Alliances and Conflict Resolution:
NATO’s Role in Security Sector Reform

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Summary
In the post-9/11 world, the United States (U.S.) has had to cope with “long wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is common between the cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts is that even after major combat operations ended, the military presence of multinational forces has not been scaled down as planned. In Afghanistan, the size of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been expanding. As post-conflict stabilization operations have not made smooth progress as anticipated, allies and coalition partners have to accelerate reform of the security sector including armed forces and police. With current realities of Afghanistan and Iraq flatly contradicting the prewar optimism entertained by the Bush Administration, Western powers will have to stay engaged in postwar peace-building for some time.

Introduction
The paradox of present alliances is that the deeper allied nations become engaged in out-of-area stabilization operations, the more unstable their mutual relationships become. The dilemma of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan lies here. U.S. allies and coalition partners are being called upon to become further involved in peace-building efforts while sharing the costs of the prolonged stabilization operations. It can be argued, as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates put it, that NATO risks degrading itself into “a two-tier alliance with some allies willing to fight and die to protect peoples’ security, and others who are not.”

Based on these trends, this paper examines what roles allies and coalition partners play in the field of conflict resolution by offering the following two questions. The first question is whether a joint military intervention in an out-of-area conflict helps to stabilize the alliance relationship as a whole. This is as a question from the perspective of alliance management. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the foreign policy of the George W. Bush Administration was characterized by unilateralism and disregard of the United Nations (U.N.). In an era of long wars, however, the stance of the Bush Administration has tilted toward the greater weight given to allies and friendly nations. This suggests that the U.S. has shifted to the approach of sharing the costs of prolonged conflicts by the international community as a whole. The fact that NATO has now taken over the command of the ISAF in Afghanistan is just one example of the shift.

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The second question is whether military intervention by an alliance brings stability to the region concerned. This is a question from the perspective of peacebuilding. Roland Paris points out that as a consequence of major Western nations getting involved in post-Cold War conflicts, a set of values such as democracy, market economy and the rule of law have come to be projected heavily on the countries in conflict. In particular, in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, NATO assumed the overall operational responsibility of U.S.-led multinational forces. In contrast to the severely undermined confidence in the U.N.-led peacebuilding process in Somalia and Bosnia, NATO took up the leadership role in multinational forces as the “guardians of justice” and become involved in post-conflict nationbuilding. The symbolic change lies in NATO’s direct involvement in security sector reform (SSR) of the recipient country. Generally speaking, the scope of SSR is quite wide, ranging from military and paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, national and provincial police, and border guards to customs services, judicial and criminal legal systems, and civilian organizations with the authority to oversee and control related ministries and agencies. Thus, SSR is seen as an essential pillar of peacebuilding.

In the conflict resolution process, the perspectives of alliance management and peacebuilding are mutually related. If the peaceful resolution of conflict succeeds, the alliance’s cohesion is expected to be enhanced. Conversely, if the conflict becomes prolonged and its burdens on allies increase sharply, the alliance without an exit strategy is likely to face the danger of disunity. Thus, conflict resolution becomes a test case for alliance solidarity.

This paper looks into the above questions on alliance management and peacebuilding by examining the two cases in which NATO has become directly involved in the post-9/11 period. The first case to be examined will be Afghanistan where NATO, as an alliance, has taken on direct command. While NATO invoked the collective defense clause in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, it was not until about two years later, in the summer of 2003, that NATO began to get involved in earnest in an alliance capacity. While considering the reasons for this gap in involvement, this paper examines the roles NATO has played in the maintenance of security and SSR. Next, this paper addresses the case of Iraq where NATO is only indirectly involved as part of the Coalition of the Willing. In the spring of 2003, there was a heated debate on opening the war against Iraq between the U.S. and Great Britain calling for the use of force, and France and Germany underscoring the need for thorough U.N. inspections. As a consequence, the role of NATO in Iraq has been strictly limited to the education and training of Iraqi armed forces. For NATO, policy priorities differ between Afghanistan, where it takes on the operational command as an alliance, and Iraq, where it provides indirect support for the mission as part of a coalition.

1. Alliance and Conflict Resolution – The Case of NATO
For NATO and the Japan-U.S. Alliance, alliances formed during the Cold War, the main task was not to militarily intervene in conflicts that arise outside areas perceived to be covered by their respective

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treaties. This is because the missions and roles of Western alliances during the Cold War were directed toward securing territorial defense of member states against the military threat from the Soviet Union. However, as a consequence of the disappearance of the military threat on the European front in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO became proactively involved in extraterritorial conflicts. The so-called crisis response operations for extraterritorial issues have turned into the main task of the alliance. These changes can be explained by (1) the transformation of the tasks of the alliance, (2) the rise of the spirit of international cooperation and (3) the complex nature of conflicts.6

First of all, the missions of NATO have undergone substantial changes due to the end of the Cold War. The alliance’s mission of defense against the Soviet Union ceased to exist due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, requiring a redefinition of the alliance. The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation followed, along with a major humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, with 200,000 people reportedly dead and two million people becoming displaced. Since the outbreak of civil war in 1992, NATO militarily intervened gradually, making crisis response operations the main task of the alliance. Starting with these operations in the Balkans, NATO took command of the ISAF in Afghanistan, in Central Asia, undertaking not only peacebuilding efforts but counterinsurgency operations as well. NATO also sent disaster relief forces to Pakistan, a neighbor of Afghanistan that was hit by a major earthquake, airlifted African Union troops to Sudan and Somalia, and provided training to security forces in Iraq in the Middle East. Thus, NATO, the world’s largest alliance, has assumed the missions of deploying some 50,000 troops to three continents for missions mandated by the U.N.

The second reason behind NATO’s involvement in conflict resolution was the rise of the spirit of international cooperation after the Cold War. In particular, there arose a tendency for major powers to disengage themselves from regional conflicts in the wake of the breakdown of the Cold War structure, and in that process, reconstruction of failed and fragile states suddenly surfaced as a major issue. An Agenda for Peace and the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali or the “Brahimi Report” reflected the spirit of the times.7 These proposals portrayed the transformation from traditional peacekeeping activities with the primary missions of monitoring ceasefire and disengagement to complex activities including responses to humanitarian crises and post-conflict nationbuilding efforts. Along with these developments, stabilization operations based on U.N. Security Council resolutions were transformed into operations that include relatively heavily-armed and combat-ready missions for protection of U.N. personnel as well as humanitarian and reconstruction support organizations. NATO, as a regional organization, gradually became involved in conflict resolutions in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The third reason behind NATO getting involved in conflict resolution is the complex nature of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. Post-conflict reconstruction of society cannot be handled by a

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single nation or organization alone. The post-Cold War shift of focus from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict required a comprehensive approach, including international organizations, national organizations or nongovernmental organizations. Broad-based cooperation and partnership among international organizations, national organizations and nongovernmental organization are essential in providing reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to failed states. NATO’s intervention can be described as part of this comprehensive approach.

Retired General Sir Rupert Smith of the British Army, who commanded the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, pointed to the advent of an era of “war amongst the people,” and characterized it as follows. In many cases, parties to the war among the people are non-state entities, and the front lines, in the classical sense, disappear. The objective of such a war is to win the hearts and minds of the people and the war coverage extends to the entire society. As a result, combat inescapably becomes protracted.8

Peacebuilding activities became further complicated as U.S.-led multinational forces became directly involved in conflict resolution in Iraq and Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As described later, NATO is responsible for a broad scope of operations in Afghanistan, ranging from counterinsurgency operations to reconstruction assistance, and conducts SSR in Iraq as well. In particular, NATO plays no small role in the reconstruction of national forces. As Fearon and Laitin point out, while the main tasks of military forces are to maintain security, “when past conflict or other factors have rendered the state apparatus too dysfunctional to provide for domestic security, mission creep is highly likely.”9 In fact, NATO’s Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building seeks democratic control of armed forces and the building of the identity as national armies in failed states.10

However, reform of the security sector in failed states in effect means the establishment of a new security sector. As pointed out by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),11 using the term reform sounds as if the mission of SSR would be completed simply with partial modifications of the existing system. However, in a society where the relationship of trust among its members has long been lost due to years of civil war, it is difficult to foresee that the armed forces would be transformed into something symbolizing national unity. In pushing forward with disarmament and at the same time newly building up the armed forces in a war-ravaged society, an international military presence is necessary, even if only temporarily. And in some cases, NATO deployed its troops in order to fill in the space while U.N. peace activities had yet to function at full capacity.

2. NATO’s Support for Afghanistan

In early 2008, the report on Afghanistan issued by the Atlantic Council of the U.S. warned: “Make

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no mistake, the international community is not winning in Afghanistan.”

Retired U.S. Marine Corps General James Jones, a chair of the study group, was the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe (SACEUR) of NATO, who oversaw the overall ISAF operations. His appointment as national security adviser to President Barack Obama foreshadowed a change in U.S. Afghan policy. Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, who was in effect dismissed by then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for taking a cautious stand on the Iraq War, was also named as an aide to the Obama Administration. A new approach to the Afghanistan War, called “the forgotten war” in the shadows of the Iraq War, is expected under the new Obama Administration. The keyword in that new approach is the surge.

Whether or not to cooperate in the surge policy of the United States is becoming the touchstone of the solidarity of NATO, which has assumed the command of the ISAF. It is because the security situation in southern Afghanistan has been deteriorating rapidly due to the resurgence of the Taliban that frictions have come to the fore between the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and Canada, which are engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the south, and Germany and some other countries, which give priority to reconstruction assistance in relatively secure regions. While NATO has experience in undertaking post-conflict reconstruction support in the former Yugoslavia, the situation is completely different in Afghanistan. The ISAF must seek to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people through reconstruction assistance while at the same time mounting counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban.

In the following analysis of the Afghanistan problem from the perspective of NATO’s out-of-area operations, the main points of discussions are as follows. First, an overview is given as to why NATO, which used to be responsible for crisis management solely in Europe, came to directly intervene in Afghanistan in Central Asia. Next, operational changes brought about by NATO assuming the command of the ISAF are roughly described. Finally, operational problems the ISAF faces in pursuing both the hard and soft aspects of counterinsurgency and reconstruction assistance are examined. In this exercise, this paper intends to show that Afghanistan’s own efforts to build its armed forces are increasingly gaining in importance.

(1) Background to NATO’s Involvement in Afghanistan

At present, NATO is in command of the 60,000-strong ISAF. However, going back to the days immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO then only had a light footprint. Of NATO member states, only Britain made the military intervention along with the U.S. forces in the anti-terrorist Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). While it is well-known that NATO invoked a collective defense clause for the first time in its history on September 12, 2001, NATO’s cooperation with the U.S. at the initial stage was limited to information gathering and surveillance such as air defense monitoring using airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) and maritime surveillance in the eastern

14 While the Taliban forces were temporarily pushed back into the tribal areas of Pakistan in the face of military operations by the coalition of U.S. and British forces and the Northern Alliance, the Taliban began to revive its influence in Afghanistan from around 2004. For details, see, Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{15} Behind NATO’s limited involvement was the Bush Administration’s decision to adopt the Coalition of the Willing approach so that OEF, which had been originally initiated by the U.S. and Britain proclaiming its having been done in accordance with the inherent right of individual self-defense, would not be constrained by other NATO members.

What changed NATO’s limited involvement was the war against Iraq. In the run-up to the Second Iraq War, the U.S., in the \textit{National Security Strategy of the United States} in September 2002, laid out the preemptive strike (the Bush Doctrine), describing weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism as new threats. As if to coincide with the new policy of the U.S., NATO made a policy switch to join the global war on terror. Already in May 2002, the North Atlantic Council, at its meeting in Reykjavik, made an important decision that would rewrite the alliance’s history, but it drew little media attention then. The final communiqué of the Council’s Reykjavik meeting set out the policy that “to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”\textsuperscript{16} In other words, NATO’s crisis responses were made free of any geographical constraints. This was how it became possible to move the alliance’s front line eastward to Afghanistan. Following the attack on Iraq in March 2003 and President Bush’s declaration of “mission accomplished” in May of the same year, multinational forces led by the United States and Britain took charge of stabilization operations in Iraq. In tandem with this, in August 2003, NATO took over operational command in Afghanistan. This implied that NATO is getting involved in Afghanistan but not in Iraq.

\textbf{(2) Expansion of the ISAF Operations by NATO}

After NATO assumed command in Afghanistan in the summer of 2003, the ISAF went through major changes in the following three aspects. First, the area of operation of the ISAF expanded substantially. The ISAF’s primary mission was limited to maintaining security in the environs of Kabul, the Afghan capital, because the United States took the stance that anti-terrorist operations across Afghanistan would be undertaken by the U.S.-led OEF.\textsuperscript{17} Following NATO’s participation, the ISAF deployed its troops to the north, west, south and east, in that order, in a counterclockwise direction, and thus became responsible for stabilization operations throughout the country.

The second change was the increase in the force strength of the ISAF. Initially, the ISAF had only a very limited strength of 5,500 troops. The small initial size contrasted with the 60,000 troops of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and the 50,000 troops of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployed in Kosovo. However, following repeated requests for reinforcements, the size of the ISAF reached about 55,100 troops as of January 2009, with reinforcements continuing to arrive. The largest contributor of troops is the United States with 23,220 troops, which account for over 40\% of the total number, and the ratio of U.S. servicemen continues to increase. Following the United States are Britain (with 8,910 troops), Germany (3,405), France (2,890), Italy (2,350), the


\textsuperscript{16} Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Held In Reykjavik on 14 May 2002. For the background to the adoption of the communiqué, see, Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Afghanistan’s transformational challenge,” \textit{NATO Review} (Web Edition), Summer 2005, [n.p.].

\textsuperscript{17} Defense Secretary Rumsfeld vehemently opposed a plan to expand the ISAF that was proposed by Secretary of State Colin Powell. For details, see, Ahmed Rashid, \textit{Descend into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia} (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. 134-135.
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Netherlands (1,770) and Poland (1,590).\(^{18}\) Fifteen non-NATO nations have also sent troops to join the ISAF, and in particular Australia, which deploys 1,090 troops in the south and east where the security situation is fast deteriorating, contributes more than the average of NATO member states.

The third change is that the ISAF’s operations have come to cover both the hard and soft aspects. At first, the ISAF was only responsible for post-conflict reconstruction support, leaving counterinsurgency operations to the U.S.-led OEF. In the face of difficulties in maintaining security in Afghanistan, however, calls were made for tighter synergy between the ISAF and the OEF, and since 2006, the ISAF took on the additional mission of maintaining security, deploying its troops to the southern part of Afghanistan. On the other hand, NATO, recognizing peace-building efforts as part of the mission of the alliance, came to take a more proactive stance toward winning the hearts and minds of the people while seeking comprehensive cooperation with the U.N. and the European Union (EU).\(^{19}\)

(3) Problems in NATO’s Afghanistan Policy

To sum up, stabilization operations in Afghanistan seek a balance between the offensive operations through the “surge” of the ISAF troops and “winning the hearts and minds of the people” through peacebuilding efforts. These two aspects are examined below in more concrete terms.

Firstly, the surge strategy for Afghanistan was catapulted into the spotlight after presidential candidate Obama pledged reinforcements of two or three brigades. However, some considered the idea prior to Obama’s call, with some reinforcements already being carried out. Army General David McKiernan, then commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and ISAF, had requested reinforcements of 20,000 to 25,000 troops to cope with the problem.\(^{20}\) In response to this, the U.S. sent some 3,200 Marines in the spring of 2008 as a temporary measure, and one brigade was sent in early 2009. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also unveiled a plan to send 20,000 to 30,000 more troops by the summer of 2009, though details of the plan have yet to be revealed. In the process of preparing its summit meeting in April 2009, NATO faced a pressure to respond to the U.S. surge strategy. A focal point was how far national caveats or the operational restraints of some 40 ISAF participating countries should be diminished. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates came up with the concept of a strategic vision, and advanced a proposal for overall adjustments over the coming three to five years, which was approved at the NATO summit meeting held in Bucharest in April 2008.\(^{21}\)

Finally, ISAF’s dual missions of reconstruction assistance and counterinsurgency should entail a certain level of difficulty. Here, the case in which the ISAF took care of transportation of a turbine generator used in a hydraulic power plant is examined. In summer 2008, 4,000 ISAF troops


\(^{21}\) According to a U.S. Congressional Research Service report, the reinforcement pledges made by the participating countries were as follows. Britain will increase its troops to 8,700, while Germany, at the repeated request of the United States, will raise the ceiling on its troops from 3,500 to 4,500. France pledged to boost troop strength by 1,000, Poland by 400, Norway by 200, Georgia by 500, Croatia by 200 to 300, the Czech Republic by 120, Greece and Romania by unidentified numbers, Azerbaijan by 45, Singapore by 20, and New Zealand by unidentified numbers. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
and 1,000 troops of the Afghan armed forces transported the 51-megawatt turbine generator to be installed at the hydraulic power station under construction in southern Afghanistan. The power plant is likely to supply electricity to 1.9 million residents within a few years.22 This ISAF operation, while contributing significantly to reconstruction, caused some 200 casualties on the Taliban side. It is highly unlikely that the struggle between the ISAF and the Taliban over winning the hearts and minds of the people will end at some point.

For NATO, which faces these difficult issues, the key to success lies in SSR conducted mainly by Afghans.

(4) SSR in Afghanistan: Efforts by the International Community and Alliances

In order to realize such universal principles as democracy, good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law in the peacebuilding process, local SSR is essential. SSR is designed to monitor the organizations, finances and operations of the security sector such as police and armed forces in order to enhance the central government’s capacity to govern.23 A key to NATO’s role in the peacebuilding process is reform of the security sectors, including police and armed forces. Generally speaking, however, when the security situation is getting worse, SSR tends to be more difficult because insurgents try to block the reform by targeting police and armed forces.

Following will be a review of developments in SSR in the Afghan peace process. Firstly, as the peace process under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, procedures were laid out for the establishment of a provisional government and of a formal government through the creation of a constitution and general elections.24 In line with this, a decision was made at the Afghanistan Support Group meeting in April 2002 to proceed with SSR in five areas: reform of the armed forces overseen by the U.S.; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) by Japan and the U.N.; police reform by Germany; judiciary reform by Italy; and counter-narcotics by Britain.25 The U.S., which is responsible for building up the Afghan National Army (ANA), first setup the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) and created a military training center in Kabul. The center was later renamed as the Coalition Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to serve as the core of education and training. As for military education in general, a military academy and a command and general staff college have been established on the U.S. model among others. NATO has also organized Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) comprising 12 to 19 members each to provide training on personnel management and sustainment logistics, with those

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23 The OECD used the term security system reform, which is deemed interchangeable with terms like security sector reform, or, justice and security sector reform. OECD, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, p. 5.


teams embedded into battalions. In Afghanistan, where the conflict has been going on for over 20 years now, the adversary relationships among warlords are complicated which makes it difficult to build up the national army neutrally. In fact, the Northern Alliance, which cooperated with the U.S. forces in the pursuit of the Taliban, initially wielded large influence in building up the national army. Subsequently, the committee for the establishment of the ANA was created under the Transitional Government, and then President Hamid Karzai of the Transitional Government announced a plan to establish a 70,000-strong national army. While the Afghan side has demanded the doubling of the army’s size, the cost is estimated at $2.0 to $2.5 billion, three times as large as the country’s national revenue. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that training of the national army by U.S., British and other foreign forces has its limitations. Basic courses for training by mentors run about 10 weeks, and more comprehensive courses take half a year, with both courses said to be highly dependent on foreign instructors.

Modeled after the example of the SSR in Iraq, an agreement was reached in April 2009 on the establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. As with the case of Iraq, the command of this training mission is assumed by the commander of the U.S.-led CSTC-A. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has agreed to cooperate with the EU Police Mission established in 2008, representing a gradual institutionalization of local cooperation between NATO and the EU. Providing education and training in a foreign language (English) in Afghanistan, where the literacy rate is only about 30%, may give the impression that a small number of elites are being treated preferentially, however. Under these circumstances, the fact that the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a non-Western entity, came around to cooperate with the ISAF is instrumental in mitigating antipathy to international forces, but the UAE role is still minimal relative to the overall scale of the mission.

Though operational capabilities of local troops are said to be improving gradually, the scale-down of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) will have to wait until around 2011 or later. First, 12 battalions began operational deployments in the spring of 2005, and carried out operations in conjunction with NATO in 2006, coming to shoulder the mission of clearing out the Taliban.

As for the provision of equipment to the ANA, Central and Eastern European countries, former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, initially offered equipment and some equipment was procured by way of the collection of weapons through DDR. Recently, the supply of equipment from non-NATO countries is increasing.

As reviewed above, in Afghanistan, a picture of the coincidental developments of reconstruction assistance and counterinsurgency is likely to emerge. Is it possible to win the hearts and minds

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26 While a total of 800 instructors are now dispatched to the ANA, given the army’s size of 40,000 troops, the impact is naturally limited. See, Mark Sedra, “Security Sector Reform and State Building in Afghanistan,” Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra, eds., Afghanistan: Transition under Threat (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), p. 202.
28 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, p. 182.
31 For the provision of equipment, see, Tomonori Yoshizaki, ‘‘Domei no Shuenron’ wo Megutte- NATO no Jirei wo Chusun ni [The End of Alliance? The Case of NATO],” Boei Kenkyujo Kiyo (NIDS Security Reports), Vol. 10, No. 3 (March 2008), p. 41.
of the people by pursuing the hard-line and soft-line operations of resorting to force on the one hand and seeking peacebuilding on the other? Given those developments, major Western nations are being pressed to redefine their Afghan strategies. As revealed in a detailed study by David Kilcullen, of Afghanistan’s insurgents called the neo-Taliban, there are only a handful of groups resorting to ideologically inspired extreme actions. Instead, the root of the whole problem lies in that amid deteriorating security and spreading unemployment, people have become increasingly disillusioned by the central government in Kabul and expressed growing antipathy toward collateral damage caused by the ISAF. The fighter described as an insurgent is “fighting us because we are in his space, not because he wishes to invade us.” Simply put, they became accidental guerrillas after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. NATO and ISAF commanders must continue to deal with this in order to win for peace. This complex structure in Afghanistan originated from the Iraq War of 2003.

3. The Iraq War and NATO –Limited Involvement in a Coalition of the Willing

As examined above, NATO came to assume command of the ISAF in Afghanistan. In contrast to this development, cooperation and coordination between the multinational force in Iraq and NATO are significantly limited. Using the descriptions by NATO, Afghanistan is an “operation” for the alliance but Iraq still remains as no more than a “mission.” This has stemmed from the split between the United States, which wants to expand the role of NATO in Iraq, and France and Germany, which want to restrict such expansion as much as possible. The chasm within the alliance surfaced at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held in February 2003, immediately before the start of the Iraq War. While the U.S. and Britain asked that Turkey be provided with air defense support, France, Germany and Belgium vetoed this, which they claimed would in effect become the grounds for starting war. Thus, NATO, as a wartime alliance, became split over the Iraq War.

The only area in which NATO is effectively supporting the Iraqi multinational force, known as the coalition of the willing, is SSR, though its progress has been far tardier than anticipated. The reason for this can be traced to the lingering difficulty in maintaining security in Iraq as well as to the lack of support from the international community due to the unilateral actions by the U.S. Following is an analysis of Iraqi SSR and its potential impact on the alliance; the description is in the following order.

First will be a review of U.S. efforts toward SSR in Iraq. In contrast to the meticulous preparation of the Iraq invasion led by the Pentagon, the U.S. crucially lacked the vision for post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. In particular, it will become known that the unilateralism of the U.S. has escalated as a result of the reconstruction support process, which lacked coordination between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Regarding NATO’s efforts toward SSR, NATO got involved in SSR in Iraq about a year after major combat operations were brought to an end. However, reflecting the lukewarm attitudes of France and Germany, rather than NATO extending full cooperation as an alliance as a whole, NATO has been preoccupied with coalition-like efforts where its member

33 Ibid., p. xiv.
states separately supply equipment in their possession and provide training.

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**1 (1) SSR in Iraq by the U.S.**\(^{36}\)

Compared with Afghanistan, the U.S. has displayed remarkable leadership in its efforts to build up the Iraqi Army. At present, memoirs of people directly involved in SSR in Iraq,\(^{37}\) reports by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service and influential think tanks, and a number of publications by journalist are available, making a contemporary analysis partially possible. Based on an analysis of these sources, it may be possible to divide SSR in Iraq into the following four periods: (a) preparations for the start of war until immediately after the end of hostilities (February-May 2003); (b) disarmament by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (May 2003 through June 2004); (c) after the establishment of the CPA to rebuilding of the national army by the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (June 2004 through January 2007); and (d) developments after the announcement of President Bush’s New Strategy for Iraq (after January 2007). The trajectories of these periods are examined below.

(a) Preparations for the Start of War until Immediately after the End of Hostilities – The Strong Initiative of the Department of Defense

During several months between immediately before the start of war and immediately after the end of combat operations, only the Department of Defense was bestowed with the leadership in postwar reconstruction.\(^{38}\) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, signed by President Bush on January 20, 2003, set out that the Department of Defense would be responsible for Iraq’s postwar reconstruction. Consequently, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was created in the Department of Defense and Jay Garner, retired Army Lieutenant General, was appointed to head the new office. After the First Gulf War, Garner had the experience of engaging in Operation Provide Comfort for the relief of several thousand Kurds in the northern Iraq; he was regarded as a valuable individual who possessed a comprehensive knowledge of Iraq. Garner was of the moderate view that the Saddam Hussein regime would be thrown into chaos through the purge from public positions and the dismantling of his armed forces. Then he came to the conclusion that the scope of the purge from public positions should be limited to several top individuals in order to get former Baath Party members and Sunni officials fully involved in the reconstruction of the Iraqi state.\(^{39}\)

\(^{36}\) This section is based on Tomonori Yoshizaki, “Beikoku to Heiwa Kochiku – Iraku no Kokugun Kensetsu wo Megutte [The United States and Peace-Building: On Building Up of the Iraqi National Army],” *Difensu* ([Defense], Vol. 45 (October 2007), pp. 32-49.


\(^{39}\) As the U.S. forces approached Baghdad, the treatment of former Iraqi Army members after the liberation of Iraq surfaced as a major issue, and the most pressing problem was salary payments to them. Iraqi officers had already handed a list of 50,000 to 70,000 people to the U.S. side. Garner feared that should salary payments be delayed, it would turn former Iraqi Army members into insurgents, and his fear subsequently became a reality. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2006), pp. 481-482.
Garner’s moderate policy invited the resentment of people surrounding President Bush who wanted a total cleanup of the former regime. While the direction of postwar preparations in Iraq was still pending, the U.S. initiated the war against Iraq in March 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which Defense Secretary Rumsfeld called for “shock and awe,” was far more successful than anticipated in the initial stage. The U.S. forces advanced the distance of over 500 kilometers from Kuwait to Baghdad without logistical support. In the meantime, the Iraqi government stopped functioning by mid-April. The Saddam Hussein regime melted away without significant coalition casualties in street fighting in Baghdad. As Iraqi troops disappeared in the process, there arose widespread looting of furniture, equipment and other fixtures in government buildings as well as works of art. But the multinational force never got involved in law-enforcement activities such as the crackdown on depredation and suppression of riots.

In May President Bush, standing below an banner reading “Mission Accomplished,” declared that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” But President Bush’s declaration of victory was made in a speech delivered on the flight deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, docked in the military port of San Diego on the West Coast. His declaration did not fully reflect the realities of the collapse of order in Iraq. Washington Post reporter Thomas Ricks derided the statement, saying that “what Bush did was tear down the goalposts at halftime in the game.”

(b) Unilateral Disarmament by the CPA

Immediately after President Bush’s declaration of victory, the CPA was established as a successor entity to the ORHA headed by Garner. Ambassador Paul Bremer of the State Department was chosen as administrator of the CPA. He was a political appointee by President Bush, and this meant the dismissal of Garner, a moderate. About a year from May 2003 to June 2004 under the CPA was characterized by the rapid dismantling of government institutions in Iraq. According to Walter Slocomb, who was responsible for SSR at the time, “the demobilization of the Iraqi military is a fait accompli.” The organized resistance Iraqi Army against the multinational force had already stopped by early April. On May 16, 2003, immediately after taking up the post in Baghdad, Bremer issued CPA Executive Order Number 1 on the “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society.” The order purged Baath Party members in Iraq, estimated to have numbered 85,000. A week after, on May 23, Bremer issued CPA Executive Order Number 2, ordering the purge of the Baathists from all public positions. The series of CPA Executive Orders resulted in the losses of jobs in a stroke by some 385,000 registered with the Iraqi Army, 285,000 policemen and other Interior Ministry employees engaged in security and law-enforcement jobs and some 50,000 Republican Guard members. As the armed forces abruptly ceased to exist, it became impossible to undertake DDR as was carried out in Afghanistan. As the purge from public positions extended to cover rank-and-file public officials including school

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43 Ricks, *Fiasco*, p. 162.
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teachers, the CPA engineered almost complete disappearance of the governing institutions in Iraq. In a post-conflict society, it is common for the end of hostilities to spawn new instability. The multinational force faced a serious dilemma in tackling SSR in Iraq. In principle, SSR should be left in the hands of the Iraqi people for the sake of the restoration of domestic order. However, security and national reconciliation must be achieved before authority is transferred to the Iraqi security sector that still lack sufficient training or equipment. The multinational force is needed to maintain security in the transitional period; in some cases, it is even required to carry out operations to clean up insurgents. Yet, such a hard-line approach may occasionally prove to be an impediment in winning the hearts and minds of the people and facilitating national reconciliation. Furthermore, if the Iraqi security sector undertakes law-enforcement activities to maintain public order, it may take on the danger of turning into a civil war among the Iraqi people. Hence, some Iraqis may avoid joining the security sector as they do not wish to fight against fellow citizens, as did Shiite members of the Iraqi security forces in the operations in Fallujah in March 2004. Shiite-dominated security and police forces trained by the multinational force might be perceived as mercenaries of the U.S. in the eyes of Sunnis and Kurds. The multinational force fell into the vicious cycle where the more fiercely it pushed ahead with the operations to clean up armed insurgencies, the more seriously the ethnic divisions deepened.

In such a situation, where President Bush publicly set the deadline for the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq to the end of June 2004 and attacks on multinational troops stationed in Iraq intensified, the CPA had no choice but to accept the reappointments of former members of the Iraqi Army. In practice, the return of former soldiers had been going on quietly. The U.S. Army established the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps to begin organizing regional neighborhood watch groups, but about 80% of recruits were former members of the Iraqi Army. However, military equipment such as vehicles and communications equipment was in short supply and training was inadequate, prompting the Pentagon to launch a full-fledged assessment in the autumn of 2003. Then Army Major General Karl Eikenberry, who helped the rebuilding of the national army in Afghanistan, took up the task. After visiting Iraq, he observed that the Iraqi security forces were deficient in all aspects of organization, training and equipment, and recommended the creation of the joint headquarters to provide guidance to the forces. In response to this, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was established in April 2004. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus was appointed as the first

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44 The RAND Corporation expressed its support for the rapid dismantling of the Iraqi military and the de-Baathification by the CPA by pointing out in a report that “A failure to take these decisions could, however, have led to the even worse situation of a Shiite insurgency against the coalition.” Rathmell, Oliker, Kelly, Brannan, and Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, p. 3.


By the spring of 2004, there arose the momentum on the part of the U.S. to undertake SSR in Iraq jointly with NATO nations on the basis of its experience in Afghanistan. The first year, considered as the most important in conflict resolution, had already lapsed. As discussed below, plugging the one-year vacuum in the SSR turned out to be a far more difficult task than anticipated.

(c) Start of Activities by the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq

Ahead of the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, U.S. reconstruction assistance also underwent change. In National Security Presidential Directive 36 signed on May 11, 2004, President Bush decided to abolish the CPA after the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq and also transfer overall reconstruction responsibilities from the Defense Department to the State Department. On June 28, the long-awaited handover of authority to the Iraqi Interim Government took place, putting SSR in the hands of the Iraqis. However, U.S. activities related to security and military operations in Iraq remained under the jurisdiction of the Defense Department, with the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) tasked to organize the Iraqi security forces and provide equipment and training to them. This marked the start of the structure of cooperation for the same purpose between Ambassador John Negroponte at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and Army General George Casey, commander of the multinational force in Iraq.

The multinational force was preparing a plan for the transfer of security authority from the autumn of 2003 through April 2006. The first achievement of that effort was put together in August 2004, which was finally incorporated into the common plan of the multinational force and the U.S. Embassy in April 2006. The plan assumed the four-step transition of (1) establishing partnership, (2) establishing leadership by the Iraqi Army, (3) establishing control over the hinterlands of Iraq and (4) establishing the strength of the Iraqi security forces (details for troop deployments are explained later).

Much of the real picture of SSR in those years remain unclear, partly because of the infeasibility of nationwide field surveys due to inadequate security in Iraq and also partly because of the undeveloped database of the Iraq Ministry of Defense. As a result, it is difficult even to make an assessment of how equipment provided by the U.S. and other countries is being utilized. Over the quantity of equipment provided to the Iraqi security forces between June 2004 and September 2005, there is a big discrepancy between the number reported by the Multinational Security Transition

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47 Petraeus returned to Baghdad in January 2007 as commander of the multinational force in Iraq, and was promoted to commander of the U.S. Central Command in October 2008, a position to oversee operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples of the lessons from stabilization operations in Afghanistan being applied to Iraq as seen here is not limited to the case of the Security Transition Command. The civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams (RPTs), first introduced by the U.S. forces stationed in Afghanistan in 2003, have been deployed across Iraq, including Baghdad, since November 2005 to implement reconstruction assistance and SSR. Major General Eikenberry, mentioned earlier, subsequently was promoted as Army lieutenant-general and returned to the Afghan capital of Kabul as commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), and then was transferred to the higher post of vice chairman of the NATO Military Committee. As seen in his case, in the U.S. Army engaged in the global fight against terrorism, the clear trend can be observed that a commander familiar with local conditions is appointed to take charge of rebuilding a national army in a failed state, and on the basis of that experience, is then promoted to the post of commander in charge of the whole combat theater.

Command-Iraq (MSTC-I) and the number confirmed within Iraq by the U.S. GAO.\textsuperscript{49} First, while a total of 185,000 AK-47 rifles, the standard equipment of the Iraqi National Army, were reported to have been provided, deliveries of only 75,000 rifles, less than half the reported number, were confirmed by the GAO. For pistols, only 80,000 were confirmed against the reported number of 170,000. While the supply of bulletproof vests was reported at 215,000, the confirmed number was about one-third, at about 80,000. The GAO, based on its investigations, suspects that the huge difference between the reported numbers of supply and the confirmed number of deliveries stems chiefly from the MSTC-I has failed to submit documents confirming the receipts of equipment.

While the security situation in Iraq did not improve much, as seen above, President Bush’s Iraq policy was never subjected to a fundamental review. After being reelected in November 2004, President Bush, in line with his intention not to alter the leadership in wartime, retained Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld while letting go of Secretary of State Colin Powell, who never budged in his cautious stance on the Iraq War. The second Bush Administration gave the impression of valuing continuity rather than seeking change from the onset.

\textbf{(d) Developments after President Bush’s New Strategy}

In 2006, the target year set prior to the start of war by the U.S. CENTCOM for the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, some 140,000 U.S. troops remained stationed in the country. Up to that year, about 3,000 U.S. servicemen were killed, with the wounded numbering some 20,000. Then, the process of reviewing the Iraq policy got under way to map out an exit strategy. One of the turning points in getting the review rolling was the major defeat suffered by Republican Party in the midterm elections of the autumn of 2006 as well as the departure of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld from the Bush Administration.

The next milestone was a report by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) released in December 2006.\textsuperscript{50} The ISG report, written by a bipartisan group of mostly legislators, blasted Iraqi SSR, saying that the national army lacks leadership, equipment is inadequate and troop levels are at less than 50\% of sufficient numbers.\textsuperscript{51} The Iraqi National Army also still heavily depended on the multinational force, particularly the U.S. forces, due to the absence of logistical support. In order to improve these deficiencies, ISG recommended that the training staff of 3,000 to 4,000, who belonged to the MSTC-I, be boosted to the scale of 20,000 to help strengthen the capabilities of the Iraqi National Army in all aspects of information gathering, transportation, air transportation and logistical support. The report called for the approach to realize the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by helping the Iraqi security forces acquire independent operational capabilities.

The Bush administration’s response to the ISG report came in the form of the New Strategy, unveiled in January 2007. The salient point of the New Strategy, in contrast to the recommendations


\textsuperscript{51} As the report pointed out, because of Iraq’s fragmented domestic remittance system, soldiers have to hand-deliver salaries to their families. However, because of the inadequate development of domestic means of transportation, soldiers posted in regions far from their homes have to take a leaves of absence for about a week every month. As exemplified by this, domestic infrastructure development is essential to secure progress in SSR in Iraq. In discussing the role of military organizations in peace-building going forward, it has to be addressed in the context of the whole structure of peace-building. Baker, and Hamilton, \textit{The Iraq Study Group Report}, pp. 70-76.
of the ISG, was the additional dispatch of 21,000 U.S. troops, focusing on Baghdad, for the purpose of reinforcing the maintenance of security. In reality, the troop reinforcements reached 30,000 by the autumn of 2007. In tandem with this, foreign military sales (FMS) to Iraq were also increased, with the total sum coming to $1.8 billion by the end of 2007. Thus, Iraq, the former enemy, turned into the largest recipient of U.S. assistance.

In September 2007, General Petraeus, commander of the multinational force in Iraq, in his testimony at a hearing of a joint session of the House Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, underscored the restoration of civil order due to the additional input of U.S. troops, stressing the significance of the surge. According to General Petraeus, attacks on U.S. troops decreased following the surge, while the combined strength of the Iraqi Army, police and special forces has grown to 140 battalions, with 95% of them capable of playing leadership roles in operations. While carefully avoiding specifying the timing, General Petraeus claimed that it is possible to bring down the present strength of 168,000 U.S. troops in Iraq back to the level prior to the surge by 30,000. Based on his testimony, President Bush noted signs of an improvement in the Iraqi situation, announced plans to double the number of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to strengthen reconstruction assistance, and offered the prospect of concluding a security arrangement with Iraq.

(2) SSR in Iraq by NATO

As described above, as the U.S.-led SSR in Iraq made headway, the U.S. administration placed its greatest expectations on support from NATO nations in gaining support from the international community. While NATO took on the task of supporting the Iraqi security forces in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, it did so only after the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, over one year after the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime. It is noteworthy that when NATO took on the task, the lessons learned from SSR in Afghanistan were applied to Iraq. The key was the presence of U.S. Army Major General Karl Eikenberry, who had experience in rebuilding the ANA. After visiting Iraq in the autumn of 2003, Eikenberry observed that the Iraqi security forces were deficient in all aspects of organization, training and equipment, and recommended the creation of a joint headquarters to provide guidance to the forces. In response to this, the MNSTC-I was established in Baghdad in April 2004.

First, as a consequence of the dispute between the U.S. and Europe over the Iraq War, NATO’s option to cooperate in the rebuilding of the Iraqi Army as the alliance as a whole is limited to the education and training of the national army. After the establishment of the U.S.-led Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq in Baghdad, NATO, at its Istanbul summit meeting held in June 2004 (one year after the start of the Iraq War), decided to support the Iraqi Interim Government and also decided in July 2004 to establish the NATO Training Mission. In September, the mission was renamed the Iraqi Training, Education and Doctrine Center, which was upgraded to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in December, and the staff was expanded to 300. While the NATO Training Mission-Iraq receives support from all 28 NATO member states, only 13 of them actually have

sent staff members to Baghdad (as of July 2009). The Training Mission is a symbol of education and training provided by NATO for democratic control of the Iraqi Army. NATO has also cooperated in the establishment of the National Defence College, and outside Iraq, established NATO Training Schools in NATO member states to accept trainees from Iraq. Compared with the case of Afghanistan, however, NATO’s involvement in the SSR in Iraq remains largely indirect.

(3) Tentative Evaluation of the SSR in Iraq

As seen above, SSR in Iraq made little headway in the period from 2003 to 2004, in sharp contrast to the careful preparations carried out for the start of the Iraq War. The military vacuum was created in Iraq in the first 12 to 18 months after the end of the conflict, the period considered to be most crucial.

Is SSR in Iraq, currently undertaken by mainly NATO member states, producing its intended results? At the end of 2008, a status of forces agreement was concluded between Iraq and the U.S., and security authority has been all but handed over to Iraq. While the quantitative expansion of Iraq’s security sector is truly remarkable, the widely-shared assessment perhaps is that a mountain of problems remains to be resolved. The security forces comprising the Iraqi Army and police rapidly expanded from 142,000 to 327,000 between March 2005 and February 2007. The size of the forces has now grown to almost double that of the U.S. troops and the multinational force combined. The task of organizing the armed forces has also made progress, with a total of 10 divisions of the Iraqi Army formed as of the autumn of 2007. The 10 divisions are broken down to nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division, and Iraqi Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki announced a plan to expand the 10-division structure to a total of 13 divisions. Such quantitative changes are sometimes used as yardsticks to show the progress in SSR. As pointed out earlier, however, it is difficult to measure the qualitative improvement such as independent operational capabilities and the morale of troops by measuring quantitative changes.

Conclusions

In the post-9/11 world, the U.S. has had to cope with long wars. Even after conquering Kabul and Baghdad militarily, security remained elusive both in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. disarmed Iraq’s military organizations immediately after defeating the Saddam Hussein regime. Unless the security sector is reconstructed, security improvement and peacebuilding are impossible to achieve. In the process of rebuilding the national army, it is essential to facilitate national reconciliation in order to bring a prewar enemy into the system as a postwar friend. Ironically, however, terrorism clearing operations that are necessary to maintain security makes the political aim of winning the hearts and minds of the people hard to attain. Breaking this vicious cycle requires the involvement of military

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58 Ibid., pp. 8-9. As of May 2007, the Iraqi Army was responsible for the command and control of eight out of the 10 divisions, while the remaining two, the Fifth and Seventh Divisions, remained under the command of the multinational force.
organizations in activities normally undertaken by civilian organizations while continuing with steady efforts in SSR. Hence, long wars are likely to influence the future shape of military organizations.59

The following two trends can be observed in the background of the prolongation of wars. The first trend is the emergence of the tendency among policymakers to underestimate a forthcoming war before opening fire. This tendency was identified with the Bush administration, which argued for a preemptive strike against the opponent while achieving a revolution in military affairs. This tendency is prone to generate unwarranted optimism that if the U.S. forces conquer the capital city of an enemy country and overthrow the country’s government, order and peace will ensue naturally. The second trend is the emergence of unexpected developments after the start of war that may be the reverse of policymakers’ assessments. There were no military operations in the Afghan War that started abruptly in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. cities, and conversely, in the Iraq War, troops necessary to maintain security across Iraq could not be secured. As a result, the U.S. forces, despite the success in initial military interventions, were not able to conduct stabilization operations on a sufficient scale, allowing the initially successful wars to turn into the long wars.

Here, this paper attempts to reply to the two questions set at the outset. The first question is whether allied intervention in out-of-area conflicts helps stabilize the relationship of the alliance as a whole, a question from the perspective of research into alliances. Multilateral frameworks such as alliances and coalitions of the willing have the following advantages in reducing the costs of conflict resolution. The first advantage is that military capabilities and assets are provided by allies and coalition partners. In the area of human resources, the provision of the physical presence of ground troops is of great significance. In Afghanistan, where NATO holds command authority, the weight of U.S. forces in the ISAF was initially zero but has now increased to 40% of the total strength. In terms of capabilities, the strategic and tactical transportation capacity is indispensable for maintaining local security. Given the relatively high degree of interoperability, including CH-47 transportation helicopters and C-130 transport aircrafts, cooperation among allies and friendly nations means a lot. In SSR, the most substantive contribution is expected to come from the provision of, and maintenance and management services for military equipment for newly formed national armed forces. In the cases of newly formed armies in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, equipment manufactured by the former Soviet Union, such as AK-47 rifles and T-54 and T-72 tanks are being reutilized. In these fields, former members of the Warsaw Pact in Central and Eastern Europe have been performing major roles in training and equipment maintenance. In addition, in the joint involvement in conflict resolution as an alliance, the alliance as a whole can be expected to develop and acquire necessary capabilities, instead of alliance member states individually building up defense capabilities.60

One of the negative aspects of jointly undertaking an out-of-area operation is that the perception gap on threats may surface within the alliance. In the Afghan War, NATO invoked the joint defense clause for the first time in its history and supported the U.S. exercise of the collective right of self-defense, displaying the solidarity of the alliance internally and externally. In the Iraq War, on the


60 NATO’s call for the buildup of military capabilities as an alliance in the Comprehensive Political Guidance formed at the Riga Summit in November 2006 conforms to these developments.
other hand, allied nations in Europe have cautiously lowered their degree of direct involvement. At present, the focus of attention among EU member states is shifting to Afghanistan, not to Iraq. A war is often said to be a test of an alliance; out-of-area conflicts serve as the touchstone of alliance solidarity even in the 21st century. The unilateralism that had characterized the Bush Administration has been transformed into the spirit of international cooperation in the aftermath of the protracted Iraq War, and this has served to stabilize the alliance. Also, cooperative efforts by the alliance or coalitions, such as NATO’s assumption of command of the ISAF in Afghanistan and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq can be described as gaining in importance as the U.S. executes long wars.

The second question posed in this paper is whether military intervention by an alliance brings stability to the region concerned, a question from the perspective of peacebuilding. An adequate reply to this question requires a comparison of joint intervention by an alliance and single-handed military intervention by a single country. Hence, an impact of military intervention by NATO is examined here by limiting the consideration to the two examples addressed in this paper. Efforts by the alliance and coalitions were observed, first in Afghanistan with NATO assuming command of the ISAF, and then in Iraq with NATO getting involved in the training of the national army. Ironically, in both examples, local security has not been restored as planned, with the U.S. forces and the multinational force still seeking viable exit strategies. What is common in these two cases is that even after major combat operations ended, the military presence of multinational forces was not scaled down as planned. In Afghanistan, to the contrary, the size of the ISAF has been expanding. As post-conflict stabilization operations have not made smooth progress as anticipated, allies and coalition partners have to accelerate reform of the security sector in areas such as national armies and police. With the realities of Afghanistan and Iraq flatly dismissing the prewar optimism entertained by the Bush Administration, major Western nations will likely be compelled to stay engaged in postwar peace-building efforts for some time.