

Specialized Units for International Peace Cooperation: Concept and Practice*

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Introduction

The post-Cold War period has witnessed increased expectations for the military to take on a range of tasks beyond defense against conventional security threats. The most conspicuous example of this is the frequent use of international peace cooperation activities such as United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. There have also been active debates both within Japan and internationally on the roles of military organizations in these activities.

The present article aims to contribute to these debates by defining the concept of “specialized units” for international peace cooperation in terms of recent theoretical developments and international practice. The term used in this context may not sound particularly familiar. Indeed, the intention here lies in its heuristic value: conceptualizing “specialized units” will entail a new issue of what significance and expectations such units would carry if created within military organizations. In other words, to discuss the concept is to discuss in concrete terms the roles and the significance of the military in the international peace cooperation context.

This article first looks at the theory of conflict by reviewing how the management of conflicts—in particular internal conflicts—¹is considered and what kind of tasks the military is expected to carry out for that purpose. It then turns attention to actual practices in the international community, and describes what efforts are being made by the UN, regional organizations, and at the national level.

This article aims to present the types of “specialized units” through an examination of the recent theory and practice of peace cooperation, and thereby to contribute to the debates regarding Japan’s future roles in international peace cooperation.

¹ Although the word “conflict” commonly refers to both international and internal conflicts, hereafter the word will mainly refer to internal conflicts, for two reasons. Firstly, changes in the attitude toward internal conflicts as an international issue have been more pronounced than those toward international conflicts. Secondly, state reconstruction discussed here ensues in most cases as a consequence of internal conflicts.

1. Internal Conflicts and International Security

One of the most significant changes in the post-Cold War period is the frequent use of peace operations by the UN and regional organizations as well as of interventions by “multinational forces” for the settlement of internal conflicts. However, this does not mean internal conflicts have become more important in this period as they suddenly increased in number. According to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,² internal conflicts increased between the early 1970s and early 1990s, but afterwards the data shows a gradual downward trend. What this indicates is that it is the international *perception* of internal conflicts, i.e., how such conflicts have come to be viewed in the international community that significantly changed in the post-Cold War period.

What are these changes in perception? There are at least four interconnected factors. Two of them are related to the changes in the perception of internal conflicts as international threats, and the remaining two concern norms related to internal conflicts.

First, there is a conspicuous increase in the number of cases in which internal conflicts were perceived as posing a threat to regional and international security and peace. This trend is exemplified in changes in the manner as to how internal conflicts are regarded in the resolutions of the UN Security Council.³ As is commonly known, the UN Charter stipulates that the Security Council determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39 of the UN Charter), on the basis of which it authorizes a series of collective security measures ranging from mediation to the eventual use of force. History shows that even in the Cold War period there were some cases in which the Council recognized an internal conflict as such a threat. In the Congo conflict and the Cyprus civil war, it determined the existence of a threat by judging that the intensification of the internal conflicts as a result of foreign military interventions (by Belgium and Turkey, respectively) threatened to disrupt regional peace and security. However, the post-Cold War period has seen a marked rise in the number of internal conflicts the Council determined as international threats. Internal conflicts have come to be considered as a threat not only in cases where they have been internationalized through explicit foreign military interventions (e.g., Liberian military support to rebels in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), but also when their duration, intensity and damage are extensive (Angola, Liberia, Central Africa Republic), and when they lead to large-scale humanitarian crises or serious offenses against human rights (Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Georgia, Albania).

Put differently, the impact of internal conflicts is now assessed by different measures.

² Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (A/59/565, 2 December 2004), para. 5. Cf. Birger Heldt and Peter Wallenstein, *Peacekeeping Operations: Global Patterns of Intervention and Success, 1948-2000* (Folke Bernadotte Academy Research Paper No.1), available from <<http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPU/Download.aspx?docid=633>>, accessed 23 June 2005, pp. 12-13 and Figure IV.

³ See Hikaru Yamashita, “The Iraq War, the United Nations Security Council, and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force,” *NIDS Security Reports* no.6 (September 2005), pp. 38-63.

During the Cold War, the impact of internal conflicts was always measured within the framework of interstate relations, i.e., by determining whether they would escalate into a regional war. Of course such perception still remains deeply rooted. However, in recent years, internal conflicts have not been regarded as only a subcategory of international conflicts; they are *in themselves* viewed as a challenge to international security. In short, an internal conflict is no longer simply an “internal issue.”

If we are to examine internal conflicts “in themselves,” what are the standards by which they are measured? If the duration, intensity and damage of an internal conflict is determined to be extensive, from what viewpoint is its extensive nature measured? What becomes clear from a review of Security Council resolutions is that the other elements of the threat to peace constitute this perspective. As already mentioned, large-scale humanitarian crises and serious offenses against human rights are in the present context the most frequently quoted elements of the threat.⁴ There are other elements, however. For example, in the resolutions concerning the Kosovo conflict, the Security Council not only referred to the repression by the Serbian government and the resultant humanitarian situations such as the enormous outflow of refugees, but also condemned all acts of terrorism including those by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In that sense, terrorism was among the elements that constituted the “threat” posed by the Kosovo conflict.⁵

This last point suggests another general trend in the perception of internal conflicts. It is that internal conflicts are now seen as a potential “hotbed” for the emergence of other threats to international peace and security. This will become clear if one examines the characteristics of contemporary threats and the nature of internal conflicts.

Let us for a moment shift our focus of discussion from internal conflicts to contemporary threats. What are these threats, and what characteristics are they believed to have? Although a few have already been suggested above, policy papers and advisory reports by the UN and European Union (EU) present a certain convergence on this question. More specifically, they both seem to agree that contemporary threats in the international community include inter-state and regional conflicts, social and economic threats (poverty, food shortage, environmental degradation, infectious disease, etc.), terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and state failure,⁶ and that these threats, which are seemingly

⁴ The High-Level Panel Report presented in December 2004 by the UN Secretary-General states that the Security Council has gradually come to accept that it can authorize military action to redress “catastrophic internal wrongs” if it is prepared to confirm that the situation is a threat to international peace and security. (A/59/565, para. 202) Although the report does not clearly explain what these “catastrophic internal wrongs” include in practice, it states in the preceding paragraph (para.200) that “genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing...can properly be considered a threat to international security” and that these can prompt “action by the Security Council.”

⁵ See Yamashita, “The Iraq War,” pp. 58-59. Furthermore, the KLA is responsible not only for committing terrorist acts but also for being extensively involved in the smuggling of heroin to Central Europe and Scandinavia. It can therefore be said that the Kosovo conflict presented not only humanitarian and terrorist issues but also issues of organized crimes. Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century* (New York, NY and London: Continuum, 2003), pp. 202-203 and 225.

⁶ A/59/565, paras. 44-177; A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (12 December 2003), pp. 3-5; see also Report of the Secretary-General: We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in

independent of one another, are in fact interconnected.⁷ If “today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated,”⁸ this means two things. One is that the gravity of threats increases as they become interconnected. For example, the High Level Panel Report presented by the UN Secretary-General in December 2004 gave the following warning concerning a potential linkage between nuclear proliferation, terrorism and state failure:

Nuclear proliferation by States increases the availability of the materiel and technology necessary for a terrorist to acquire a nuclear weapon. The ability of non-State actors to traffic in nuclear materiel and technology is aided by ineffective State control of borders and transit through failed States.⁹

The other significance is that “a threat to one is a threat to all.”¹⁰ If threats become increasingly serious due to their interrelated nature, and if many of these threats transcend national borders, threats to one region or one country take on a significance that can simply not be ignored by the others.

If we reexamine internal conflicts based on the fact that contemporary threats have these characteristics as a whole, we realize that they possess special features that the other threats do not have. Indeed, an internal conflict, like an inter-state or regional conflict, is a threat that takes place (literally) on a specific spatial setting, in which sense it provides a space for other threats such as terrorism and organized crime to emerge.¹¹ Moreover, unlike inter-state conflicts in which states exercise a certain measure of control and discipline, internal conflicts often arise from, or result in, state failure, with the result of offering places and opportunities to forces that produce various threats to the international community.¹² The internal conflict as a potential “hotbed” for the emergence of international threats contains these implications.¹³

the 21st Century (A/54/2000, 27 March 2000), pp. 19-53.

⁷ A/59/565, paras. 17-28; A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (15 September 2004), p. 8.

⁸ A/59/565, para. 17.

⁹ A/59/565, para. 20. In a more recent think-piece, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also makes the following point: “...Neglect and misgovernment in Afghanistan allowed terrorists to find a haven. Chaos in Haiti caused attempted mass migration to Florida. And poor health systems in poor countries may make it easier for a disease like avian flu to spread spontaneously, or even to be spread deliberately, from one continent to another. So development and security are connected — and both in turn are linked to human rights and the rule of law...” Kofi Annan, “United We Stand,” *Wall Street Journal*, 24 June 2005.

¹⁰ A/59/565, para. 17.

¹¹ This indication may seem to contradict the fact that many of the recent threats “transcend borders.” However, the idea that threats “transcend borders” does not mean that they do not require a place for their emergence. Just like al-Qaeda sought sanctuary in Afghanistan after being expelled from Sudan, even international terrorists require a base for their activities.

¹² The current situation in Somalia is a case in point. Ever since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia (even with the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government in October 2004) has been devoid of any effective central government. Amid such circumstances, since 2003, Somalia has seen the emergence of a new al-Qaeda-linked jihadist network, as a result of which it is said that the country is likely to become a major al-Qaeda hub in East Africa. International Crisis Group, “Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?” (Africa Report No. 95, 11 July 2005), available from <<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/icg-som-11jul.pdf>>, accessed 12 July 2005.

¹³ This characterization follows the same logic as the concept of “new wars” in the report by the EU’s Study

This perceptive shift with regard to internal conflicts is occurring along with changes in two related important norms: security and state sovereignty. First, the notion of security is no longer defined solely from the perspective of statehood but from that of individual human beings: human security.

In relation to internal conflicts, the concept of human security¹⁴ takes on significance in two ways.¹⁵ First, if we think of security threats from this viewpoint, their main sources are not so much inter-state conflicts but rather internal crises, in particular “authoritarian states that repress their own citizens or a combination of state and non-state armed groups in conditions of state failure.”¹⁶ The reason is that repression under an authoritarian regime leads to genocide (Rwanda), ethnic cleansing (Kosovo) or systematic and extensive human rights violations (extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, etc.). Meanwhile, state failure creates a situation where numerous uncontrolled armed groups including government forces swarm, triggering serious violations of human rights such as non-discriminatory attacks against non-combatants or rapes. Unlike the conventional approach to security which focused on inter-state conflicts, human security tends to highlight the gravity of immediate internal threats.

Although the concept of human security is intended to overcome the perception that security is restricted to state security,¹⁷ in more practical terms it also aims to mobilize various international actors for the security of individuals in other states because the notion of humanity implied in human security not only covers actual individuals but also refers to the elements of humanity common to all people. In other words, this concept identifies the series of needs and rights that should be guaranteed to all individuals in order for them to be blessed with survival, livelihood and dignity.¹⁸ What this means in turn is that if threats to these needs and rights are also threats for all humanity, they can serve as grounds for the cooperation and joint action by various actors of the international community, and that these common rights and needs as goals to be achieved in these actions. For instance, the final report (Barcelona Report) of the EU’s Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, formed with the purpose of setting up the Union’s common foreign and security policy, argues that if “human security

Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities (Barcelona Report). This report states that contemporary conflicts are characterized by lawlessness, impoverishment, exclusivist ideologies and the daily use of violence, and that they provide a perfect ground for human rights violations, criminal networks and terrorism. Although the expression “contemporary conflicts” is used here, it is clear from the above characterization that the main focus is on internal conflicts. A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, pp. 7-9 and 18.

¹⁴ For definitions of this concept, see United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York, NY: Commission on Human Security, 2003).

¹⁵ In more general terms, Gerd Oberleitner argues that human security challenges our existing perception on security in two ways: it shifts the focus toward the individual; and it attempts to base security on common values. Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?” *Global Governance* 11, no. 2 (April-June 2005), p. 190.

¹⁶ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p. 8.

¹⁷ For a concise overview on the relationship between human security and state security, see Takashi Oshimura, “Kokka no anzenhosho to ningen no anzenhosho (State Security and Human Security),” *Kokusai mondai (International Affairs)* no.530 (May 2004), pp. 14-27.

¹⁸ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, p. 4.

is vitally connected to the security of Europeans,” the EU must not only focus on the Union’s borders but must “contribute to the protection of every individual human being.”¹⁹

Finally, with changes in the perception of internal conflicts and in the notion of security, the nature of state sovereignty has also been under scrutiny. State sovereignty consists of three components: the state’s internal supremacy over all other authorities, external independence from outside interference, and the indivisibility of these two. In particular, following the rapid decolonization around the 1960s, the state’s external (formal) independence rather than its actual ability to govern its territory and population has come to be valued as a prerequisite for state sovereignty. This is because many newly independent states did not have the capacities and experiences necessary for modern statecraft, and were expected to foster these abilities within the legally protected framework of independent statehood.²⁰

However, the limitations of this approach became apparent in the fact that many of the internal conflicts and state failures occurred in the states that gained independence after the Second World War. For if the above expectation had come true—and it did in a few cases in which states did manage to establish a relatively stable government—the results could not have been such crises. Furthermore, the concept of state sovereignty that attaches importance to maintaining external independence served to prevent outside interference into “domestic” affairs such as state failure and internal conflicts. This created a dilemma for the international community.

The recent introduction of concepts such as “sovereignty as responsibility” and “responsibility to protect” aims to overcome this dilemma. They are based on the idea that state sovereignty does not imply a right but responsibility for the protection of its people. More specifically, proponents of this idea argue that the sovereign state does not have the outright prerogatives to take certain actions domestically and internationally but the responsibility to discharge a set of obligations entrusted by its citizens and the international community. Therefore, when a state fails to fulfill such responsibility, or is in itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities such as blatant violations of basic human rights or abuse of minority groups, global and regional organizations like the UN assume a residual, fallback responsibility.²¹ The overall objective is to make the concept of state sovereignty flexible

¹⁹ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p. 9 and 28. One of the initiatives the report proposes as constituting a direct contribution in ensuring and restoring the security of people under armed conflicts is the Human Security Response Force (HSRF). The HSRF is composed of 15,000 personnel, of which at least one third would be police and civilian specialists consisting of human rights monitors, civilian administrators, and humanitarian aid workers. Another 5,000 personnel should be at a high level of readiness for deployment within days in the form of civil-military teams etc. With regard to the actual force generation, the report proposes using not just existing frameworks such as the EU Civil/ Military Cell, which will be later explained, but also the establishment of a Human Security Volunteer Service that would offer opportunities for volunteers to participate in these activities. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23.

²⁰ See Gerard Kreijen, *State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa* (Leiden and Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).

²¹ Francis Deng et al., *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (New York, NY: Brookings Institution, 1996); International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001); Michael Ignatieff, “State Failure and Nation-building,” in: J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.

enough to allow international involvement in “domestic” affairs.

In sum, these perceptive shifts and conceptual innovations indicate the following. First, internal conflicts are increasingly seen as a serious threat to the international community, in particular as a “hotbed” for the emergence of other threats or as a condition that threatens human security, as a result of which they tend to receive higher attention even for actors that are not directly involved in those conflicts. Secondly, a new normative framework (human security, sovereignty as responsibility) that enables international involvement in these conflicts has been proposed and is gradually gaining ground. It is not a new idea to recognize internal conflicts as an issue confronting the international community as a whole and to make its members collectively manage these conflicts. What is new, however, is the extent to which this is reflected in various decisions and doctrines and (as will be mentioned below) is concretized through actual operations and institutions.

2. Principles of Conflict Management and Roles of the Military

What principles or approaches of conflict management does the perceptive shift of the international community concerning internal conflicts lead to? They can be expressed in two terms: comprehensiveness / multifunctionality and intrusiveness.

First, a comprehensive or multifunctional conflict management means rebuilding institutions of the country concerned in such a way that the norms of the international community are followed by that society. The oft-mentioned multifunctionality of recent UN peacekeeping missions exemplifies this general trend. As is commonly known, peacekeeping, which was traditionally intended to prevent the recurrence of conflict in the period between a ceasefire agreement and a comprehensive peace agreement and therefore mostly limited to the monitoring of ceasefire and related arrangements, has now included in its scope a broad range of measures for building institutions for durable peace, i.e., peacebuilding. More specifically, these missions have come to include security sector reform (SSR) including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former government forces and armed groups; election monitoring and electoral assistance; reestablishment of administrative and legal systems; civilian protection and human rights monitoring; and protection of humanitarian activities such as assisted return of refugees.²²

Comprehensiveness or multifunctionality is inextricably linked to another principle of intrusiveness. Here, intrusiveness refers to the tendency to manage the conflict in the light of widely accepted standards of international society. It has become accepted practice that the international community draws up a reconstruction plan in line with established norms that

299-321.

²² The need to integrate within peacekeeping these activities that are usually classified under peacebuilding has for example been reconfirmed in the December 1998 statement by the President of the Security Council. The statement says the Council “welcomes the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the role of the Security Council in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in ensuring a smooth transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding,” and requests the Secretary-General to report to that effect. Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/1998/38, 29 December 1998).

serve human security purposes (rule of law, democracy, human rights, market economy, etc.), and on that basis assists and monitors the country's efforts to implement that plan. Needless to say, it is important that the main actors within the country concerned give their approval to the overall process in the peace agreement. Importantly, however, the substance of the agreement itself has often been premised on these norms. In the meantime, the fact that international assistance tends to converge on the five items mentioned above underpins a trend towards standardization of internationally assisted peace processes. The sovereignty-as-responsibility principle in this context provides a theoretical rationale for dealing with clashes with the sovereignty of the state concerned that might arise as a result of intrusive involvement by the international community. Contemporary conflict management thus serves to actively foster the core values of international society in the post-conflict society.

Then, what roles are the military expected to play? The traditional role of the military has been the protection of the citizens, border and territory against physical military threats by other states. However, the situations discussed here are those in which conflicts, in particular internal conflicts, have tentatively ended, and thus are clearly different from those presupposed in traditional defense tasks.

First of all, the military is expected to contribute to the increasingly multifunctional and comprehensive efforts by the international community. In this context, the roles the military is expected to play consist mainly of DDR and provision of training for a new national army and other security-related organizations if necessary; maintenance of law and order conducive to confidence-building among warring parties (ceasefire monitoring, protection of government officials and other vital infrastructure); securing the conditions for peace and humanitarian operations by civilians;²³ and assistance in arrest activities as part of law enforcement activities.²⁴ One can add that they all concern the issue of so-called civil-military coordination / cooperation, that is, the question of how the military and non-military sectors can and should cooperate in their joint efforts.

The principle of intrusiveness on its part has a bearing on the nature of the use of force for conflict management purposes. As the international community moves towards comprehensive involvement in the reconstruction of a post-conflict society, and as the reconstruction process takes on a standardized character based on universal values, that process is more likely to face resistance or obstruction by disgruntled elements. This problem occurs when the peace process is viewed as working in the favor of one side of the warring parties, or when the establishment of peace likely results in a loss of their economic benefits and identity. In these situations, peacekeepers must be able to provide rapid and robust response. To this end, the mandate of the mission must first include appropriate authorization regarding use of force, and secondly, it is imperative to have the resources and logistics required for such response.

3. Overview of International Efforts

²³ Cf. Fred Tanner, "Weapons Control in Semi-permissive Environments: A Case for Compellence," in: Michael Pugh (ed.), *The UN, Peace and Force* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), Table 1 (p. 129).

²⁴ A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p. 19. What I have in mind here are the activities by NATO and EU troops in Kosovo and Bosnia.

The various efforts that are currently underway at national, regional and international levels are designed with these two principles in mind. They are offered either as part of cooperation with civilian sectors in the context of comprehensive and multifunctional conflict management or to provide prompt and robust response to the resistance or obstruction that takes place in the process of intrusive intervention. This section reviews some of such efforts.

As is well known, UN peacekeeping missions are becoming increasingly multifunctional. In fact, all of the missions that have been newly created or extensively reorganized in the past 5 years now include most of the new tasks listed above when we discussed the comprehensive and multifunctional nature of conflict management. Another point that should be noted is that all of these missions were given authorization to act under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and that many of them have also been authorized to use “all necessary means” to execute the mandated tasks including ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel, facilities and equipment.²⁵ Multifunctional and robust UN peacekeeping missions are clearly becoming the norm.

However, even if the authorized mandate allows for a robust response, this does not mean that the required resources are actually provided by the UN Member States. The attacks and hostage-takings by armed groups of the personnel of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in May 2000 or the extensive clashes three years later between armed groups in Eastern DRC showed that the peacekeepers whose mandates should enable them to respond to such situations in fact often do not have the capabilities to do so. As a matter of fact, the hostage crisis in Sierra Leone was eventually resolved by the intervention of British rapid deployment troops, and it was the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) that contributed to reestablishing stability in the DRC. The UN’s struggle in finding ways to get the necessary personnel and equipment for peacekeeping missions is not new. To alleviate this problem, in 1994, the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) was established, and in the same year the United Nations Logistics Base was built in Brindisi, Italy, to store start-up equipment for peacekeeping missions.²⁶ However, what has been of particular concern in recent years is how to deal with future Sierra Leone or Congo-like situations which UN troops on the ground will most likely not be able to provide for with the capabilities at hand—that is, how to ensure a robust and prompt response capability. The creation in July 2002 of a new Rapid Deployment Level (RDL) within the UNSAS which would enable deployment within 30 to 90 days²⁷ and the December 2004 proposal by the United Nations Secretary-General to

²⁵ See Hikaru Yamashita, “Reexamining Peacekeeping: The ‘Brahimi Report’ and Onward,” *NIDS Security Reports* no.7 (December 2006), pp. 41-77.

²⁶ Since the UNSAS originally targeted military personnel and equipment, the UN has been trying to establish a similar standby system for police personnel and other civilian experts. In addition, the creation of a on-call list of military and police officers who would be promptly mobilized at the planning stage has also been proposed. See the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, Annex), paras. 102-145.

²⁷ Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/57/711, 16 January 2003), para. 33. Apart from the RDL, the UNSAS consists of the following three levels: the provision of a list of capabilities available for call-ups (Level 1), the provision of more detailed information

introduce a strategic reserve system²⁸ can be seen as efforts to bolster this capability.

Other than the UN, two regional organizations in Europe have been reinforcing various mechanisms related to conflict management: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

Following the 1992-1995 civil war in Bosnia, where it conducted a naval blockade in the Adriatic as well as close air support and air strikes for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), NATO has shown a willingness to become a serious player in this field.²⁹ In post-war Bosnia, NATO organized two multinational peacekeeping forces, the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and assist the process of post-conflict peacebuilding. In Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, NATO has actively contributed to the security and military sectors of peace operations organized with other regional organizations or the UN.³⁰ As the demand for such activities increased—and as peace operations came to be recognized as part of a new identity for NATO in the post-Cold War period—, NATO started the development of capabilities tailored to its new role. One such example is the launching of the NATO Response Force (NRF) initiative announced at the Prague Summit in November 2002. The NRF is a force with the following characteristics:

including a list of major equipment, description of the organization of units and level of self-sufficiency, and data on individuals (Level 2), and the signing of a generic MOU specifying response times and conditions for employment (Level 3).

²⁸ Based on lessons learned in Sierra Leone (2000) and Eastern DRC (2003-2004), the proposal aimed to send prompt reinforcements to peacekeepers deployed in rapidly deteriorating situations. This system would identify missions with high security risks, exchange memorandums of understanding with troop contributing countries to form task forces (1,250 troops in total) for each such mission, and have the troops maintain a high state of readiness and be available on seven days' notice (troops are paid during this standby period). The proposal, made in the Report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in December 2004, was discussed during an annual meeting of the Special Committee (January 31 through February 25, 2005). Although the Special Committee took note of the initiatives "with interest," it stressed that issues such as the composition of task forces, the decision-making processes for the deployment, command and control arrangements, complementarity with other crisis response initiatives, sustainability, and financial implications needed to be defined in more details and recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) work closely with Member States to answer those questions. Interview at the DPKO on February 28, 2005; Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General (A/59/608, 15 December 2004), paras. 13-18; Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Its Working Group (A/59/19/Rev.1, 1 March 2005), para. 45. Meanwhile, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 supplement to the Agenda for Peace contains a similar idea. The proposed "rapid reaction force" would be the "strategic reserve" for deployment in the event of an emergency need for peacekeeping troops and would comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995), para. 44.

²⁹ NATO, "Building Peace and Stability in Crisis Regions," *NATO Briefing* (October 2003), p. 2.

³⁰ In Kosovo, NATO formed the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and contributed to the prevention of conflict mainly through support to UN transitional administration and humanitarian efforts, as well as demilitarization of the KLA. In Macedonia, NATO was engaged in the demilitarization of the National Liberation Army and in protecting international monitors from the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In Afghanistan, NATO took over the UK-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. Its role was to assist in reforming the security sector and in maintaining security within its area of operations. And in post-war Iraq, NATO has been providing logistical support to Polish troops in Iraq, as well as training and advising the newly created Iraqi military.

- Aims to start deployment within 5-30 days and as a stand-alone force for 30 days
- Joint and combined force composed of 21,000 personnel
- Stresses the element of “global reach” in the areas of deployment
- Operational control is shared on the rotational basis between 3 headquarters (Naples, Lisbon, and Brunssum in the Netherlands) every 6 months³¹

After inaugurating the NRF prototype (8,500 troops) in October 2003, NATO announced that NRF would have reached its initial operational capability of 17,000 troops in a year and was aiming at reaching its full operational capability by October 2006.³² What should be noted is its wide range of tasks that include not only collective defence operations but also various “crisis response operations” (evacuation operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping operations, etc.) as well as its use as an initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces.³³ Through the NRF NATO institutionalized the ability to conduct conflict management in a flexible and proactive manner. Meanwhile, the organization has also been developing its civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine since the late 1990s.³⁴ NATO’s definition of CIMIC—“co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors”³⁵—is wide-ranging and, just as with the

³¹ The force is envisaged to consist of a brigade-size land component including a special force, a naval task force (one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface group), and an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day. NATO, “Deploying Forces Faster and Further than Ever Before,” *NATO Briefing* (January 2005), p. 4.

³² NATO, “Response Force Demonstrates Capability in First Exercise,” 21 November 2003, available at <<http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/11/i031121a.htm>>, accessed 5 September 2005. Meanwhile, the NRF rotations to date filled the following periods: NRF1 (October - December 2003, Brunssum, the Netherlands), NRF2 (January – July 2004, Brunssum), NRF3 (July – December 2004, Naples), NRF4 (January – July 2005, Naples). The headquarters for NRF5 and 6 is expected to be in Lisbon. NATO, “Deploying Forces Faster and Further than Ever Before,” p. 3; Joint Allied Force Command Naples, “Exercise Allied Warrior 2004” (AJFCN Fact Sheet), 17 January 2005, available at <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Exercises/2004/Allied_Warrior04/Factsheets/43MNbrigade.htm>, accessed 5 September 2005.

³³ Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, para. 4a; NATO, “Questions & Answers on the NATO Response Force (NRF),” available at <http://arrc.nato.int/brochure/q_a.htm>, accessed 27 July 2005; “NATO Response Force—NATO’s Expeditionary Capability” (Background Briefing on NRF from Colorado Springs Defence Ministers Meeting), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf>>, accessed 27 July 2005. NATO defines crisis response operations as military operations that do not apply to the collective defence operations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (took effect in August 1949). Meanwhile, the term crisis management refers to NATO’s overall operations that include collective defence operations, crisis response operations, and natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations. See e.g., NATO, the Alliance’s Strategic Concept (24 April 1999), paras. 31 and 47-49; “Crisis Management: What Does It Mean in Practice?” available at <http://nato.int/issues/crisis_management/in_practice.htm>, accessed 8 September 2005; “Crisis Management: What Does It Mean in Practice? Crisis Response Operations,” available at <http://nato.int/issues/crisis_management/crisis_response_operations.htm>, accessed 8 September 2005.

³⁴ Larry Jenkins, “A CIMIC Contribution to Assessing Progress in Peace Support Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 10, no.3 (Autumn 2003), p. 128.

³⁵ The full definition is as follows: “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine (AJP-9, June 2003), para. 102-1.

NRF, applicable to both Article 5 collective defence and Non-Article 5 crisis response operations.³⁶

Whereas NATO is expanding its roles from collective defense to non-collective defense operations, the EU is using the latter activities for its entry into the field of security. What directly led to this was the introduction of the “Petersburg tasks” set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam (entry into force in May 1999), which consisted of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management.³⁷ Although the Treaty of Maastricht (entry into force in November 1993) under which the EU was established had already defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the “pillars” of the Union, it was the Treaty of Amsterdam, which amended and expanded the Treaty of Maastricht, that concretized the security aspects of the CFSP. And this constitutes the substance of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Following the introduction of the Petersburg tasks, the EU has launched a series of initiatives to establish the necessary capabilities. First, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 determined that by 2003, Member States of the EU would have the capabilities to perform the Petersburg tasks through the establishment of a 50- 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that could be deployed within 60 days and sustain operations for at least one year.³⁸ In 2004, the EU updated these objectives, and decided to create EU Battlegroups (EUBG) as part of the ERRF which would reach Initial Operational Capability in early 2005 and Full Operational Capability from 2007. Accordingly, the EUBG concept is characterized by the following aspects:

- The ability to launch an operation within 5 days and deploy it within 10 days of the approval by the European Council, and to undertake operations sustainable for a period between 30 and 120 days
- Formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States
- Based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force (about 1,500 personnel)
- To set as the objectives of the operations the tasks (joint disarmament operations,

³⁶ AJP-9, para. 103-1. But the CIMIC concept generally presupposes the autonomy of military activities and aims at the creation of an environment conducive to their operation. According to NATO’s doctrine, the core of CIMIC activities is composed of civil-military liaison, civilian support for military operations, and support to the civil environment. And on this last point, it states that “normally it is not support under the direction of civil authorities.” (ibid., para. 104-1) This also appears to be the logic behind the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. For recent discussions on PRTs, see Yuji Uesugi, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): A Review of a New Peacebuilding Tool in Afghanistan,” *Kokusai Anzen Hoshō (Journal of International Security)* 34, no.1 (June 2006), pp. 35-62.

³⁷ Treaty on European Union, Article 17(2). Unlike NATO, which is essentially a military organization, the EU understands “crisis management” as including both military and civilian operations in the implementation of the Petersburg tasks. These tasks originally formed part of the Petersburg Declaration (June 1992) where the Western European Union (WEU) declared its own role in acknowledging the establishment of the EU. As a result, by introducing the Petersburg tasks, most of the WEU operations other than common defense operations were transferred to the EU. The European Union, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction,” available at <<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm>>, accessed 4 August 2005.

³⁸ This is called the Helsinki Headline Goal. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Helsinki European Council (10 and 11 December 1999), Annex IV.

reform of the security sector, support for third countries in combating terrorism)³⁹ specified in the European Security Strategy of December 2003, which is the policy guideline that describes the Petersburg tasks and security strategies of the EU⁴⁰

The EU maintained at least one battlegroup between 2005 and 2007, and plans to keep two battlegroups on standby in subsequent periods.⁴¹

In addition, the EU has been developing civilian aspects of crisis management ever since the Feira European Council (June 2000).⁴² More specifically, the Council defined four priority areas, namely police (officers for police operations including provision of training to local police), strengthening the rule of law (prosecutors, judges, etc.), civil administration (experts and advisers), and civil protection (field survey and intervention teams), in each of which it has been improving the capability to deploy relevant personnel at short notice.⁴³ Building on

³⁹ European Security Strategy, p. 12.

⁴⁰ This updated goal is called the Headline Goal 2010. According to Hans-Bernhard Weissert (General Secretariat, Defence Aspects, Council of the European Union), the 10 day-deployment timeline is decided in view of cases in which non-EU forces are unable to respond to rapidly deteriorating situations (e.g., Eastern DRC) or serious humanitarian crises (the Srebrenica safe area during the Bosnian war). Interview with Hans-Bernhard Weissert (September 20, 2005).

⁴¹ For the first half of 2005, the UK and France had a battlegroup, followed by Italy in the second half and France and Germany in the first half of 2006. Meanwhile, in tandem with the above developments, the EU Member States have held four ministerial-level meetings at the time of writing (November 20, 2000, November 19, 2001, May 19, 2003, and November 22, 2004), through which they have been engaged in identifying and coordinating the national contributions to the ERRF. In this process, they agreed on the European Capability Action Plan to remedy the identified shortcomings (November 2001), and the Global Approach on Deployability aiming at more effective use of available assets, mechanisms and initiatives for strategic transport (November 2004). Meanwhile, the EU officially inaugurated in early 2001 bodies for gathering information and making decisions necessary for the operation of these forces. The Köln European Council (June 1999) decided to establish the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which helps to define policies within the CFSP including its security aspects; the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters; and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) that supports the EUMC. The Nice European Council (December 2000) determined to include them among the standing bodies of the EU. The Köln European Council also created the post of High Representative for the CFSP, which was filled by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on October 18, 1999 (he also assumed the post of Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union). In July 2004, a European Defence Agency was established to define and meet the capability needs of the ESDP through planning and promotion of European defense-relevant R&T. Council of the European Union, Military Capability Commitment Declaration (Brussels, 20 November 2000); Council of the European Union, General Affairs, Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities (Brussels, 19-20 November 2001); Council of the European Union, Military Capabilities Conference: Declaration on European Military Capabilities (Brussels, 22 November 2004); Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP (12 July 2004).

⁴² See Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Santa Maria da Feira European Council (19-20 June 2000), Annex I, Chapter III.

⁴³ At the Police Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2001, the EU Member States undertook to provide 5,000 police officers by 2003 (of which 1,400 police officers could be deployed within 30 days). The other areas were discussed during two conferences held at ministerial level (November 2002 and November 2004). As a result, in the area of civil protection, it was agreed that two or three assessment and/or coordination teams that could be dispatched within 3 to 7 hours and intervention teams of 2,000 persons for deployment at short notice would be created, while a roster of experts including a pool of judges (300) and civilian administration advisors (160 were listed as of June 2003) has been established. Declaration of EU Chief of Police Following the Meeting on Police Aspects in the ESDP-Framework (Warnsveld, 25 October 2004); Council of the European Union, Ministerial Declaration Adopted by the Civilian Crisis Management

these efforts, the Brussels European Council held in December 2004 adopted a document specifying that the EU must be able to take the decision to launch a mission within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council, and that specific civilian ESDP capabilities should be deployable within 30 days of the decision to launch the mission.⁴⁴

Finally, in late 2005 the EU created within the EU Military Staff the EU Civil / Military Cell consisting of military and civilian experts. Already in 1999, the Situation Centre composed of military and civilian experts was established within the EU Military Staff. The expansion of the Centre into the Civil / Military Cell whose main task is to formulate plans for crisis management operations suggests the European Union's desire to develop its conflict management capabilities under the cooperation of the military and civilian sectors.⁴⁵

At the national level, two general trends can be observed. First, many countries are developing some sort of framework within their military postures to meet their commitments to the UN, regional organizations or other multilateral arrangements. Generally speaking, there are three types of such framework: specific units are pre-designated and placed on stand-by for international operations (e.g., Denmark, Norway, the Czech Republic, Austria); the required personnel and equipment is provided from different parts of the military on a rotational basis (e.g., Germany, Spain, Sweden, Australia); and a mission-specific unit is formed anew by selecting the necessary personnel and equipment from the entire force (e.g., France, the Netherlands, UK, Kenya, Nigeria).⁴⁶ Secondly, many of the military units formed

Capability Conference on 19 November 2002; Council of the European Union, Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference: Ministerial Declaration (Brussels, 22 November 2004); Caroline R. Earle, "European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock" (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), pp. 6-8.

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union, Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (Brussels, 7 December 2004), para. 5. Preceding this Headline Goal, the Police Action Plan (June 2001) and the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP (June 2004) had been adopted at the European Council.

⁴⁵ European Union, Fact Sheet: The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell (February 2005). These developments are also closely connected to the debates within EU countries regarding whether the EU should possess its own military command and control capability. The proponents included France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg which had proposed the creation of an independent EU military command at the summit meeting held on April 29, 2003. Countries like the UK, however, feared that this could undermine NATO's capability. In short, the creation of the Civil/ Military Cell tasked with situation analysis and operational planning short of command and control represented a compromise between these two camps. However, what is important here is that the Cell and its predecessor are both composed of military and civilian personnel, and shares the EU goal of developing military and civilian conflict management capabilities in a comprehensive manner. In that sense, the Situation Centre and Civil / Military Cell are indicative of the fact that in the context of conflict management, the EU is attaching importance to cooperation between the military and civil sectors.

⁴⁶ One of the countries that are the most advanced in this area is Belgium. Belgium recently restructured its military into a single joint force (40,000 all ranks, scheduled to be reduced to 35,000), with the Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations & Training) taking the operational command over all troops on the ground. Its Land Component (14,000 personnel) is composed of 9 battlegroups (9,500 personnel in total), of which three are for EUBG or NRF operations, one is for non-combatant evacuation operations, and the remaining five rotate every 4 months for assignment to UN, NATO or EU operations. The personnel of the first three battlegroups and those of the last five basically do not overlap as they are trained according to the requirements of each mission. Meanwhile, the Air Component has the following tactical capabilities: 10 F-16 for EU missions (sustainable for one year), 30 F-16 for NRF (deployable to two locations), and 6 F-16 for NRF (the first two groups are not expected for simultaneous deployment). As for transport capabilities, it

in this manner aim at being capable of deployment within a specific period from the day the decision to deploy is made. The fact that this period ranges from a few months to 3 to 14 days suggests that many militaries are making efforts in both force generation and training to ensure smooth and rapid deployment to post-conflict areas.⁴⁷

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to articulate, in view of current international theory and practice, what significance and expectations “specialized units” might carry in the context of international peace cooperation activities. First, it pointed out the changes in the perception of internal conflicts in the international community. There is an increasingly pronounced tendency to recognize internal conflicts as a threat to regional and international security and as a “hotbed” for various threats such as terrorism. In response, new conceptions of security (human security) and state sovereignty (sovereignty as responsibility) are also being proposed to open new avenues of justifiable international intervention.

The principles of conflict management derived from the idea that internal conflicts are a matter of concern for the entire international community and should therefore be managed by the international community as a whole are as follows: to develop a comprehensive reconstruction plan for the post-conflict society in line with the various norms established in the international community (rule of law, democracy, human rights, market economy, etc.), and to actively intervene into the country in support of its domestic efforts at implementing the plan. And these two principles in turn require the military to provide its unique capability and expertise as part of the comprehensive international peace cooperation activities (DDR/SSR, maintenance of law and order conducive to confidence building among the warring parties, providing the security conditions necessary for civilians to engage in peace and humanitarian operations, and information gathering and assistance in arrest activities as part of post-conflict law enforcement), and respond rapidly and robustly against obstruction and resistance by groups that oppose the international intervention.

The “specialized units” may be defined as a unit that plays at least either one of these two roles. The latter half of the article overviewed efforts by the UN, NATO, the EU, and national governments to institutionalize international peace cooperation activities in order to show that they aim at either type of the “specialized units.” The UN’s multifunctional peacekeeping operations and the EU’s comprehensive crisis management exemplify the former, while the addition of the RDL to the UNSAS and the development of rapid deployment capabilities in the EU and NATO are examples of the latter.

possesses 8 C-130 and 2 A-310 for the EU and NATO. Interview with the Belgian military (September 20, 2005)

⁴⁷ Since, unlike international and regional organizations, organizations in charge of the military and civilian sectors are normally clearly divided at the national level, it is unlikely that many countries institutionalize an integrated civil–military structure similar to the EU Civil/ Military Cell. What is noteworthy in this respect, however, is the French effort. Created under the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff, the *groupelement interarmées des actions civilo-militaires* (GIACM, up to 550 personnel) is a standing group whose purpose is to coordinate and promote cooperation in France’s peacekeeping and civil-military operations.

In considering the prospects for Japan's international peace cooperation, the concept of "specialized units" discussed in this article provides a guidepost. As a framework of reference reflecting the consensus of the current international community, it suggests what "specialized units" should look like if Japan is to proceed with this path. This article will hopefully serve as an opportunity to further discuss the role and significance of the armed forces in the context of international peace cooperation activities.