CHAPTER 11

Japan’s Security Outlook: Its Implications for the
Defense Policy

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Introduction

After its military expansion and subsequent defeat in the Second World War, Japan opted for a policy of pacifism. It declared in its Constitution that it would renounce aggressive military action and establish various norms in its defense policy. Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy (senshu boei) holds that it will not employ defensive force unless an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such cases, only the minimum force necessary will be employed to defend itself. Japan also adopted the three non-nuclear principles (hi kaku san gensoku), vowing to not possess, produce, or allow nuclear weapons within its borders. Moreover, Japan guarantees civilian control of its government and has no intention of becoming a military power that could threaten its neighboring countries. Within these parameters, Japan has an ongoing alliance with the United States and maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that possess the minimum force necessary to defend the nation. Under these self-imposed restraints — like renouncement of wars of invasion, the exclusively defense-oriented policy, the three non-nuclear principles, and ensuring civilian control of government — Japan advances its efforts to secure itself and to improve the international security environment.

Japan is currently facing various security challenges that include alliance management and regional and global security issues. These challenges affect Japan’s defense policy, force structure and defense procurement. We can find them in the Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation in 2006, in the concept of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities (takino danryokuteki boeiryoku), which was newly introduced in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG: boei keikaku no

1 The argument in this paper reflects the author’s own view. The author wishes to thank for Dr. Katahara Eiichi, Dr. Sandra Tarte, Dr. Lam Peng Er, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Kagatani Tadashi and Col. Hayashi Takeshi for their comments in preparing this article.

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Security Challenges Facing Japan

Alliance Management

The alliance between Japan and the U.S. is a very important element of Japan’s defense policy. In 2010, the two countries celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the present Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which has provided the alliance with its foundation. However, for the past 13 years, the relocation of the Futenma Air Station (Ginowan, Okinawa) has loomed as a persisting source of conflict. This conflict is widely acknowledged in Japan to be a critical determining element of Japan–U.S. relations.

In April 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale agreed on the return of the U.S. Marines’ Futenma base. This came shortly after the Okinawan rape incident in September 1995. However, alternative facility construction encountered numerous obstacles over the subsequent decade. In May 2006, as a result of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) based on the Global Posture Review (GPR) under the George W. Bush administration, Tokyo and Washington agreed on the Roadmap for Realignment Implementation and decided on Henoko in Nago (Okinawa) as the relocation destination for the alternative

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3 The Futenma base mainly equipped necessary functions for the U.S. Marine to keep full-readiness against emergency surrounding Japan. The beginning of the Futenma base relocation issue was the Okinawan rape incident in September 1995. Japan and the U.S. seriously examined to reduce the burden of Okinawa, but after 1996 Japan–U.S. agreement, 10 years of trial and error over relocation destination started. In the end of 1997, Higa Tetsuya, Mayor of Nago in Okinawa, resigned for his announcement to receive alternative facility in his city. In February 1999, Obuchi Keizo administration decided to construct civil-military airport in Nago, setting expiration date. The 7th Committee for Alternative Facility which has held in September 2002 decided to relocate Futenma base to off the coast of Henoko in Nago. But opponents obstructed environment assessment there and Futenma base relocation issue had deadlocked.
facility. However, the DPJ government, which assumed power in September 2009, proposed a review of the Roadmap, which was formulated under the LDP government. Washington refused to renegotiate the terms of the agreement, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates — who visited Japan in October 2009 — urged Tokyo to implement the Roadmap before U.S. President Barack Obama’s scheduled visit the following November. In the Japan–U.S. summit during Obama’s visit, then Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama agreed “to reach a resolution as soon as possible” on the Futenma base relocation issue through a high-level working group. But, in December, the DPJ government decided to postpone determining a relocation destination until May 2010. On January 2010, Inamine Susumu, who opposes the Roadmap, won the mayoral election in Nago, rendering the future of relocation process even more uncertain.

**Regional Security Issues**

On top of the disputes over the Futenma base relocation issue, the situation in the region surrounding Japan is far from peaceful or stable. In October 2002, North Korea’s highly-enriched uranium (HEU) plan was revealed when then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited Pyongyang. North Korea launched ballistic missiles in June 2006 and conducted its first nuclear test in October of the same year. In 2009, Pyongyang escalated the crisis by again launching ballistic missiles, declaring a boycott of the Six-Party Talks in April, and conducting a second nuclear test in May. Japan is actively seeking to resolve this problem by engaging in dialogue and applying diplomatic pressure — thus far it has negotiated through the Six-Party Talks and imposed economic sanctions. At the present time there are no effective alternatives to the Six-Party Talks. The only way would be to negotiate with North Korea from a position of strength, using economic sanctions and the potential for economic cooperation after relations are normalized between Japan and North Korea as bargaining weapons.

The other security challenge which Japan faces in the East Asian region is China’s rapid rise as a military power. In Asian history, the 21st century would be the first era in which two great powers, Japan and China, would emerge simultaneously. Some predict that China will be the second largest economic power, overtaking Japan in 2010, having recorded a growth rate of over 10% for 21 consecutive years since 1989, backed by its growing national power. On the other hand, China does not do
enough to disclose the purpose of its military’s modernization. Some military experts specializing on China also note the nation’s transformation from a brown-water navy (active in home waters) to a blue-water navy (active on the high seas). Such movements by the Chinese military could potentially have a negative impact on the existing regional order. In addition, the cross-strait conflict between the PRC and Taiwan could have an impact on Japanese security.

**Global Security Issues**

The security challenges that Japan faces are not restricted to regional security issues like the North Korean problem or the Chinese military build-up. Global security issues, like terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), could directly threaten Japan. Moreover, continuous regional conflicts—including piracy in areas of strategic importance for Japan and the routes that connect such areas to Japan (much energy and material resources, and foods that Japan imports pass through the Gulf of Aden, the Straits of Malacca and the East China Sea)—pose serious security concerns. Japan is also expected to play a responsible role in the international community to improve its security environment as a great power.

**Japan’s Defense Policy, Force Structure and Defense Procurement**

*The Roadmap for Realignment Implementation*

Failure to manage the Futenma issue could directly affect the deployment and force structure of the SDF. The Futenma issue is only one aspect of the Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. The Roadmap also includes the U.S. Marines’ relocation to Guam. Moreover it could lead to additional issues that are related to the SDF’s deployment in Japan. According to the Japan–U.S. agreement in 2006, the Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters, which centrally controls mobile operation units and specialized units, will be relocated to Camp Zama (Kanagawa) so that it may strengthen coordination with the transformed U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) headquarters. The SDF Air Defense Command (Tokyo) and its relevant units will also relocate to the Yokota Air Base (Tokyo) where the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force is located. This will further enhance coordination between the headquarters.

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of the SDF and U.S. forces. In other words, alliance management, which includes resolution of the Futenma issue, is very important for the swift deployment of the SDF.

**The NDPG 2004 and Multifunctional, Flexible and Effective Defense Capabilities**

During the Cold War, Japan’s major security contribution to the Western Bloc was made through the provision of military bases to the United States. In such a context, the first NDPO 1976 (NDPG was called the National Defense Program Outline before 2004) indicated “basic defense capability” (*kibanteki boeiryoku*) as Japan’s defense posture. Basic defense capability was a concept designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly counter military threats.⁵ Although the concept of basic defense forces played an important role in restoring the political cracks that emerged regarding Japan’s defense posture, this position embraced conflicting viewpoints regarding the threat level and the autonomy of Japan’s defense capability and led to diverse interpretations of the concept. As a result, there was considerable confusion regarding the basic defense concept.⁶

After the concept of basic defense capability was followed by the second NDPO 1995, the third NDPG 2004 introduced a new defense concept characterized by multi-purpose functionality, flexibility and effective defensive capabilities. Japan’s future defense capability needs to be highly responsive, flexible and multifunctional, and to be supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities in line with trends in military technology standards. Such developments will ensure that Japan can respond appropriately to various contingencies through flexible deployment of the SDF units and utilization of multifunctional defense equipment.⁷ The reason for the introduction of the concept of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities was attributed to changes in the structure of international politics.

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⁷ See *Defense of Japan 2009*, pp. 139–140.
fixed structure of international relations in the Cold War era collapsed, and Japan was faced with new security challenges, such as the North Korea issue, China’s rapid military growth and global security issues. Therefore, Japan sought some responses to new conditions and situations — such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, and aggression on Japan’s offshore islands, and improvement of the international security environment. Although the concept of the basic defense capability was retained for the NDPG 2004, some explained that the defense posture would shift, according to Japan’s security challenges, from being focused on deterrent ability to an emphasis on Japan’s overall response capability. Figure 1 indicates the relationship between the two defense concepts.

Although Japan’s defense expenditures are subject to strictly imposed financial restrictions and limited within the parameters of the NDPG 2004, Japan employs a missile defense (MD) system. The Maritime SDF has equipped its Kongo and Chokai Aegis destroyers with SM-3s, and the ASDF has deployed Patriot PAC-3 to four fire units of the 1st Air Defense Missile Group and one fire unit of the 4th Air Defense Missile Group. The Central Readiness Force will be newly organized for the unified control of mobile operation units and various other specialized units; it will serve as a unit that will be provided to specific areas in the case of contingencies in order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies, should they occur.8

*International Peace Cooperation*

Since September 1992, Japan has taken part in U.N. peace keeping operations (PKO) in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Sudan, and Nepal (in January 2010, the Japanese government decided to dispatch the SDF to the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti, which suffered earthquake disaster). Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, Japan dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for the U.S. and other allied forces engaged in anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan after December 2001 (Japan’s activities in the region ceased in January 2010). From December 2003 to February 2009, the SDF engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in postwar Iraq. In addition, after March 2009 Japan became engaged in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of

8 The introduction of DDH *Huga* constructed under the NDPO 1995 is not departure from the Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.
Japan's Security Outlook: Its Implications for the Defense Policy

**Figure 1**

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<td>● International tensions alleviated though the Cold War continued</td>
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<td>● Established balance among the U.S., China, and Russia in areas around Japan</td>
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<td>● The need to notify citizens of the defense capability goal</td>
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**Basic Defense Force Concept**

Adhere fundamentally to

  - Aiming to retain a steady position in deployment and structure including the logistics support structure while also preparing various functions necessary for defense
  - While being sufficiently alert in ordinary times, being able to effectively react to small and limited invasions
  - Sufficient foresight to be able to smoothly switch to new postures in cases where there is a critical change in international affairs

**1995 National Defense Program Outlines (NDPO) (Nov. 28, 1995, Security Council meeting –Approved by the Cabinet)**

- The end of the Cold War
- International affairs with unclear and uncertain elements
- Public expectations regarding international contributions

**Basic Defense Force Concept**

- Our country’s defense
- Response to diverse situations such as large-scale disasters
- Contribution to building a more stable security environment


- New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missiles
- Direct correlation between world peace and Japan’s peace
- The need for a shift from emphasizing the deterrence effect to response capabilities

**Basic Defense Force Concept**

Succeed effective parts

  - Instead of directly responding to military threats against Japan, retaining the necessary minimum defense force as an independent country as to not create a power vacuum and cause instability in neighboring areas
  - Aiming at being equipped with the necessary functions for defense and retaining a balanced posture in deployment and structure including the logistics structure

**Multifunctional, Flexible, and Effective Defense Capabilities** (Effective Response-Oriented concept)

- Equipped with high responsiveness, flexibility, and multipurpose functionality, and supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities in line with trends in military technology standards
- More productive with limited resources through efficiency and rationalization of personnel, equipment, and operations

**SOURCE:** Defense of Japan 2009, p. 139, Figure II-2-1-2.
Aden. The SDF was also dispatched to Honduras, Indonesia’s Sumatra Islands, and other areas as part of international disaster relief operations. Moreover Japan plays a role in the field of human security and peace building through official development assistance (ODA), intelligence contributions, and human resource development. Recently, the government of Japan declared its commitment to help improve the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are hot beds of international terrorism. To enhance Afghanistan’s public security capability and accomplish disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), Japan has already begun providing five billion dollars that it pledged in financial assistance. Japan also decided to provide one billion dollars to help Pakistan’s economic growth.

The concept of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities emphasizes these activities. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be newly organized to conduct the necessary education, training and research, with the aim of swiftly dispatching personnel for international peace cooperation activities.

**Prospects for Japan’s Defense Policy and Regional Cooperation in Asia-Pacific**

*Japan’s Security Outlook and the Japan–U.S. Alliance*

It is important for Japan to ensure a U.S. presence in Asia in order to cope with various security challenges. American presence in the region is critical to the fostering of a peaceful resolution to the North Korean problem, as well as to promote China’s status quo orientation. The U.S. should understand that a withdrawal from Asia would cause a change in the regional order, damaging existing U.S. security and economic interests in Asia.9 When the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was held in February 2005, the Government of Japan and the U.S. agreed on “common strategic objectives,” highlighting the following points as mutual priorities: achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks; recognizing the importance of China’s contributions to regional and global security; and further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder by...

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9 For example, in 1992, the U.S. military withdrew from the Subic and Clark base in Philippines. After that, Chinese military entered Spratly Island where China and Philippines disputed the territorial.
improving transparency in its military affairs, and maintaining consistency between its stated policies and actions.\textsuperscript{10} Japan and the U.S. also made an agreement on “the Japan–U.S. Alliance in the New Century” in June 2006, declaring the intent to construct a global partnership, meaning that the Japan–U.S. alliance would be beneficial to advance efforts for Japan’s international peace cooperation.\textsuperscript{11}

Both the U.S. and Japan should be cautious not to inflate the “crisis” between the two countries over the Futenma issue. In the first place, the Koizumi–Bush era must not be regarded as the sole factor for understanding the current condition of the alliance. Under the Koizumi Junichiro and George W. Bush administrations (2001–2006), Japan and the U.S. enjoyed a “honeymoon”, resulting from Japan’s support for the U.S. after the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 and the U.S. support for Japan regarding the North Korean problem, including the abduction issue. Some describe the era as an “inverted V-shaped alliance,” that is, the two top leaders maintained a close relationship. But the honeymoon, or inverted V-shaped alliance, was an exceptional phenomenon in the history of the Japan–U.S. alliance. Before the Koizumi-Bush era, uncertainty over the alliance relating to the Gulf War and the North Korean crisis in the 1990s was widely publicized, as was the fact that the two countries suffered hard-fought economic conflicts in 1980s. The alliance has nevertheless been maintained for a half century following the revision of the Security Treaty.

Considering the strategic importance of the Japan–U.S. alliance, it is unimaginable that the alliance would deteriorate based only on the Futenma issue. In February 1994, the Japan–U.S. summit between non-LDP Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro and U.S. then President Bill Clinton collapsed. At the time, the Japan–U.S. alliance had just lost a common target — the Soviet Union — which forced the two nations to

\textsuperscript{10} See MOFA, “Joint Statement U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html (January 26, 2010). The NDPG 2004 stated “military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions. The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” See the NDPG 2004.

question their raison d’etre, and the U.S. and Japan assaulted each other over economic conflicts. But today’s alliance plays an important role in stabilizing the East Asian security environment, which was affected by the North Korean issue and China’s growing military presence. In fact the Hatoyama–Obama summit in November 2009 emphasized cooperation in wide fields, including clean energy technologies, climate change, and nuclear disarmament.

If the Japan–U.S. alliance faces a crisis, it will be due to more structural problems than the Futenma issue. Kent Calder, a professor at John Hopkins University, suggested a “silent crisis,” which means a weakening of the economic base (low standard of foreign investment within Japan) and human networks (decreasing number of travelers and foreign students, generation change) between Japan and the U.S. 12 It may be important not only to resolve visible issues like Futenma but also to find “silent crises” behind them for the maintenance and strength of the alliance from a long-term viewpoint.

In January 2010, Japanese Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton agreed to begin talks “to deepen” the alliance, and these talks are scheduled to be concluded in November 2010 when President Obama visits Japan again to participate in the Yokohama APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). Tokyo–Washington talks to deepen the alliance should deal not only with military affairs, but also with political, economic and cultural relations, including the enhancement of economic cooperation and the strengthening of human networks between the two nations.

Formulation of the NDPG 2010
After the NDPG 2004, the next planned revision was supposed to occur in 2009. The incoming DPJ government, however, decided to postpone the formulation of the new NDPG until 2010. Although the DPJ is not clearly defining its security policy at the present time, its policy is unlikely to undergo great change in the new NDPG as long as international politics do not change dramatically. But it is possible to suggest this for the new NDPG.

As mentioned before, the NDPG 2004 introduced the concept of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities. At the same time, the NDPG 2004 says that it “succeeds in an effective part” of the concept of basic defense capability. What is an effective part of the concept of basic defense capability? How does the new NDPG succeed in the concept of basic defense capability? Also, the introduction of the concept of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities is interpreted as shifting emphasis from the ability to deter to response capabilities—is this an apt interpretation? These discussion points should be addressed in the next NDPG.

The Katsumata Report, published in August 2009 by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (anzen hosho to boeiryoku ni kansuru kondankai), which was established under the LDP government to examine the new NDPG, made an important point: “[T]he importance of situations in the gray area between peacetime and wartime is growing [and] seriously necessitates putting priority on deterrence by operations through activities under normal circumstances, in addition to deterrence by existence of the defense force-static deterrence.” It seems that enhancing response capability should mean strengthening deterrence (except, of course, in the case of PKO and response to large-scale disasters). Responses to ballistic missile attacks, to attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, and to aggression on Japan’s offshore islands, should be dealt with by emphasizing Japan’s deterrence capability using the concepts of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities. For example, former U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Ryan Henry proposed the concept of tailored deterrence (this concept appears in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] 2010). The basic function of defense capability should be deterrence, and changes in the types of deterrence should be determined by changes in the natures of the threats that are faced. The form of deterrence would be tailored by the types of threats and means against them, rather than shifting emphasis from deterrent ability to response capability as the NDPG 2004 mentioned.

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A senior research fellow at the PHP Research Institute, Kaneko Masafumi, clearly articulated the U.S. QDR 2006 on this point.\(^{16}\) Setting the two axes of possibility and vulnerability, the QDR 2006 indicated four types: “catastrophic challenges” (both possibility and vulnerability are high), “disruptive challenges” (possibility is low, vulnerability is high), “irregular challenges” (possibility is high, vulnerability is low), and “traditional challenges” (both possibility and vulnerability are low).\(^{17}\) On that basis, it describes today’s U.S. military capability portfolio, and the directions that shift the weight. Although it is not necessary for Japan’s NDPG to be the same type of policy document as the U.S. QDR, the logic of the QDR is helpful in examining Japan’s defense posture. The Katsumata Report pointed out the importance of “clearly defining priorities in terms of threats and challenges to Japan’s security.”\(^{18}\)

**Possibility of the East Asian Community**

The DPJ government takes a positive posture toward the East Asian Community. But such a posture toward regional cooperation in East Asia is not peculiar to the DPJ. The Katsumata Report previously emphasized “regional cooperation,” despite its having been under the LDP government.\(^{19}\) Despite this, the relation between regional and global security issues that Japan faces and the East Asian Community is not clear.

There are many opinions in Japan about whether East Asian regional cooperation should be enhanced to the level of a community or not. Here are some representative opinions maintained within Japanese academic and journalistic circles. In December 2009, *Kokusai Seiji*, which is an academic journal published by the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR), featured an issue titled, “The Path to a New Order in East Asia.” In that issue, a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Yuzawa Takeshi, pointed out that East Asian multilateral institutions such as APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), and East Asia Summit (EAS) contributed to the maintenance and formulation of the current regional order through the following four roles: improving the predictability of the U.S. presence in the region, coordinating rules governing state cooperation, promoting

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\(^{19}\) *Ibid*, p. 19. The NDPG 2004 only referred to “Japan’s own efforts” “cooperation with its ally” and “cooperation with the global community” and did not refer to regional cooperation as main approach.
the rise of China as a force for maintaining the status quo, and easing tensions between major powers.\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, recognizing the roles of multilateral institutions in East Asia, Yuzawa emphasized that they cannot successfully foster a shared regional identity. Construction of a community accompanied by a regional identity would face various difficulties. In the monthly journal \textit{Gaiko Foramu}, Kato Yoichi, who is a journalist at the \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, criticized the idea of an East Asian Community. He insisted that Japan faced global security issues that could not simply be resolved by utilizing regional means.\textsuperscript{21} Conflicts between the global view and the regional view over the East Asian Community may be unavoidable. Kitaoka Shinichi, professor at the University of Tokyo, indicated in the traditional monthly journal \textit{Chuo Koron} that regional order without principle would be an instrument for dominance by great powers.\textsuperscript{22} It seems that the concept of an East Asian Community and the military rise of China could not be separated.

Considering these opinions, a feasible concept for the East Asian Community is not to establish a European Union-like regionally integrated organization, but rather multilateral joint cooperation against regional issues such as piracy or disasters (This does not preclude the possibility that it could still be called a community). The idea for fraternity (yuai), which Prime Minister Hatoyama used in his foreign and security policy including East Asian Community, is a legacy of his grandfather Hatoyama Ichiro, who came into office in 1954. Former Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro learned this word from the book written by Coudenhove-Kalergi who has been called the father of European integration. But there may be many historical gaps between European integration and East Asian regional cooperation. In addition, taking into consideration balance of power and regional effectiveness, it would be unthinkable to construct such a community without the United States. In fact, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated a positive posture toward East Asian multilateral talks in her policy address in January 2010.

\textsuperscript{20} See Yuzawa Takeshi, “Higashi Ajia no Takokukan Seido to Chiiki Chitsujuyo no Tenbo: Genjyo Iji Sochi toshiteno Chiiki Seido no Yakuwari” [Multilateral institutions and the prospects for regional order in East Asia: The role of regional institutions as mechanisms for maintaining the status quo] \textit{Kokusai Seiji} 158 (December 2009), pp. 10–24.

\textsuperscript{21} See Kato Yoichi, Kokubun Ryosei, and Watanabe Tsuneo, “Hatoyama Seiken ha Dokoni Mukau noka” [Where the Hatoyama administration go?] \textit{Gaiko Foramu (Diplomacy forum)} 259 (February 2010), p. 57

\textsuperscript{22} See Kitaoka Shinichi, “Ketudan ka samonakuba Nihon no Kiki” [Decision, or Japan’s crisis] \textit{Chuo Koron} 1509 (January 2010), p. 88.
Conclusion

Japan is facing security issues including alliance management with the U.S. brought about by the Futenma issue, regional security issues including the North Korean problem and the Chinese military build-up, and global security issues like terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts and piracy.

These security challenges affect Japan’s defense policy, force structure and defense procurement. Failure to manage the alliance would directly affect the SDF’s deployment plan based on the Roadmap. Regional and global security challenges prompted Japan to introduce the new defense concepts of multifunctional, flexible and effective defense capabilities. Furthermore, Japan has engaged in defense procurement including MD systems, international peace cooperation including PKO, support for anti-terrorism operations, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, anti-piracy activities, international disaster relief operations, and peace building.

As a security outlook for Japan, it is important to endure the U.S. presence in Asia and promote China’s status quo orientation. In the anticipated NDPG 2010, the relationship between deterrent effect and response capability should be more clearly articulated. At last, a feasible concept for an East Asian Community would not be EU type regional integration, but rather a multilateral joint cooperation to address regional issues.