Chen Jian, the UN Deputy Secretary-General, referred to China’s dispatch of FPU to the MINUSTAH and stated “China’s effort is regarded as an important step to improve its international status” in an interview with *People’s Daily*.⁵⁶ In addition, Chen praised the high standard of qualities, strict discipline and proficiency of China’s peacekeeping units and stated that “the United Nations places higher expectations on China’s roles in the maintenance of world peace and regional security, hoping China would send out more peacekeeping forces and continue to play greater role in international affairs.” Moreover, in August 2007, Major General Zhao Jingmin of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense was appointed as the Force

⁵⁵ “2003 nian zhongguo junshi waijiao,” *Xinhua Meiri Dianxun*, January 5, 2004.

⁵⁶ “Zhongguo guoji diwei ri yi zhongyao: fang lianheguo fumishuzhang Chen Jian (China’s International Status Becomes Increasingly Important: Interview with UN Deputy Secretary-general Chen Jian),” *Remin Ribao*, November 15, 2004.

Commander in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).⁵⁷ He is the first Chinese officer to be appointed as the UN peacekeeping force commander, and upon his appointment as the Force Commander of the MINURSO he stated that “it has shown the UN’s trust in the capability of a Chinese military officer and the appreciation of China’s 17 years of active participation in UN peacekeeping missions.”⁵⁸

Figure 3: The number of personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations by the permanent members of the UN Security Council



Source: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>

* Number of personnel dispatched as of December 31 of each year.

After achieving such a high reputation internationally and domestically, China started more active military diplomacy by using peacekeeping operations as a policy tool. Such examples include holding “seminars “ or “symposiums” under the theme of international peacekeeping operations (hosted by the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense), and the PLA started using the forums as a policy tool for developing common understanding of the future image of UN peacekeeping operations and enhancing military exchange among the major countries and regions. In November 2004, the Peacekeeping Affairs Office and the China Institute for International Strategic Studies jointly hosted an international seminar on “Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century” in Beijing, which was attended by about 40 representatives from 10 countries.⁵⁹ In this symposium, General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, referred to China’s basic position in UN peacekeeping operations and expressed the intention to implement capacity building for the PLA to conduct peacekeeping operations. In addition, he stated that in order for

⁵⁷ “Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General,” August 27, 2007; “Secretary-General Appoints Major General Zhao Jingmin of China,” SG/A/1089, August 28, 2007.

⁵⁸ “First Chinese UN Peacekeeping Force Commander Takes Office,” *Xinhua*, September 17, 2007.

⁵⁹ “Guoji weihe yantaohui zai jing juxing (International Peacekeeping Seminar was Held in Beijing),” *Renmin Ribao*, November 4, 2004.

China to make a further contribution he would like to “learn from the experience of the armies of other countries to enhance exchange and cooperation in international peacekeeping operations,” and expressed the intention of the PLA to promote confidence building in the international society regarding peacekeeping missions.⁶⁰ Moreover, bilateral seminars have been held, such as with the UK, in order to deepen the dialogue on UN peacekeeping operations, based on the agreement of the joint statement published in May 2004. Three seminars related to international peacekeeping operations were held between China and the UK by the end of 2008, and the peacekeeping and reconstruction roles of the UN were discussed.⁶¹

According to *PLA Daily*, these seminars on international peacekeeping operations were held under the instruction of the CMC.⁶² It is considered that the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense has been making efforts to implement a method based on “mutual connection of ‘Going Out’ and ‘Bringing In’ strategies,” following the CMC’s instruction. That is to say, China is not only promoting the dispatch of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (i.e. “Going Out”), but also taking initiatives to enhance exchange and cooperation with the UN and the governments, armies and educational institutions of the related countries regarding the position and issues of the UN.

In June 2007, the first PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference was held in order to summarize the previous participations in UN peacekeeping operations and exchange the know-how accumulated in each unit.⁶³ The conference confirmed the achievements of the previous participations, and its main theme was the concept of regulations and institutional design for China’s participation to UN peacekeeping operations in the recent situation where the function of peacekeeping operations is becoming more diversified. International exchange in international peacekeeping operations was also discussed in the conference. On the last day of the conference, Zhang Qingsheng, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, indicated that “international exchange and cooperation for peacekeeping operations will be intentionally and intensively increased step by step,” and stressed that the PLA should actively participate in multilateral exchange in the field of peacekeeping operations organized by the UN and regional organizations.⁶⁴ In fact, in November 2007, “China–ASEAN Peacekeeping Seminar” was held in Beijing, hosted by the Peacekeeping Affairs Office.⁶⁵ In this symposium, Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, argued that “regional organizations should play an active role” in international peacekeeping missions, based on an assumption that the UN plays

⁶⁰ Xiong Guangkai, “Jiaqiang hezuo, gongying tiaozhan (Strengthening Cooperation, Sharing Challenges),” *Guoji Zhanlue Yanjiu (International Strategic Studies)*, No.1 (2005), pp. 8–12.

⁶¹ “Dangang weihe: zhangxian fuzeren daguo xingxiang (China Plays a Leading Role in Peacekeeping: Shows its Image of Responsible Power),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, December 17, 2008. See also, “Yang Jiechi Holds Talks with British Foreign Secretary David Miliband,” *Xinhua*, February 28, 2008.

⁶² “China Plays a Leading Role in Peacekeeping: Shows its Image of Responsible Power,” *Jiefangjun Bao*, December 17, 2008.

⁶³ “Wo jun shouci weihe gongzuo huiyi kaimu (First PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference Opens),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 19, 2007; Deng Guozheng and Lv Desheng, “Weiyan heping zhu renhuan: quanjun shouci weihe gongzuo huiyi ceji (Wish for People to Live in Peace: Report on First PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 23, 2007.

⁶⁴ “Yao jiji canjia duobian weihe jiaoliu huodong (We Need to Participate Actively in Multilateral Peacekeeping Exchanges),” *Zhongguo Xinwen Wang (China News: Internet Version)*, June 21, 2007. Available at <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2007/06-21/962758.shtml> (accessed December 15, 2011).

⁶⁵ “Zhongguo-dongmeng weihe yantaohui zai jing juxing (China-ASEAN Peacekeeping Seminar was Held in Beijing),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, November 20, 2007.

a leading role. In order to achieve this, capacity building is essential for the regional countries to accomplish their peacekeeping missions, and the possibilities of cooperation and exchange between China and ASEAN were discussed from this point of view.⁶⁶

The enhancement of international exchange for peacekeeping operations is assumed to be followed by the implementation of joint training with foreign armed forces. According to *PLA Daily*, once “good exchange and cooperative relationships” in this field has been established through the symposiums, joint training and exercise with foreign armed forces for peacekeeping missions may be conducted in the future. During China–ASEAN Peacekeeping Seminar, China invited the ASEAN delegation to visit 61975 Unit in Beijing Military Region, where the engineering brigade dispatched to the MONUC stations, as a part of the symposium.⁶⁷ This can be seen as the PLA has shown the intention to provide ASEAN with the know-how it accumulated from the dispatch of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.⁶⁸ At the same time, the Chinese government started the process of institutionalization of cooperative relations with the defense authorities of ASEAN nations in the field of non-traditional security, including UN peacekeeping operations. At the China–ASEAN Summit in early November 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out the importance of cooperation in non-traditional security fields and proposed to “increase military exchange and cooperation, promote institutionalization of cooperation between the defense authorities, and enhance defense policy dialogue.”⁶⁹ Based on this proposal, “China–ASEAN Senior Defense Scholars’ Dialogue” hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of China was held in March 2008 and from March to April 2009 at the Academy of Military Sciences of the PLA, and methods to enhance cooperation between units, including the peacekeeping field, were discussed.⁷⁰ Judging by these movements, it seems that China assumes future implementation of multilateral training for their peacekeepers with ASEAN nations.

In addition, the PLA has already implemented joint training for peacekeeping operations with some foreign armed forces. From the end of June to July 2009, the PLA implemented a joint training “Peacekeeping Mission 2009” with the Mongolian armed forces. This was the first joint training for peacekeeping missions that the PLA conducted with a foreign military. In addition to theoretical discussion on peacekeeping missions, they conducted joint training such as transportation missions and lookout and defense in camp.⁷¹ *PLA Daily* pointed out that the joint training “suggested the

⁶⁶ “Zhongguo-dongmeng weihe yantaohui zai jing juxing (China–ASEAN Peacekeeping Seminar Was Held in Beijing),” *Xinhua*, November 19, 2007.

⁶⁷ “Dongmeng shiguo weihe yantaohui daibiao cangan zhongguo weihe daiming budui (Representative from 10 ASEAN Countries Paid a Visit of Chinese Standby Unit),” *Qing Bingqi (Small Arms)*, No. 4 (2008), p. 4.

⁶⁸ A military officer of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense, in discussion with the author (April 2008, Tokyo).

⁶⁹ Wen Jiabao, “Kuoda hexuo, huli gongying (Expand Cooperation and Mutual Benefit and Win-win),” *Renmin Ribao*, November 21, 2007; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu Zhengce Guihuasi (Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China), *Zhongguo Waijiao: 2008nianban (China’s Foreign Affairs: 2008)*, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2008), p. 237.

⁷⁰ “Zhongguo-dongmeng gaoji fangwu xuezhe duihua zai jing juxing (China–ASEAN Senior Defense Scholars’ Dialogues was Held in Beijing),” *Jiefangjun bao*, March 13, 2008; “2009 Zhongguo-dongmeng gaoji fangwu xuezhe duihua zai jing juxing (2009 China–ASEAN Senior Defense Scholars’ Dialogues was Held in Beijing),” *Jiefangjun bao*, March 31, 2009; Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “2008nian zhongguo de guofang (China’s National Defense in 2008),” *Renmin ribao*, January 21, 2009.

⁷¹ “Zhongmeng ‘Weihe shiming-2009’ lienhe xunlian (China–Mongolia ‘Peacekeeping Mission 2009’ Joint Training),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, July 7, 2009.

practical exchange and cooperation between both armed forces had entered a new stage,” and regarded the implementation of the joint training for peacekeeping missions as an indicator that specifies a development stage in relations between the two armed forces.⁷² Furthermore, considering that the purpose of “Peacekeeping Mission 2009” was to “improve the capability of both the PLA and Mongolian armed forces to jointly accomplish peacekeeping missions,”⁷³ and that Ma Xiaotian stressed that the joint training “reflects the common hope of both countries to jointly maintain international and regional peace and stability,”⁷⁴ it is possible that China is thinking of jointly dispatching personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.

In June 2009, the Peacekeeping Center of Chinese Ministry of National Defense, which was ratified by the State Council and the CMC at the end of 2003, was established in a suburb of Beijing. It is aimed to be used for training peacekeepers and international exchange.⁷⁵ According to the Peacekeeping Affairs Office, the center is used for not only training the PLA officers but also training commanders, military observers, and staff of peacekeeping units of “friendly nations.” However, apparently when the center was established there was no dedicated instructor, and the center started its activity with an international exchange.⁷⁶ In November, 2009, “2009 Beijing International Peacekeeping Seminar” was held at the center under the main theme of “strengthening exchange and cooperation, and improving UN peacekeeping operations’ efficiency.” A total of 110 representatives from 6 international and regional organizations including the UN, the EU, the African Union (AU), ASEAN, Non-Aligned Movement, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 22 government and military officials took part in the symposium. The participants discussed 10 sub-topics such as measures to strengthen UN peacekeeping ability construction and to enhance training for peacekeeping forces.⁷⁷ On the day after the symposium, representatives were invited to observe the training of Chinese peacekeeping force, in which they demonstrated the

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ “China, Mongolia Launch Joint Peacekeeping Exercise,” *Xinhua*, June 28, 2009.

⁷⁴ “Zhongmeng weihe lienhe xunlian yuanman jieshu (Sino–Mongolian Joint Peacekeeping Training Successfully Ends),” *Xinhua*, July 3, 2009.

⁷⁵ “Guofangbu weihe zhongxin guipai, jiaqiang weihe renyuan peixun (The Peacekeeping Center of the Ministry of National Defense Was Unveiled, Strengthening Training for Peacekeepers of the PLA),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, June 26, 2009.

⁷⁶ Author’s interview with a PLA senior colonel (Beijing, December 2009). In late September, 2010, the first 19 personnel, mainly colonels and major generals, received training as future commanders for UN peacekeeping operations at the Peacekeeping Center of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. See, “Wo guo juban shouqi weihe xingdong gaoji zhihuiguan peixun ban (China’s First UN Peacekeeping Senior Commanders Training Course Held),” *Jiefangjun bao*, September 21, 2010; “Jiaoxue xiangchang, gongtong tigao (Improving Together Through Education),” *Jiefangjun Bao*, October 1, 2010. Also, Zhang Li, deputy director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense, pointed out the significance of the establishment of this training course as both international exchanges and capacity building of PLA, and stated as the following: The establishment of the peacekeeping center will “have advantage not only in strengthening exchanges and cooperation between China and the UN for trainings,” but also in “developing PLA’s training system for peacekeeping operations so that it would improve capabilities of peacekeepers of PLA.” See, *Jiefangjun Bao*, September 21, 2010.

⁷⁷ “Zhongguo guofangbu juban guoji weihe yantaohui (Chinese Defense Ministry Holds International Peacekeeping Seminar),” *Xinhua*, November 23, 2009; Wei Heping eds., *Chinese Peacekeeping Troops* (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2011), p. 93.

removal of mines and operation of excavators.⁷⁸ The center is open to foreign media, and equipped with facilities for simulation training and English training.⁷⁹ This is the first peacekeeping center with training facilities for the PLA, and this newly established center is expected to accelerate international military exchange.⁸⁰

(3) Variability of the Principle of Non-Interference in Internal Affairs: Darfur Conflict

Along with the new context of “contribution” and “responsibility,” China started dispatching personnel including troops more actively, and consequently China’s image and status in the UN and international security was improved; however, there are still challenges for the principle position of China, which is to respect national sovereignty and to comply with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. China’s diplomatic maneuvering on the question of Darfur is a symbolic example. Since fighting broke out between the anti-government force from the south, mainly consisting of Christians, and the government, Sudan had been in a volatile situation. In February 2003, the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) led an armed uprising in the Marra Mountains, and a large number of black Africans in Darfur joined the rebel group. In response to this, an Arab militia called “Janjaweed,” which is said to be supported by the Sudanese government, executed mop-up operations against non-Arabic villagers in Darfur. The attack included persecution, looting, rape and even genocide, and sparked international outcry. Under such circumstances, the AU started acting as an intermediary to reach a ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the two rebel movements from the Darfur region, and the agreement on a ceasefire and the dispatch of AU’s monitoring unit to Darfur was signed in April 2004.⁸¹ However, due to insufficient military capacity of the AU troops and a lack of financial means, the ceasefire monitoring by the AU did not achieve sufficient results.

On the other hand, as the situation in Darfur became more tense, the UN Security Council adopted a number of resolutions to request a ceasefire, disarmament and improvement of the human rights situation for the Sudanese government. During the period from the break out of armed conflict in 2003 to the end of 2007, 21 Security Council Resolutions related to the Darfur conflict were adopted.⁸² However, China abstained from the vote for some of the resolutions. For example, China

⁷⁸ “Guoji weihe yantaohui daibiao canguan zhongguo weihe daiming budui (Representatives Who Attend International Peacekeeping Seminar Visit Chinese Standby Troops),” *Zhongguo Guangbo Wang (China National Radio Online)*, November 21, 2009. Available at http://mil.cnr.cn/bwyc/200911/t20091121_505650872.html (accessed July 6, 2011); *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 22, 2009. This training was held at the engineering brigade in a suburb of Beijing, but not at the peacekeeping center.

⁷⁹ “Chugoku ga PKO senta hatsu koukai (China Opened the Peacekeeping Center to the Public),” *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 20, 2009.

⁸⁰ “China Opens 1st Peacekeeping Training Center,” *Xinhua*, June 25, 2009. Needless to say, it does not mean that PLA had lacked functions to train and educate peacekeeping personnel until then. Every year, the PLA trains one or two groups of about 50 military observers and staff officers. See, Liu Yuan ed., *Fei Zhanzheng Junshi Xingdong zhong de Zhengzhi Gongzuo (Political Work in Military Operation Other Than War)*, (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 2009), p. 293. On the other hand, while such courses remain secret with some exceptions, the peacekeeping center will serve as a training unit intended to facilitate exchange with other nations and international organizations.

⁸¹ “The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union (AU) Encourages the Parties in the Darfur Conflict in the Sudan to Continue with Dialogue,” Press Release No. 085/2004, August 28, 2004. Available at http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Press_Releases/85%2004%20CP%20encourages%20Parties%20in%20Darfur.pdf (accessed September 10, 2010).

⁸² Wang Suolao, “Da’erfuer wenti (Darfur issue),” Wang Jisi ed., *Zhongguo Guoji Zhanlue Pinglun 2008 (China International Strategy Review 2008)*, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2008), p. 255.

abstained from the vote for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1556 in July 2004 and 1564 in September 2004. This was because these resolutions included the statement, “including measures as provided for in Article 41 of the UN Charter.”⁸³ China recognized the possibility of the use of force or economic sanctions against Sudan. During the discussion of Security Council Resolution 1564, Ambassador Wang Guangya, Permanent Representative of China to the UN, stressed that “there will be no change in China’s position against sanctions” from the standpoint that “sanctions not only prevent complicated problems from being solved, but also make the problems even more complicated.”⁸⁴ China also abstained from the vote for Security Council Resolution 1706 adopted in August 2006, which regulates the deployment of UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur.⁸⁵ This was because the resolution text did not include a wording “Khartoum’s consent.”⁸⁶ In other words, China expressed its intention to oppose a resolution that contradicts China’s principle position for UN peacekeeping operations by abstaining from the vote.⁸⁷ Admittedly, China abstained from voting, but did not veto. According to Ambassador Wang Guangya, China expressed “strict reservation” but “it has never blocked adoption of resolutions.”⁸⁸ This means that China was not against deployment of peacekeeping operations in Darfur itself, but considered that “expansion” of the AU’s peacekeeping mission should have a priority in a situation where the Sudanese government was refusing to accept UN peacekeeping troops. In this regard, China put an emphasis on consultations by related nations and organizations, and enforcement actions such as the use of force and economic sanctions should not be taken in its understanding.

However, China’s voting behavior did not necessarily gain international understanding. For example, *The Wall Street Journal* reported that China threatened to wield its veto rights in the UN Security Council many times to avoid sanctions against the Sudanese government.⁸⁹ In addition, there was an increasing criticism that China’s close relationship with Sudan in oil development was one of the reasons why China had abstained from voting for adoption of Security Council Resolutions. Stephen Hadley, US Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, criticized China for “supporting resource-rich nations that have bad records of democracy and human rights violation.”⁹⁰ Peter Takirambudde, the Executive Director of the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch also criticized China and Russia for abstaining from voting for Security Council Resolution 1706 as follows. “Russia is one of the major ammunition suppliers to Sudan, and China is one of the major consumers of the oil of Sudan, and both countries abstained from voting for the resolution. This suggests that they do not have strong intention to put pressure on Khartoum to accept the UN troops.”⁹¹

Under such increasing criticism in international society, after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1706, China started persuading the Sudanese government to accept the dispatch of UN’s

⁸³ S/RES/1556, July 30, 2004; S/RES/1564, September 18, 2004.

⁸⁴ “Zhongguo fandui zhicai (China Opposes Sanctions),” *Renmin Ribao*, September 20, 2004.

⁸⁵ S/RES/1706, August 31, 2006.

⁸⁶ “Security Council Passes Resolution on UN Troop in Darfur,” *Xinhua*, August 31, 2006; “China Calls for Comprehensive, Lasting Peace in Sudan’s Darfur Region,” *Xinhua*, August 31, 2006.

⁸⁷ China also abstained from voting on the UN Security Council Resolution 1591, 1593, and 1672.

⁸⁸ “Zhongguo fandui zhicai,” *Renmin Ribao*, September 20, 2004.

⁸⁹ “China’s Crude Conscience,” *The Wall Street Journal*, August 8, 2006.

⁹⁰ “‘Rieki kyoyusha’ ni nariuruka (Can China Be A ‘Stakeholder’),” *Asahi Shimbun*, April 15, 2006.

⁹¹ “U.N.: Darfur Resolution Only a First Step,” *US Fed News*, August 31, 2006.

blue helmets to Darfur, based on the idea that if UN forces take over the mission from the AU ceasefire monitoring units and conduct peacekeeping operation in Darfur, it would help to stabilize the situation.⁹² In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao met the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, who was visiting China to attend the Summit of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. Hu pointed out that “when the resolution 1706 has been adopted, Darfur conflict will enter another key phase” and strongly requested President Bashir to lead Sudan to “enhance dialogue with various sectors, coordinate position, and find appropriate measures to solve problems.” One of the “appropriate measures” that China suggested was the dispatch of AU–UN joint force to Darfur, and the Sudanese government agreed in principle to accept the joint force.⁹³ However, at the Peace and Security Council of the AU in December, President Bashir took the opposite stance again and stated that they would not allow the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, nor would they allow the UN’s right to command. Facing such circumstances, China took the position to “support the leading role of the AU and give priority for the extension of the stationing of the AU forces” (Wang Guangya), and while showing consideration for the Sudanese government, China strongly requested “appropriate solutions for problems” and accelerated diplomatic efforts to encourage the Sudanese government to accept UN peacekeeping troops. In February 2007, Hu Jintao visited Sudan and presented four principles to solve the Darfur conflict in his meeting with the President Bashir: (1) to respect Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) to persist in holding dialogue and consultation on an equal footing and using peaceful means to resolve the issue; (3) the AU and the UN should play constructive roles with regard to peacekeeping in Darfur, and urge the Sudanese government to accept peacekeeping troops; (4) to promote stability in Darfur and improve the local people’s living conditions.⁹⁴ Hu also stated that China had decided to provide 40 million yuan worth of aid to the Darfur region. In addition, he signed seven cooperation documents to deepen practical cooperation with Sudan.

In accordance with such summit diplomacy, in May 2007, the Chinese government established a new ambassador level post, Special Representative on African Affairs, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appointed Liu Guiji, the former Chinese ambassador to South Africa, as the special representative.⁹⁵ The mission of the special representative is to focus on the Darfur issue. By February 2008, Liu Guiji visited Sudan four times in less than a year after his assignment, and conducted negotiations with the Sudanese government regarding the deployment of the joint peacekeeping forces of the UN and the AU in Darfur.⁹⁶ Thanks to the China’s diplomatic efforts, on July 31, 2007, the Sudanese government declared the acceptance of the joint forces. Following this, on September 28, Security Council Resolution 1769 was adopted with the consent of the Sudanese government, and the prompt deployment of AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was mandated.⁹⁷

Thus, China played the part of the “arbitrator,” a role which has traditionally been played by

⁹² “China Pushes Sudan to Let UN Troops into Darfur,” *Reuters*, September 14, 2006.

⁹³ “Government ‘Accepts’ UN Troops in Darfur,” *All Africa*, November 18, 2006.

⁹⁴ “Hu Jintao tong Sudan zongtong Baxier huitan (Hu Jintao and Sudan Preisident Bashir Had Meeting),” *Renmin Ribao*, February 3, 2007.

⁹⁵ “Zhongguo zhengfu sheli feizhou shiwu tiebie daibiao (China Sets Up Special Representative of the Chinese Government for African Affairs),” *Renmin Ribao*, May 11, 2007.

⁹⁶ Li Zhifei, “Lengzhanhou de zhongguo teshi waijiao (China’s Envoy Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War Era),” *Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of University of International Relations)*, No. 3 (2008), p. 26.

⁹⁷ S/RES/1769, September 28, 2007.

the UN through summit diplomacy and appointment of the special representative. Then how should such diplomatic efforts by China be evaluated in terms of its principle position? Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun indicated that there would be no change to China's principle position and pointed out that "China has been consistently stressing that Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected and maintained." He also emphasized the importance of "solving development problems" as a key for delivering a "permanent solution" for the Darfur issue, and explained that in this context China has been deeply committed to the friendship and cooperation with Sudan, which is "based on mutually-beneficial relations, and characterized by non-interference in internal affairs and no imposed conditions."⁹⁸

On the other hand, the experts in China are promoting construction of a new concept to justify China's diplomatic maneuvers related to the Darfur issue. For example, Wang Yizhou, deputy director of Institute of World Political and Economic Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Science, presented a concept of "creative intervention" to understand China's diplomatic efforts separately from "humanitarian intervention" by Western countries. One of the characteristics of China's "creative intervention," according to Wang, is to value a dialogue with the government concerned, and other is "legal" diplomatic activities that have been "authorized by the UN."⁹⁹ In addition, Wang Suolao, Professor at School of International Studies, Peking University, presented an argument that found a "development" in the principle of non-interference in internal affairs among China's diplomatic activities. According to the professor, China's understanding of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs used to be "static, unilateral, rigid and passive."¹⁰⁰ In short, so-called non-interference was almost synonymous with "inaction," and used as a "shield" or an "excuse" for not dealing with problems they didn't want to look into. However, he argued that China's diplomacy for the Darfur issue suggested that a new content had been added to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. He explained that it was a "dynamic, global, flexible and active" principle, which pursues a solution for problem "vigorously and actively "without fearing the problem or trying to avoid inconveniences." The professor concluded that "China does not need to abandon 'the principle of non-interference in internal affairs,' since a new intention has already been included in the principle in accordance with the change of international situation." In other words, it can be understood that China's diplomatic activities for the Darfur issue initiated an argument for the variability of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs.

Conclusion

The principle position of China in terms of troop dispatch to UN peacekeeping operations is to respect national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and limited use of force; however, it has not been easy for China to maintain its principle position. Especially, since the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, China has been developing a sense of crisis regarding the new trends for

⁹⁸ Zhai Jun, "Zhongguo jiji tuidong jieque Da'erfuer wenti (China Promotes Actively to Resolute Darfur Issues)," *Qiushi (Seeking Truth)*, No. 11 (2007), p. 63.

⁹⁹ "Zhongguo: weiji wajiao 2008 (China: Crisis Diplomacy in 2008)," *Shijie Zhishi (World Knowledge)*, No. 23 (2008), p. 20. Liu Guijin also mentioned that China would "make its own contributions to the settlement of the Darfur issue by intervening constructively and actively." See, "Da'erfuer xuyao zui jiben de huxin (Darfur Needs Basic Mutual Trust)," *Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek)*, No. 8 (2008), p. 55.

¹⁰⁰ Wang Suolao, "Da'erfuer wenti," p. 264.

“global intervention” under the banner of humanitarianism in Western countries and the dispersion of UN authority caused under such trends. China stressed the urgency of strengthening the UN’s role and maintaining the prestige of the Security Council. In this context, China expressed its intention to “play a broader and deeper role in UN affairs,” and thus expanded the scale of dispatch of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations as a mean to achieve this. However, it resulted in the full-scale troop dispatch, which was difficult to be explained based on the principle position of China. This is because China originally regarded troop dispatch as a policy that opposes to its principle position. For this reason, it took nearly five years to decide to “participate in principle” and then to “formally participate” in the UNSAS, and when dispatching troops to the MONUC for the first time after the dispatch of troops to the UNTAC, China insisted that it was a “non-combat” force.

Another reason why China started full-scale troop dispatch despite such logical difficulties was because it found a new significance: international contribution/responsibility. Consequently, more emphasize was placed not only on the context of refutation against the “global intervention,” but also the context of China’s active/proactive contribution and responsibility for international and regional security. In a situation where troop dispatch by other powers was slow, China expanded the scale of dispatching personnel including troops and as a result managed to exhibit its concrete “contribution” to UN peacekeeping operations and thus international security, as well as improving the international image and status of China to a certain degree. Moreover, by utilizing these new contexts and the know-how accumulated by the full-scale troop dispatch, the PLA started implementing military diplomacy in a form of forum or seminar, and is also trying to institutionalize relations among defense authorities that use peacekeeping missions as a policy tool with ASEAN and Mongolia.

However, while the argument for international contribution/responsibility is a new context that China added to its international peacekeeping policy, it has at the same time become an argument in the international community that is asking China to take more responsibility.¹⁰¹ In other words, the international community is asking China for more concrete involvement in the consensus-building process, so that China will move beyond troop dispatch to contribute to resolving disputes and building peace. In the case of the Darfur issue, China was expected not only to insist its principle position in the UN Security Council but also to use its influence for the Sudanese government to make them accept peacekeeping forces.¹⁰² In accordance with such international public opinion, China started moving toward “arbitrator diplomacy” through summit diplomacy and the Special Representative on African Affairs. Such arbitrator diplomacy could possibly change China’s diplomatic principle—the principle of non-interference in internal affairs—to a certain degree. As pointed out in this article, there has been a trend to construct a new theory regarding arbitrator diplomacy among the experts inside China. New concepts such as “creative intervention” and “dynamic, global, flexible and active” principle of non-interference in internal affairs have been presented. In this sense, there is a chance that variability could be found in China’s principle position.

¹⁰¹ For the increasing international pressure for China’s responsible role and China’s response to it, for example, see Masayuki Masuda, “Chugoku gaiko ni okeru ‘kokusai sekinin’ (‘International Responsibility’ in Chinese Foreign Policy),” *Ajia Keizai (Asian Economy)*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (April 2009), pp. 2–24.

¹⁰² “Responsible China?: Darfur Exposes Chinese Hypocrisy,” *The Washington Post*, September 6, 2006.